
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS



BUDDHISM

INTO THE YEAR

2000

DHAMMAKAYA FOUNDATION

BUDDHISM INTO THE YEAR 2000

International Conference Proceedings

Dhammakaya Foundation
Bangkok · Los Angeles

Contents

WORLD BUDDHISM IN THE PRESENT DAY

THE FUTURE OF BUDDHISM

OPEN HOUSE PRESENTATIONS

Preface

When H. E. Somdej Phra Buddhajinavamsa, Emissary of H.H. the Supreme Patriarch entered Sukhothai Thammathirat university auditorium at the opening ceremony of the Dhammakāya Foundation's first international Buddhist conference "Buddhism into the Year 2000", he was received by over eight-hundred monks and lay-delegates from twenty-six countries and countless Buddhist traditions from around the world. Bringing this breadth of experience to the doorstep of Thailand's fifty-million practising Buddhists inspired eager expectation as to the conference's predictions for the future of Buddhism.

Such analysis of Buddhist history has often been punctuated of late, by the attempts of devoted intellectuals to seek a coherent thread of unity amidst the profusion of practices adopted *in reality* by Buddhists of various schools around the world. In an attempt to find, for example, 'how' the austere hardship of the Theravāda monk can be reconciled against the liberality of modern Western Buddhism or 'why' the scope of Buddhist movements in the Far East has come to defy the broadest definitions of both Colonel Olcott and Christmas Humphreys. What Buddhists *ought* to believe has done nothing to limit the heterodoxy with which Buddhists throughout the world *actually* continue to identify. Buddhism of the present day is a colossal body of culture and practice defying any superficial attempt to generalize, and the magnitude of the task to reach a synthesis becomes apparent and tangible only when representatives of the full variety of schools share dialogue. It is therefore the pride of the current editorial board to have had the chance to compile such a diversity of experience into a single volume — both as a milestone of Buddhist understanding and a beacon to shed light on our own Thai Buddhist tradition.

The conference 'Buddhism into the Year 2000' and these ensuing *Proceedings* were pursued with the following four objectives: firstly, to enhance understanding and *bon-accord* between Buddhists of different viewpoints and traditions through emphasis of the shared respect for the Lord Buddha; secondly, while maintaining moral and humanitarian values, to promote joint activity between religious and academic institutions for the enrichment of life and development of the human

resource in response to the needs of society and nation; thirdly, to promote the establishment of an international Buddhist network to facilitate Buddhist outreach; and fourthly to make available a corpus of current information on Buddhism for reference by scholars and researchers. In brief, the benefits actually derived from the conference were as follows: firstly, to provide a forum where there was a significant exchange of Buddhist knowledge between scholars and participants; secondly, to summarize opinions and recommendations on Buddhism for the Year 2000 (*see 'Practical Leaders' and 'Declaration' below*), and; finally, to promote collaboration between the Buddhist Saṅgha and academic institutes in the task of spreading Dhamma.

The history of Buddhism and its development that has emerged from the papers collected in this volume has been that of cultural interaction throughout the ages. Earliest Buddhism did not develop in a vacuum but even from the beginning survived and spread largely through the intercultural harmony the Lord Buddha Himself sought through debate. This tradition was perpetuated less harmoniously after His passing, leading to various separate traditions of philosophy. From the undercurrents of doctrine experienced in India, Buddhism moved downstream to new lands turbulent with the complexity of cultural assimilation. No longer a question of debate, mutual influence between Buddhism and new cultures came through the channels of scriptural analysis, materialism, education and migrant populations.

Examining the history of Buddhism from its inauguration up to the present time, there are recurring themes of Buddhist identity: the balance between orthodoxy and heterodoxy; syncretism; moderation in community self-discipline; transmission of sanctity, and; the supramundane. 'The old' has constantly had to cope with 'the new' — circumstances have dictated whether the result of change is reform, revival or schism. These themes, together with cultural channels of interaction, have formed a basis for producing scenarios for the adaptation of Buddhism to the world of the year 2000. Indeed, the approach of several papers in this volume is to predict that Buddhist history will repeat itself in the years ahead.

Besides conclusions drawn from the presentation of academic papers, a synthesis of dialogue came from 'open-house' presentations and 'round-table' discussions. Open-house presentations made informally during the conference are also recorded here in the cases where papers were submitted. The informal round-table discussions, summarized Buddhist practices and values considered to be the most important. Practicable projects emerging from these discussions were subsequently presented to H.H. the Supreme Patriarch of Thailand as practical leaders and a declaration as follows:

PRACTICAL LEADERS FOR BUDDHISTS

1. General: Buddhist Practice: The Buddhist religion should be more ready and willing to open itself and its practices to examination by other interested parties. Thus, such down-to-earth values such as simple living, together with the happiness of true-practising Buddhists, will most genuinely lead people to see

the need for the practice of Buddhism, offering a positive alternative to materialism;

2. ***Environment***: In view of the disastrous proportions of today's environmental problems, conferences and workshops should be organized to develop the Buddhist maxim of 'Harmony with Nature for the highest global benefit. Buddhist monks may have an important educational role in this respect;

3. ***Education***: A university should be built to teach a full range of subjects according to Buddhist methodology and ethics. A system should also be explored, to establishing internationally compatible standards of Buddhist study to allow the quality of Buddhist education to be raised worldwide;

4. ***Scholasticism***: Philology should be used both to broaden the base of Buddhist understanding within its historical context and to increase the reliability of texts. Buddhists also have much to learn from the comparative religious study of Jainism and should study this area more thoroughly;

5. ***Buddhist Specialists***: There should be more frequent meetings and conferences to determine areas of specialism where Buddhists with special expertise can enter dialogue to solve the problems of the world. Besides forging cohesion between the Buddhist experts who already exist, there should be programmes to train Buddhists, especially monks, in spiritual and social development;

6. ***Counselling and Arbitration***: Buddhists should make a more positive contribution to the community. Buddhists have special capability as conciliators in the building of bridges between all faiths and cultures. The application of the Buddhist principles such as self-sacrifice and non-violence for the reduction of social problems, holds a positive future through such practicable outlets as prison-visiting and counselling services. The comprehensive Buddhist literature relating to medical ethics should be drawn upon more thoroughly in the cases of abortion, contraception, organ-transplant and euthanasia. Buddhists are in a good position to set up a counselling service for ethical problems in this area.

DECLARATION: 'BUDDHISM INTO THE YEAR 2000'

We, the participants of the International Conference: 'Buddhism into the Year 2000', convened by the Dhammakāya Foundation in Bangkok, Thailand from 7 - 9 February B.E. 2533 (1990):

* Inspired by the depth, the quality and diversity of the Buddhist studies in which the scholars from all regions of the world continue to be engaged;

* Encouraged by the reports of progress which Buddhism has made in the modern world in reaching out to an ever-growing circle of seekers for the peace, tolerance and moderation which the benign message of the Buddha highlights, and;

* Deeply conscious of the responsibilities cast on Buddhists in promoting mutual understanding among people and fostering inter-religious co-operation and collective support for the development of ethical values and spirituality in

humanity as a whole, we...
* must re-dedicate ourselves to the service of Buddhism in our own diverse ways whether as objective scholars, devotional promoters of the Buddhist way of life or adherents to the Noble Buddha Dhamma;
* must become conscious of our responsibility to play an active role in the solution of the many economic, social and cultural problems of the modern world, which deprive a large section of mankind of human dignity and even threatens their survival;
* must strictly adhere to the Buddha's Noble Precept and example, treat life in all its forms, with due regard and respect, concentrating our efforts on the conservation of the environment and Nature's flora and fauna;
* must participate and take a lead in drawing together all those who have a common interest in upholding the ethical principles of non-violence, tolerance and compassion and developing the idea of spirituality for the expressed purpose of fostering world peace and international understanding;
* must demonstrate through our lifestyle, the relevance and efficacy of the Middle Path which avoids extremes and upholds simplicity, generosity and service to humanity;

...and, in preparation for the twenty-first century that dawns in a decade, do further declare our intention...
* to redouble our efforts in the education of both youth and adults through not merely encouraging the acquisition of knowledge in every form, but more importantly, inculcating in them such intrinsic values as loving kindness and compassion;
* to promote the practice of *sīla* (moral conduct) as the foundation for mental development through meditation, leading to the realization of the ultimate wisdom through the perfect understanding of existence;
* to take the message of the Buddha's sublime Teachings to all corners of the world so that it could contribute to the happiness and benefit of the many, and for this purpose foster co-operation and friendly co-existence among all schools and sects of Buddhism, recognizing their intrinsic unity in spite of the visible divergences in practice.

In compiling this volume the editorial board has had to play a neutral role in adjusting papers submitted. In most cases, papers are published here in the exact form instructed by the authors. Where adjustments have been made, they have been made only with the consent of the authors. Some views expressed in this volume may not necessarily be those of the editorial board or of the Dhammakāya Foundation: a compromise that has had to be made so that these *Proceedings* may remain a *complete* record of the conference. Indeed, such an editing policy is in keeping with the open-minded spirit of the 1990 conference.

A glossary of unfamiliar Buddhist terminology, written by Professor Visudh Busyakul has been included in these *Proceedings* for the convenience of non-aca-

demics who might study this volume, in the hope that it will be not only scholars who will derive benefit from these pages. An appendix of biographical information about the authors of the papers is included at the end of the book to help readers to realize the rare depth of experience and knowledge exemplified by the contributors.

Finally, the editors of this volume would like to convey special thanks to Phrasudharmayanathera (Ven. Dhammajayo Bhikkhu), President of the Conference Executive Committee; Phrabhavanaviriyakuhn (Ven. Dattajīvo Bhikkhu), Vice-president of the Conference Executive Committee; Ven Mettānando Bhikkhu, Executive Secretary of the Conference; Her Highness Princess Vimalachatra, President of the Organizing Committee; Khunying Uraiwan Hongsaprabhas, Vice-president of the Organizing Committee and Chairman of the Finance Committee; Manit Rattanasuwan, Vice-president of the Organizing Committee and Chairman of the Publicity Committee; M.L. Pariyada Chaicharoen, Chairman of the Hospitality Service Committee; Prof. Dr. Phumara Talalak, Chairman of the Programme Committee; Assoc. Prof. Sauvaluck Piampiti, Chairman of the Secretariat, and; Dr. Siwalai Thanapatra, Co-chairman of the Finance Committee, together with many others whose names are too countless to mention, for the encouragement and advice they have given throughout the four years this volume has taken to complete. Special thanks also to Prof. Visudh Busyakul for the meticulous attention he has given to the glossary — and thanks for the voluntary help of many members of the Dhammakāya Foundation Education Department for the success of this volume; it is fair to say that lacking any one of their contributions, this book would not have reached the press.

It is the earnest hope of all on the editorial board that the fruits of the merits accrued through the completion of this volume will inspire wisdom and understanding to prevail between all Buddhists, non-Buddhists and scholars throughout the world — leading to harmony, co-operation and solidarity in the Buddhist rank and file, marching, ever onward, towards the goal of enlightenment and peace taught by our father, the Lord Buddha.

Editorial Board

Wat Phra Dhammakāya,
Patumthani, Thailand
31 December 1994

Foreword

H.E. Dr. Ananda W.P. Guruge

By inviting me to write the foreword for this first edition of the *Proceedings of the First International Conference, 'Buddhism into the Year 2000'*, the Dhammakāya Foundation have not only conferred on me personally an enviable privilege and honour but also signified the close and lasting bonds of friendship between Thailand and Sri Lanka, founded on our joint commitment to the preservation and development of Buddhism. It is with satisfaction that I recall the role which the learned Buddhist elders [*therā*] of Sri Lanka played over the last millennium in the establishment and the promoting of Theravāda Buddhism in Thailand. At the same time, it is with a deep sense of gratitude that I acknowledge the indebtedness of Sri Lanka to Thailand for its contribution to the revival of Higher Ordination in 1750, when due to foreign invasion the Saṅgha had virtually disappeared. May I also express on behalf of the international Buddhist community our grateful appreciation to Thailand for having provided a home for the World Fellowship of Buddhists, which was founded in Sri Lanka in 1950 on the initiative of Professor Gunapala Malalasekera.

When I informed His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka, Mr. Ranasinghe Premadasa, of my participation in the conference, he made three specific requests. The first was to apprise the audience of his personal admiration for the laudable services rendered by Their Gracious Majesties the King and the Queen of Thailand and Their Royal Highnesses as well as by the Government for the promotion of Buddhism both in Thailand and abroad. He also asked me to convey to you his most cordial greetings and best wishes for the success of the Conference, of which this book is the fruit. Lastly, he underscored the noble example set by Aśoka the Righteous, the great Indian Buddhist emperor of third century B.C., and wished that I should highlight its relevance to the tasks before the international Buddhist community.

Today at the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century, we focus our attention on the new century that will soon dawn, with promise and anxiety, hopes and fears, aspirations and apprehensions. Humanity will look back on the last two

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centuries in particular, with an unprecedented sense of pride, achievement and fulfillment but, nevertheless, with also a disquieting of disappointment, if not, dejection.

While gloating over the spectacular successes in science and technology, conquest of nature, inroads into space, mastery over disease, advances in communication and the like, we wonder whether all these achievements are of equal benefit to humankind as a whole or whether these have been accomplished with justifiable means. At what price have we achieved an incredible prosperity for a relatively small fraction of humanity? In the process, how much irreparable damage have we done to planet Earth through our greed and ignorance by polluting the environment with industrial waste and over-exploiting irreplaceable natural resources? With continuing destruction of the ozone layer and the resulting global warming, to what extent have we endangered life on earth? How many thousands of species, both flora and fauna, have become extinct as the result of our wilful encroachment or unpardonable neglect? I have no doubt that there arises a tinge of guilt in the mind of every reasonable human being as he asks himself these ineluctable questions.

The spectre of hunger, malnutrition, disease and preventable death stalks over vast continents, as deserts advance at a galloping pace over once smiling green fields and millions are driven away from their homelands in search of the barest means of survival. Two-thirds of the world's population lives in abject poverty of a minimum of food, clothing and shelter even to ensure them a modicum of human dignity. A billion adults, mostly women, remain illiterate and have no access to essential knowledge for better and more dignified living.

Alongside poor, debt-burdened developing countries, which ask for nothing more from the world than a fair and reasonable price for the products of their labour, are those rich nations which still think that a pittance of foreign aid (more often than not with strings attached), is all they owe their less fortunate fellow-humans. But the tragedy is that the same kind of exploition of the poor and the weak which we unhesitatingly condemn in world forums, exist in diverse forms within every nation.

With mind-boggling advances in knowledge, we had hoped that science and technology would solve problems of food, health, housing, communication and environment. Instead what we see is that close upon half-a-million of the best scientists in the world devote their supremely invaluable talents to the perfection of increasingly deadly weapons of destruction. Yet we are mesmerized by them to such an extent that even forums dedicated to world peace do not see the incongruity of expressing gratitude for what are called 'non-military spin-offs' of military research. Not only are the fears of a deliberate or accidental nuclear holocaust real, but the fact is undeniable that the arms-race deprives nations of their scarce resources for development and the indiscriminate arms-sale has brought violence and insecurity to everyone's doorstep.

With developments in human and social sciences, we also hoped that we would discover ways and means of improving interpersonal relations and pave the way for societies to eliminate social inequalities and that men, women and children would freely and fruitfully co-operate in a collective effort to enhance their opportunities for

better life. However, these remain receding goals even as we understand more the needs and the motivations of the humankind. The human and social scientist may not throw up his hands in despair at the moment, but will insist that human nature still needs to be understood.

Yet, with our increasing awareness of global social problems, we are appalled by the deterioration of basic human values. How else could human society allow innocent children to be abused and neglected, women to be exploited and humiliated and the most dangerous narcotics and drugs to be pedalled about with no scruples whatsoever.

It is with such a balance sheet that we prepare ourselves for our different roles in the new century. We are elated with the gigantic victories of the humankind in diverse fields; but at the same time, we are perturbed by the accusations of our inner conscience. We cannot deny that we have paid too dearly for our materialistic achievements, whose beneficiaries are only a small minority. This inordinate price has been not only in terms of the damage to the environment but moreso in terms of sacrificing basic human values of equity and social justice, kindness and compassion and moderation and generosity.

If this truly is how we feel, do we not share the same frame of mind which Emperor Aśoka experienced on the day he was victorious in his war against Kāliṅga? Here was a conqueror who, at the height of his military career, asked himself if the price of victory paid in terms of human lives and suffering was justified or permissible. His conscience, undoubtedly, replied with a resounding "No!". Therefore, did he abandon war and violence for ever and expound 'Conquest by Righteousness' as the one and only noble pursuit for both monarch and commoner.

Emperor Aśoka's principles and methods are as relevant to us in our present crisis as they were twenty-three centuries ago. They was founded on the conviction that the human being is basically good and just and all that is necessary is to help one to guide one's life on a simple and practical code of ethics. It is undeniable that Emperor Aśoka found this code of ethics in the noble teachings of the Buddha; but Aśoka did not tell his people that he was teaching them Buddhism. He made no reference to even the most fundamental doctrines of the Buddha such as the 'Four Noble Truths', the 'Noble Eightfold Path' or *Nibbāna*, because it was neither philosophy nor ultimate emancipation that concerned him, but the essence of Buddhism as a gift to his people.

Further, to show that it was virtues that he valued and not individual sects and schools of religion, he not only supported every traditional religion but strongly advocated inter-religious tolerance and amity. His most fervent plea was not to speak disparagingly of other religions but to seek co-operation so that the essentials of righteousness could be jointly developed through each and every one of them.

As I examine the contents of these conference *Proceedings*, I am impressed by the vision of Venerable Mettānando, Her Highness Princess Vimalachatra and the Dhammakāya Foundation. They have identified for discussion a most promising theme. It would enable us to examine in what way Buddhism, with its rich diversity of observances around its noteworthy doctrinal unity, could serve humanity today.

With the Buddha's overarching emphasis on the Four Sublime States [*brahmavihāra*] namely loving-kindness [*mettā*], compassion [*karuṇā*], sympathetic joy [*muditā*] and

equanimity [*upekkhā*], Buddhism cannot help but be conscious of the glaring imbalances which divide humanity today. I would therefore like to encourage readers to concentrate when reading these *Proceedings*, on how Buddhists, in unity, can dedicate themselves to bring about the most urgent of all conquests by righteousness and that is to conquer greed and avarice, hatred and violence, delusion and ignorance, so that all beings shall be happy and contented, and each in his or her own way and pace, shall strive for their ultimate Deliverance from the misery and suffering of endless births and deaths.

Sabbe sattā bhavantu sukhitatattā!

1

Person and Self

L.S. Cousins

The source of this paper lies in a concern to explore the nature of Buddhism in the Mauryan period — a time when Buddhism existed in forms which underly all present existing Buddhist schools. In fact this is one of a series of papers looking at the two major *Vinaya* traditions (Mahāsaṅghika and Sthaviravāda/Theravāda) and the three major schools of thought which developed at this time (Vibhajyavāda/Vibhajjavāda, Sarvāstivāda and Pudgalavāda). The present study is concerned with the last of these, the school of Personalists who held that there was a person (*puggala*) which existed in a real sense (*paramatthato*, *dravyatas*) as something which cannot be said to be either conditioned (*saṅkhata*) or unconditioned. After a brief consideration of the origin of the school, the main issues of debate as portrayed in surviving (critical) Sanskrit sources are identified. Reference is then made to the available information in the two Pudgalavādin texts which survive in Chinese. This material from the first millenium A.D. is then compared with the much earlier criticism found in the Sarvāstivādin *Vijñānakāya* and (earliest of all) the Vibhajjavādin *Kathāvatthu*. The last in particular seems most aware of the actual position of the Pudgalavādins.

The last decade of Buddhist studies in Europe has seen a revision of ideas about the early history of Buddhism. The most notable area of this has perhaps been the important discussions and articles on the date of the Buddha initiated by Heinz Bechert. A consensus seems to be emerging which places the date of the *parinibbāna* of the Buddha towards the end of the fifth century, if not later.[1] Another important area of rethinking is a renewed attempt to gain some idea as to what Buddhism was like in the earliest period.[2] The present paper belongs in some respects with this second line of scholarly exploration.

It is clear that there is at present no agreement among scholars as to the precise methods which are most suitable for this purpose. Various attempts have been made to stratify the materials preserved in the Pali Canon and elsewhere. This leads

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inevitably to the identification of a group of ideas and practices of some relatively less complex kind as 'original' or 'earliest' Buddhism. I am myself convinced that such an endeavour, although often interesting, is somewhat premature. My concern is rather to try to gain a clear conception of the nature of Buddhism at a slightly later date. The advantage of this is that we can then take for granted the existence of the bulk of the canonical sources and work with a relatively large amount of source material. This at least ensures that the Buddhism we reconstruct is reasonably close to something that must once have existed and provides some restraint on the introduction of pet ideas and present day concerns.

The particular value of this approach is that, in seeking to understand the nature of Buddhism in the Mauryan period around the third century B.C., we are exploring the shared roots from which all forms of Buddhism today derive their heritage. It is especially interesting to seek to comprehend the way in which the process of diversification, already underway at this time, has brought about so many different kinds of Buddhism. Until relatively recent times no other religious tradition was anywhere near as successful at adapting itself to such very different cultural contexts.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In fact when we explore this period of Buddhist history we find that surprisingly little is known. Traditionally, there were eighteen schools or 'sects' of Buddhism at this time, but the list varies in different textual sources.[3] Some of these are mentioned in inscriptions (mostly A.D. in date) and some others not included in textual lists are found in the archæological evidence.[4] It seems that eighteen is more a notional figure of symbolic significance than a literal enumeration. In some cases extremely minor, perhaps even quite imaginary, fraternities have probably been included to make the number up to eighteen.

Looking more carefully at Buddhism in this period, it seems that two great traditions of Vinaya practice had come into existence. The tradition known in Sanskrit as the Sthaviravāda (Pali Theravāda) is the ancestor of all existing branches of the Buddhist *saṅgha* today (including those of East Asia and Tibet). The other major form of monastic practice was the Mahāsaṅghika branch, which probably became extinct in the late mediæval period. These two sections of the saṅgha were not originally distinguished by doctrine so much as by details of monastic practice — this can be compared to the difference between the two main sections of the *saṅgha* in Thailand today.[5]

Quite distinct from the traditions of Vinaya practice and probably of somewhat later origin were three major schools of thought: the Sarvāstivāda, the Vibhajyavāda (the Analysts — ancestors of the school which became established in Ceylon) and the Pudgalavāda. These schools were probably not originally separate fraternities or *nikāyas* so much as schools of thought either within the Sthaviravāda branch or within the *saṅgha* as a whole. I hope to look at the first of these schools on another occasion, but what concerns me in this paper is the third school: the Pudgalavādins or Personalists.[6] This school at first sight poses something of a problem if we suppose that

every kind of early Buddhism teaches some kind of doctrine of no-self or even that this is doctrinally distinctive of Buddhist thought. How could there have been a school of Buddhism which rejected so fundamental a part of Buddhist teaching and practice? Yet this school was widely influential[7] and accepted as part of the Buddhist tradition (*sāsane*).

THE ORIGINS OF THE PUDGALAVĀDA

The recent publication of translations of the appendix or ninth chapter to the *Abhidharmakośa* in which Vasubandhu rejects theories of self (*ātman/pudgala*) provides a convenient starting point.[8] The first half of this chapter refutes the teachings concerning the *pudgala* of a school named by Vasubandhu as the Vātsīputrīyas.[9] This school is generally believed to have been founded by an elder named Vātsīputra who lived sixty three years after the time of the Nandas (i.e. in the third century B.C.).[10] In fact there is good reason to doubt the existence of doctrinally based schools in the sense of distinct fraternities (*nikāya*) in the Mauryan and pre-Mauryan periods. Vātsīputra would have put forward (and perhaps systematized) his own version of the Buddha's teachings and won a following. No doubt other leading monks did likewise.

It is possible to doubt whether the name of this school really derives from the name of the monk (see Appendix to this article). However, the relics of *sappurisā* named Vāchīputa and Mogalīputa are referred to in inscriptions from Andher Stūpa II and Sāñchī Stūpa II.[11] Both are said to be the pupils of another famous monk named Gotīputa. If Vātsīputra is indeed the originator of the Pudgalavādin approach, it would certainly be he who is the opponent of Moggalliputta Tissa in the *puggalakathā* of the *Kathāvatthu*. It seems to be Moggalliputta who is referred to in a slightly later Sarvāstivādin work the *Vijñānakāya* of Devaśarman (preserved in Chinese) as the opponent of *sarvam asti*. Hsüan-tsang records a tradition that the originator of the Pudgalavāda was an arhat named Gopa who was the opponent of Devaśarman on this issue. Since both Gotīputa and Gopa are presumably derived from the root GUP, they could very well be versions or corruptions of the same metronymic. It may very well be the case that the name of the teacher has replaced that of the pupil.

Subsequently the followers of Vātsīputra (or his teacher) continued to develop the line of thought introduced by him and (in the Mauryan period) constituted a well-known approach to certain of the teachings of the Buddha. The most controversial of their ideas was their teaching that the person (*pudgala*) exists as a reality in the highest sense in contrast to the usual Buddhist view that the person exists only conventionally as a label. For this reason the Vātsīputrīya school of thought eventually became known as the Pudgalavāda (Personalism). It was only in the post-Mauryan period that there ultimately came to be distinct fraternities espousing Pudgalavādin doctrines.[12]

THE FOUR MAJOR AREAS OF DEBATE

Vasubandhu's refutation of the arguments of the Vātsīputrīyas is convenient as a starting point because it gives us a summary of a number of their views at a relatively well-defined point in time i.e. the fourth or fifth century A.D.. In fact Vasubandhu is almost certainly basing himself on Vaibhāṣika traditions of a somewhat earlier date,

but that is probably not important for present purposes. The position of the Vātsīputrīyas, as Vasubandhu represents it, is that the 'person' is neither substantially real (*dravyatas*) nor real only by way of designation (*prajñaptitas*). It is made known (*prajñapyate*) in reliance upon aggregates which are internal (*adhyātmika*), appropriated (*upātta*) and of the present time. To illustrate this they give the example of the relationship between fire and fuel.[13] This seems to mean that a person is only made known when there are aggregates present. The person cannot be said to be something other than the aggregates as this would lead to eternalism. Nor can it be said not to be something other than the aggregates as this would lead to annihilationalism.

If we set aside issues of debate which turn on exegesis of statements in the *sūtras*, which can be taken as explicitly referring to no-self teachings or to persons, etc., it seems that there were four main areas of debate:

1. A group of problems connected with the 'undeclared questions' — any Buddhist theory of the person must avoid postulating or implying a soul which is either eternal or non-eternal. Nor may that soul be either identical with or different to the body. Similar problems arise here with the status of the Tathāgata after death and with the question as to whether suffering is self-caused, other-caused and the like.[14]
2. The problems involved in explaining *karma* and rebirth.
3. The issue as to the status of the person in relation to the unconditioned and the conditioned. The problem here is that the solution adopted by the *abhidharma* schools of the Vaibhāṣikas and of the Pali tradition — that the person exists only as a name or concept — is open to the criticism that it is effectively annihilationist and identifies the soul with the five aggregates. If so, the Tathāgata certainly cannot exist after death. The same is the case if the person is considered to be a conditioned *dharma*. On the other hand, if the Personalists were to declare the person unconditioned we would obviously have here a soul very much on the lines of the *Upaniṣads* — precisely the kind of *ātman* which is explicitly criticized in the *sūtras*. The solution adopted by the Pudgalavādins is to introduce an additional category — as well as conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) *dharmas* of past, present and future and unconditioned *dharma*s, there is also one *dharma* which cannot be spoken of as either conditioned or unconditioned: i.e. the *pudgala*.
4. Debate necessarily arises in relation to the analytical structures devised by the sūtras to support meditation on no-self — such lists as the aggregates, bases, elements and faculties. For Vasubandhu the relevant list is that of the six classes of consciousness (*vijñānakāya*) and he tries to show that the notion of the *pudgala* is incompatible with the teachings in regard to this. The Pudgalavādins, for their part, appear to interpret the objects of the various consciousnesses differently to the *abhidharma* schools known to us and can therefore claim that the person can be perceived by every class of consciousness. Probably they didn't accept the momentariness of such objects, at least not to the extent found in most forms of *abhidharma*.

The same four broad areas of debate are to be found in the critique of the Pudgalavādins in the *Satyasiddhiśāstra*.[15] We find there also the simile of fire and fuel.

Similar criticisms of Pudgalavādin views are found in Madhyamaka treatises. Indeed the simile of fire and fuel (or wood) may in fact derive from Nāgārjuna, as the relationship between these two is the subject of one chapter of the *Madhyamaka-kārikā*.[16] This comparison does not occur in the earliest accounts of Pudgalavādin views.[17] It is, however, referred to in the commentary to the *Kathāvatthu*[18] and, interestingly, in the *Sammatīyanikāyaśāstra*.[19] It is possible that the manner in which it is used by Nāgārjuna suggested to the later Pudgalavādins its applicability to the relationship between the *pudgala* and the aggregates.

THE PUDGALAVĀDIN SOURCES

The *Traidharmakaśāstra*

This Pudgalavādin text was translated twice into Chinese. The first translation was made in 382 A.D. by Kumārabuddhi, a monk from the reigning family in Turfan, assisted by several Chinese collaborators. A second translation was made in 391 A.D. by Gautama Saṅghadeva, a monk of Kashmirian origin, and Hui-yüan. The original text of this work does not survive and it is uncertain whether it was written in Sanskrit or some form of Middle Indian. The author's name was Vasubhadra or Giribhadra, but nothing is known of him. However, the contents of the work suggest a date in the early centuries A.D., but no doubt it incorporates material from an earlier Pudgalavādin *Abhidharma-piṭaka*. Both translations incorporate a commentary, in one case with the author named as Saṅghasena — it is not quite clear whether the commentaries to the two translations are from the same or just a very similar original.

The *Traidharmakaśāstra* is a relatively short work (46 leaves, each containing 28 ślokas — we are told.[20]). It is a rather ingenious classification of *abhidharma*, produced by dividing everything into three, subdividing again into three and continuing in this manner. Occasionally this may have forced the author to coin new collective terms and so it is difficult in places to tell whether we are dealing with particular terminology of the Pudgalavādin tradition or simply the special language of this text.

Most of the contents of this work are then a rearrangement of fairly standard *abhidharma* type material, somewhat closer to the position of the Vaibhāṣikas than to the Pali tradition, as would be expected in a North Indian tradition.[21] One important passage, however, makes very clear that this is a Pudgalavādin text. After classifying the unskilful under the three headings of wrong behaviour (*duścaritra*), craving and ignorance, the *Traidharmakaśāstra* goes on to subdivide ignorance into lack of knowledge (*ajñāna*), wrong knowledge (views) and doubt. The first of these (ignorance proper) is then defined as lack of knowledge of the conditioned, of the unconditioned and of the indefinable (*avaktavya*?).[22] So here we have one of the four areas of debate explicitly presented.

The text goes on to divide lack of knowledge of the indefinable into three kinds. The first is based upon what is made known by the basis for clinging (*upādāna-prajñapta*) i.e. the soul (*jīva*) which cannot be said to be identical to the aggregates or different to them. This is explicitly related by the commentary to four of the undeclared questions.[23] The second is based upon what is made known by the past (or by the

means) i.e. temporal succession from life to life. In other words the relationship between an individual in one life and a subsequent one cannot be defined either in terms of identity or as different, since the one case leads to eternalism and the other to annihilationism. The third kind of ignorance as to the indefinable refers to what is made known by cessation (*nirodhaprajñapta*). This refers to the after-death condition of a Tathāgata where existence, nonexistence, etc. are all specifically ruled out in the undeclared questions.

B. The *Sammatīyanikāyaśāstra*

Turning now to the *Sammatīyanikāyaśāstra*,[24] a Pudgalavādin text preserved in Chinese translation, we find the four broad areas of debate together with a number of specific issues of textual exegesis. Overall, however, the person of this text seems to be dialectical in nature. Most of the first part of the *śāstra* is concerned with putting detailed arguments both for and against nine propositions:

1. There is no self.
2. Self neither exists nor does not exist.
3. Self exists.
4. The self is the same as the five aggregates.
5. The self is different to the five aggregates.
6. The self is eternal.
7. The self is not eternal.

All of these views are in the end effectively refuted. One example may suffice:

If self is absolutely non-existent, there could be no breaking of the five precepts. Even the worst kinds of action would not be wrong. Neither freedom nor bondage would be possible. There could be no doer, no deed and no result and equally no birth and death (i.e. no suffering). If there is no suffering, it can have no cause. There can therefore be no removal of the cause (i.e. *nirvāṇa*) and no path leading to that removal. Clearly if the four truths are not possible, there can have been no Enlightened Being who proclaimed them. With no Buddha or Dhamma there could be no Ariya-saṅgha, hence no Triple Gem. As Venkataramanan has pointed out, this argument is strikingly reminiscent of chapter XXIV of the *Madhyamakakārikā*.[25]

The impression one receives from this part of the *Sammatīyanikāyaśāstra* is not so much of an attempt to establish a doctrine of a *pudgala* in a positive sense as of a dialectic whose purpose is to undermine rigid views and fixed understandings. It may therefore be the case that we should see the Pudgalavādins as a line of development of Buddhist thought which developed a type of dialectical meditation on the topic of the nature of self. Certainly there is only a very brief attempt to establish their own positive account of the nature of the *pudgala* or *pudgalas*.

Apart from one or two further dilemmas, most of the remainder of the *śāstra* is concerned with the theory of the intermediate existence (*antarābhava*). It is not impossible that this might be part of the original teachings of the Pudgalavādins as it is clearly a topic closely related to the nature of self. This teaching was rejected in the Pali sources, but it was probably accepted almost universally in North India. If the

original promoters of the teachings concerning the intermediate existence were the Pudgalavādins, this would not be surprising, since the Pudgalavādin fraternities do not appear to have been present in any numbers in South India and Ceylon.

CRITIQUE OF THE PUDGALAVĀDA

The *Vijñānakāya*

Turning now to earlier times, we can ask the question as to how far the account of the Pudgalavāda in sources of the first millennium A.D. is representative of an older period. There does not appear to be an extant Pudgalavādin text to which we can attribute a B.C. date with any certainty. However, we do have two significant critiques of the teaching that the person exists in the highest way. The later of these is probably the Vijñānakāya of Devaśarman, one of the seven canonical *abhidharma* texts of the Sarvāstivādins.[26] This is probably a work of the second century B.C.

Despite the considerable lapse of time between this date and the later works so far referred to, we find in the *Vijñānakāya* the same four main areas of debate as we find in the later works: 1. The fourteen unanswered questions; 2. *karma* and rebirth; 3. the conditioned and the unconditioned and 4. the analytical structures. Here the last is naturally represented especially by the *vijñānakāya* themselves, as well as by the process of sense perception more generally.

It is clear that one of the major issues is in fact the status of concepts. If a person is a mere label for a particular momentary collection of aggregates, then it can be argued that it is essentially irrelevant to the development of wisdom. If, as suggested above, the Pudgalavādins were using meditation on the dilemmas concerning the nature of the person to establish right view (in much the same way as other Buddhist traditions use the dilemmas concerning eternalism/annihilationism or existence/non-existence), then they could not have welcomed such a development and would have had no alternative but to defend some kind of real existence of the person.

Let us illustrate the *Vijñānakāya* debate with one example.[27] The protagonists are the Personalist and the follower of the emptiness teaching (Suññatāvāda). We will call the latter the Voidist. The Personalist asks what is the object of loving-kindness. The Voidist replies that it is the five aggregates given the label of 'being'. The Personalist, not unreasonably, suggests that this is not in harmony with the *suttas* which recommend loving-kindness towards living beings rather than aggregates. The Voidist counters with reference to the six classes of consciousness. The object of visual consciousness is visual form. The cases of hearing, smelling, tasting and touching are similar. The object of mental consciousness is dhammas. In none of these cases would loving-kindness have a being as its object.

It follows therefore that the Personalist must affirm a seventh class of consciousness. The Voidist then argues that this is equivalent to accusing the Buddha of ignorance. The Personalist replies that the Buddha certainly knew it, even if he didn't proclaim it. The Voidist counters with the well-known saying that the Buddha did not have the 'closed fist' of a teacher who holds back some of his teachings from his advanced disciples.[28] The Personalist replies with the equally well-known simile[29] which

compares the leaves on a single *siṃsapā* tree with those on the trees of the forest to illustrate the difference between the teachings which the Buddha actually taught and those which he knew but did not teach. However, the Voidist gets the last word by pointing out that the truths which the Buddha knew but did not proclaim were precisely those which were not conducive to following the path to enlightenment. If therefore the person exists, it is not conducive to the path!

This is an effective critique in terms of the Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma*, but probably doesn't address the actual views of the Personalists very accurately. It is unlikely that they taught a seventh class of consciousness whose object is the person. It is much more probable that their teaching was the same as in the later period. They must have held that the person is apprehended by all six classes of consciousness. This is not actually quite as different from the *abhidharma* position as it appears at first sight. Both schools in fact hold that the person is apprehended by all six consciousnesses. The difference is that for the Voidist the person is a label for the aggregates experienced as objects of consciousness whereas for the Personalist the relationship between the person and those objects cannot be described as either the same or different.

Another point of interest in the *Vijñānakāya* is the specific doctrine of the eight persons (*aṭṭha purisapuggalā*) i.e. the stages of realization or sanctity. The Voidist attempts to use this as the basis for his critique, arguing that this implies that there is more than one person and therefore the person cannot be an unchanging category. The problem with this is that it is open to a Personalist counter, citing the undeclared questions in relation to the existence of the Tathāgata after death.

The *Kathāvatthu*

Earlier than the *Vijñānakāya* and probably the source for some of its discussion is the *puggalakathā* of the *Kathāvatthu*.[30] I have elsewhere discussed the dating of this work.[31] Here I will simply say that the discussion of the puggala is certainly part of the original core of the *Kathāvatthu*. I believe it to be the work of Moggaliputta Tissa during the reign of the Emperor Asoka Moriya in the third century B.C. This may well bring us back to the time of the Elder Vātsīputra and is in any case no more than a generation later. It is almost certainly our earliest source for this controversy.

There are some difficulties in using the *Kathāvatthu* material to determine the nature of the Pudgalavāda in the earliest period, if we wish to be sure of avoiding the intrusion of later data. The first of these is the question of the status of the commentary. It is clear that the commentaries of all seven canonical *abhidhamma* works are by the same author. Whether this is Buddhaghosa or a close associate is not certain, but in any case it must be a work of the fifth century A.D. in its present form. Like most of the other commentaries of 'Buddhaghosa' it will be a rendering into Pali of an earlier work or works in Sinhala Prakrit and is unlikely to contain much, if anything, of a later date than the second century A.D., perhaps even the first.[32] However, this is still a long time after the third century B.C.. While it is likely that some of what the commentary says is based upon an oral tradition brought from India, it is not possible that everything is.

Indeed the commentary sometimes attributes views in the *Kathāvatthu* to sects which came into existence long after the time of Moggaliputta Tissa. Often it indicates that this is the case by the use of the word *etarahi* 'nowadays.'[33] Caution is therefore necessary in using the commentary.

The second difficulty lies in the nature of the *Kathāvatthu* itself. It is a text written in a format developed from the oral literature of the early period. In particular it is written for memorization with formulaic repetition of a quite technical kind — often very difficult to interpret without recourse to the commentary. It is in the form of a dialogue in which the second speaker limits himself to the answers 'yes' or 'not so'. In fact the initial first speaker, who is a Vibhajjavādin — the commentary refers to him as the *sakavādin* — subsequently changes place with the initial second speaker, the *paravādin*, for some passages. This is not signalled in the text but is required by the sense and so explained by the commentary. The difficulty lies in the fact that the first speaker sometimes repeats the same question and receives the opposite answer i.e. 'yes' in place of 'not so' or vice versa. This is generally explained by the commentary and usually makes sense, but it is not easy to be sure that the commentary's explanation is what was intended by Moggaliputta Tissa in the third century B.C.

Let us take an example (Kv 32):

Sakavādin *Does the very same person transmigrate from this world to the other world, from the other one to this one?*

Paravādin *Yes.*

Sakavādin *Does he transmigrate without difference and complete?*

Paravādin *Not so.*

Sakavādin *Does he transmigrate without difference and complete?*

Paravādin *Yes.*

Sakavādin *Is one who has lost an arm still without an arm?*

Paravādin *Not so.*

[The same question is asked first of a series of mutilated and diseased persons and then for a series of animals. The answer is of course the same.]

Sakavādin *Does the very same person transmigrate from this world to the other world, from the other one to this one?*

Paravādin *Yes.*

Sakavādin *Does he transmigrate together with the aggregate of materiality?*

Paravādin *Not so.*

Sakavādin *Does he transmigrate together with the aggregate of materiality?*

Paravādin *Yes.*

Sakavādin *Is the soul (jīva) the same as the body?*

Paravādin *Not so.*

[The same sequence is then gone through with each of the other four aggregates, then again with each of the five aggregates asking the question "Does he transmigrate without the aggregate of ...", but now ending with the question, "Is the soul different to the body?" A similar sequence then follows with the five aggregates themselves ("Does materiality transmigrate?" etc.) and with their negations ("Does materiality not transmigrate?" etc.). Then follows a verse:]

If the person breaks up when the aggregates break up,
it is the annihilationist view which was rejected by the Buddha.
If the person does not break up when the aggregates break up,
the person is eternal and very similar to nibbāna.

Earlier the question "Does the very same person transmigrate from this world to the other world, from the other one to this one?" was answered first with 'not so' but on a second asking it was answered with 'yes'. The commentary has previously explained as follows: The Puggalavādin holds the view that "the person transmigrates", based upon such sutta passages as "a person after transmigrating seven times at the most" (e.g. S II 185) and speculates (*voharati*) upon that basis. When the *sakavādin* asks the question specifying 'the very same' (*sv' eva*) with the intention of asking if the one who transmigrates according to your view is identical (*eko yeva*) in both this and the other world, the Puggalavādin denies this out of fear of eternalism. When the question is asked again to make it firm (*daḷhaṃ katvā*), he affirms it because it is just that person and not another entity (*bhāva*) — there are such *suttas* as "He perished from there and arose here" (D I 81, etc.).

Returning to the passage translated above, the commentary explains the expression 'without difference' (*anañño*) in the question as meaning 'identical in every respect', while the expression 'complete' (*avigato*) is understood as meaning 'not lacking in one respect'. The question "Does he transmigrate without difference and complete ?" is first answered with 'not so' because one who has arisen in the *deva* world is not a human being. Questioned again 'to make it firm', the Puggalavādin agrees because of his view that the very same person transmigrates. All this seems straightforward and no doubt the commentary is correct in its interpretation.

More interesting is the commentary's handling of the next pair of opposite answers to the same question. The question is whether he transmigrates with materiality (and the other four aggregates). In the first case he rejects because there is no going [to the next world] with this material body (*rūpakāya*). In the second case he agrees with reference to the person in the intermediate state.

"For in his view the [person in the intermediate state] goes precisely with materiality and enters the mother's womb; then the materiality of that [person in the intermediate state] breaks up."

With the next aggregate —feeling (*vedanā*) — the same opposite answers are interpreted slightly differently. The Puggalavādin rejects the proposition that one

goes to the other world 'with feeling' with reference to an unconscious rebirth (*asaññūpapatti*), but agrees to it with reference to rebirth other than that.

The *Mūlaṭīkā* subcommentary expands this, pointing out that it should apply to any rebirth immediately after perishing (*cuti*) since [the Puggalavādin] does not teach an intermediate existence for a person going to *niraya*, to the unconscious existence or to the immaterial (*arūpa*) realm.[34] It also points out that it could not apply to those who affirm the existence of consciousness for unconscious beings at the times of conception and death, since they would have an intermediate state. The *Anuṭīkā* in fact comments that this would apply to former *antarābhavavādins* and cites a *pāda* from the *Abhidharmakośa* (III 15) for the contemporary view that a person going to *niraya* does so upside down.35 It also attributes to some among the Sabbatthivādins the view that unconscious beings experience consciousness at the beginning and end of their life.

What emerges very clearly from this example is that the commentary takes the discussion of the person as very closely related to discussions of the exact process of rebirth. This is just what we found in the *Sammatīyanikāyaśāstra*. The question is whether the commentary has been influenced by later discussions in its interpretation. For a number of reasons I believe that we should in this case accept its interpretation of the *Kathāvatthu*.

Firstly it is not obvious how one would offer a consistent alternative explanation of the pairs of opposite answers. No doubt the onus would lie on us to offer such an alternative if we wished to dispute the commentary's exegesis. Secondly, it is here, if anywhere, that one would expect an ancient commentarial interpretation to be handed down i.e. precisely where the text does not make sense without one. A third, more general point concerns the basic thesis of the Puggalavādins. Their position is that the person is inexplicable and in any case cannot be seen as occurring apart from the aggregates any more than it can be identified with them. It follows necessarily that the process of rebirth requires a continuous sequence of aggregates. Otherwise there would either be a person existing between rebirths apart from the aggregates or a gap in the continuity of the person. These objections are perhaps not insuperable but it is easy to see the appeal of the notion of a set of aggregates belonging to a being in the intermediate state and providing temporal and spatial continuity between existences.

The Structure of the *Kathāvatthu's account*

It can be seen from the kind of material involved here (and even more in the *Sammatīyanikāyaśāstra*) that it is bound to be the case that a simple 'yes' or 'no' answer is often not possible. So there is nothing very surprising in the fact that the *Kathāvatthu* often finds it necessary to avoid straightforward answers too. What is interesting is that the kind of topic that is being addressed here is recognisably related to the kind of material we have already seen.

The *puggalakathā* contains eight chapters. Apart from material of an entirely different kind (e.g. connected with the development of Buddhist logic[36]), it seems that the first chapter is mostly concerned with the 'undeclared questions.' (They are returned to again in chapter five.) Most of chapters two and three are concerned with

the analytical structures, as I have called them — in this case, the aggregates, bases, elements and faculties, the basic structural material of the Pali *abhidhamma* texts. Chapter six and a small part of chapter two are concerned with the process of *kamma* and rebirth, while another small part of chapter two is directed at the question as to whether the person is unconditioned or not. Notably the opponent Pudgalavādin is depicted as holding precisely the views found in the later Sammatīya texts: the person is neither in the category of being conditioned nor in that of the unconditioned. Chapter eight mostly deals with *sutta* passages, including some interesting references to the eight persons and to the issue of conditioned or unconditioned. This leaves three chapters unaccounted for, but in fact they are the shortest chapters and amount to less than five pages out of nearly sixty nine (in the PTS edition).

CONCLUSION

Overall then it looks as if the *Kathāvatthu* is already addressing much the same kind of issue that we find addressed in later polemics against Pudgalavādin views. The difference is, I think, that they were addressing those arguments in a way which suggests that they were actually in living contact with actual Pudgalavādins. The impression one gets while reading Vasubandhu and others is that it is questionable whether they had actually met a Pudgalavādin. This difference is very clear when one looks at the extant Pudgalavādin writings. The Kathāvatthu seems to be much more aware of the sort of arguments which Pudgalavādins actually advance and certainly doesn't seem to be treating the Pudgalavāda as something completely beyond the pale.[37]

APPENDIX

On the origin of the names Vātsīputrīya/Vajjiputtiya and Sāmmatīya/Sāmitıya

At the centre of a sequence of three suttas in the *Majjhima-nikāya* is the figure of an arahat-to-be who is referred to as a wanderer (*paribbājaka*) of the Vaccha clan (Vacchagotta = Vatsagotra or Vātsyagotra).[38] His personal name is not given, but the Buddha always addresses him by the name of Vaccha (= Vātsya or Vātsa or Vatsa). He is a figure of some subsequent importance: he has a verse in the Theragāthā and recurs at the centre of two sections of the *Saṃyutta-nikāya*. Of particular interest for our purposes is the middlemost of the three *Majjhima* suttas. The subject of this is the 'undeclared questions' and it takes its name of *Aggi-Vacchagotta-sutta* from the simile in it of fire which exists in dependence upon fuel (*upādāna*) of grass and wood. Similarly the *Vacchagotta-saṃyutta* consists entirely of fifty five short, repetitive suttas in which the Vacchagotta wanderer asks the Buddha about the 'undeclared questions.'[39] Again the *Avyākata-samyutta* — set of linked suttas on the 'undeclared questions' — ends with five suttas in which the same wanderer is featured.[40] One of these again makes use of a simile of fire and fuel (*upādāna*).[41]

Vasubandhu in fact twice quotes from a version of one of these latter suttas, the second time referring to it as the *Vātsya-sūtra*.[42] The wanderer is three times referred to as '*Vatsasagotra* *parivrājaka*' (or similar) and once (below in a citation which the

Vyākhyā says is from Kumāralāta/Kumāralābha) as Vātsya. The former version is probably a mistaken Sanskritization of a Middle Indian form such as *Vacchayagotta < Vātsyagotra with a *svarabhakti* vowel where the Pali form has assimilated the 'y'.

Turning now to the name of the school which Vasubandhu refers to as the Vātsīputrīyas, this must certainly be the school which the *Dīpavaṃsa* and other Pali sources know as the Vajjiputtakas. This name is surprising and is usually explained by confusion with the Vajjiputtakas defeated at the second communal recitation.[43] However, they are clearly distinguished, with one connected to the Mahāsaṅghikas and the other treated as a branching from the Theravāda. Probably the reading of Vajjiputtiya[44] for the Pudgalavādin school is the correct one, although a later Pali source refers to the school as the Vacchiputtakā.[45] The confusion is probably quite recent and due to the similarity of Vajjiputtaka (= Vṛjiputraka) and Vajjiputtiya.

In sources using classical Sanskrit (none of the surviving ones are particularly early) we find Vatsīputrīya or Vātsīputrīya. The latter, at least, clearly takes the underlying Middle Indian form as derived from the name of its founder i.e. the son of the Vatsa woman. Since the eponymous ancestor of the Vatsas could no doubt be identified with the sage who is the eponymous source of the *gotra* name, we therefore get various legendary stories which can play a part. It is clear, however, from some of the legendary explanations which attempt to explain the name by means of the future stem *vatsy-* that a form of the name such as *Vatsyaputrīya was also current. This must come from an alternative Sanskritization of the Middle Indic form.[46]

There is only one epigraphic source. An addition to the pillar of Asoka at Sarnath in characters similar to those in early Gupta records refers to Sammitiya teachers as 'Vātsīputrīkānāṃ.' The heavily Sanskritized nature of this makes it difficult to know the exact underlying form.

What is clear is that there are at least three plausible interpretations of the origin of the name of this school. It could, as implied by E.J. Thomas, be simply a school which drew its origins among the Vatsas.[47] Most probably, in view of the evidence cited above, it derives from Vātsīputra as the name of a famous monk (either the son of a woman from Vatsa or the son of a woman of the corresponding *gotra*). It is also possible that it is a school which took its inspiration from the teachings of the *arahat* Vaccha/Vātsya. At all events because of the similarity of the teachings of this school and the issues raised in the canonical sources which mention this *arahat*, there has clearly been a tendency to connect the two.

Later Sanskrit sources generally refer to what seems to be the most influential branch of the Vātsīputrīyas as either Sāmmatīya or Sāmmitīya. It is clear that these forms of the name are derived from a Sanskritization associated with the popular etymology that derives the name of this fraternity from its putative founder: Sammita or Sammata. Other explanations are possible, based on some derivative of *saṃmita-*, *saṃmata-* or even *svamata-*.[48]

More likely now is a derivation from *samiti-* 'assembly' or 'council'. This school would then be the followers of the Council. Presumably there were other Vātsīputrīyas who did not accept the authority of this council. This gains considerable plausibility

from the account of the five councils of this school preserved in a Tibetan source.[49] Furthermore Bhavya gives Avantaka as a synonym for this school, deriving from their having held a council in Avanti.[50]

Pali sources refer normally to either Samitiyā or Sammitiyā, but Mss. have some other variations.[51] The metre of the *Dīpavaṃsa* reference requires that the first syllable be long.[52] Even earlier than this is an inscription in perfectly preserved letters on a stone slab reclaimed from a well in Mathurā which recalls the installation of an image of a 'bodhisatvo' in the Sirivihāra: "... *ācariyāna Samitiyāna parigrahe sarva-Buddha-pujāye.*"[53] This would date from about the second century A.D. Since the inscription from the early Gupta period cited above may also have -i- in the second syllable, we should probably assume that in the early period the form of this name would be written Samitiya but intending a long first syllable. The Sanskrit form should then be: Sāmitīya.

NOTES

1 See the substantial volumes edited by Heinz Bechert: *The Dating of the Historical Buddha. Die Datierung des historischen Buddha*, Parts I and II, Göttingen, 1991–2, Part III to appear shortly.

2 See for some of the issues the preface and papers to: David Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen, *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka*, (Vol. II of Johannes Bronkhorst, *Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference*), Leiden, 1990.

3 Étienne Lamotte, *History of Indian Buddhism*. From the Origins to the Śaka Era, Louvain, 1988, pp. 523–28 provides a useful summary of the older data.

4 In some cases they may simply be less well-known names of a school otherwise known to us by a different name.

5 See L.S. Cousins, "The 'Five Points' and the Origins of the Buddhist Schools," T. Skorupski, *The Buddhist Forum*, Vol. II, London, 1991, pp. 27–60.

6 Several articles have been produced on the Pudgalavāda by Ven. Thích Thien Châu, but more unpublished information is still to be found in his: *Les sectes personnalistes (pudgalavādin) du Bouddhisme ancien*, Thèse pour le doctorat d'état ès-lettres et sciences humaines, Université de la Sorbonne nouvelle (Paris III), 1977 (cited as Chau, *Thesis*). See: "Le personnalisme du Bouddhisme ancien", ICO, 1973; "The Literature of the Pudgalavādins", *JIABS*, 1984, 7–16; "Les Réponses des Pudgalavādin aux Critiques des Écoles Bouddhiques", *JIABS*, 1987, 33–53. For other work on the Pudgalavādins see: P. Skilling, "The Samskrtāsamskṛta-Viniścaya of Daśabalaśrīmitra", BSR, 1987, 3–23, Louis de La Vallée Poussin, (English translation by Leo Pruden), *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*, Berkeley, 1990, Vol. IV, chapter 9, especially pp. 1356 ff.; S. Schayer, "Kamalaśīla's Kritik des Pudgalavāda", RO, 1932, 68–93; Mervyn Sprung, *Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way*, London, 1979, chapters X and XI, esp. pp. 125 ff. and 142 f.; Peter G. Fenner, "A reconstruction of the Madhyama kāvatāra's Analysis of the Person," JIABS (1983) pp. 7–34; Stefan Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu, Delhi, 1984, pp. 96–100; Ganganatha Jha, *The Tattvasaṅgraha of Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalashīla*, Delhi, 1937 (repr. 1986) Vol. I pp. 217–28. For further references, see: Étienne Lamotte, *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, Louvain, 1949, Vol. I p. 43 n.3.

7 At the time of the visit of the Chinese pilgrim Hsüan-tsang we are told that they numbered some 66,500 out of a total saṅgha of about 254,000. This figure is probably misleading, however, for several reasons. Hsüan-tsang did not visit the south where non-Pudgalavādin schools were strong and he probably understates their numbers. It is also likely that the strength of the Sammatīya school was unusually great at this point in time due to the patronage of the Emperor Harsa and his family. Note that Hsüan-tsang is probably using Sammatīya as a collective designation for all branches of the Pudgalavāda.

8 From the Sanskrit: James Duerlinger, "Vasubandhu's 'Refutation of the Theory of Selfhood' (*Ātmavādapratiṣedha*)," JIP 17,2 (1989) pp. 129–87 (erratum in JIP 17,3 p. 327); cf. the same writer's "Vasubandhu on the Vātsīputrīyas' fire-fuel analogy," *Philosophy East and West* 32 (1982) pp. 151–158. From the Chinese and Tibetan, but well-annotated and still very valuable: La Vallée Poussin, op. cit.

9 Ms. Vatsīputrīyāḥ. The *Vyākhyā* glosses this as equivalent to: 'Āryasāmmatīyāḥ.' This certainly reflects a later stage when the Sammatīya school was the most numerous and influential exemplar of one of the four major traditions of later Indian Buddhism. However, it may also be literally correct. See n. 11 below.

10 Peter Skilling has shown that the tradition of the Sammitīya school of Pudgalavāda held that this took place "four hundred years after the Parinirvāṇa of the Tathāgata", but it is not sure what date they had adopted for the Buddha's *parinibbāna*. There is some reason to suggest that they may have had a relatively early date for this. See: Peter Skilling, "History and tenets of the Sāmmatīya school," *Linh-Són* 19 (1982) pp. 38–52.

11 H. Lüders, "A List of Brahmi Inscriptions," Appendix to *Epigraphia Indica* X, Calcutta, 1912: Nos. 654–64; 680; 682.

12 There is no reason to suppose that the name Vātsīputrīya became the property of only one of these later fraternities. No doubt each of the four later branches of this tradition considered themselves to be the authentic Vātsīputrīyas. Probably whichever you asked you could get a list consisting of the Vātsīputrīyas and three or so others — in other words the name of the school from which the list came could be precisely the one omitted. This certainly accounts for some of the variation in the Tibetan sources. In this situation Yaśomitra is no doubt right to use the term Āryasāmmatīya as equivalent to Vātsīputrīya, since the term Ārya- is precisely used to indicate one of the four major Buddhist traditions recognised in later Indian sources. This of course is just what the term Vātsīputrīya meant in the earlier period. In fact I am not completely confident that there were ever more than three Pudgalavādin fraternities — Sammatīyas proper, Dhammuttarīyas and Bhadrāyaṇīyas. All our data could be reconciled with this if it is assumed that Avantaka and Kaurukullaka/Kurukula are names for two (or one) of these and additions have sometimes been made to get the number of fraternities up to eighteen. In fact, however, it is more likely that Kurukula is simply a version of Kaukkuṭika (Pali Gokulika), in fact a Mahāsaṇghika fraternity. (This school is referred to as Kakatika in an inscription at Mathurā — H. Lüders, *Mathurā Inscriptions*, Göttingen, 1961, p. 102.)

13 This example is also in the discussion in Vasubandhu's Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa (Anacker, op. cit., p. 98).

14 The Pudgalavādins became known for adopting the position that an issue was 'undeclared'. At all events, in the *Abhidharmadīpa* they are specifically cited as holding in relation to the question of the existence of past and future dharmas that it was an undeclared matter. Abhidh-dīp 258: *Paudgalikasyāpi avyākṛtavastuvādinaḥ pudgalo 'pi dravyato 'stīti*. Their position is subsequently considered to amount to that of the Jains (°*nagnāṭapakṣe*) i.e. the *śyādvāda*. Terms such as *avaktavya-* or *avācya(tā)* are commonly used in discussions of their views e.g. *Prasannapadā* (ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, repr. Osnabrück, 1970) p. 64 n.3 and 283 n.4.

15 N.A. Sastri, *Satyasiddhiśāstra of Harivarman*, Baroda, 1978, II pp. 69–74.

16 *Madhyamakakārikā*, chapter X.

17 The *Kathāvatthu* gives the similes of tree/shadow, village/villager; kingdom/king and bolt/jailor. Nāgārjuna has as well as fire/fuel the two similes of pot and cloth, both subsequently to be clichés of philosophical literature. The commentarial tradition of the Mādhyamikas develops this — see, for example, the works of Sprung and Fenner cited above. Also cited here is the example of an employer and his employees which seems closer to the examples given in the *Kathāvatthu* (Fenner, op. cit., p. 11). Chau (Thesis p. 200) cites a Chinese source (critical of the notion of the *pudgala*) as giving the similes of owner and house, light and lamp; space and things, as well as fire and wood. The

Sammatīyanikāyaśāstra (p. 182) also uses milk and its colour, cf. Abhidh-k-bh 463 (milk or water).

18 Kv-a 27 f.

19 K. Venkataramanan, "Sāmmitīyanikāya Śāstra", *VBA*, 1953, pp. 182 and 186.

20 Chau, *Thesis*, p. 105. For a translation into English of a portion of this text, see: Leon Hurvitz, "The road to Buddhist salvation as described by Vasubhadra," *JAOS* 87 (1967) pp. 434–86.

21 Note for example the following (page references to Chau, *Thesis*): *avijñapti* (p. 56 n. and p. 106); twelve *dhūtaguṇa* (p. 60); the different kinds of sexuality of *devas* in the heavens of the *kāmadhātu* (p. 90); *antarābhava* (p. 114); the falling away of *arhats* (p. 115); the *dhyānāntara* (p. 121). In particular, the description of the stages of insight prior to the *darśanabhūmi* (p. 61) looks like a development of the fourfold *nirvedhabhāgiya* (skilful roots) of the Vaibhāṣika tradition.

22 Chau, *Thesis*, p. 80.

23 Ibid. p. 117.

24 Venkataramanan, op. cit. This text was translated into Chinese in the fourth or fifth century A.D., if not earlier.

25 Ibid. p. 223 n.39.

26 Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "La controverse du temps et du pudgala dans le Vijñānakāya", *Études Asiatiques publiées à l'occasion du vingt-cinquième anniversaire de l'École Française d'Extrême-orient*, Paris, 1925, Vol. I pp. 343–75.

27 Ibid p. 366 ff.

28 D II 100; S V 153.

29 S V 437 f.

30 Kv 1–69.

31 L.S. Cousins, op. cit., p. 34 ff.

32 There may of course have been earlier renderings into Pali (or even Sanskrit) of such material. The *Vimuttimagga* must bear some such relationship to the *Visuddhimagga*. Compare also the relationship between the *Dīpavaṃsa* and the *Mahāvaṃsa* and between the *Peṭakopadesa* and the *Nettipakaraṇa*.

33 L.S. Cousins, op. cit., p. 33 n.34.

34 The *Traidharmakaśāstra* denies *antarābhava* for the *arūpa* realm — Chau, *Thesis*, p. 114.

35 Kv-anuṭ (Be 1977) 79 (cf. n.1): *uddhaṃpādo tu nārako ti.*

36 On this, see Fumimaro Watanabe, *Philosophy and its Development in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma*, Delhi, 1983.

37 In fact the attitude of later writers seems to be ambivalent. So for example Yaśomitra: *na hi Vātsīputrīyāṇāṃ mokṣo neṣyate, Bauddhatvāt* — "for liberation is not denied for the Vātsīputrīyas since they are Buddhists." Abhidh-k-bh-vy (edited D. Shastri, Benares, 1973) Part IV p. 1161.

38 M I 481–497.

39 S III 257–263.

40 S IV 391–403.

41 S IV 399. For this usage, see CPD II s.v.upādāna 1.

42 Abhidh-k bh p. 470 and p. 471. The *sutta* referred to is designated in the Pali sources as either Ānando or Atth'attā (vll. Attanto and Atthanto), whereas the name Vaccha or Vacchagotta is sometimes given to the first of the five *suttas* which feature this wanderer. In fact, however, it is clear that the names of *suttas* often remained rather fluid until a very late date.

43 A similar confusion in a Chinese source is discussed by André Bareau: "Une confusion entre Mahāsaṅghika et Vātsīputrīya," JA (1953) pp. 399–406.

44 This is found in some manuscripts of Kv-a (Ee 1979) p. 37 and at Mhv 5.

45 Moh 258.

46 On the origin of the name Vātsīputrīya, see: Paul Demiéville, "L'origine des sectes bouddhiques d'après Paramārtha," in *Choix d'Ëtudes Bouddhiques*, Leiden, 1973, p. 57 n.; André Bareau, "Trois Traités sur les sectes bouddhiques ...", JA (1956) p. 169.

47 E.J. Thomas, *History of Buddhist Thought*, pp. 38–39 nn.

48 So D.R. Bhandarkar, CII Vol. IV *Inscriptions of the Early Gupta Kings*, New Delhi, 1981, pp. 141–142; 292.

49 Peter Skilling, *History and Tenets...*, (cited above n. 10).

50 Bareau, op. cit., p. 170.

51 e.g. to Mhv V 7. Moh 259 has Sammitīyā.

52 D¡p V 46. The line ends: ... *ca Sammiti*.

53 J.Ph.Vogel, *Epigraphia Indica* VIII pp. 71–72.

56. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 17.6 - 10: *tiṣṭhaty ā pākakālāc cet karma tan nityatām iyāt / niruddhaṃ cen niruddhaṃ sat kiṃ phalaṃ janayiṣyati // 6 // yo 'ṅkuraprabhṛtir bījāt saṃtāno 'bhipravartate / tataḥ phalam ṛte bījāt sa ca nābhipravartate // 7 // bījāc ca yasmāt saṃtānaḥ saṃtānāc ca phalodhavaḥ / bījapūrvaṃ phalaṃ tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvatam // 8 // yas tasmāc cittasaṃtānaś cetaso 'bhipravartate / tataḥ phalam ṛte cittāt sa ca nābhipravartate // 9 // cittāc ca yasmāt saṃtānaḥ saṃtānāc ca phalodbhavaḥ / karmapūrvaṃ phalaṃ tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvatam // 10 //.*

57. One might argue (with the Theravādin *vibhajyavāda*) that the action would not be eternal, because it would cease to exist once its consequence had been experienced. But Candrakīrti explains for Nāgārjuna: *naitad evaṃ pūrvaṃ vināśarahitasyākāśādivat paścād api vināśena saṃbandhābhāvāt / vināśarahitasya cāsaṃskṛtatvaprasaṅgād asaṃskṛtānāṃ ca vipākādarśanād avipākatvena sadaivāvasthānān nityatābhyupagama eva karmaṇām upapadyate /*, "This is not so, for what had been spared annihilation up to that point would also be dissociated from annihilation thereafter, being like space and other such [unconditioned phenomena]. Whatever escapes annihilation must be non-conditioned, and non-conditioned phenomena are not seen to undergo any process of maturation into something else. Because they do not 'mature' they endure for ever. It follows that we would have to accept that actions are eternal."

58. Abhidh-k-bh on 1.2cd.

59. See Abhidh-k-bh on 4.4ab.

FURTHER READING

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2

The Sarvāstivāda and its Critics: Anātmavāda and the Theory of Karma

Prof. Alexis Sanderson

The Sarvāstivāda, one of the main divisions of the earliest (non-Mahāyānist) Buddhism, is notable for the emphasis which it places on the Abhidharma. Its Abhidharmapitaka survives with exegesis culminating in the system of the Kashmirian Vaibhāṣikas expounded in the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu. Like the Theravādins, the Sarvāstivādin Vaibhāṣikas deny that an unchanging 'Self' [*ātman, pudgala*] is the basis of personality and explain how past (or present) action (karma) can bear fruit in the present (or future) simply on the basis of the doctrine of Dependent Origination [*pratītyasamutpāda*]. They also agree with all other Buddhist schools that only intentional actions can lead to retribution: "It is intention [*cetanā*], O monks, that I call karma" (AN 3, 415). They differ, however, in their view of the mechanism of retribution and in their analysis of action itself. The first follows their doctrine that phenomena [*dharma*] exist not merely in the present but also in the future and the past (the *sarvāstivāda*). They claim that the transience [*anityatā*] taught by the Buddha refers to their present activity [*kāritra*] and not their existence itself. This enables them to say that a karma in its present mode establishes a connection with its future consequence and in its past mode stimulates that consequence to pass from latency to present actuality. The action itself they analyse into intention and the deed itself, the first a mental phenomenon [*caitta*] and the second a configuration of matter [*rūpasamsthāna*]. In certain cases a self-reproducing imperceptible form of the latter is believed to arise, an *avijñapti* or 'non-communicator', which amounts to an enduring and in some cases growing state of responsibility or deservingness. In his commentary on his Abhidharmakośa Vasubandhu presents a Sautrāntika (Sūtra-based) critique of the Kashmirian Vaibhāṣika doctrines, which accuses it of obscuring the simplicity and economy of the Abhidharmic teachings found in the Sūtras. The theory of existence in all three times is rejected for a doctrine of momentary existence in which karmic retribution is explained as the culmination of a gradual change in a chain of momentary mind-events initiated by the action [*cittasamtānaparināma*]. The dichotomy between (mental) intention and (material) deed is rejected: there is only intention, latent and active. The material *avijñaptis* go too. The facts which they are supposed to explain are accommodated in the model of gradual change initiated in the flux of mental events. However, both Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika accounts of karma are compromised by accommodating certain beliefs which cannot be justified in terms of the intentionalism of the philosophical theory,

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notably the beliefs that a donor benefits karmically every time his donation is used by a beneficiary even if he is unaware of that use, and that a person who instigates someone to commit a murder is more karmically disadvantaged if the assault is successful than if it is not. Vasubandhu's commentary on his Abhidharmakośa shows that he is aware of these difficulties, but he does not pretend to solve them. Both Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika approaches are thoroughly exegetical. They will not jettison a belief supported by the Sūtras even though it appears to contradict the fundamental teaching.

Of the various divisions of the earliest, non-Mahāyānist Buddhism, which the Mahāyānists refer to as the Śrāvakayāna or Hīnayāna, only the Theravāda survives as a living religion, being practised in Sri Lanka, Thailand and other parts of Southeast Asia. For knowledge of the other non-Mahāyānist Buddhist sects which once flourished on the Indian subcontinent and beyond we depend entirely on what has survived of their literature or, in some cases, on second hand accounts of their doctrines found in the writings of those who opposed their views.[1] Within this literature one of these sects stands out by reason of the thoroughness with which it systematized its interpretations of the Abhidharma: the sect of the Sarvāstivādins. This is the only *nikāya* apart from the Theravāda whose Tripiṭaka canon survives in its entirety. We also have much of its extensive corpus of post-canonical Abhidharmic *śāstras*. The Sarvāstivādin Vinaya flourished principally, though not exclusively, in the northwestern regions of the Indian subcontinent, particularly in Gandhāra and Kashmir.[2]

The cause of the separation of the first Sarvāstivādins from the Theravāda (Sthaviravāda) is said by unconfirmed and dubious tradition to have been a dispute over a point of Abhidharmic doctrine. It arose, we are told, in the middle of the third century B.C. between Maudgalīputra-Tiṣya (Moggaliputta-Tissa) and Kātyāyanīputra and concerned the existential status of the past and the future. To Maudgalīputra-Tiṣya is ascribed the view known as the *vibhajyavāda*, namely that what exists [*asti*] is only whatever is in present time, together with a part of what is past, that is, those past intentional actions, good [*kuśala*] or bad [*akuśala*], which have not yet given birth to the reward or punishment which are their effects. Against this view, which is that of the Theravāda, Kātyāyanīputra and those that sided with him are said to have insisted on the *sarvāstivāda*, 'the doctrine that everything exists [whether it be present, past or future].'[3] According to this view all future events already exist and all past events continue to exist, not merely those past actions which have yet to bear fruit. The transient existence of an event in present time is seen as just one mode of an eternal existence, its momentary point of passage from existence in the future to existence in the past.[4]

Four facts are given by the Sarvāstivādins as proof of this doctrine of the real existence of all past and future phenomena. The first is a passage from their Sūtrapiṭaka (Saṃyuktāgama 3, 14) in which the Buddha Himself is taken as teaching explicitly that past and future matter [*rūpa*] really exist. The second is a canonical

passage in which the Buddha teaches the same fact by implication when He says that the arising of any cognition depends on two conditions: the cognitive faculty and its object. If the Buddha had held that past and future phenomena were non-existent, He would not have said this. Why ? Because mental cognition [*manovijñāna*] is one of the forms of cognition. Since He held that it arises, He must have believed that past and future phenomena exist, since these are its objects.

These two proofs are scriptural. They are backed up by two non-scriptural arguments. The first is as follows. A cognition arises only when there exists an object of cognition. Past and future phenomena are cognized, therefore they exist. The second is that if past events were non-existent a good or evil action could not have an effect in the future. For at the time at which the reward or retribution should arise the action supposed to be the cause of this outcome [*vipākahetu*] would have ceased to exist: only an existent cause can give rise to an effect.[5]

The Sarvāstivādins were unique among the sects in taking their name from an Abhidharmic doctrine; and indeed, it was in the seven treatises which compose their Abhidharmapiṭaka that they deviated most from the other sects. The most fundamental of these seven canonical works is the Jñānaprasthāna. This, expains Yaśomitra, is the 'body' of the Abhidharma collection, the other six works being the 'feet' on which it rests.[6] In Kashmir in about 200 C.E. an enormous collective commentary on the Jñānaprasthāna was composed. This great work, the Mahāvibhāṣā or Vibhāṣā, is the source of the name Vaibhāṣika, 'adherent of the Vibhāsā' or 'expert in the Vibhāṣā'[7] under which the Sarvāstivādins are generally known in subsequent accounts of the varieties of Buddhist doctrine.

The Abhidharma texts and the Mahāvibhāṣā were composed in Sanskrit; but apart from fragments none of them survives except in Chinese, and, in one case, Tibetan translations. However the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu survives in the original Sanskrit, together with the author's own commentary [*-bhāṣya*] and the commentary of Yaśomitra [*-vyākhyā* (*sphuṭārthā*)]. This masterly work was composed in the fourth century C.E.[8] It presents a systematic account of Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma in some six hundred (598) verses and elaborates, defends and occasionally criticises its doctrines in the prose autocommentary. The tendency of Vasubandhu's criticisms is Sautrāntika, a term to whose meaning I shall return. Also Sautrāntika is a chapter appended to the commentary in which he refutes the soul-doctrine [*pudgalavāda, ātmavāda*] of the heretical Buddhist sect of the Vātsīputrīyas and that of the system of Brahmanical philosophy known as Vaiśeṣika. Vasubandhu refers to the doctrine he expounds in the verses as 'the system of the Kashmirian Vaibhāsikas' [*kāśmīravaibhāṣika*][9], thereby excluding the tradition of certain non-Kashmirian sub-schools and emphasising the pre-eminence of the Kashmirian scholastic tradition.[10] His work and that of his commentator Yaśomitra are the main basis of the following account of Sarvāstivādin doctrine and its Sautrāntika critique.

In this paper the purpose is to consider first how the Vaibhāṣikas resolved the problem of karma and then to consider the Sautrāntika critique of their solution. The word 'problem' is used because the theory of karma seems at first sight to call into

question the truth of two fundamental tenets of Buddhist doctrine: first that all conditioned things [*samskārāh*] are impermanent [*anityāḥ*][11] and second that all phenomena [*dharmāḥ*] are impersonal [*anātmānaḥ*].[12] Intentional actions [*cetayitvā karma*] are conditioned events. They are therefore impermanent. How, then, can they affect the present after their occurrence? And if all phenomena are impersonal, how can we hold that past actions affect not just the present but the present of the person who intended the action? The problem was real, both within Buddhism itself, and in relation to the non-Buddhist, Brahmanical schools of thought. Within Buddhism there were the Ārya-sāmmatīyas of the Vātsīputrīya Nikāya, an offshoot of the Sarvāstivādins, who held that the Sūtras do in fact teach the existence of a personal identity, a 'self' [*pudgala*] which is the ground and support [*āśraya*] of changing mental states. Moreover, they used the theory of karmic retribution as evidence to support their doctrine.[13] Outside Buddhism were the various schools of Brahmanical thought, all of which taught some variety of the doctrine that the basis or source of consciousness and action is an eternal [*nitya*] Self that remembers, recognizes and experiences the effects of its past.

THE SARVĀSTIVĀDA'S THEORY OF KARMA

Anātmavāda

Vasubandhu begins his refutation of these Buddhist and non-Buddhist soul-doctrines with the following:[14]

> Is there no liberation [possible] in any system other than this? There is not. Why so? Because [the followers of the inferior religion (Yaśomitra: *kutīrthyāḥ*)] do not recognize that that to which they apply the term 'self' is nothing more than a series of constituents [*skandhasamtāna*]. What, then [, do they recognize]? They wrongly believe that their identity [*ātman*] is a distinct reality [*dravyāntara*] [over and above this series]. And from [this] clinging to a Self arise the Afflictions [*kleśa*].

His commentator Yaśomitra quotes a hymn to Śākyamuni by the poet Mātṛceṭa:

> The sequence of births does not come to an end so long as the mind retains any sense of personality ('I') [*ahaṃkāra*]. And this sense cannot leave one's awareness if one believes in the Self Doctrine. And since no teacher in the world but [You] has taught the Doctrine of Selflessness [*nairātmyavādin*], there can be no Way out but Yours.[15]

The Buddha's teaching that all phenomena are impersonal [*sarve dharmā anātmānaḥ*] means that there is no phenomenon which is a Person in the sense of an entity other than the transient constituents of personality, nor any such entity within or behind phenomena.[16] 'Self' is purely nominal [*prajñaptisat*]. Ordinary people and saints alike use it and other terms expressing personal identity;[17] but the reality [*dravyasat*] to which the name is applied [*prajñapyate*] is actually this or that sequence of everchanging associations between five changing factors [*skandha*]: the body or matter [*rūpa*], feelings [*vedanā*], perceptions [*samjñā*], volitions [*samskāra*] and cognitions [*vijñāna*].

Pratītyasamutpāda

It was, says Vasubandhu, precisely to counter this idea that the factors constituting individuals require and presuppose a 'Self' as their basis that the Buddha taught His doctrine of dependent origination [*pratītyasamutpāda*]. The essence of this doctrine is that the coherence of phenomena is not the result of an unchanging and transcendental element which unifies them from within but comes about simply because these phenomena are causally related: when A is present B arises.[18]

Dharmas

There is then no agent of action [*kartṛ*], only actions arising as transient events within a continuum of causally connected states. What, then, is an action? To understand the Vaibhāṣikas' answer to this question their classification of phenomena must be understood. This differs in important respects from that of the Theravādin Abhidharma and from that accepted by the Sautrāntikas. Whatever exists is in one of two classes. It is either the result of causes and conditions [*saṃskṛta*][19] or it is not [*asaṃskṛta*]. Three things are not the result of causes and conditions. They are space [*ākāśa*] [20] and the two non-occurrences [*nirodha*].[21] The two are: 1. 'non-occurrence (of the defilements [*kleśa*]) brought about through wisdom' [*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*], and 2. 'non-occurrence as a result of something other than wisdom' [*apratisaṃ-khyānirodha*]. The first is, in the highest case, the nirvāṇa attained by an Arhat while still in his body [*sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu*]. The second is the non-occurrence that pertains, for example, to all the other consciousnesses that would have occurred if one kind of consciousness, say a visual consciousness of yellow, had not arisen, or to all the life experiences that would have occurred in a particular incarnation if untimely death had not intervened.[22]

These three causally unconditioned [*asaṃskṛta*] phenomena and one phenomenon which is causally conditioned are free of defilement [*anāsrava*]. This causally conditioned but undefiled dharma is the fourth Truth of the Noble [*āryasatya*], the Path to the Cessation of Suffering [*mārga*]. All other phenomena, i.e. all causally conditioned phenomena except the Path, are defiled [*sāsrava*].[23]

Causally conditioned phenomena are classified into three types. They are either (i) material [*rūpa*], (ii) mental [*citta* + *caitta* / *caitasa* (*cittasaṃprayukta*)], or (iii) neither material nor mental. These last are termed 'conditioned phenomena which are not involved in cognition' [*cittaviprayuktāḥ saṃskārāḥ*].[24] As Yaṣomitra explains, they resemble mental phenomena in that they are immaterial [*arūpin*], yet they are unlike mental phenomena proper, such as feelings and volitions, because they do not arise at the same time as cognitions and with reference to the same faculty and object.[25] The most basic of these phenomena are sentences [*padakāya*], words [*nāmakāya*] and letters [*vyañjanakāya*], the similarity which defines an animate creature [*sattva*] as a member of a particular species [(*nikāya*)*sabhāgatā*], the four characteristics [*lakṣaṇa*] of any conditioned phenomena, namely birth [*jāti*], continuance [*sthiti*], decline [*jarā*], and impermanence [*anityatā*], and the so called 'possessions' [*prāpti*] and 'non-possessions' [*aprāpti*] which are believed to arise whenever any phenomenon, conditioned or unconditioned, occurs or does not occur in an individual stream of

conscious existence.[26]

Karma

Vasubandhu begins his exposition of the subject of karma with the assertion that it is the *karmas*, the actions of sentient beings alone that are responsible for the diversity of the incarnations of these beings and indeed for the diversity of the universe itself, which exists solely as the receptacle of their experiences [*bhājanaloka*].[27] Just as the Self of the Brahmanical schools is nothing but the Five Factors of Personality [*skandha*], so the role which the majority of these schools assign to a world-creating and administering God [*Īśvara*] is taken in Buddhism by the actions of these same 'Self'-less persons.

What, then, is an action? It is divided by the Vaibhāṣikas into two parts: the intention [*cetanā*] which initiates the action and the intended action itself [*cetanākṛtam, cetayitvā karma*].[28] The intention constitutes action in thought [*mānasaṃ karma*] and the action which arises from it is either verbal or bodily.[29] The intention is a mental phenomenon, a *cittasaṃprayukta*, whereas the verbal or bodily actions which it may initiate are purely material. It may be ethically good [*kuśala*], bad [*akuśala*] or indeterminate [*avyākṛta*].

Avijñapti

Any action of either of these two kinds, the verbal or the bodily, is a *vijñapti*, that is to say, an action which communicates itself by being audible or visible. If the intention which gives rise to it is ethically good or bad and not merely indeterminate, then, provided it is intense enough or sufficiently meritorious or sinful in itself, there will also arise a verbal or bodily 'non-communicator' [*avijñapti*], an internal action which does not communicate itself to anybody else nor, in all cases, to the agent himself, as we shall see.[30] It rises from the communicated action;[31] and, like that action, it is ethically charged.[32] It also resembles that action in that it is an entity under the category of matter [*rūpa*] rather than thought.[33] However it is unlike such action in that it is perceptible only to the mind and not to the senses.[34] It is also different in that it is self-reproducing [*anubandha, pravāha*], whereas the outward action is a single, transient event.[35]

In order to remain associated with the *skandha*-series of the individual the *avijñapti* requires the help of 'possessions' [*prāpti*], those phenomena neither material nor mental [*cittaviprayukta*] which the Vaibhāṣikas believe to be necessary if any phenomenon is to belong and continue to belong to the personality stream in which it arises.[36]

The Vaibhāṣikas' main arguments for the existence of these non-communicators are the following:

1. If there were no non-communicators, there could be no Prātimokṣa discipline. Only if the act of undertaking the Buddhist vows to abstain from various actions gives rise to a continuous stream of non-communicated acts of abstention' [*viratilakṣaṇā avijñaptayaḥ*], can we explain how it is that those who have taken these vows are always responsible for any infringement, even though they may be unconscious of their vows at the time when the infringement occurs. Similarly, to take professions at

the other extreme of the scale of morality, when a person commits himself to murder, theft, hunting or the like as his livelihood this conscious act of non-abstention [*avirati*] is followed by a stream of 'non-abstentional non-communicators' [*avirati-lakṣaṇā avijñaptayaḥ*] which make him a murderer, thief, or hunter etc. even when he is not actually committing the sins in question.[37]

2. If there were no non-communicators, the Buddha would not have taught in the Mahācundasūtra that the merit [*puṇya*] that comes to a person who does some pious act such as donating a garden [*ārāma*] or a monastery to the Saṅgha, goes on steadily increasing [*puṇyavṛddhi*] after the act and does so whether the donor is walking or sitting, awake or asleep.[38] The point of this argument is the belief that the merit earned by such a pious donation is augmented with every use that the beneficiary or beneficiaries make of it. Merit of this kind is called *paribhogānvayaṃ puṇyam*, 'merit determined by profitable use' and is distinguished from that derived from such actions as donations to shrines [*caitya*], in which there is no beneficiary, and in which, therefore, such merit as there is derives solely from the act of surrendering ownership [*parityāgānvayaṃ puṇyam*]. The problem to be explained, then, is the following. If such actions are analysable into nothing but initial intentions [*cetanā*] and the manifest acts which result from them, how could the subsequent use of a gift by others have any ongoing karmic consequences for the donor? The Vaibhāsikas argue that this problem can be solved only by assuming that a non-manifest action-matter, a non-communicator, arises in the stream of the donor every time his gift is enjoyed by another stream. Demeritorious non-communicators of this sort can also arise. This occurs if the gift is for an immoral purpose, as is the case in the founding of a Hindu temple in which animal sacrifices will occur.[39]

3. If there were no non-communicators, one would escape the karmic consequences of an evil action by having it done by someone else.[40] In fact, at the moment that a murder is accomplished on a person's instructions an *avijñapti* arises in the stream of the instigator, making him a murderer.

These arguments also exemplify the classification of non-communicators into three kinds: restraint [*saṃvara*], non-restraint [*asaṃvara*] or neither [*naivasaṃvarāsaṃvara*]. These pertain respectively to the following three classes of individuals:

1. monks [*bhikṣu*], nuns [*bhikṣuṇī*], male novices [*śrāmaṇera*], female probationers [*śikṣamāṇā*], female novices [*śrāmaṇerikā*], male and female lay Buddhists [*upāsaka, upāsikā*], and male lay Buddhists observing the twenty-four hour fasts [*upavāsaka, upavāsastha*], all these, with the exception of the last, having adopted lifelong abstentional vows [*prātimoksasaṃvara*] of varying degrees of rigour;
2. those such as fishermen and hunters who have committed themselves to livelihoods that are the antithesis of Buddhist morality; and;
3. the mass of humanity, which falls between these extremes of virtue and sin [*madhyastha*].

When a person takes Buddhist vows [*saṃvara*] or adopts a sinful livelihood, a stream of non-communicators will always be initiated. But morally determinate actions of other kinds, committed not only by those who have adopted neither Buddhist nor

sinful vocations [*naivasaṃvarāsaṃvarastha*] but also by those who have, will give rise to corresponding non-communicators only under either of two conditions. The first is that the manifest action must have been strongly intended. It must have been prompted by an exceptionally pure or defiled state of mind [*prasādavega, kleśavega*]. The second is that the manifest action must be particularly virtuous or sinful. A non-communicator will always arise, even if the intention behind the action is half-hearted, if it is one of a list of charitable donations that benefit the Buddhist Saṅgha or needy monks, if it is some pious act such as worshipping a Stūpa, if it is a pious vow, for example, not to eat without first venerating the Buddha, or is one of the major sins such as murder.

The function of *avijñapti* matter [*rūpa*] is to accommodate beliefs which suppose the existence of ethical states independent of consciousness. Now, what these beliefs have in common is that they more or less blatantly contradict the general Buddhist theory of action. Thus, if it is intention that is all-important, as this theory maintains, why should the sin of one who instigates a murder be dependent to any extent on whether or not the person engaged to carry out the murder succeeds or fails; why should merit accrue to a donor whenever his gift is used, after the initial intention has expressed itself in the physical and verbal act of giving; and why should being a Buddhist [*saṃvara*] or a professional sinner [*asaṃvara*] be considered a moral state over and above the states of mind in which this or that action is performed?

Retribution

Avijñaptis are only actions of another kind. They make retribution possible in certain cases, but only because one cannot have retribution without an action. The problem remains: how it is that actions can give rise to consequences after they have ceased to exist? The Vaibhāṣikas' answer lies not in a particular class of phenomena but rather in their view nature of any phenomenon. As we have seen earlier, they argued that the fact that past intentional actions give rise to effects in the present is one of the proofs of the *sarvāstivāda*, the doctrine that phenomena exist not merely in the present but also in the future, before they are present, and in the past, after they are present no more. They cite the following scriptural verse:[41]

> Actions do not cease to exist even after thousands of millions of aeons. It is certain that once they obtain the right moment and all the necessary conditions they subject creatures to their [inevitable] effects.

Actions, then, are eternal. To exist is their nature [*svabhāva*] regardless of whether they are in the past, the present, or the future. When the Buddha taught that all conditioned phenomena are transitory He was referring only to the process by which all phenomena have been, are, or will be briefly present after having been future and before becoming past. He did not mean that phenomena exist only for a moment after and before their nonexistence in the future and the past respectively. When an intentional action, good or bad, is occurring in the present, it is said to establish a relation with its still future effect, to 'seize' or 'anticipate' it, with the result that this effect will pass at some future moment from inefficacious existence to efficacious existence [*kāritra*]. When that moment is at hand, the intentional action, which is now

in the mode of past existence, 'bestows' [*prayacchati*] its effect in the present: when the experience-to-be approaches the present, the past act stimulates it to enter the present.[42]

THE SAUTRĀNTIKA CRITIQUE

Let us now consider the Sautrāntika critique of this Kashmirian Vaibhāṣika account of action and retribution. The term *sautrāntika* is the Sanskrit equivalent of the Pali *suttantika* and has the same primary meaning, namely 'one who is an expert in the Sūtras (/ Sūtrāntas).' In this sense it is parallel to the terms *vinayadhara* and *ābhidharmika*, meaning 'an expert in the Vinaya' and 'an expert in the Abhidharma [texts].'[43] However, Yaśomitra's commentary on the Kośa gives it a more specialized meaning: "Sautrāntikas are those who accept the evidence of the Sūtras and not that of the *śāstra*."[44] The *śāstra* to which he refers is evidently the Jñānaprasthāna and the other six texts of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharmapiṭaka, since he makes it clear elsewhere that they reject the Kashmirian Vaibhāsikas' claim that the Jñānaprasthāna is the word of the Buddha.[45] There is no evidence that their Sūtrapiṭaka and Vinayapitaka were other than those of the Vaibhāṣikas. Nonetheless they are referred to as a separate Nikāya in Indian sources.[46] The origins of the Sautrāntikas are obscure; but the opposition between Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas on the matter of karma and retribution goes back at least to the second century C.E., since it is already central for Nāgārjuna when he presents the current Buddhist theories on this subject in his Karmaphalaparīkṣā (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 17.2-20). He does not mention the schools by name but the arguments presented are exactly those opposed as Vaibhāsika and Sautrāntika in the Abhidharmakośa and its autocommentary.

The gist of the Sautrāntikas' critique of the Vaibhāsika Abhidharma is that it has obscured the simplicity of the Abhidharmic teachings found in the Sūtras themselves.[47] The simpler ontology which they saw in the Sūtras did away with a number of the Vaibhāṣikas' basic categories. They denied that 'non-occurrence (of the defilements [*kleśa*]) brought about through wisdom' [*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*] and the other non-conditioned phenomena [*asamskrtā dharmāḥ*] were entities [*dravyasat*]. For them the first, which includes *nirvāna*, was not an entity but an absence [*paścādabhāva*], the non-arising [*anutpāda*] of suffering. The same applied to 'non-occurrence caused by factors other than wisdom' [*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*]: this too was seen as the simple absence of certain events due to the absence of the necessary conditions. Space, likewise, was simply the absence of space-filling bodies.[48]

Only conditioned phenomena [*saṃskṛtā dharmāḥ*] were held to be ultimately real [*dravyasat*]. Here too the Sautrāntikas simplified. Of the Vaibhāsikas' three categories (1. material entities [*rūpa*]; 2. mind and associated mental events [*citta* and *caittas*]; and; 3. the neither material nor mental [*cittaviprayukta*]) the Sautrāntikas accepted only the first two. The phenomena of the third category were dismissed as having no more than a conceptual or nominal existence [*prajñaptisat*]. Thus they eliminated the 'possessions' [*prāpti*] of the Vaibhāṣika account of karma.[49] Furthermore, they accepted only ten of the eleven categories of material phenomena taught by the Vaibhāsikas, namely the five sense-organs [*indriya*] and the five kinds of sense-object

[*viṣaya*], rejecting their eleventh, the imperceptible *avijñapti*. They claimed, as we shall see, that the circumstances cited by the Vaibhāṣikas as evidence of its existence can be explained in purely mental terms.[50]

The Sautrāntikas also rejected the Vaibhāṣikas' dichotomy between action as intention and action as matter. Motivated action, they said, is intention [*cetanā*] throughout. Beginning as resolve [*saṃkalpacetanā*] it develops to become verbal or physical [*kriyācetanā*].[51]

Finally, and most radically, they threw out the doctrine of the existence of phenomena in the past and future. They held that when the Buddha taught that phenomena are impermanent He meant that they cease instantaneously and spontaneously as soon as they arise.[52] The Vaibhāṣikas' operation in the present [*kāritra*] was also momentary [*kṣaṇika*]; but their moment [*ksana*] was a finite division of time equal to 0.013333 of a second, and therefore infinitely divisible.[53] For the Sautrāntikas, however, a moment is indivisible, like a mathematical point in space. The Vaibhāṣikas' phenomenon, though it was brief enough in its state of activity in the present, had to dwell there long enough to be the substrate of the four marks of a conditioned entity: birth, continuance, decay and impermanence. For the Sautrāntikas, as we have seen, these marks, being among the *cittaviprayukta dharma*s, do not really exist [*dravyasat*]. They exist only nominally [*prajñaptisat*]: nothing really waits for its end, for however brief a span of time; nor is there any cause of its destruction. Its cessation is spontaneous.

How, then, does the Sautrāntika account for the process of karmic retribution taught in the Sūtras? He does so through the theory of 'the final, critical state [*-viśesa*] of a process of change [*parināma*] [initiated by intentional action] in the series of [momentary] mental events' [*cittasaṃtānaparināmaviśesa*].[54] An intentional action, though momentary [*ksanika*], is a 'seed' [*bīja*] which initiates a gradual transformation [*pariṇāma*] in the series of subsequent mind-events; and this transformation culminates at some future time to give rise in the next moment to the fruition of that action as reward or punishment. The intentional action is necessary if the effect is to arise; but it does not need, as the Vaibhāṣika argued, to continue to exist at the time that the effect arises. The action is to its effect as the seed is to the fruit: between the two lie processes of gradual transformation [*parināma*].[55] In his Mūlamadhyamakārikā Nāgārjuna shows how the Sautrāntika sees his answer to the problem as avoiding the two extremes of eternalism [*śāśvatavāda*] and annihilationism [*ucchedavāda*]:[56]

> If [, as the Vaibhāṣika maintains,] an action continued to exist [after its occurrence] up to the time of its consequence, it would have to be eternal.[57] If [on the other hand] it ceased to exist [after its occurrence], then being non-existent what consequence could it produce? [The Sautrāntika denies this latter consequence:] The seed initiates a series [of stages] beginning with germination. It is from that series [rather than from the seed] that the fruit arises; but that series does not develop unless there is a seed to start it. Because the series arises from the seed and the fruit arises from the series, the fruit depends on the seed, but [the seed] is neither utterly annihilated nor eternal. [Likewise, a mind-event [*citta*]

in which there is a good or bad intention] initiates a series of mind-events [*cittasaṃtāna*]. It is from this [series] that the consequence [good or bad, in good or bad incarnations] comes about; but the [series] does not get under way without the [initial] mind-event. Because the series arises from the mind-event and the consequence arises from the series, the consequence depends on the [intentional] action; but [the action] is neither utterly annihilated [in the sense that it has no effect] nor eternal.

CONCLUSION

The Vaibhāṣika project is primarily exegetical: it outlines and defends what it sees as the system of the canon itself. It offers this system as a comprehensive description of extra-textual reality, because it believes that the Buddha's system is the only true and truly liberating doctrine; but it demonstrates the necessity of its categories from the evidence of the word of the Buddha. Everywhere we encounter arguments in the form: if X were not so, the Buddha would not have made the following statement(s). In the introduction to his commentary on his Abhidharmakośa Vasubandhu explains the meaning of the work's title in a manner which makes his own commitment to this exegetical perspective entirely clear. He tells us that the title Abhidharmakośa means Abhidharma-Sheath and that this is open to two analyses: 'The Sheath [*kośa*] of the [Sword which is the] Abhidharma' and '[The Sword] whose sheath is the Abhidharma', where Abhidharma means the Abhidharmapiṭaka. Both senses, he explains, express the fact that his work presents the essential teachings of that part of the Tripiṭaka, a part considered by the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāṣikas, whose view he is representing, to be the word of the Buddha himself.[58]

This desire to reflect the teachings of the Buddha is a desire to show their complete and systematic nature. The Sarvāstivādin Abhidharmapiṭaka reflected by Vasubandhu is itself a systematization of the teachings of the Sūtras, and one which goes far beyond the meaning and implications of those early texts, as both the Sautrāntika and the indifferent philologist would agree: they do not support the *sarvāstivāda*, the *avijñapti*s, or the various phenomena neither mental nor material among which we find the *prāpti*s. Nonetheless, the Sūtras remain the ultimate point of reference; and beliefs originating from, or supported by Sūtra passages are allowed to compromise what might otherwise have been a more symmetrical doctrine. We have seen evidence of this in the Vaibhāṣikas' arguments for the existence of *avijñaptis*. The theory of intention [*cetanā*], which appears to be the very heart of the Buddhist doctrine of action, is tacitly pushed aside by beliefs which entail a less rational, more magical view of karmic consequences.

The Sautrāntikas' point of view might have been expected to be more consistent. Discarding many of the categories sanctified by the Sarvāstivādin tradition they offered a more economic and coherent model of change and responsibility which, as they claimed, was certainly closer to the position of the Sūtras. However, their desire for coherence did not tempt them to explain away the maladjusted karma beliefs that appear in these Vaibhāṣika arguments for the existence of *avijñaptis*. They deny the conclusion: what the Vaibhāsikas call *avijñaptis* are for them simply changes

[*pariṇāma*] in the stream of consciousness. But they do not deny that merit arises in the donor as the result of an action outside his consciousness and volition, namely the use of his donation by a beneficiary, that responsibility arises in an instigator to murder when and only when the murder has been successfully accomplished, or that acts of lay Buddhist piety are consequential (initiate a change in the stream of consciousness) regardless of the strength of intention, whereas other virtuous acts will do so only if that intention is intense. Vasubandhu as Sautrāntika confronts the first two of these beliefs. He offers no explanation of how these changes can come about. He says only that it is in the nature of things that they do, and admits that the problem is impenetrable. If he prefers the theory of change in the stream of consciousness to that of the *avijñapti* in these cases, it is only, he says, because it is less unreasonable to believe that an action by one person gives rise to a phenomenon in another's mind-series than to believe, as the Vaibhāṣikas do, that such an action gives rise to a phenomenon that is connected neither with the body of the agent nor with mind of the person affected.[59] In the first belief there is only one problem: the basic one of interpersonal causality. In the second case there are two: that and the problem of the *avijñapti's* materiality.

NOTES

Abbreviations used in the text and notes are as listed below:

AN = Aṅguttara Nikāya

MCB = Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, Bruxelles 1931—.

Abhidh-k = Abhidharmakośa

Abhidh-k-bh = Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

Abhidh-k-vy = Abhidharmakośabhāṣyavyākhyā

1. The term 'sect' here translates the Sanskrit and Pāli *nikāya*. It refers, in the words of Heinz Bechert, to "a group or community of monks that mutually acknowledge the validity of their *upasampadā* or higher ordination and therefore can join together in the performance of acts prescribed by Vinaya or Buddhist ecclesiastical law." See 'Mahāyāna Literature in Sri Lanka: the Earliest Phase', in L. Lancaster (ed.), *Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems. Studies in honour of Edward Conze*, (Berkeley: The Group in Buddhist Studies, etc., 1977), 363.

2. This Vinaya ('in ten sections' [Daśādhyāya]) is referred to as the Vinaya of Kashmir; see Étienne Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien* des *Origines à l'âre Śaka* (Bibliothèque du Muséon, Vol. 43, Louvain: Institut Orientaliste de Louvain, 1958), 191. The Kashmirian Vibhāṣā on this text is probably the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins (adopted by the Tibetans); see ibid. p. 192.

3. André Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (Saigon: École Française d'Extrême Orient, 1955), 33; 137 (n.5); Étienne Lamotte, op.cit., 665-667. Abhidh-k-bh on 5.25cd: *ye hi sarvam astīti vadanti atītam anāgataṃ pratyutpannaṃ ca te sarvāstivādinaḥ / ye tu kecid asti yat pratyutpannam adattaphalaṃ cātītaṃ karma kiñcin nāsti yad dattaphalam atītam anāgataṃ ceti vibhajya vadanti te vibhajyavādinaḥ //.*

4. For the four *sarvāstivādas*, the Mahāvibhāṣā's four accounts of the nature of the difference that occurs when a phenomenon passes from the future into the present and from the present into the past (the theories of Dharmatrāta [transformation], Ghoṣaka [change of emphasis], Vasumitra [passage through a moment of efficacy] and Buddhadeva [shift in relational definition]) see ibid. 5.25c - 26 (approving the third).

5. For these four arguments, scriptural and rational, see Abhidh-k 5.25ab (*sarvakālāstitoktatvād dvayāt*

sadviṣayāt phalāt) and commentary. For the scriptural passages see Louis de la Vallée Poussin (tr), *L' Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu* (Paris: Geuthner, 1923-31) on 5.25ab, 51(n.1 and n.2).

6. Abhidh-k-vy on 1.2b: *śāstram iti jñānaprasthānam / tasya śarīrabhūtasya ṣaṭ pādāḥ prakaraṇapādaḥ, vijñānakāyaḥ, dharmaskandhaḥ, prajñaptiśāstram, dhātukāyaḥ, saṅgītiparyāya iti //.*

7. Abhidh-k-vy on 1.3: *vibhāṣayā dīvyanti caranti vā vaibhāṣikāḥ / vibhāṣāṃ vā vidanti vaibhāṣikāḥ //.*

8. See Erich Frauwallner, *On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu* (Rome: Istituto per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1951) for the later dating (distinguishing the Kośakāra from the earlier, Mahāyānist author of the Triṃśikā etc.) and Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu the Buddhist Psychological Doctor* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), 7-24, for the earlier (following hagiographical sources which do not so distinguish). See also (against the distinction) Lambert Schmithausen, 'Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen in Viṃśatikā und Triṃśikā' in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* XI (1967), 109-136 and *Ālayavijñāna. On the Origin and Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy* (Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987), 262-263 (n.101).

9. Abhidh-k 8.40ab: *kāśmīravaibhāṣikanītisiddhaḥ prāyo mayāyaṃ kathito 'bhidharmaḥ /.*

10. Abhidh-k-vy ad loc.: *santi vaibhāṣikā na kāśmīrā ye bahirdeśakā vaibhāṣikāḥ /.*

11. Abhidh-k-bh on 2.47a: *sarve saṃskārā anityāḥ*; Candrakīrti, Mūlamadhyamakakārikāvyākhyā on 1.3 (quoting Āgama): *anityā bata saṃskārā utpādavyayadharmiṇaḥ...*

12. Abhidh-k-bh on 2.47a: *sarve dharmā anātmānaḥ*; ibid. Pudgalaviniścaya, 1204 (ed. Swāmī Dwārikādās Śāstrī, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1981 [Bauddha Bharati Series, 5-6]. 2nd edition. All page references in these notes to the Kośa, the bhāṣya and Yaśomitra's vyākhyā are to this edition): sarve *dharmā anātmānaḥ* [=Saṃyukta 10. 7; see La Vallée Poussin, op. cit., vol. 4, 252]; Abhidh-k-bh on 3.28ab (462): *ātmā ātmeti bhikṣavo bālo 'śrutavān pṛthagjanaḥ prajñaptim anupatitaḥ / na tv ātmā vā ātmīyaṃ vā* (cf. La Vallée Poussin, op. cit.,vol. 4, 249 (n. 1)).

13. Abhidh-k-bh, Pudgalaviniścaya,1214: *yadi tarhi pudgalo nāsti ka eṣa saṃsarati*, "If, then, there is no person, who is this that transmigrates [in accordance with his acts] ?"

14. Ibid. 1189: *kiṃ khalv ato 'nyatra mokṣo nāsti / nāsti / kiṃ kāraṇam / vitathātmadṛṣṭiniviṣṭatvāt / na hi te skandhasaṃtāna evātmaprajñaptiṃ vyavasyanti / kiṃ tarhi / dravyāntaram evātmānaṃ parikalpayanti / ātmagrāhaprabhavāś ca kleśā iti //.*

15. Abhidh-k-vy. 1189: *stotrakāreṇāpy eṣo 'rtha uktaḥ "sāhaṅkāre manasi na śamaṃ yāti janmaprabandho nāhaṅkāraś calati hṛdayād ātmadṛṣṭau ca satyām / anyaḥ śāstā jagati ca yato nāsti nairātmyavādī nānyas tasmād upaśamavidhes tvanmatād asti mārgaḥ "//.*

16. Abhidh-k-vy. 1204: *sarvadharmā anātmāna iti / na caita ātmasvabhāvāḥ / na caiteṣu ātmā vidyata ity anātmānaḥ sarvadharmāḥ* // (i.e. glossing *anātman-* as both *karmadhāraya* compound ['non-self'] and *bahuvrīhi* ['self-less']).

17. See the Mānuṣyakasūtra quoted at Abhidh-k-bh, Pudgalaviniścaya, 1201 - 1202 (...*vyavahāramātram evaitat /*); ibid. p. 1214 10 - 13 (on the Buddha speaking of His former lives).

18. See Abhidh-k-bh on 3.28ab (*hetur atra samutpādaḥ samutpannaṃ phalaṃ matam*), p. 458: *santi tarhi kecid ya ātmani saty āśrayabhūte saṃskārādīnāṃ bhāvaṃ parikalpayanty avidyādīnāṃ cotpādāt tadutpattim / atas teṣāṃ kalpanāṃ paryudāsitum idaṃ nirdhārayāṃ babhūva "yasyaivotpādād yad utpadyate tasminn eva sati tad bhavati nānyasmin / "//.*

19. See Abhidh-k-bh 16: *hetupratyayajanitā rūpādayaḥ saṃskṛtāḥ /.*

20. Abhidh-k 1.5d: *tatrākāśam anāvṛtiḥ*; Abhidh-k-bh ad loc.:...*yatra rūpasya gatiḥ*; Abhidh-k-vy ad loc.:...*avakāśaṃ dadātīty ākāśam iti nirvacanam /.*

21. Abhidh-k 1.5bc: *trividhaṃ cāpy asaṃskṛtam / ākāśaṃ dvau nirodhau ca...*

22. Ibid. 1.6 and commentary; also Abhidh-k-bh on 2.55d (321).

23. Abhidh-k 1.4: *sāsravānāsravā dharmāḥ saṃskṛtā mārgavarjitāḥ / sāsravā āsravās teṣu yasmāt samanuśerate // anāsravā mārgasatyaṃ trividhaṃ cāpy asaṃskṛtam //.*

24. Abhidh-k-bh on 2.36: *ime saṃskārā na cittena samprayuktā na ca rūpasvabhāvā iti cittaviprayuktā ucyante /.*

25. Abhidh-k-bh on 2.36 (210): *cittagrahaṇaṃ cittasamānajātīyapradarśanārtham / cittam iva cittena ca viprayuktā ity arthaḥ /...caittā api cittena tulyajātīyāḥ / te tu cittena sahālambane saṃprayuktāḥ / tadviśeṣaṇārthaṃ viprayuktagrahaṇam /.* For the meaning of the term *cittasaṃprayukta* ('engaged with cognition') see Abhidh-k 2. 34cd and commentary, which gives the five *samatās* (< *saṃ-* in *saṃprayukta*), the 'equalities' of substrate (faculty), object, form, time and number.

26. See Abhidh-k 2.35-48 and commentary. According to Yaśomitra Vasubandhu's list is not meant to be exhaustive. There are other *cittaviprayukta* phenomena, such as schism [*saṅghabheda*]; see Abhidh-k-vy 210.

27. Abhidh-k 4.1a and commentary: *atha yad etat sattvabhājanalokasya bahudhā vaicitryam uktaṃ tat kena kṛtam / na kenacid buddhipūrvakaṃ kṛtam / kiṃ tarhi / sattvānāṃ karmajaṃ lokavaicitryam /.* Cf. Abhidharmadīpavibhāṣāprabhā (ed. Padmanabh S. Jaini, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Volume 4, second edition, Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1959) on 4.1. [155], p. 118: *etāni khalu trīṇi karmāṇi śubhāśubhāni dvividhasyāpi sattvabhājanalokasya hitāhitanimittāny utpattau sampattau ca vaicitryasya kāraṇam / neśvarakālapuruṣapradhānādayaḥ /*, "These three kinds of action [, mental, physical and verbal], when either good or bad, are, being the causes of what is pleasant and what is not, the cause of the arising and maintenance of the world in both its kinds, i.e. the world of creatures and the receptacle-world [which is their habitat], not God, Time, the Individual Soul or Fundamental Matter."

28. Ibid. 1b: *cetanā cetanākṛtaṃ ca tat /.* The commentary ad loc. quotes the canon: *dve karmaṇī cetanā karma cetayitvā ca.*

29. Ibid. 1cd: *cetanā mānasaṃ karma tajjaṃ vākkāyakarmaṇī //.*

30. Abhidh-k-bh on 1.11: *rūpakriyāsvabhāvāpi satī vijñaptivat paraṃ na vijñāpayatīty avijñaptiḥ /.*

31. Abhidh-k-bh on 1.11: *samāsatas tu vijñaptisamādhisaṃbhūtaṃ kuśalākuśalaṃ rūpam avijñaptiḥ /.*

32. Abhidh-k 4.7a: *nāvyākṛtāsty avijñaptiḥ.* The commentary: *kiṃ kāraṇam / avyākṛtaṃ hi cittaṃ durbalam / ato na śaktaṃ karmākṣeptuṃ yan niruddhe 'pi tasminn anubadhnīyāt*, "Why [is there no such thing as an ethically indeterminate *avijñapti*]? It is because an ethically indeterminate awareness is weak. It cannot project an action [of the *avijñapti* kind] which could continue undiminished even after that [outwardly manifest action] had ceased."

33. Abhidh-k 1.9ab: *rūpaṃ pañcendriyāṇy arthāḥ pañcāvijñaptir eva ca*, "matter is the five sense-organs, the five sense-objects and *avijñapti*."

34. Abhidh-k 15cd: *dharmāyatanadhātvākhyāḥ sahāvijñaptyasaṃskṛtaiḥ*, "[These seven entities] together with *avijñaptis* and the [three] unconditioned phenomena are referred to as the *dharmāyatana* and as the *dharmadhātu* ('the sphere of mental objects')."

35. Abhidh-k 1.11 and commentary (*anubandhaḥ śubhāśubhaḥ, kuśalākuśale prāptiprabandhaḥ*). See also n. 31 above.

36. Abhidh-k 2.36bcd: *prāptir lābhaḥ samanvayaḥ / prāptyaprāptī svasaṃtānapatitānāṃ...*

37. Abhid-k-bh 583[4 5].

38. Abhidh-k 580 and Abhidh-k-vy ad loc.

39. Candrakīrti, Mūlamadhyamakārikāvyākhyā on 17.5: *apuṇyaṃ ca tathāvidham / paribhogānvay am ity arthaḥ / tad yathā devakulādipratiṣṭhāpanaṃ yatra sattvā hanyante / yathā yathā hi tatkīrtau prāṇino hanyante tathā tathā taddevakulādyupabhogāt tatkartṛ ṇāṃ saṃtāne paribhogānvayam apuṇyam api jāyata ...//*, "There is also demerit of this sort, demerit, that is, which grows with use [by beneficiaries]. An example is the founding of a temple in which living creatures are immolated.

Whenever living beings are killed there in honour of the deity, a commensurate demerit of this sort arises in the personality-streams of the founders as a result of the use of the temple or similar endowment."

40. Abhidh-k-bh on 4.4ab.

41. Étienne Lamotte, MCB IV (1935) 152: *na praṇaśyanti karmāṇi kalpakoṭiśatair api / sāmagrīṃ prāpya kālaṃ ca phalanti khalu dehinām //*. See also S. Anacker, op.cit., 103. The verse is also quoted by Candrakīrti on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 17.21d.

42. See Abhidh-k 2.59 and commentary. Vasubandhu uses the term √*grah* / *prati-grah*. Yaśomitra gives √ *ā-kṣip* as a synonym and explains that 'to seize' or 'anticipate' an effect means to be established as the cause of that effect (ad loc., 333[27-28]]:...*gṛhṇantīty avadhāraṇam / pratigṛhṇantīti / ākṣipanti hetubhāvenāvatiṣṭhanta ity arthaḥ /*. The past cause which 'bestows' its effect in the present is termed the *vipākahetu*; see ibid. on 2.59d.

43. See, e.g., Abhidh-k-bh on 4.34.

44. Abhidh-k-bh 15: *kaḥ sautrāntikārthaḥ / ye sūtraprāmāṇikā na tu śāstraprāmāṇikās te sautrāntikāḥ /*.

45. For this usage see, e.g., Abhidh-k-bh on 7.11, 1050: *varaṃ śāstravirodho na tu sūtravirodhaḥ*, 'It is better to contradict the *Śāstra* rather than the Sūtras.' Yaśomitra ad loc. explains: *abuddhoktam abhidharmaśāstram ity abhiprāyaḥ*, "The point is that the Abhidharmaśāstra is not the word of the Buddha himself." The Vaibhāṣikas hold that the Abhidharmapiṭaka consists of the teachings of the Buddha collected and redacted by Kātyāyanīputra and others; see Abhidh-k-bh 15[23-27].

46. Candrakīrti introduces the Sautrāntika view of retribution refuted in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 17.6-11 as the view of 'the followers of another Nikāya': *nikāyāntarīyāḥ* (135[1] in P.L. Vaidya's edition, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 10, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960); *aikanikāyikaiḥ* (ibid. 136[19]).

47. See Abhidh-k-bh on 1.3 (15) on the Sautrāntika view that the Abhidharmapiṭaka is contained in the Sūtrapiṭaka itself in the form of such Sūtras as the Arthaviniścaya.

48. Abhidh-k-bh on 2.55d, 320[13] (*atha ko 'yaṃ visaṃyogo nāma*...) -327.

49. Abhidh-k-bh on 2.36cd (debate between Vaibhāśika and Sautrāntika on the existence of *prāptis*).

50. Abhidh-k-bh on 4.4ab, 578-590: *avijñaptiḥ pūrvam evoktā / sāpi dravyato nāstīti sautrāntikāḥ*...)

51. Abhidh-k-bh introducing 4.1; on 4.3c: *saṃkalpacetanā pūrvaṃ bhavaty evaṃ caivaṃ ca kariṣyāmīti / tathā cetayitvā paścāt kriyācetanotpadyate /... kāyakarmasaṃśabditāc cetanāviśeṣāt....*

52. For the Sautrāntika arguments against the Vaibhāṣika theory of existence in the future and the past see Abhidh-k-bh on 5.26.

53. See Louis de la Vallée Poussin, 'Sarvāstivāda', in MCB 5 (1936-7) 140.

54. See Abhidh-k-bh, Pudgalaviniścaya, 1229 (*katham asaty ātmani vinaṣṭāt karmaṇa āyatyāṃ phalotpattiḥ*...) to 1231[10] (...*na punar vipākāntaram iti*). The present author's rendering of *pariṇāmaviśeṣa* follows Vasubandhu, ibid. 1230[6-8]: *yaḥ karmapūrva uttarottaracittaprasavaḥ sā saṃtatiḥ / tasyā anyathotpattiḥ pariṇāmaḥ / sa punar yo 'nantaraṃ phalotpādanasamarthaḥ* so *'ntyapariṇāmaviśiṣṭatvāt pariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ /*, "The 'series' [*saṃtati*] is the sequence of mind-events that arises in the wake of an intentional action. The 'process of change' [*pariṇāma*] is the fact that this series changes as it proceeds. The 'final, critical point of the process of change' [*pariṇāmaviśeṣa*] is that mind-event in the series which has the power to give rise directly to the fruit of the action. It is called *pariṇāmaviśeṣa*, literally 'exceptional change', because it is distinguished [*viśiṣṭa*] by [the fact that it is] the culminating [moment of the process of] change."

55. Ibid. 1229[11] - 1230[5]: *naiva tu vayaṃ vinaṣṭāt karmaṇa āyatyāṃ phalotpattiṃ brūmaḥ / kiṃ tarhi / tatsaṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣād bījaphalavat /*, "But we do not claim that the retribution in the future arises from the no longer existent action. What do you claim then ? [We claim that it arises] from the specific transformation of the series [of events that arises] from that [action]."

56. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 17.6 - 10: *tiṣṭhaty ā pākakālāc cet karma tan nityatām iyāt / niruddhaṃ cen niruddhaṃ sat kiṃ phalaṃ janayiṣyati // 6 // yo 'ṅkuraprabhṛtir bījāt saṃtāno 'bhipravartate / tataḥ phalam ṛte bījāt sa ca nābhipravartate // 7 // bījāc ca yasmāt saṃtānaḥ saṃtānāc ca phalodhavaḥ / bījapūrvaṃ phalaṃ tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvatam // 8 // yas tasmāc cittasaṃtānaś cetaso 'bhipravartate / tataḥ phalam ṛte cittāt sa ca nābhipravartate // 9 // cittāc ca yasmāt saṃtānaḥ saṃtānāc ca phalodbhavaḥ / karmapūrvaṃ phalaṃ tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvatam // 10 //.*

57. One might argue (with the Theravādin *vibhajyavāda*) that the action would not be eternal, because it would cease to exist once its consequence had been experienced. But Candrakīrti explains for Nāgārjuna: *naitad evaṃ pūrvaṃ vināśarahitasyākāśādivat paścād api vināśena saṃbandhābhāvāt / vināśarahitasya cāsaṃskṛtatvaprasaṅgād asaṃskṛtānāṃ ca vipākādarśanād avipākatvena sadaivāvasthānān nityatābhyupagama eva karmaṇām upapadyate /*, "This is not so, for what had been spared annihilation up to that point would also be dissociated from annihilation thereafter, being like space and other such [unconditioned phenomena]. Whatever escapes annihilation must be non-conditioned, and non-conditioned phenomena are not seen to undergo any process of maturation into something else. Because they do not 'mature' they endure for ever. It follows that we would have to accept that actions are eternal."

58. Abhidh-k-bh on 1.2cd.

59. See Abhidh-k-bh on 4.4ab.

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3

On the Status of Plants in Earliest Buddhism[1]

Lambert Schmithausen

In Vedic religion as well as in Jainism, not only animals but also plants and even the elements - especially water and earth - are living, sentient beings, and injuring (especially killing) them entails retribution. In Vedic religion, killing living beings is enjoined in the context of ritual, which at the same time provides means for avoiding retributions, but *brahmacārins* (not yet entitled to ritual) and renouncers (who have abandoned ritual) can avoid retribution only by entirely avoiding injuring or killing. The same is true of the Jainas, who do not believe in ritual. Hence, especially Jaina monks and nuns have to refrain from killing or injuring any living beings, including plants and elements as much as possible. The Buddhists, on the other hand, have usually rejected the idea that plants are sentient beings, not to speak of the elements. In the Prātimokṣasūtra, however, Buddhist monks and nuns, too, are prohibited from injuring plants and even from digging the earth or spoiling water. The question to be dealt with in my paper is whether at all, or to what extent, such prohibitions presuppose a belief in the sentience of plants etc., and whether there are other clues for ascertaining the status of plants, etc., in Earliest Buddhism. The result of my investigation is that there are some passages in the Suttapiṭaka which seem to imply that on the one hand in earliest Buddhism it was still taken for granted that plants, too, are living beings. On the other hand, they appear to have been felt to be a kind of border-line case, with a growing tendency to ignore their sentience, more or less, when it raised serious problems of practicability.

When asking what status plants had in earliest Buddhism, I put this question, on the one hand, as a historian of ideas. The answer depends on what the sources (in my case mainly the early texts) disclose if one tries to understand them without preconceptions, in a natural way, so to speak. This means, among other things, that one should try to understand a passage, if possible, by itself and against the background of the ideas and terminology or phraseology of its own time, and that one should not lightly follow the interpretations of commentaries stemming from a

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considerably later period characterized by more developed or even new ideas.

The result of such an investigation may differ from what came to be fixed as the orthodox position, and adherents of this position may be irritated. I apologize if this should be the case with my paper. Normally I should say: If you don't like my result, just don't care about it! After all, the historical method is by no means undisputed even among scholars, many of whom will not accept my results either. However, in the present case, my motive is not merely to find out what we call "historical truth", although I shall try to do this to the best of my capacity. The main motive for giving this paper here, in the presence of Buddhists, is rather an ethical one: the treatment of plants by man.

Man has always been using plants, and this has probably from the outset involved a certain amount of injuring and destruction. Today, however, both the dimension and relentlessness of destruction have increased formidably, and man is about to extirpate all plants that do not fit in with his wants or whims. This is also true of most Buddhist countries, and I am afraid Thailand is one of them. Therefore, it would seem that Buddhists, too, ought to reconsider their attitude towards plants, and their view of what plants are.

As is well-known, Buddhism, at least on the doctrinal level, and apart from certain developments in the Far East, *denies* plants the status of living or, more precisely, sentient beings (*satta*, *pāṇa*), i.e., beings having at least one sense-faculty (viz. the sense of touch) and some kind of mind.[2] Not being living, sentient beings, plants are not (at least not directly) protected by the Buddhist precept not to kill living beings (*pāṇātipātā veramaṇī*). Still, in at least some traditional Buddhist societies there was, for reasons that will become clear below (pp. 5 and 13), at least a certain reluctance to destroy *trees*. In modern societies, such inhibitions tend to disappear, and this is why the status of plants, and behaviour towards them, needs reconsideration. It is in this existential context -as a plea on behalf of the very weakest, who cannot even cry -that I dare to present, to this audience, the results of my investigation into the status of plants in earliest Buddhism.[3]

Let us first have a look at what we know about the views of other Indian religions prior to or contemporary with earliest Buddhism.

As for Vedic religion, there is sufficient evidence that not only plants as well as seeds but even water and earth were, more or less naively, believed to be living and even sentient,[4] and fire and wind had at least a personalized, divine aspect (viz. the gods Agni on the one hand, and Vāyu and Vāta on the other).

In post-Vedic Hinduism, at least the view that plants and seeds are sentient beings is still well documented,[5] although some circles and authors disagree.[6] Occasionally, even stones, water or the earth are admitted as living or sentient.[7]

Jainism is, on the whole, extremely conservative and has stuck, until today, to the view that plants and seeds are sentient beings, and according to the view prevailing in Jaina sources even earth, water, wind and fire consist of minute living beings possessing, like plants, the sense of touch.[8] In contrast to the Vedic ritualist who believes to be able to counteract the act of killing by certain ritual or meta-ritual

devices, the Jaina has no such possibility. For him, killing inevitably means bad karma, and if he wants to avoid bad karma - as is, in Jainism, essential for release - he has to avoid all killing of living beings, including plants and even the element-beings. This is, of course, very difficult and entails very strict rules of conduct for the Jain monk.

Now let us turn to Buddhism. Here, too, killing living beings has to be avoided; and living beings doubtless include animals. But how about plants? Were they excluded from the outset? Or are there any passages proving or at least strongly suggesting that in earliest Buddhism plants were still regarded as living, sentient beings, or at least not yet definitely considered to be lifeless and insentient?

Let me start with the Pāṭimokkhasutta. The most important passage in our context is, of course, Pācittiya 11:

> "If [a monk or nun] is ruthless with regard to plants, this is an offence to be atoned" (*bhūtagāmapātabyatāya pācittiyaṃ*)."

Before asking what this *sutta* suggests as regards the status of plants, a few philological problems have to be discussed.

Firstly, in '*bhūta-gāma*' (Skt. *bhūta-grāma*),[9] '*gāma*' originally means "multitude", "mass"[10] and is little more than a suffix of collectivity. For '*bhūta*', the special meaning "(green, fresh, 'living') plant, vegetable"[11] is confirmed by the commentaries[12] as well as by some Chinese translations,[13] and also by some parallel passages,[14] and even by a Jaina commentary[15] specifying, in a quite different context, *bhūta* as trees.[16]

As for '*pātabyatā*', its derivation is doubtful, and my rendering "ruthlessness" is no more than a guess, chosen in view of other contexts, like *kāmesu pātabyatā*,[17] which seems to mean something like lack of restraint with regard to sensual pleasures, i.e., indulging in them. In the present case, as also when referring to living beings (*pāṇesu pātabyatā*),[18] lack of restraint would not, however, be indulgence but ruthless, destructive behaviour, and as the commentaries[19] as well as the Sanskrit versions[20] and the Tibetan and Chinese translations[21] suggest this would, in the case of plants, consist in cutting, felling, splitting, etc.

This is also confirmed by a parallel in the Suttapiṭaka,[22] where a monk's morality (*sīla*) is said to include abstention from injuring or killing seeds and plants (*bījagāma-bhūtagāma-samārambha*).[23] By some later sources[24] and by a contemporary German Buddhist,[25] this rule is understood as a prohibition of agriculture. Though '*samārambha*' can have the meaning "undertaking" or "effort", Buddhaghosa is certainly right in preferring the meaning "injuring".[26] At Sn 311, '*samārambha*' unambiguously means killing of cattle.[27] In this sense, '*samārabhati*' as well as '*ārabhati*' continue Vedic '*ālabhate*'[28] "to seize", used as a euphemism for "to kill [a victim in sacrificial ritual]",[29] and there is ample evidence of a similar use also in Jaina texts[30] and in the Aśoka inscriptions.[31] Therefore, this Suttapiṭaka passage refers to the same issue as Pācittiya 11.

The only essential difference is that the Suttapiṭaka passage speaks of seeds and plants, whereas the Pāṭimokkha mentions only plants. But this discrepancy may not be original. For, among the Prātimokṣasūtra versions of other Buddhist schools,

preserved in Sanskrit and Chinese, a majority speaks not of plants only but, just as the Suttapiṭaka passage, of seeds and plants.[32] In view of the Suttapiṭaka parallel,[33] this reading is likely to be the original one; the more so since the versions containing it stem from schools unrelated to each other,[34] whereas the versions omitting the seeds belong, as far as I can see, to closely related schools.[35] It would, moreover, seem to be more difficult to conceive of a reason for a later addition of the seeds than to account for their omission.[36]

There can thus be little doubt that the Pāṭimokkhasutta declares injuring or destroying plants, and originally probably even seeds, to be a *pācittiya* offence, just like killing animals (Pāc. 61). The question is, however, whether destroying plants and seeds was prohibited because in earliest Buddhism plants and seeds were still considered as living, maybe even sentient beings, just as in Vedic religion and Jainism, or whether there is some other explanation.

To be sure, there are other explanations in the Suttavibhaṅga, but modern scholars have good reasons to consider the Suttavibhaṅga, as we have it, to be of somewhat later origin than the Pāṭimokkhasutta itself.[37] Hence, as a historian of ideas, I must be careful. The only thing I can do for the moment is to have a look whether the explanations of the Suttavibhaṅga actually fit in with the Pāṭimokkhasutta itself.

In the Pāli Vinaya,[38] there are two such explanations. One tells the story of monks felling a tree, an action disapproved by people as an act of injuring since they regard trees as living beings with one sense-faculty (*ekindriya jīva*). The other refers to a monk felling a tree and thereby hitting the arm of the child of the deity or spirit inhabiting the tree, and, of course, also destroying the deity's abode.

The second explanation is clearly secondary. For firstly it is palpably intercalated,[39] and in fact missing in both the Vinaya of the Mahāsāṅghikas[40] and at least one of the Sthavira branch;[41] and secondly it could only explain a prohibition to fell or injure trees, at best plants in general (if, as SN IV 302 suggests,[42] even grass and herbs are inhabited by deities); but it can hardly explain the prohibition to injure seeds.

On the other hand, the first explanation, viz. that monks should not destroy plants because people regard them as living beings, is, more or less explicitly, found both in the Vinayas of the Sthavira branch[43] (except for two dubious cases)[44] and in that of the Mahāsāṅghikas,[45] and it is doubtless suited to explain the prohibition as it stands; for as was stated above[46] at least the Jainas consider all plants as well as seeds to be living beings with one sense-faculty, and similar belief was probably widespread in early India, at least in rural areas. I was told by a Burmese scholar[47] that in Burma people still regard plants as living beings and speak of *rukkha-jīva*, etc.; and M. Maithri Murthi[48] writes the same about Sri Lanka where, as he states, the idea of plants as living beings with one sense-faculty (*ekindriya-pāṇin*) is still found in popular Buddhism. Cp., in this connection, also the talking tree of Ja IV 210,[49] and especially the Bhaddasālajātaka[50] where the tree deity shows characteristic features of a tree soul since she is so closely connected with the tree she inhabits that she has to die when it is felled, and since she even calls it her body.

According to the explanation of the Suttavibhaṅga under discussion, it would,

however, be only in order to allow for such a view of *people*, i.e. other people, that a monk should not injure or destroy plants (and seeds). It seems to be implied that the monks themselves do not share the belief in plants (and seeds) being living, sentient beings. Hence, not to injure plants would not be a moral act in the strict sense but, at least from the point of view of the monks, rather an act of decency.[51] There is no intrinsic contradiction in such a view because the Pāṭimokkha (though some of its prohibitions do also refer to morality proper) is primarily concerned with the correct and decent behaviour of the Order and its members in society. If - as it appears to have been the case - many people still believed plants and seeds to be sentient beings and hence considered not to injure or destroy them as part of the proper behaviour of an ascetic,[52] then it makes good sense that Buddhist monks, too, were enjoined not to injure plants and seeds even if they themselves no longer shared this belief. But as a historian I cannot be sure that this explanation of the Suttavibhaṅga, doubtless possible, does indeed represent the original situation; for, the Pāṭimokkhasutta itself would make equally good sense if originally also the monks themselves, and even the Buddha, still somehow held the view that plants and seeds were living beings. Therefore, additional evidence is required.

There are, in the Pāṭimokkhasutta and also in the Khandhaka, some passages which prohibit more special cases of injuring plants, but as far as I can see none of them yields unambiguous information with regard to the original motive. Let us rather turn to possible evidence in the *Suttapiṭaka*.[53]

I have already referred to the passage stating that a monk refrains from injuring or destroying seeds and plants (*bījagāma-bhūtagāma-samārambha*).[54] Since this passage belongs to the context of morals (*sīla*), one might think that destroying seeds and plants is a morally bad action. This, however, would be hardly intelligible unless seeds and plants themselves[55] are, somehow, affected by that action, hence living if not sentient beings. But the context is not simply morals, but morals or *sīla* of a *monk*, and may hence include matters of mere decent behaviour, or at least points considered as immoral not by the monks themselves but only by (a significant part of) the society. Therefore, as for the status of seeds and plants, this passage is as inconclusive[56] as Pācittiya 11.

But there is also evidence which is not concerned with monks' morals but with that of a layman, namely the Kūṭadanta Sermon, where the sacrifice of a great king of the past is described.[57] This sacrifice is characterized as superior to the traditional ones because the only offerings were things like butter, curds and molasses, but no animals were slaughtered as sacrificial victims, no trees were felled for being used as sacrificial posts, and no grass was cut to strew it over the sacrificial ground. This clearly presupposes that felling trees and cutting grass are acts of *hiṃsā*, of injuring or killing, and that plants, too, are living beings.

However, in this case one might argue that the text, dealing with the pre-Buddhist past, presupposes not the - in a sense "modern" - Buddhist point of view but rather the older, Vedic belief.

Besides, one might argue that the divergence of the Buddhist view from this older

belief is signalized by the fact that the text uses the word '*pāṇa*', i.e., "living or breathing beings", only with regard to the animals, hence virtually excluding plants from this category. This is also the case in the Pāṭimokkhasutta. But there, at Pāc. 61 (*yo ... pānaṃ jīvitā voropeyya, pācittiyaṃ)*, it is absolutely clear that '*pāṇa*' means "animal" also in contrast to *men*; for killing a man is not a *pācittiya* but a *pārājika* offence. Thus, '*pāṇa*' appears to have come to be used in the special sense of "animal". Therefore, in such cases the fact that plants are not included in *pāṇa* may, to be sure, signalize an awareness of some difference between plants and animals, but it does not necessarily exclude plants from the realm of living or sentient beings.

On the other hand, '*pāṇa*' may also be used in a broader sense, doubtless including men, as, e.g., in the general precept not to kill living beings (*pāṇātipātā veramaṇī*).[58] But does that mean that *pāṇa*' may even comprise plants? Actually, the Suttapiṭaka does contain some passages using '*pāṇa*' in a broader sense that are of greatest importance for the plant problem. Especially in old verse texts, but occasionally also in prose *suttas*,[59] we find references to the mobile (*tasa*) and stationary (*thāvara*) living beings. And the word for "living beings" is, in some of these passages, '*pāṇa*'[60] or '*pāṇabhū(ta)*'[61]. And even where the corresponding word is '*bhūta*'[62] or is missing,[63] we can in most cases still be sure that the texts refer to the mobile and stationary living beings. For the context is usually that a Buddhist, especially a Buddhist monk, should not injure[64] or oppress[65] them, should be neither hostile nor attached to them,[66] but should rather protect them[67] and suffuse them with friendship and benevolence (*mettā*).[68]

At least oppressing and suffusing with benevolence would seem to make sense only with regard to living, nay sentient beings. In this regard, my interpretation of the verses is in agreement with the commentaries; for they too take the *tasa* and *thāvara* to comprise all living, sentient beings (*satta*).[69]

According to the commentaries, the *tasa* are those living beings who are still under the sway of Thirst or desire (*tasiṇā, taṇhā*) and of fear (*bhayabherava*), i.e., ordinary beings, whereas the *thāvara*, the stationary ones, are those who are free from thirst and fear, i.e., the saints.[70] This means that '*tasa*' is either derived from the root *tṛṣ* "to be thirsty" or from *tras* in the sense of "to tremble with fear", taken in a metaphorical sense, and that '*thāvara*' is also taken in a metaphorical sense, namely that of spiritual and emotional stability, and referred to *human* beings.

However, in a historical perspective I cannot help having problems with this interpretation of the expression "*tasa* and *thāvara* (living beings)". For, this expression is quite frequent in Jaina sources,[71] where it can hardly mean anything but "mobile[72] and stationary living beings" in a literal sense, the stationary living beings usually consisting of earth-beings, water-beings and, last but not least, *plants*.[73] The dichotomy (though not the terminology) goes back to Vedic times,[74] and is common also in Hindu sources.[75] And even in later Buddhist sources '*sthāvara*' occurs in the sense of "plant".[76] It is difficult to imagine that any auditor at the time of earliest Buddhism would have understood the fairly common expression "*tasa* and *thāvara* (living beings)" in a different sense, and hence I for one do not find it probable that they were

used differently without any explicit warning. It is more probable that it was only at a somewhat later date that the notion of stationary living beings was found to be at variance with the Buddhist doctrine that plants are not living beings, and that therefore both concepts were reinterpreted in the commentaries. But even among contemporary Buddhists, their reinterpretation has not remained undisputed, some Sri Lankan monks suggesting that the stationary living beings are special animals like sea-anemones.[77]

Anyway, there is yet another passage where plants are - I should say: unequivocally - included in the category "living, animate beings" (*pāṇa*): In Sn 600ff, a series of verses is introduced by the remark that what follows is an explication of how species of living beings (*pāṇa*) are distinguished from each other, namely by specific biological characteristics, in contrast to the social distinctions established in human society. The explication then starts with *plants*, which are quite obviously regarded as part of the living beings (*pāṇa*), just like the animals treated subsequently.

The commentary[78] wonders why the text starts with plants when it should, according to its introductory verse, explicate the distinctive marks of living beings, i.e., animals, and suggests that this is a propaedeutical device, facilitating instruction with regard to the animals. But this is surely not the natural way of understanding the situation. It is the understanding of one who presupposes the view that plants are definitely *not* living beings, and who hence thinks that the text cannot by any means have intended them to be included among the latter. The only natural, unbiased way of understanding the text is to accept that it does precisely this, namely, that it takes for granted that plants form a group among living, animate beings (*pāṇa*).

In the light of this passage, then, in all probability, the above-mentioned expression '*tasa-thāvarā pāṇā*', too, was, also in earliest Buddhism, understood as "mobile and stationary living beings", the stationary living beings being the plants.

I for one find it extremely difficult to account for these passages if we assume that Buddhism from the very beginning dogmatically denied plants the status of living beings. Even if we assume that these passages were borrowed or adapted from some non-Buddhist tradition, such a borrowing or adaption is hardly conceivable if the idea that plants are living beings had already been categorically rejected. Actually, there is, to my knowledge at least, no explicit rejection or refutation of the sentiency of plants in the four Nikāyas (but only implicit exclusions, to be discussed later). On the other hand, the passages presupposing plants to be living beings (*pāṇa*) are comparatively few, and there are no fully explicit statements to this effect either. Therefore, it would seem that in earliest Buddhism the question of the status of plants had not yet been settled on a theoretical level.

My impression is that plants were felt to be a kind of *border-line case*, treated differently in different contexts, in a pragmatic way.

In the context of Sn 600ff, envisaging a kind of rough but comprehensive outline of taxonomy of biological species, there was no reason to exclude them; and also in ethical spirituality, in the context of developing an all-encompassing attitude of universal peacefulness or benevolence, or when *ideal* behaviour is described, it was

quite natural that even a border-line case, like plants, was expressly included.

In *practical life*, however, the situation becomes more complicated. On the one hand, *monks* and nuns were, to be sure, in a position to put the attitude of peacefulness even towards plants into practice by actually not injuring them, and this is what the Pāṭimokkhasutta enjoins them to do. But it clearly distinguishes between seeds and plants on the one hand and *pāṇa*, restricted to animals, on the other. This may indicate that in the context of practical life this distinction is, in fact important. Not so much, however, for the monks as for *lay people*. For, in an agrarian or urban society, lay people can perhaps, at least in a country like India, survive without killing animals, but hardly without harvesting and preparing vegetables, fruit and grain. Hence, there is good reason for a distinction, especially in connection with the everyday life of lay people. But this distinction is somehow mirrored even in the rules of behaviour for monks and nuns.

The specific character of the Buddhist attitude becomes clear if one contrasts it with the Jainist one. In Jainism, too, the basic commandments for lay people are confined to the prohibition of gross *hiṃsā*, i.e., killing animals, whereas destruction of plants[79] forms part of subtle *hiṃsā* which is obligatory for the ascetic only. But since Jainism does not in any form reduce or ignore the idea that plants, too, are living, sentient beings, all forms of injuring or killing them cannot but be bad karma. Hence, also the Jaina layman is enjoined to avoid destruction, particularly useless destruction, of plants, too, as far as possible,[80] and for that reason Jainas try to refrain from professions like agriculture[81] and tend to be businessmen.[82]

Buddhism, on the other hand, appears to have deliberately avoided arousing qualms in lay people in connection with the utilization of plants for food and other basic needs. Lay people, to be sure, save the monk the trouble to "kill" plants and seeds, but this "killing" is obviously played down. As Maithri Murthi[83] states, villagers in Sri Lanka, though regarding plants to be, somehow, living beings, yet do not consider cutting them to be bad karma,[84] and I for one do not know of any passage in a Buddhist text where a lay person is remonstrated for cutting or preparing plants or seeds for food.

Accordingly, in Jainism, a monk is not allowed to eat any kind of food that has been prepared or bought expressly for him.[85] This means that not only in the case of animals but also in the case of plants he must avoid even to be the indirect cause for their being killed. In the case of the Buddhist monk, on the other hand, it is only meat and fish that he should not eat if he knows or supposes that the animal was killed expressly for him.[86] There is no such restriction with regard to vegetable food, which means that "killing" plants is taken less seriously.

There is a similar difference between Buddhism and Jainism with regard to drinking water. A Jaina monk is prohibited from drinking fresh water since this would be an act of killing, water being regarded as consisting of living beings.[87] He is allowed to drink water only when somebody else (i.e. a lay follower) has already cooked it, i.e. has made it lifeless.[88] For a Buddhist monk, on the other hand, there is no such restriction. He is allowed to drink fresh water provided that it is free from tiny animals.[89] This means that in the case of water the old belief that it, too, is living and even sentient is disregarded completely.[90]

This is hardly accidental. For in a tropical country being prohibited from drinking fresh water doubtless causes much more inconvenience than having to depend on alms for food. Thus it would seem that in this case, too, it is *practicability* that determined Buddhism to ignore the old belief in animateness and sentiency. In contrast to the Jainas, for whom liberation depends on a punctilious avoidance of injuring even the most minute living beings and on severe austerity, in Buddhism, the decisive point is the spiritual process of the eradication of Desire. Abstention from killing living beings is a presupposition for spiritual progress, but had to be kept within practicable limits in order not to become a handicap to the main aim. This is supported by the Mahāsīhanādasutta where the Buddha, describing the severe but futile austerities he had practised before his Awakening, also mentions, as one of them, excessive punctiliousness in mindfulness (*sati*) like paying heed even to the drops of water on the way.[91] It is this sense of the practicability of the precepts, for both monks and lay people, that was probably also the reason for the pragmatic treatment of the status of plants in earliest Buddhism.

It is, however, possible (to my mind even probable) that Buddhism did not initiate the tendency towards weakening the view of plants, let alone earth and water, as sentient beings. This tendency may well have started in connection with an overall process of rationalization, perhaps concomitant with the emergence of urbanization.[92] If this is true, Buddhism would have accepted this tendency because it facilitated practicability - practicability, to be sure, for the monks and nuns who could concentrate their effort on their spiritual task of eradicating Desire, but no less for the peasants who were not obliged to remorse for tilling the soil, using water or harvesting plants, and hence could be integrated by Buddhism much better than by Jainism.

Later on, however, this pragmatic flexibility and reticence fell a prey to the desire for an unambiguous theoretical position, which amounted to plants being virtually, and in the end, at least on the doctrinal level,[93] explicitly, excluded from the range of sentient beings, which means that in the long run the point of view of practicability in connection with food, etc., has come to prevail over the other aspects.

This change is already palpable in, e.g., the scheme of the four *yonis*,[94] classifying living beings according to the way they are born. As a comparison with similar Jainist and Brahmanical patterns shows, the plants are missing in this scheme;[95] for it lacks the category under which they are usually taken to be subsumed, viz. the "sprout-born" (*udbhijja*) beings.[96]

It is, however, only in comparatively late texts that we find express statements that plants are not sentient beings,[97] and formal arguments to prove this or to disprove the opposite view.[98]

In most schools of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, plants are viewed as being entirely on the same level as inorganic things like a clod or a crystal.[99] In Theravāda dogmatics, however, a trace of their original border-line position appears to have been preserved; for, according to Nārada,[100] plants are, to be sure, devoid of mental life-force (*nāma-jīvitindriya*), but they do have material life-force (*rūpa-jīvitindriya*), though only one different from the karma-conditioned one of men and animals. They are thus, it is true,

not sentient, but, in a sense, living beings.

By way of conclusion, let me link up the past with the present, and with the future.

Our problem today is not so much: How can we use (and this means in most cases: injure) plants without becoming guilty? It is rather: How can we come to feel guilty again when using and injuring plants to the point of extirpation?

If the usual Buddhist view is presupposed, viz. that plants are not living beings, at least not in the sense of being sentient or at any rate somehow susceptible to injury, one may recur to the two above-mentioned reasons offered by the Suttavibhaṅga when motivating the precept not to injure them.

One is regard for the view of common people who did consider plants to be living, sentient beings. Unfortunately, this argument, apart from addressing monks only, will hardly work in our rationalistic modern societies, where most people seem to hold just the opposite view, or at least behave as if they did.

The other reason is that plants, at least trees, are inhabited by deities or spirits who may even punish the destruction of their abodes. This argument would hold good for lay people, too, and at the same time allows cautious use of plants since some of them may be devoid of a deity or because the deity can be requested to please choose another abode.[101] However, in modern society belief in such deities is vanishing. They will not be able anymore to protect their trees. One may, at best, substitute them by the modern concept of Nature, which, mistreated, takes revenge sooner or later.

But there is a third argument, which is found in the Vinayas of the Sarvāstivādins and Mūlasarvāstivādins.[102] It starts from interpreting '*bhūta-g(r)āma*' as "village", or abode, not, or not only, of a deity but of creatures, i.e., animals, either insects, etc., or even birds and quadrupedes. To destroy plants means to destroy the abode or habitat of animals. This ecological argument is fully valid also today, even more than ever, and for both monks and lay people.

However, I for one should find it reasonable to combine this latter argument with the view that I have tried to show to have been the view of earliest Buddhism: the view that plants themselves, too, are living beings, in the sense of a border-line case. This means: Not living beings like animals, not at all living beings like men, with some secret anthropomorphic features and faculties. Hence perhaps not sentient beings in the usual sense of the word; but not entirely insentient either, not altogether insusceptible of being injured. Living beings of a peculiar kind, which we can somehow explore from outside, but which we will probably never be able to "understand" from within. Familiar beings, but at the same time utterly strange, and precisely for that reason to be treated with respect: because we simply do not know, and perhaps cannot even imagine, what it means for a plant itself to be injured.

To be sure, unless we are ready to starve, we cannot avoid using plants, and this often means: injuring or even killing them. But we should do this as little as possible, carefully and with a sense of regret. Not with the unnecessary brutality and relentlessness which has become habitual, and at the root of which is mostly not understandable need but insatiable greed.

POSTSCRIPT

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NOTES

1. Abbreviations for Pāli texts are those of the Critical Pāli Dictionary. Besides, the following abbreviations are used:

AKBh = Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, ed. P. Pradhan, Patna 1967.
Āyār = W. Schubring, Ācārāṅga-sūtra, Erster Śrutaskandha, Leipzig 1910.
BoBh = Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. N. Dutt, Patna 1966.
Dasav = Dasaveyāliya, ed. E. Leumann and trans. W. Schubring (Ahmedabad 1932); repr. in W. Schubring, Kleine Schriften (ed. K. Bruhn, Wiesbaden 1977), 109ff.
Dha. = Dharmaguptakas
Mā. = Mahāsāṅghikas
MHṛd = Madhyamakahṛdaya; ed.: Sh. Kawasaki, The Mīmāṃsā Chapter of Bhavya's *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* (3), in: Tetsugaku shisō ronshū (Tsukuba Univ.) 13/1988.
Mī. = Mahīśāsakas
Mū. = Mūlasarvāstivādins
Prāt. = Prātimokṣasūtra
Sa. = Sarvāstivādins
T = Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (Buddh. Tripiṭaka in Chinese, Taishō ed.).
TJv = Tarkajvālā: Peking Tanjur, dbu-ma, vol. dza.
Vin. = Vinaya
VinMañj = Vinayatthamañjūsā nāma Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī-ṭīkā, ed. U. P. Ekanayaka, 1937.
Vin.Mū.$_t$ = Tibetan version of the Vinaya der Mūlasarvāstivādins: Peking bKa'-'gyur, 'dul-ba.
VisM = Visuddhimagga (Buddhaghosa), ed. Warren and Kosambi, Cambridge, Mass. 1950.

2. I disregard, in this context, the case of the *asañña-satta*s or *asañña-deva*s, who, according to Theravāda dogmatics, consist of matter (*rūpakkhandha*) only (cp. VisM XVII.254f).

3. I am fully aware of the fact that the present attempt is by no means exhaustive, especially because a comprehensive treatment of the issue should perhaps, with due caution, also investigate similes, poetical imagery and artistic representations, etc., referring to plants. But this would have required more time than available.

4. E.g., Śatapathabrāhmaṇa 11.6.1 (trees, plants, water); 3.3.1.7 (earth); 3.8.5.9f (plants, trees, water); 1.2.2.11 (grain). Cp. H.-P. Schmidt, The Origin of *Ahiṃsā*, in: Mélanges d'Indianisme à la mémoire de L. Renou (Paris 1968), 644-648. Cp. also the idea of water, fire and breath (the microscopic aspect of wind) as life principles (cp., e.g., E. Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, vol. 1, Salzburg 1953, 49ff).

5. E.g., Mahābhārata (crit. ed.) 12.177.10-18. Cp. A. Wezler, Bemerkungen zu einigen von Naturbeobachtung zeugenden Textstellen und den Problemen ihrer Interpretation, in: Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 13-14(1987), 335ff; id., Cattle, field and barley: A Note on Mahābhāṣya I 337.24-27, in: Adyar Library Bulletin 50 (1986), 432ff and 455; id., On the term antaḥsaṃjña-, in: Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 68 (1987), 111ff; W. Halbfass, Karma, *Apūrva*, and "Natural" Causes: Observations on the Growth and Limits of the Theory of *Saṃsāra*, in: W. D. O'Flaherty (ed.), Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions (1980), 291f and 301; W. Slaje, Bewußtsein und Wahrnehmungsvermögen von Pflanzen aus hinduistischer Sicht, in: B.

Scholz (ed.), Der Orientalische Mensch und seine Beziehungen zur Umwelt (Graz 1989), 151ff.

6. Cp. Halbfass, op. cit. [see n. 5], 291f (Praśastapāda and others); Wezler, Cattle ... [see n. 5], 460f and 476 (pointing out a certain tendency, at least in certain circles, to abandon the idea of the sentience of plants in the course of time); id., On the term ... [see n. 5], 129f; Slaje, op. cit. [see n. 5], 152 (Abhinavagupta).

7. Slaje, op. cit. [n. 5], 152 (Śaiva author Bhāskara, 18th century: water and earth) and 157 (Yogavāsiṣṭha : stones but not atoms and elements); cp. also Rāmānuja ad Bhagavadgītā 14.18 (rebirth as a stone or clod).

8. E.g., Dasav 4.1; Āyār 41,4; cp. W. Schubring, Die Lehre der Jainas (Berlin/Leipzig 1935), 133f. Cp., however, Dasav 6.33ff, where at least fire itself is not regarded as consisting of living beings; Āyār p. 2,3ff is, at least partly, ambiguous; cp. ib., 57f; Bansidhar Bhatt, The Concept of the Self and Liberation in Early Jaina Agamas, in: Self and Consciousness: Indian Interpretation (Rome 1989), 135ff.

9. Cp. T. Sugimoto, *Bhūtagrāma* ni tsuite, in: JIBSt 26.2 (1978), 623ff.

10. Cp. Sp 761: *rāsi*; Paṭis-a 690: *samūha*; cp. also T vol. 23, 474b7 (see n. 13) and Vin.Mū.$_t$ ce 249b5f (Vin.Mū.): *tshogs* (but je 260a3 and 7 has *gnas*).

11. Buddhaghosa (Sp 761: *jāyanti vaḍḍhanti jātā vaḍḍhitā cā ti attho*) may not be far off the mark; cp. M. Mayrhofer, Kurzgefaßtes Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen (Heidelberg 1956-1980), mentioning, s.v. *bhavati*, Armenian *boys* "Schößling, Pflanze"; cp. also German "Gewächs", mainly used for plants.

12. E.g., Sp 761 (*patiṭṭhita-harita-tiṇarukkhādī*); Sv I 77 (*alla-tiṇarukkhādika*); Spk III 134; Mp IV 51.

13. T vol. 22, 41c17 (Vin.Mī.): 生草木 "living herbs and trees"; T vol. 23, 474b7 (Prāt. Sa.) 衆草木 "all herbs and trees"; T vol. 24, No. 1464 (a Vinaya of the Sa.: cp. n. 35), 879c5 樹 :"trees".

14. MN I 230; SN V 46; AN IV 100 (where *osadhi-tiṇa-vanappatayo* is best taken as a gloss on *bhūtagāma*); similarly L. Sander and E. Waldschmidt, Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden, IV (Wiesbaden 1980), 100f; Śikṣāsamuccaya (ed. Bendall) 206,10; Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra (ed. Vaidya) 84,20f (where *bīja-grāma* is accompanied by *oṣadhi-grāma* instead of *bhūta-grāma*).

15. Śīlāṅka ad Āyār p. 5,6.

16. In Hindu sources, *bhūtagrāma* is usually less specific, including both stationary and mobile beings, thus at any rate plants as well as animals; cp., e.g., Mahābhārata 12.249.6-7; 14.42.19; Śaṅkara on Brahmasūtra 3.1.20 and on Bhagavadgītā 8.19; cp. Sugimoto, op. cit. [n.9], 625. A likewise comprehensive use is found at Samavāya 14.1 (Jaina Āgama Granthamālā ed., p. 351).

17. Vin V 123; MN I 305; 307; AN I 266; 295; cp. also DN III 89 (*asmiṃ asaddhamme*, i. e. *methune*).

18. Vin III 42.

19. Sp 761: *chedanabhedanādīni*; cp. Vin IV 35: *chindati ... bhindati ... pacati.*

20. Prāt.Mā. (ed. Tatia, Patna 1976), p. 20,5: °*pātāpanake*; Prāt.Sa. (ed. Finot in: Journal Asiatique 1913), 504: °*pātanāt* (G. v. Simson, Prātimokṣasūtra der Sarvāstivādins, Teil I, Göttingen 1986, 88, reads °*patanāt*); Prāt.Mū. (Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts, Facsimile Edition, Part I), p. 31, leaf 51, l. 4: °*pātana-pātāpanāt.*

21. E.g., T vol. 22, 197a20: 伐 "felling"; 552b6: 破 "breaking"; 1018b23: 壞 "destroying"; vol. 23, 75a22f: 拔 "pulling out"; 474b7: 殺 "killing"; vol. 24, 879c5: 斫 "chopping"; Vin. Mū.$_t$ je 260a3: "destroying" (*'jig*).

22. DN I 5; 64; MN I 180; 268; III 34; AN II 209; V 205; cp. SN V 470.

23. This (minor) precept is missing in the parallel versions known to me (Saṅgha-bhedavastu of Vin. Mū., ed. R. Gnoli, Rome 1978, II, 233,6ff = Vin.Mū.$_t$ ce 249a2ff; T vol. 1, 83c27ff, 89a5ff, 264c4ff and 273a8ff [Dīrghāgama]; 657b6ff and 733b20ff [Madhyamāgama]), some of which have abstention from

drinking wine instead. K. Meisig (Das Śrāmaṇyaphala-sūtra, Wiesbaden 1987, 58) thinks that the latter is the original item and that the first part of the series of precepts to which it belongs is modelled on the latter part of the ten *śikṣāpadas* for lay followers practising *uposatha*. But it is more probable that special *uposatha* rules for lay followers were moulded after the monastic precepts and that in this connection the precept not to injure plants and seeds was omitted because it was impracticable for lay people. On the other hand, if the precept not to drink alcohol was originally missing in the monastic precepts, it is understandable that it was introduced later on, since monks too should not of course drink wine. At any rate, it is quite difficult to see why the Theravāda tradition should have removed the prohibition to drink alcohol, which has hardly lost its importance in later times, and should have replaced it by the archaic rule to abstain from injuring seeds and plants. If, however, we start from the assumption that the latter is the original one, it is quite easy to understand that when it had become more or less obsolete it came to be replaced by the more topical precept not to drink alcohol, which was missed (cp. also SN V 467 where this precept has been incorporated but still remains outside the traditional series (ib. 468-474)). This way of looking at things is, by the way, supported also by another fact: In some Sūtras (DN I 5; 64f) the series of precepts under discussion is followed by another one, which Meisig (op. cit., 59) supposes to be a kind of "commentarial extension". Now, this latter series, too, starts with a paragraph criticizing ascetics injuring seeds and plants, and, what is more, this latter paragraph is found also in some versions where the precept not to injure seeds and plants is missing in the preceding series (T vol. 1, 84a9-11; Saṅghabhedavastu II 234,3-7).

24. Vin.Mū.$_t$ ce 249b5ff: *rtsom pa* "undertaking". Cp. also T vol. 1, 84a10f and 89a18, prohibiting monks from sowing or planting trees which may become the abode (**grāma*) of demons or spirits (**bhūta*).

25. Hellmuth Hecker, Die Ethik des Buddha (Hamburg 1976), 218.

26. As 146; Sv I 77 (*chedana-bhedana-pacanâdi-bhāvena vikopana*). Cp. also Mp II 267 (ad AN I 169): *pīḷa-saṃkhāto samārambho.*

27. Cp. also AN II 197f, which has (albeit, in view of the subsequent *vacī-* and *mano-samārambha*, probably with a shift of meaning) *kāya-samārambha* where the parallel passage MN I 361 has *pāṇātipāta etc.*.

28. CPD s.v. ^{2}*ārabhati.*

29. Cp. H. Oertel, Euphemismem in der vedischen Prosa und euphemistische Varianten in den Mantras (Sitzungsber. d. Bayer. Akad. d. Wiss., 1942), 7ff; T. Gotō, *rabh-*, *labh-* + *ā* in der vedischen Literatur, in: JIBSt XXIV.2 (1976), (29)f.

30. E.g., Āyār 15,17 (*no pāṇiṇaṃ pāṇe samārabhejjāsi*) beside Ja I 168 (*na pāṇo pāṇinaṃ haññe*); Dasav 6.29 (*puḍhavikāya-samārambha*; cy.: *ālekhanādi*) beside 6.27 (*puḍhavikāyaṃ ... hiṃsanti*).

31. Rock Edicts III D (*pānānaṃ anālaṃbhe*); IV A (*pānālaṃbhe*); I B, F-H.

32. Prāt.Mā. (ed. Tatia, Patna 1975), 20,5; cp. T vol. 22, 552b6; Prāt.Sa., ed. Finot [see n. 20], 504; ed. v. Simson [see n. 20], 49 and 88; cp. T vol. 23, 75a22f and 482c29; Prāt.Mū., loc. cit. [see n. 20]; cp. T vol. 23, 776b5f; vol 24, 504a18; Vin.Mū.$_t$ je 260a3; Prāt. der Kāśyapīyas (T vol. 24), 662b10.

33. Cp. also Mahāvyutpatti No. 8431: *bījagrāma-bhutagrāma-vināśanam.* Cp., moreover, the fact that in Jaina sources, too, the combination of green plants (*harita*) with seeds (*bīya*, *bīja*) is not unfrequently met with, and in similar contexts at that (cp., e.g., Āyār 41,4; 37,24; Dasav 4.11 = p. 13,11-13).

34. There is no special relationship or close connection between the Mahā-sāṅghikas, Mūlasarvāstivādins and Kāśyapīyas. As for the Sarvāstivādins, their Vinaya- and Sūtrapiṭaka has, to be sure, many features in common with that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, but this may be due to close contact from a certain time onward, and not to original relationship. According to E. Frauwallner (The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature, Rome 1956, 24ff), the Sarvāstivādins originally rather belong to the same group as the Theravādins. Actually, the reading of several old Chinese versions of their Prātimokṣasūtra goes with that group (see n. 35).

35. Viz. Theravādins, Mahīśāsakas (T vol. 22, 197a20), Dharmaguptakas (T vol. 22, 1018b23), and the Sarvāstivādins. As for the latter, it is, to be sure, only in Kumārajīva's translation of their Prāt. (T vol. 23, 474b7), in a still older version of a Vinayavibhaṅga of this school (T vol. 24, No. 1464, 879c5; cp. A. Yuyama, Systematische Übersicht über die buddhistische Sanskrit-Literatur, 1.Teil: Vinaya-Texte, Wiesbaden 1979, p. 7 § 1.15.C.1) and in a Tun-huang version of Prāt.Sa. (see T. Inoguchi in: K. Sasaki [ed.], Kairitsu shisō no kenkyū, Kyoto 1981, 196; Yuyama, op. cit., § 1.11.C.2) that the reference to seeds is missing, but these documents may well represent an earlier tradition of the school since the Skt. fragments are later and the "official" Chinese Vin.Sa. has been revised (Yuyama, op. cit., p. 8 § 1.15-19.C.2; cp. also L. Schmithausen in: H. Bechert (ed.), Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur, 2. Teil, Göttingen 1987, 315ff). As for the close relationship of these schools, see Frauwallner, op. cit. [n. 34], 8ff.

36. One might be tempted to see a connection between the omission of the seeds and the explanation of the precept in terms of plants as a habitation of deities or spirits (see p.5), since '*bīja-grāma*' does not allow of a similar reinterpretation. But the problem is that this secondary explanation of the *sūtra* is missing in at least one of the Vinayas of those schools which omit the seeds from the precept. Hence, this omission may, in the community from which these schools derive (see n.35), have preceded the attempts to reinterpret it, and may have been motivated by the fact that non-injuring of seeds was found too cumbrous and no longer required by the society. But I admit that the matter requires further investigation.

37. Cp., especially, D. Schlingloff, Zur Interpretation des Prātimokṣasūtra, in: Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 113 (1963), 536ff.

38. Vin IV 34.

39. Cp. the repetition of the act of felling, first ascribed to the monks of Āḷavī (plural!) and then again to a single monk. It is with the latter that the story of the tree deity (*devatā*) is connected. After this story, the text returns to the plural (*samaṇā Sakyaputtiyā ... chindissanti*). There is no further mention of the deity, not even in the Buddha's reproof of the monks' (pl.!) behaviour. If the "*devatā* block" is athetized, the remaining text is fully consistent in both form and content. Should there still be any doubt, it is removed by a glance at the introductory story to Pāc. 10 (on digging the earth), the structure of which is exactly the same as that of the one under discussion if cleared of the "*devatā* block".

40. T vol. 22, 339a.

41. Viz. in that of the Mahīśāsakas (T vol. 22, 41c). It is also missing in the version of the Dharmaguptakas (T vol. 22, 641c5ff), but this version does not offer conclusive evidence since it gives the impression of having a considerable lacuna (in line 5). However, when interpreting the wording of the *sūtra* it explains *bhūta* as "demon" (**amanuṣya*) (641c14), which may signalize that this version did contain the *devatā* story.

42. Cp. also T vol. 24, 879b29ff, esp. c4 ("in all herbs (**oṣadhi*) and trees, there are spirits/deities").

43. I.e., apart from the Pāli version, T vol. 22, 41c5ff (Vin.Mī.); vol. 23, 74c22ff (Vin.Sa.); c.p. also 776a24ff (Vin.Mū., not explicit).

44. T vol. 22, 641c5ff (Vin.Dha.) appears to have a considerable lacuna (see n. 41); T vol. 24, No. 1464, 879b27ff shows no trace of this explanation, but this text, according to A. Yuyama (see n. 35) of the Sa. school, may not be a complete and literal translation.

45. T vol. 22, 339a6ff.

46. See ns. 8 and 5.

47. In a discussion after a lecture similar to the present one which I delivered at the Australian National University, Canberra, in Oct. 1989.

48. Mudagamuwe Maithri Murthi, Das Verhalten der ceylonesischen Buddhisten gegenüber Tieren und Pflanzen (MA thesis, Hamburg 1986), 62.

49. This passage is, by the way, contrasted at Mil 172ff with Ja III 24, expressing the "rationalist" (or

everyday?) view that trees are insentient (or merely dumb?) and hence unable to understand when addressed.

50. Ja IV 144ff, esp. 153ff; cp. A. Henrichs, "Thou shalt not kill a tree": Greek, Manichaean and Indian tales, in: Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists 16.1-2 (1979), 103; Maithri Murthi, op. cit. [n. 48], 65.

51. I.e., a case of *paṇṇatti-vajja* (Sp 228) or *pratikṣepaṇīya-sāvadya* (BoBh 112,20-22; AKBh 218,15ff), and not of *loka(/pakati)-vajja* or *prakṛti-sāvadya* (BoBh 113,17; AKBh 218,19ff). Cp. also Max Weber's concept of "Anstandsregeln" (Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, [6]Tübingen 1978, 244).

52. Cp. VinMañj 201: *kasmā bhūtagāmassa pātabyatāya pācitti icchitā ti. samaṇa-asāruppato.*

53. It would be interesting to discuss the case of the earth, digging which a monk is prohibited from (Pāc. 10). The Suttavibhaṅga offers the same reason as in the case of injuring plants, viz. that people mind it because they believe the earth, too, to be a living being with one sense-faculty (*ekindriya jīva*) and therefore consider digging her to be an act of injuring her.

54. See p.4 with n. 22.

55. Since the tradition seems to be unanimous in taking, in this passage as well as in the case of Pācittiya 11, seeds and plants in a general sense including all seeds (or rather all parts of a plant) that are capable of germinating and all green plants that have not withered or been cut off, and does not indicate any restriction to cultivated plants or plants exploited by man, I ignore the possibility that injuring seeds and plants may be immoral because of the damage inflicted upon the owner.

56. I refrain, in this paper, from discussing other possible but, to my mind, equally inconclusive considerations.

57. DN I 141.

58. This is made explicit at Dharmaskandha (ed. S. Dietz, Göttingen 1984), 82f.

59. SN IV 351; V 393.

60. Sn 704: *aviruddho asāratto pāṇesu tasathāvare*; cp. 394a (*pāṇa*) + cd (*sabbesu bhūtesu nidhāya daṇḍaṃ ye thāvarā ye ca tasanti loke*).

61. Sn 146: *ye keci pāṇabhūt' atthi tasā vā thāvarā v' anavasesā.* On *pāṇabhū/pāṇabhūta*, to be derived from the Skt. *prāṇabhṛt*, see K.R. Norman, Pāli Lexicographical Studies IV, in: Journal of the Pāli Text Society 11 (1987), 39f.

62. Sn 394 (see n. 60); 629 = Dhp 405: *nidhāya daṇḍaṃ bhūtesu tasesu thāvaresu ca.* Needless to say that '*bhūta*' is used in these passages in a wider sense than at Pāc. 11.

63. Sn 967 (*mettāya phasse tasathāvarāni*); SN I 141 = IV 117; 351; V 393; MN II 105 = Th 876.

64. Sn 394 (see n. 60); 629 (see n. 62); SN I 141.

65. SN IV 351; V 393.

66. Sn 704 (see n. 60).

67. Th 876.

68. Sn 967 (see n. 63); 145c-147d.

69. Th-a ad Th 876.

70. E.g., Nd1 488; Nd2 221; Th-a ad Th 876; Ps ad MN II 105; Spk ad SN I 141 and IV 117.

71. E.g., Dasav 6.10 (*jāvanti loe pāṇā tasā aduva thāvarā, te ... na haṇe ...*); 6.24 (*sant' ime suhumā pāṇā tasā aduva thāvarā*); Uttarajjhāna 5.8b and 19.89d; Sūyagaḍa 1.6.4b.

72. Cp. K. R. Norman, The Group of Discourses, vol. I (London 1984), 65 (v. 394), 106 (v. 629), etc. At Āyār 5,8f, the context suggests the nuance "getting frightened [very often]" (cp. Bhatt, op. cit. [n.8], 137), but this would seem to be a secondary one.

73. Schubring, op. cit. [n. 8], 96.

74. Cp. V 1.115.1d = AV 13.2.35d (*jagatas tasthuṣaś ca*); V 1.80.14 (*sthā jagac ca*); 4.53.6 (*jagataḥ sthātur ubhayasya*); cp. also Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad 3.18 (*sthāvarasya carasya ca*).

75. In the Mahābhārata, even the pair *trasa/sthāvara* is found: 3.185.28 (*trasānāṃ sthāvarāṇāṃ ca, yac ceṅgaṃ yac ca neṅgati*); 12.9.19 (*trasa-sthāvara-varjakaḥ*); 13.26.24 (*trasānāṃ sthāvarāṇāṃ ca ... bhayaṃ tyajet*). More frequent is, however, the pair *sthāvara/jaṅgama.*

76. E.g., MHṛd IX.139; TJv 361a3 (read *brtan pa*).

77. M. Maithri Murthi (oral communication).

78. Pj II (vol. 2), p. 464.

79. R. Williams, Jaina Yoga (repr. Delhi 1983), 65f.

80. Ibid., 66.

81. Ibid., 118; 122.

82. H. v. Glasenapp, Der Jainismus (Berlin 1925), 321ff.

83. Op. cit. [n. 48], 62.

84. That mowing grass or felling trees is not bad karma is expressly stated at T vol. 12, 460b17-19 (Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra). Cp. also T vol. 51, 438b3f, stating that it is not heard [in any authoritative Buddhist text] that in the case of insentient beings [like plants, destroying them is an act which] has a [karmic] result. However, the Kūṭadantasutta (see above) would seem to suggest that avoidable destruction of plants is not sanctioned. Cp. also M. Aris (Man and Nature in the Buddhist Himalayas, in: N.K. Rustomji and Ch. Ramble, Himalayan Environment and Culture, New Delhi 1990, 99) reporting a passage from a Bhutanese school textbook where needless injury inflicted upon a tree is described as 'sinful'. Cp., in this connection, also Pv II.9.3 and 6 where a person who, for the sake of material gain, fells or injures a tree the shade of which he has enjoyed is called an evil person breaking friendship (*mittadubbho pāpako*).

85. E.g., Dasav 3.2; 5.1.55.

86. Vin I 237f; MN I 368f; cp. L. Alsdorf, Beiträge zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien (Wiesbaden 1961), 563f.

87. See p.3 with n. 8.

88. Schubring, op. cit [n. 8], p. 173; Alsdorf, op. cit. [n. 86], 571.

89. Pāṭimokkhasutta, Pāc. 62; cp. Pāc. 20 and 40.

90. In this connection, it is interesting that in the Milindapañha the most elaborate refutation of life and sentience in entities believed to possess them by the Jainas but not by the Buddhists concerns water (see Mil 258ff).

91. MN I 78.

92. At any rate, it is interesting that in the inscriptions of Aśoka, which surely reflect the ambiance of the capital, the words for "living beings" - not only '*pāna*' but also '*jīva*' - clearly refer to animals only, not to plants. On the other hand, in Sri Lanka it is, as M. Maithri Murthi told me, rural people who still consider plants to be, somehow, living beings (see p.5 with n. 48).

93. For popular belief, see p.5.

94. MN I 73; DN III 230.

95. Cp. MHṛd IX.140ab: *sacetanā hi taravo na, caturyony-asaṃgrahāt*; VinMañj 200f: *rukkhādayo ... na jīvā, ... catuyoniyaṃ apariyāpannato.*

96. Cp. W. Halbfass, op. cit. [n. 5], 292f, also pointing out that even *udbhijja* does not always refer to plants.

97. E.g., Mil 172-174; Yogācārabhūmi (ed. V. Bhattacharya) 171,12ff; T vol. 32, 313a22+25

(*Tattvasiddhi).

98. T vol. 30, 660a21-b12 = Peking Tanjur, sems-tsam, zi, 211a5-b6(Yogācārabhūmi, Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī); MHṛd IX.139-147 and TJv 354b4-361a5 (cp. Sh. Kawasaki, Bhāvaviveka no seiruikan: sōmoku ni kokoro ga aru ka, in: Buzan kyōgaku-daikai kiyō 14/1986, (1)ff); Nyāyabindu III 59; VinMañj 200f. The latter reference, I owe to my student and friend M. Maithri Murthi.

99. Cp., e.g., MHṛd IX.140 (*loṣṭavat*); 147 (*svargaloke ... ratnadrumā yathā*).

100. Nārada, A Manual of Abhidhamma (Abhidhammattha Sangaha), Colombo [3]1975, 88. Cp. Kv-a 112, where the opponent is stated to reject the non-existence of life (*āyu*) in material things because he takes it (not as *jīvitindriya* in the technical sense but) as the occurrence (*pavatta* or °*tti*) of the corporeal matter in sentient beings and of plants (*tiṇakaṭṭhādīnaṃ*) in the form of a continuous series (*saṃtānavasena*). The aspect of (material) life in plants is not disputed by the Theravādin.

101. T 23, 776a13ff. In the Bhaddasālajātaka (see n. 50), where the deity is so closely connected with the tree that she is almost a kind of tree-soul, no such possibility seems to exist.

102. T vol. 23, 75a23ff; 776b18ff; Vin.Mū.ₜ je 260a7f. Cp. V. Rosen, Der Vinayavibhaṅga zum Bhikṣuprātimokṣa der Sarvāstivādins (Berlin 1959), 138. Cp. also VinMañj 201: *kasmā bhūtagāmassa pātabyatāya pācitti icchitā ti? ... tannissitasattānurakkhanato.*

4

The Madhyamaka and The Future

Prof. Shohei Ichimura

The term 'madhyamaka' generally denoted whatever is middle to any object of reference, but within the Buddhist usage, it means the insight as well as the practice of the Middle Way [*madhyamā-pratipad*]. In the developmental history of Buddhist Doctrine, this fundamental concept evolved through two major stages, namely, from the Ābhidharmaka to the Mādhyamaka school. The Kathāvatthu preserved in the Theravādin Abhidharma literature clearly demonstrates the crisis of Buddhist Doctrine in terms of 'logical deadlock' in failing to establish clear distinction between the trans-empirical *dharmas* (elements) and the empirical *pudgala* (person) in the Theravādin-*versus*-Pudgalavādin logical dispute. This paper is to elucidate the nature of this logical deadlock and the Mādhyamaka solution in terms of an innovative dialectic introduced by Nāgārjuna (ca. A.D. second century). Illustration is given to this 'logical deadlock' as arising form different presuppositions, i.e. different logical linkages between the reason and the consequent, despite the same subject term and logical rules. The doctrinal crisis is also of the contemporary nature in terms of communication-breakdown as well in two-fold ways: (1) intra-Buddhist problem observed in the absence of clear distinction, hence, lack of right reconciliation, between the transcendent non-self and the empirical self; (2) inter-religious problem observed in the confrontation and lack of adequate reconciliation between different religious thoughts and cultures. Antithesis is easily sharpened and magnified through the logical and linguistic behaviour of the human mind: (1) referential force toward objective variables, and (2) tendentious or purposive force toward term or propositional linkages. Buddhist logicians whose intent can be traced back to Nāgārjuna have always tended to solve confrontation of this kind by working at the trans-empirical level, allowing two contradictory arguments to be successfully juxtaposed against reality. The applications of this Mādhyamaka dialectic are explored with reference to Buddhist tasks for the years to come.

One of the major problems with which every religious tradition ought to contend is the linking of the religious and secular domain of human society. From the time of inception, growth, and transformation, each religion ought to find ways to engage itself in secular society, not limiting itself to its own religious affiliations within community and society, but daring to venture beyond or outside of its own religious tradition. The manner of such linkage may vary in form according

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to systems of religious doctrine, differing times, and different socio-cultural environments. Take, for instance, the Theravādin and Mahāyāna traditions; the respective ways in which they have linked the religious and secular domains of society appear to have been somewhat different. The primary objective in this paper is to call attention, on the part of each tradition, to the long overdue task of critically reviewing existing forms of linkage between the religious and the secular, in order to bring the reform that is necessary to the future growth of Buddhism, uniting the two traditions through the creation of a viable basis for communication and cooperation between the two.

Today, the trend toward secularization is an inevitable force of history everywhere on earth, resulting from rapid industrialization and social modernization, which, hand in hand, have been transforming traditional society and culture from agrarian to urban. Thus, the teachings and practices of religion have also been confronted with the challenge of a new period dominated by these forces of social and cultural change. In Buddhist tradition, whether Theravādin or Mahāyāna, professional monk or lay devotee, the leaders have been aware of these forces of change and have found it necessary to review old forms of expression and search for the new, so as to accommodate this on-going change with a new set of appropriate meanings and directives. Moreover, in this era the physical presence of Buddhist tradition is no longer confined to the geographical regions of the past, but has extended globally to all parts of the world. The tradition has increasingly come to be respected as the equal of other religious traditions of the West. If Buddhist tradition as a whole, including both the Theravādin and Mahāyāna, can hope to offer a service to humanity on global terms, it is the time today that the tradition must engage itself in the examination and assessment of the aforementioned problem of linkage, thereby to introduce a new form and direction for the new period to come.

COMMUNICATION BREAKDOWN EXPRESSED IN THE KATHĀVATTHU[1]

It is generally believed that during the history of Buddhism in India there was no direct contact between the Theravādin tradition which has been dominant in Southeast Asia, and the Mahāyāna tradition which has been transmitted and preserved in East Asia. However, it should be pointed out that there was a thread of continuity in doctrinal development from the crisis of the Theravādin orthodoxy, recorded in the Kathāvatthu, to the successful solution of the problem by way of Nāgārjuna's (*c.* second century A.D.[2]) innovative method of Mādhyamaka dialectic. It is ever more relevant today to address the said dialectical method for the purpose of establishing communication between Theravādin and Mahāyāna tradition.

The compilation of the Kathāvatthu, attributed to Moggaliputta-tissa,[3] who chaired the third Buddhist Council (*c.* mid-third century B.C.), was, perhaps, the boldest and most courageous task ever undertaken by the editorial authors of the Pāli Abhidhamma Piṭaka. This text, entitled *'The Points of Controversy'* in Mrs. Rhys Davids' translation,[4] is known as the record of extensive doctrinal disputes exchanged among various Buddhist schools on logical proceedings. It was the 'boldest and most

courageous task,' precisely because those points of controversy, unresolved as they were, could have undermined the religious authority of the orthodoxy and the position of the editors themselves, by allowing leeway for the espousal of heretic views. In this connection, it is necessary to repeat that the said dialectical method bears significance more than ever before in establishing communication between Theravādin and Mahāyāna traditions.

It is well known that Buddhist doctrine fundamentally consists of the insights of the Four Noble Truths [*catur-ārya-satya*], Dependent origination [*pratītyasam-upāda*], Five Aggregates [*pañca-skandha*], Twelve Bases of Cognition' [*dvādaśa-āyatana*], and Eighteen Categories of Reality' [*aṣṭādaśa-dhātu*]. The very reason that the metaphysical principle of 'Self' [*attā* or *ātmā*] was rejected [i.e. the doctrine of *anattā*] in Buddhism was due to the insight that an individual person [*puggala* or *pudgala*] is an organized aggregation of the Five Khandhas [*upādāya-skandha*]. Hence, the psycho-physical elements of the Five Khandhas (i.e. those categories of *rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskārā*, and *vijñāna*) were regarded as more real than an individual person [*puggala*], because the latter is nothing but a product of multiple psycho-physical elements organized through direct and indirect causal networks [*hetu-pratyaya-tā*] which has been given a linguistic name. In this manner, viewing every object of experience as arising from the causality of dependent origination [*pratīyasamutpāda*] was the essence of the doctrine of right view [*samyag-dṛṣṭi*], and training oneself to see things as they really are [*yathābhūtam*] was the essence of the practice of the Middle Way [*madhyamā-pratipad*].

When the linkage between religious and secular consciousness is under reviewal (here, 'religious consciousness' and 'secular consciousness' meaning respectively a state of transcendence and an empirical state of involvement), the core of Buddhist doctrine, such as the 'non-self' [*anattā* or *anātmā*], raises a problem in the reasoning mind. This is precisely because to any individual, it is difficult to rationalise how and why the core of an individual person, conventionally believed to be the seat of all vested interest, could ever be linked to its trans-empirical non-existence! In this connection, there was the Buddha's word in explaining the conditional presence of a '*puggala*' as an empirical self or individual person; the passage was frequently quoted in the Kathāvatthu, because the Puggalavādins made it their source of authority. It reads as follows:

> "There is the person who works for his own good. And material quality is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact."[5]

The passage in question comprises some ambiguity which could lead to a full blown controversy such as that in the Kathāvatthu. The Theravādin orthodoxy held fast to the ultimate non-existence of any metaphysical entity such as 'self' [*attā*] or semi-metaphysical 'person' [*puggala*], but the innovative Puggalavādins espoused the existence of a semi-trans-empirical agent [*puggala*] along with trans-empirical entities, such as psycho-physical elements (such as *rūpa-dhammas* etc). Doctrinal controversy between the two schools was inevitable. The Kathāvatthu took up this controversy, made it the heart of all other disputes; it was coupled with numerous other

topics of dispute, all of which did, however, stem from that original controversy.[6]

The passage from which the crux of the Kathāvatthu controversy derived mentioned two classes of entities:

1. ***The empirical person*** who goes along with the psycho-physical elements, such as *rupa-dhamma*, but it is not sufficiently clear whether or not this *puggala* is clearly confined to the secular or empirical domain, and;
2. ***Trans-empirical dhammas*** (such as *rūpa-*, *vedanā*- etc.), which are supposed to be known in the sense of a genuinely real thing [*rūpam upalabbhati saccika ṭṭha-paramatthena*], but again it is not clear whether or not these entities are indisputably distinguished as separate or different from the *puggala* which is supposed to be an empirical agent.

THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL DEADLOCK IN THE KATHĀVATTHU

In order to clarify the nature of the logical deadlock between the respective claims of the Theravādin and the Puggalavādin, it is necessary to introduce another example of logical dispute exchanged between the Hindu Nyāya ;empiricist and the Mīmāṃsā; transcendentalist of Medieval India. In defining the nature of the vocal word [*śabda*], for instance, the Hindu logician (Nyāya schoolman) would formulate the following syllogistic argument:[7]

Thesis:	'Vocal word' [*śabda*] is impermanent,	*śabdo 'nitya*
Reason:	because it is a product,	*kṛakatvāt*
Example:	just as a pot (anything that is moulded) is.	*ghaṭatvavat*

The Mīmāṃsā linguist would put up another syllogistic argument against the former as follows:

Thesis:	'Vocal word' [*śabda*] is permanent,	*śabdo nitya*
Reason:	because it is audible (i.e. communicable),[8]	*śravaṇatvāt*
Example:	Just as any vocal word (that is audible).	*śabdatvavat*

This is an excellent example of communication breakdown between two different cultures or thought systems. One schoolman presupposed that from the empiricist point of view, "whatever is produced is impermanent." Since a vocal word (a set of sounds making a symbol) is a product of human effort and is hence impermanent, for, just as a pot which once moulded eventually breaks down, a word disappears no sooner than it is uttered. Another schoolman, however, who presupposed from the transcendentalist point of view that a word symbol transmits a command to another person, determined that the meaning elicited by a vocal word, the essential ideation communicated by it, ought to be transcendent of space and time, and hence, permanent. Despite one and the same subject term '*śabda*,' the two different presuppositions led the two schools to end up drawing mutually contradictory predications: 'is impermanent' and 'is permanent.'

In Indian logical terminology, the logical linkage between reason and thesis, (namely, 'whatever is a product is impermanent' and 'whatever is audible is permanent'), is called 'pervasion' or 'concomitance between two terms' [*vyāpti*]. The very contradiction manifested between the two theses, which are induced from the two

different logical relations [*vyāpti*], despite the same subject term, obviously caused communication breakdown. Thus, when two people respectively hold different presuppositions or logical linkages due to their respective cultural upbringings, this difference is likely to lead to communication breakdown between them. Take the case of Moslem-Hindu communal violence in India, that of Moslem-Christian violence in Lebanon, or that of ethnic and religious confrontations in Northern Ireland as well as in Soviet Russia; the root cause of human tragedy and disaster can, indeed, be identified as the manifestation of communication-breakdown resulting from different cultural and religious presuppositions. In this context, it seems certain that the task of establishing communication between Buddhist and non-Buddhist cultures and religions can be carried out in a manner similar to that in which the said logical dispute was resolved.

Returning to the logical problem of Kathāvatthu it is apparent in the last example, in order to accomplish communication between two people, one's logical linkage from reason to conclusion must be accepted by the other. If a person tries to communicate to a group of people that there is an outbreak of fire over a distant hill, he ought to let them know that smoke is rising from that hill. If the causal linkage of smoke and fire is common knowledge to the people, they will immediately grasp the idea of an outbreak of fire on that hill. This means that they should be able to judge whether the referred linkage of smoke and fire is possible in the area in question; if the same linkage is made in reference to another location, such as, a pond, they would immediately doubt that the smoke implies an outbreak of fire near the pond. Now, a summary can be made of the basic rules which make communication between two people possible:[9]

1. the logical or causal linkage of two terms (e.g. smoke to fire) must be commonly known by both parties in reference to a class of objects, like a kitchen, where both smoke and fire are always observed together;

2. the contrary negative linkage, "When there is no fire, there is smoke," must also be known equally to the same people in reference to another class of objects, like a pond, where neither fire nor smoke is possible at all times.

If these dual conditions, which can safeguard our thinking process from falling into error, are not met, there results communication breakdown. When a public argument takes place between two parties, whichever party's claim fails to comply with the foregoing dual rules, is regarded as invalid, suffering defeat. Now, the logical deadlock recorded in the Kathāvatthu was due to a failure by both parties to comply with the said logical rules, mutually invaliding their intended theses. The initial dispute quoted in the Kathāvatthu was the Theravādin's refutation against the heresy of the Puggalavādin such that the '*puggala*' (an individual person) is a semi-trans-empirical entity. The Theravādin orthodoxy linked up two concomitant statements:

1. whatever ('x') is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing;[10]

2. it is known in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.[11]

These two statements can be notated respectively as 'p' and as 'q.'

In the crucial arguement of the Kathāvatthu, the Theravādin was referring to a trans-empirical *dhamma* (such as, that of *rūpa*, *vedanā*, and so forth) in the Khandha categories, believing that these two qualifying propositions could distinguish clearly whatever entity that belongs to the trans-empirical domain from whatever entity that belongs to the empirical, such as a *puggala*.

The Theravādin questioned the Puggalavādin, stating: "Is '*puggala*' known in the sense of a genuinely real thing?" The Puggalavādin replied affirmatively, "Yes, it is known" (notated as 'p'). Next, they again questioned the Puggalavādin, stating, "Is '*puggala*' known in the same way as a genuinely real thing (i.e. a *dhamma*) is known?" The Puggalavādin cannot give a similar affirmative reply, "No, it is not known" (notated as '-q'). With this expected negative answer, the Theravādin declares that the Puggalavādin suffered defeat by referring to their failure in complying with the two logical rules, quoting:

> "You, Puggalavādin, are wrong, because if you affirm the first proposition 'p,' you ought to also affirm the second one, i.e. 'p·q,' but you instead affirmed the former but negated the latter, i.e. 'p·-q.' If you ought to negate the latter, you also ought to negate the former ('-q·-p'), but you instead affirmed the former and negated the latter"(i.e. 'p·-q').[12]

Ingeniously, however, in the second round (i.e. rejoinder [*paṭikamma*]) the Puggalavādin rebutted the Theravādin through similar tactics, questioning: "Is '*puggala*' not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing?" The Theravādin replied, "No, it is not so known" ('-p'). The former again questioned the latter, stating, "Is '*puggala*' unknown in the same way as a real thing is known?" Here the Theravādin could not give a similar confident reply, hence answer with a negation: "No, it is not unknown" (i.e. 'q'), because the unreality of 'empirical self' is known only through the trans-empirical insight (i.e. of *rūpa-dhamma*, etc.). Thus, the Puggalavādin successfully induced a defeat to the Theravādin on the same grounds, i.e., the Theravādin's failure in complying with the logical rules, resulting in '-p·q.' The Puggalavādin thus censured the Theravādin, saying:

> "If you, Theravādin, negate the first proposition, you ought also to negate the second one (i.e. '-p⊃-q'), but you instead negated the first and then affirmed the second (i.e. '-p·q'). On the other hand, if you wish to affirm the second proposition, you also ought to affirm the first one as well (i.e. 'q⊃p'), but you instead negated the first and then affirmed the second, (i.e. '-p·q'). Since, while negating the first, you affirmed the second (i.e. '-p·q'), you failed to accomplish your thesis."

The Puggalavādin further proceeded to press the Theravādin with the third round [*niggaha*: refutation], the fourth round [*upanaya*: application of the Theravādin's reasoning to his own case], and then the fifth round of conclusion [*niggamana*].[13]

Since the beginning of this century, Buddhist scholars had been for a long time puzzled about the nature and origin of the logical method which those pre-Classical

Ābhidharmikas applied to the proceeding of their public debate or doctrinal demonstration. Relying on her Burmese co-translator's analysis, Mrs. Rhys Davids briefly discussed on the nature of this logical method in her prefatory note of *The Points of Controversy*.[14] The analysis, however, failed to grasp the underlying logical rules of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* and thus somewhat blurred the doctrinal issue concerning the transcendental and the empirical domain inseparably tied with the limit and the range of logical reasoning. In order to clarify the way mutual invalidation took place, reproduced here is the same chart which was once included in an article published elsewhere by the present author:[15]

Table 7.1.
Mutual Invalidation: Transcendental/empirical debate

I. Theravādin Refutation	II. Puggalavādin Rejoinder
Puggalavādin Thesis: 'p·-q' is false, because 'p⊃q' 'p·-q' is false, because '-q⊃-p' Hence, the thesis 'p·-q' is false	Theravādin thesis: '-p·q' is false, because '-p⊃-q'; '-p·q' is false, because 'q⊃p' Hence, the thesis '-p·q' is false
III. Puggalavādin Refutation	**IV. Puggalavādin Application**
Theravādin thesis: '-p·q' can be refuted, because '-p⊃-q'; '-p·q' can be refuted, because 'q⊃p' Hence, 'p·q' can be refuted	Our thesis: 'p·-q' is not falsified Your refutation '-(p·q) is not acceptable because 'p⊃q' and '-q⊃-p' Hence '-(p·q)' is not acceptable

V. Puggalavādin's Conclusion
Our thesis 'p·-q' is not refuted,
because 'p·q' is not compelled;
Your refutation '-(p·-q)' is not convincing
because '-q·-p' is not compelled;
Our thesis 'p·-q' is not refuted
because neither 'p·q' nor '-q·-p' is compelled.

The subject of disputes then moves on to the Five Khandhas (i.e. *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskārā*, and *vijñāna*), Twelve Āyatanas, Eighteen Dhātus, and then to the physical body [*kāya*], as to whether *pudgala* is known differently or identically with respect to each set of *dhamma*s in these categories.[16] Next, the subject of dispute moves to the matter of transmigration (*puggalo sandhāvati asmālokā paraṃ lokaṃ parasmā lokā imaṃ lokan ti? Āmantā; So puggalo pe? Na h'evaṃ vattabbe*).[17] and to

favourable [*kusala* or *kuśala*], unfavourable [*akuśala*], and indeterminate [*abvyākata* or *avyākṛta*] *dhammas*, and so forth up to good [*kalyāṇa-*] and bad conduct [*pāpaka -kamma* or *karma*], supernormal powers [*chaḷabhiñña* or *abhjñānuyoga*], and all stages of saintly attainments, and so forth. The way in which these disputes were carried out was precisely identical, and thus, every dispute ended up in logical deadlock by the same kind of mutual invalidation due to the failure of both parties to comply with the two logical rules.

To explain this logical deadlock, the inferential demonstration must be referred to, based on the linkage of 'smoke and fire.' It has been explained above that there is a valid logical context for which in the first case, the instances of a positive class, like a kitchen, accomplish the presence of the linkage of 'smoke' and 'fire' in reference to a positive substratum 'x' by verifying the two propositions: "'x' is having smoke" and "'x' is having fire," as true (i.e. (x)p.(x)q); while for the second case, the instances of a contrapositive class, such as, a water tank, accomplish the absence of the linkage in reference to a contrapositive substratum 'y' by falsifying the two propositions as "'y' is neither having fire," "nor is 'y' having smoke," (i.e. (y)-q.(y)-p). Besides these two opposite classes of things, 'x' and 'y,' it is necessary to indicate the existence of two other classes of referential variables, namely, a third case, 'u,' which may have been observed as having smoke but no fire (i.e. (u)p.(u)-q), and a fourth case, 'v,' which may have been observed as having fire but no smoke (i.e. (v)q.(v)-p). In logic, the first two are the only valid conditions while the latter two are invalid conditions, precisely because the former clearly distinguish the logical boundary between positive and contrapositive instances, whereas the latter cannot do so. It is on the same grounds that both parties in the Kathāvatthu controversy mutually induced the third case and the fourth case in the opponent's thesis on '*puggala*.'

It was in this way that the subject term *puggala* was thrust into the arena of public debate as an ambiguous and very upsetting subject matter, when the Puggalavādin, in part, asserted that *puggala* is a trans-empirical entity like a *rūpa-dhamma*, while, in part, accepting its denial by being unable to equally assert the second proposition, namely 'p·-q!' Moreover, the Theravādin failed in public to prove that it is a *rūpa-dhamma* alone which is real and trans-empirical. Though they could repudiate that a *puggala* is trans-empirical, they could not equally repudiate the second proposition that the way one perceives a *puggala* as unreal is the same way one intuits the reality of *dhammas*, hence '-p·q!' In short, the Theravādin failed to clearly distinguish the status of a trans-empirical *dhamma* and that of an empirical *puggala* in logical terms.

SOLUTION BY MADHYAMAKA DIALECTICAL METHOD

Although we do not know the precise date of Nāgārjuna, this innovator of the Madhyamaka dialectic came to existence three or four centuries after the time of the Kathāvatthu compilation. Despite many works being attributed to this master, it is sufficient to take up two texts, identical in method and style as well as in versified composition, in order to understand his doctrine of *śūnyatā* and the method of his dialectic. One of them is called '*The Treatise on the Middle through Versified Composition* (Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā-śāstra),' and another is '*(The Treatise) On Turning around (Doctrinal) Disputes* (Vigrahavyāvartanī).'[18] Since the present author

regards Nāgārjuna as an Ābhidharmika, it is justified to refer to the following elements of information, be they legendary or historical, to approximate the date of his active life:

1. that the Chinese text Fu-fa-ts'ang-yin-yüan-chuan (*Record of the Histories of Dharma-Transmission*) compiled in A.D. 472'[19] listed Nāgārjuna as fourteenth andAśvaghoṣa; as twelfth in the patriarchal geneology of Dharma transmission;

2. that the Rājataraṃgiṇī (*The History of the Kings of Kaśmīra*) which was written by Kalhana in the twelfth century refers to Nāgārjuna's relation to Kaniṣka;

3. that Hsüan-tsang recorded in one of his Hsi-yu-chi passages that Nāgārjuna was a contemporary of Aśvaghoṣa;

4. that Aśvaghoṣa was one of the favoured confidants of the Kuṣāṇa ruler Kaniṣka along with Vasumitra, Sarvāstivādin head monk, leader of the legendary Fourth Buddhist Council sponsored by that king, and one of the editors of the Mahāvibhāṣya-śāstra;

5. that A. Basham reconfirmed that the era of Kaniṣka; began during the latter half of the first century, i.e. 78 A.D., instead of 144 A.D.;[20]

6. that Nāgārjuna introduced the method of dialectic as solution to the unresolved controversy of the Ābhidharmika tradition concerning the heresy of the Pudgalavāda. Accordingly it would be a feasible hypothesis to place the active date of Nāgārjuna as early as that of Kaniṣka or perhaps a little later in the first part of the second century A.D..

The four classes of variables explained earlier, can be differentiated regarding the logical linkage between smoke and fire: in the first case including those which can be predicated as having both smoke and fire, like a kitchen, (and so forth);[21] a second case including those which can never be predicated as having either one of them separately or jointly, like a lake or a water tank; these two classes of things constitute the referential variables of the dual rules of valid inference;[22] a third case including those which can be predicated as having smoke but no fire, which can be notated as 'p·-q;' and a fourth case including those which can be predicated as not having smoke but having fire, which is to be likewise transcribed as 'q·-p.' Now, it is necessary to mention that the point of controversy between the two Hindu schools and that of the Ābhidharmika schools are identical in essence. This means that despite the same subject terms, what the respective disputants of the two schools were talking about were two different things. In case of the Hindu disputes between the Nyāya logicians and Mīmāṃsā linguists, the subject term '*śabda*' appears to be the same, but what one party refers to as 'impermanent' is different from what another party refers to as 'permanent.'

The referential discrepancy between the Theravādin and Puggalavādin, however, is far more complicated than the Nyāya versus Mīmāṃsā logical deadlock, because the syllogistic arguments presented by the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schoolmen are equally

correct in terms of logical rules: in the first argument, 'a vocal sound (*śabda* symbolized as 's') is a product by human effort' [(s)π = a kind of *śabda* defined by the Nyāya as 'is a product of human effort'], and 'it is impermanent' [(s)-ß; ('ß' = 'is permanent')], and in the second argument, 'A vocal sound ('t') is audible' (or intelligible and communicable), [(t)Ø a different kind of *śabda* defined by the Mīmāṃsā as 'is audible'], and 'it is permanent' [(t)ß]. The discrepancy of their respective concomitances is now expressible as between '(s)π·(s)-ß' versus '(t)Ø·(t)ß.' The problem arises from the fact that both parties are convinced that they are talking about one and the same subject term '*śabda*' although actually not. Applying a similar analysis and symbolism, we can obtain the argument in which the Theravādin refers to a *puggala* by negating the first proposition, but affirming the second as '(x)-p·(x)q.' Likewise, we can obtain the Puggalavādin's argument, i.e. affirming the first but negating the second, as '(y) p·(y)-q.' Simply stated, the logical deadlock consisted of both a discrepancy between their referential variables 'x' and 'y,' although both parties are convinced that they are disputing over one and the same subject term, and; also a discrepancy between their mutually contrary propositional relations, i.e. '-p·q' and 'p·-q.' The Ābhidharmikas could not resolve this twofold discrepancy, which it seems, was the target of the Madhyamaka method of dialectic.

What follows is a demonstration that the dialectical argument as Nāgārjuna applies it by selecting his passages from the Chapter.10: Examination of Fire and Fuel (Agnīndhana-parīkṣā-nāma) in the Mādhyamaka-kārika-śāstra which dealt with the relationship between the *puggala* and the Khandhas (i.e. *rūpa-dhamma*, and so forth). He uses the .i.metaphorical relation of fire and fuel,; exemplifying a *puggala* and a group of *khandha*s respectively, which are supposed to be simultaneously ongoing affairs. The multiple psycho-physical elements of the *khandha*s are meant to be fuel, while an empirical self or *puggala* is a fire. The phenomenon of combustion occurs somehow through the meeting of the two, fuel and fire, and so is the activity of a '*puggala*' along with the group of *khandha*s. Now Nāgārjuna argues in the said chapter as follows:[23]

> If fuel is identical with fire, the fire, agent of burning, and the fuel, object being burnt, may become identical. [For,] if fire is different from fuel, there should be fire without fuel. (Verse.1)
>
> [If this be so,] the fire would continue to burn forever, without any fuel it burns, or without a meaning (necessity) of burning it again, and thus, it would become one that has no function of burning. (V. 2)
>
> Here, if that fuel which is being burnt is identical with this fire, when that fuel is being burnt alone, by what agent of burning should it be burnt further? (V.4)
>
> [If fuel is different,] it is not reached; the unreached would not be burnt. Moreover, whatever abides unburnt would not be extinguished; being unextinguished, it would remain, indeed, like one that has its own mark (*svaliṅgavān*: i.e. *svabhāvatas*). (V.5)

In this way, Nāgārjuna gradually induces an idea of 'interdependence' of two related

things in the mind of the reader, but again repudiates this conception as well, arguing: [24]

> If fire depends on fuel, and fuel on fire, which one of these two [fire or fuel] should first come to existence, so that, depending on which, fire burns fuel? (V.8)
>
> Fire does not arise by depending on fuel, nor does fire arise without depending on fuel, nor is fuel burnt depending on fire, nor does it burn without depending on fire. (V.12)
>
> Fire does not arise from anything other than itself, nor is fire found anywhere in the fuel. About this fuel, every alternative feature has already been said by examining the passage of present, past, and future moments of movement (i.e. in Chapter 2.: Examination of past and future motions: Gatāgata-parīkṣā-nāma). (V.13)
>
> Again, fuel is not fire, nor is fire found elsewhere other than fuel. Fire does not possess fuel, nor is fuel found in fire, nor is fire found in fuel. (V.14)

Originally the concept of *puggala* was introduced to explain the continuity of an empirical person over the group of psycho-physical elements (a *rūpa-dhamma*, and so on) which were defined as momentary (*anitya*), arising and perishing in time. The pertinent question is, "By repudiating any linkage whatsoever between the two, what does Nāgārjuna intend to accomplish?"

Another example is given in the Vigrahavyāvartanī; where Nāgārjuna refutes the conventional way in which illumination is conceived as arising out of the meeting of light and darkness. By applying his dialectic to this metaphorical relation, he argues in Verses 36-39 of the text as follows:[25]

> If, as you say, fire illuminates both other things and itself, then darkness will cover both other things and itself. (V.36)
>
> There is no darkness in fire nor in something else in which fire stands. How can it [then] illuminate? For illumination is destruction of darkness. (V.37)
>
> It is wrong to say that fire illuminates in the very process of its origination. For, in the very process of its origination, fire does not come in contact with darkness. (V.38)
>
> Or, if fire destroy darkness even without coming in contact with it, then this fire, standing here, would destroy darkness in all the worlds. (V.39)

Here, in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, Nāgārjuna uses the metaphorical relation of light and darkness in parallel with the category of cognitive faculty [*pramāṇa*] and that of cognitive object [*prameya*] in order to refute the system of Hindu Nyāya logic, precisely because the *pramāṇa* was of the primary importance in the system of logic. He exhaustively repudiates the relationship between the two by referring to our convention, according to which we explain the fact of illumination by referring to the spatio-temporal sphere where light and darkness somehow meet together. The fact of perception is conceived in reference to the spatio-temporal sphere where visual faculty

and its object somehow obtain their contact. So once again, Nāgārjuna leads his argument toward the same goal, namely, that irrespective of whether light and darkness are different or identical, the very condition of illumination which requires an assumed contact of the two cannot be accomplished insofar as they are believed to be in possession of their own exclusive natures. Thus, the question can be raised once again, "By repudiating any form of relation between light and darkness, what does Nāgārjuna intend to accomplish?"

THE COMMON STRUCTURE OF LOGICAL & DIALECTICAL METHODS

In Medieval India, the Nāgārjunian dialectical method was called '*prasaṅga-vākya*' (or '*reductio-ad-absurdum* argument' as a nearest rendering). The present author has however been calling it 'dialectical method' for the following reason. As has been demonstrated elsewhere,[26] there is the common structural foundation for inferential logic and dialectic. The logical structure consists of two conditions as explained above. Firstly, it consists of the dual rules of valid inference: namely, (1) affirmative linkage of two terms, (for example, 'if smoke, then fire'), and; (2) negative linkage of two terms, (for example, 'if no fire, then no smoke.' Secondly, it consists of two clearly distinguished classes of referential variables for respective linkages: (1) those which, like a kitchen, may be capable of having both smoke and fire, and (2) those which, like a pond, may have neither fire nor smoke. Indeed, Nāgārjuna's dialectic is anchored in this logical structure. The difference between logic and dialectic arises respectively in the logical and dialectical contexts.

In the logical context, the two sets of referential variables are strictly separated by means of the positive and negative term-linkages. No cross-logical boundary is permitted, because a cross-logical boundary brings about a context similar to the Theravādin versus Puggalavādin dispute, resulting in logical fallacy or, at best, logical indeterminacy. In the dialectical context, however, both positive and negative sets of referential variables are totally identified by juxtaposition of both positive and negative term-linkages in reference to the sphere where two sets of variables are conceived, in convention, to meet each other. Nāgārjuna repudiated any conceptually possible relation between two terms. By so doing, he created a thought in the mind of the audience, such that there must be a meeting point in space and time where light and darkness come together, because, otherwise, our convention cannot explain the fact of illumination. In like manner, the audience is pressed by a thorough repudiation of the linkage between fire and fuel (i.e. between *puggala* and *khandhas*), thereby forced to think that there must be some point in space and time where an empirical person and the on-going totality of psycho-physical elements [*khandhas*] are conjoined, because otherwise, it is impossible to explain the existence of an individual person constituted of multiple facts of thought and perception. Here attention must be drawn to this meeting point in space and time as conceived by this convention. It is here that the dialectic presses the mind of the audience to juxtapose two opposite sets of term-linkages onto the referential domain in nature, creating 'a dual natured variable,' such as 'a fire,' simultaneously identical to and different from 'fuel,' or *vice versa*. The discrepancy between two variables can thereby be totally eliminated.

This dialectician's approach is not essentially different from the way Buddhist logicians of Medieval India approached similar problems somewhat differently but leading towards a fundamentally identical goal. In dealing with the two contradictory statements raised by the Nyāya logicians and Mīmāṃsā linguists: '*śabda* is impermanent' and '*śabda* is permanent,' the Mādhyamaka dialectician proceeds to create a total contradiction in the mind of audience by heightening their conviction that they are talking about one and the same thing and thereby pressing the identity of the two contradicting propositions: '(s)π·(s)-ß' and '(t)Ø·(t)ß,'[27] although the respective variables 's' and 't' are two different things. Now Buddhist logicians approached the problem with three cautious considerations which seem to be especially relevant to inter-cultural or inter-religious dialogue:[28]

1. they placed emphasis on the respective reasons, namely, '*śabda* is a product,' and '*śabda* is audible,' but not on the syllogism as a whole, because each syllogism is valid in the light of inferential rules;
2. they accepted their simultaneous validity within each system of philosophical presuppositions respectively expressed in the logical linkages, i.e., 'whatever is a product is impermanent,' and 'whatever is audible is permanent;'
3. they shifted both the mental process and the logical meaning on to a different plane from that of those logical laws, which in fact sharpen the sense of difference. This means that Buddhist logicians intended to resolve the confrontation by the two Hindu adversaries in the trans-empirical plane of their minds.

Thus, it is apparent that for Buddhist logicians, it was permissible to juxtapose against reality two different arguments which are mutually contradictory. Here is the common way between Buddhist logicians and the Mādhyamika dialecticians to accomplish elimination of the aforementioned discrepancy through total identification of their referential points in nature.

As mentioned before, this dialectical approach is not essentially different from the way in which Buddhist logicians treated the problem of communication breakdown, precisely because inducing contradiction in the logico-linguistic sphere of the mind, and thereby inducing total identification in the referential sphere in the mind, actually do the same thing as shifting the matter toward the trans-empirical sphere. In fact, the theoretical basis of the logicians was originally developed from the dialectical approach. When an object of reference is perceived as having an independent nature [*svabhāva*] through a symbolic system, we call it empirically existent. When it is intuited as having a merely dependent nature [*pratītya-samutpāda*] because of causes and conditions [*hetupratyayatā*], we call it transcendentally non-existent [*śūnyatā*] by discounting the reality of the symbolic system.

It is clear that the Mādhyamaka dialectic does not repudiate the empirical world, and that what it repudiates or treats is two categories of underlying mental forces of linguistic behaviour and culture formation, namely, the referential force of the mind toward its objective reference and the tendentious or purposive force of the mind that links one symbol with another. The Ābhidharmika disputes invariably originated in these two forces of the mind, which the Mādhyamaka dialectic is designed to deal with

in order to bring about a more conciliatory state of mind. By disclosing hidden contradiction in each symbol usage, the dialectic is intended to annihilate each sharpened discrepancy between two different assertions.

Additionally it should be noted that Nāgārjuna's solution is not to abandon the orthodox insight of Khandhas, Āyatanas and so forth. He restored the status of real *dhammas* to the trans-empirical and non-linguistic domain as the matter of saintly intuition by totally distinguishing it from the empirical and linguistic domain, because the status of *dhammas* was subjected to controversy in the empirical and linguistic domain through admixture with the *puggala* whose status is essentially limited to the empirical and linguistic domain.

CONCLUSION

The ancient tradition of the Theravādin Abhidharmists left the matter of disputes unresolved without establishing a form of systematic reconciliation, but it was eventually accomplished by the Mādhyamaka dialectical method innovated by Nāgārjuna. Considering today's trends in secularization and social change, the present author believes that the communication of the Theravādin and Mahāyāna traditions constitutes the foremost important step in establishing the linkage between the trans-empirical and empirical domain of consciousness. In this context, the Mādhyamaka method of dialectic can surely provide a viable catalytic means of communication between the two traditions. Simultaneously, it must be added that the Mādhyamaka dialectical method can provide a similar catalytic means of communication between Buddhist and non-Buddhist cultures and societies.

Finally, the present author is obliged for two reasons, to pay tribute to those elders who were engaged in assembling the Kathāvatthu disputes. Firstly, they made a very open display of the doctrinal crisis, through which it was intended to demonstrate the fundamental problem inherent in the linkage between the world of Buddhist transcendence and the world of convention. They deliberately prepared the arena for future generations to grapple with the problem and to seek its solution. Secondly, Buddhists in search of human religiosity have the task both to review the relation between the transcendental value [*paramārtha-satya*] and that of convention [*laukika-sāmvṛti-satya*], and to be involved in communication with non-Buddhist religions and cultures as well. It should be remembered that the Saṅgha which the elder Moggaliputta-tissa; led was located in Mathura, later the summer capital of the Kuṣāna; rulers. It was in this progressive circle of the Buddhist world in ancient India that the Graeco-Indian text, the Milinda-pañhā, was created. In this connection, the present author can foresee that the role of the Mādhyamaka dialectic has a new meaning in our time and in the future.

NOTES

1. Edited by Arnold C. Taylor for PTS, 1894-97; reprint by Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979. According to Caroline Augusta Foley Rhys Davids, the text was compiled when the contents of, at least, parts of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi (first book), Vibhaṅga (second one) and Paṭṭāna (seventh one) of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka were already established as orthodox Buddhist doctrine. (Cf. Prefatory Note, *The Points of Controversy or Subjects of Discourse being a Translation of the Kathā-vatthu*, (London: PTS, Luzac

& Co., 1960)). In his commentarial work Kathāvatthu-ppakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā, however, Buddhaghoṣa conveys the tradition, stating that the Kathāvatthu was compiled to refute heresies as a pre-emptive measure [*āyatilakkhaṇa*] after the Puggala-Paññatti had been compiled in succession to the Dhamma-saṅgani, Vibhaṅgha, and Dhātukathā. [Cf. Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā included in Pañcappa-karaṇa-aṭṭhakathā named 'Paramathadīpanī' critically edited by N. A. Jayawickrama (Text Series No.169) (London: PTS, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), xv.]

2. There have been postulated at least four or five Nāgārjunas as authors of those texts which clearly belonged to different periods or to different Buddhist doctrines: 1. author of the definitive, dialectical texts, Mūla-madhyamakakārikā-śāstra and Vigrahavyāvartanī, and those of Suhṛllekha and Ratnāvalī, epistles addressed to a monarch traditionally identified as belonging to the house of Sātavāhana; 2. author of the encyclopaedic Mahāprajñāparamitā-śāstra, having been trained in the Sarvāstivādin Ābhidharma tradition; 3. author of the commentary on the text Daśabhūmika-sūtra which is generally believed to have belonged to the Yogācāra School; 4. author of some Tantric texts and known as a Tantric *siddha*, who was recorded as Bhadanta Nāgārjunācarya in a seventh century inscription discovered a century ago in South India. Besides these figures, there is another Nāgārjuna who is recorded in the twelfth century text written by Kalhaṇa on the dynastic history of Kāśmīra Rājataraṅgiṇī as a confidant of the Kuṣāṇa ruler Kaniṣka, and Hsüan-tsang recorded Nāgārjuna in one of his Hsi-yu-chi passages as a contemporary of Aśvaghoṣa who was a confidant of the same ruler and supposed to have been a contributor to the fourth Buddhist Council and to the compilation of the Mahāvibhāṣā -śāstra.(Cf. David Seyfort Ruegg, 'Towards a Chronology of the Madhyamaka School,' *Indological and Buddhist Studies (Volume in Honour of Professor J.W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday), Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica No.27*, (Delhi: Indian Books Centre, 1982), esp. 505-509). A.K. Warder, and along with him, David J. Kalupahana questioned whether Nāgārjuna was a Mahāyānist:.(Cf. resp.: *Indian Buddhism*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970) 376; *Nāgārjuna, the Philosophy of the Middle Way*, (New York State Univ. Press, 1986), 7). Shōson Miyamoto, known for his authority on Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika Studies in modern, contemporary Japan, suggested to this writer at a private meeting in the sixties that Nāgārjuna could have been an Abhidharmist. E. H. Johnston's article: 'N āgārjuna's List of Kuśaladharmas,' (*Indian Historical Quarterly*, IVX (1938), 315-323) also attests to a probability, as evidenced by Nāgārjuna's enumeration of 119 Kuśaladharmas in his Vigrahavyā-vartanī, that he held an Abhidharmist concern and knowledge although his list of 119 *dharma*s was different from that of the Sarvāstivādin enumeration.

3. According to the Dīpavaṃsa (*The Chronicle of Ceylon*), being the councilor of King Aśoka, Moggaliputta-tissa ordained his prince Mahinda by the sixth regnal year (262 B.C.). After retirement, upon the king's request, he attempted to reform the Saṅgha which had not been able to conduct the Uposatha meeting for seven years due to obstruction by evil-minded monks; he did this by organizing a council consisting of a thousand qualified elders as its chair. The council was completed in nine months, during Aśoka's seventeenth regnal year (251 B.C.) and when the master was seventy-two years of age. He is known also to have compiled the Kathāvatthu, promoted the establishment of the Kāśmīra-based Saṅgha, and to have become the first patriarch of the Dharmaguptaka school.

4. See n.1 above; PTS Text Series V, jointly translated by Shwe Zan Aung and Caroline Augusta Foley Rhys Davids, originally published 1915.

5. Ibid., 18. An alternative translation: "There is the 'person' [*puggala*] that goes along (with an aggregation of Five Khandhas) for the sake of an individual's self [*atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno*], and the *rūpa-dhamma* (and so forth) are known in the sense of a genuinely real thing." The passage appears from No.74 onward as part of disputes concerning the question as to whether a *puggala* is different from or identical to a *khandha* of *rūpa-dhamma*s, etc. The Puggalavādin presses the Thera-vādin, arguing:

> *Puggalo n'upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti?* [Theravādin answers: "Yes".]
>
> *Vuttaṃ Bhagavatā - Atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno, rūpañ ca upalabbhati sacci-kaṭṭhaparamatthenāti?* [Theravādin answers "Yes".]

Then, the Puggalavādin presses the Theravādin:

aññaṃ rūpam añño puggalo ti? ["Is the *rūpa-dhamma* one thing? ...and is the *puggala* another?"]

6. According to Buddhaghoṣa, Moggaliputta-tissa is said to have followed the method of discourse adopted by the Buddha [*satthārā dinna-nayavasena*] at the time he established the 'topics' of the Kathāvatthu [*mātikā*]. He adduced 500 suttas each from the Theravāda [*sakavāda*] and the outside schools [*paravāda*] and thus made the entire Abhidhamma his own teaching of the ultimate truth [*paramattha-desanā*] as opposed to the popular teachings' [*vohāra* or *vyvahāra*]. There are 217 issues classified under twenty-three vaggas. See Jayawickrama's introduction to his critical edition of the Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā (op.cit. xv-xix).

7. These examples are given in the Nyāyapraveśakasūtram: *Gaekwad Oriental Series, 38* (1930), 3-4. Although strictly speaking, '*śabdo anityaḥ kṛtakatvāt ghaṭavat,*' is a Vaiśeṣika presupposition [*siddhānta*], since the Naiyāyika accepted the metaphysical system in toto, it is presented here as the Naiyāyika view of language. Cf. Arnold Kunst: 'The Concept of the Principle of Excluded Middle in Buddhism,' *Rocznik Orientalistyczny, XXI*, (1957), 146.

8. The Mīmāṃsā schoolmen, along with the Grammarians [*Vaiyākaraṇas*], postulated the transcendental existence of ideas and concepts in similar manners as Plato postulated the world of eternal ideas. The schoolmen favored a *vox archetypa* rather a *vox ectypa* which the Naiyāyika favoured. Bhartṛhari, a grammarian of the sixth century, theorized three stages of verbal sound [*trayī vāc*], through which the archetypical essence of a word, initially abiding as supreme consciousness [*śabdabrahman*] (i.e. the stage of *paśyantī*), subsequently becomes an awakening consciousness accompanied by a subtle movement (i.e. that of *madhyamā*, where the eternal word [*sphoṭa*] appears), and finally, manifests itself as an audible verbal sound by taking its phenomenal expression (i.e. that of *vaikharī*). Any audible sound word is therefore regarded as carrying its paradigmatic meaning by virtue of its communicability to every one at any time within a linguistic community. Cf. Vākya-padīya: kārikā 143. (Kānda 1.): *paśyantī, madhyamā,* and *vaikharī*; K. Kunjuni Raja parallels these stages respectively with *sphoṭa, prākṛta-dhvani,* and *vaikṛta-dhvani*. [K.Kunjuni Raja: *Indian Theories of Meaning*, (Adyar Library and Research Center, 1963).

9. These two rules are a paraphrase of the valid syllogistic principles of 'similar and dissimilar instantiation' or 'method of agreement and that of difference' [*anvaya* and *vyatireka*]. Cf. Theodore Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic, Vol I.*, 283-287. Śaṅkarasvāmin (probably Dignāga's disciple) defined these two rules in his concise Nyāyapraveśaka-sūtram as */sapakṣe sattvaṃ vipakṣe 'sattvam/* "two concomitant propositions ought to be jointly verified by the class of similar instances" and "the same propositions equally falsified by the class of dissimilar instances." (*Gaekwad Oriental Series, Vol. 33* (1930), 1)

10. */(dhammam) upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena/*

11. */saccikaṭṭho paramattho tato so (dhammam) upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena/*

12. In Indian logic, logical relation was not conceived in terms of comprehension of the minor term (or proposition) by the major, but in terms of concomitance, concurrence, or accompaniment of two terms or propositions, although the latter relation can be translated into the former — comprehension of a minor universal by a larger one. Hence, a conditional statement: "if 'p,' then 'q,'" was not conceived in terms of comprehension expressible by the 'horseshoe symbol' '$\supset$,' but, strictly speaking, in terms of conjunction expressible by the symbol of '$\cdot$.' Here, the horse shoe symbol '$\supset$' is used with an intention to express the conditional force of the logical rule, and the argument in question ought to be understood as "$p\cdot{-}q$ is false, because $p\cdot q$."

13. For the foregoing initial session [*paṭhamo niggaho*], see the Kathāvatthu in Pāli, *op. cit.*, 2-4, where there follow the subsequent sessions, such as, second refutation No.6 through No.10 (*ibid.*, 4-7), and the short refutations which constitute third, fourth, and so forth, up to eighth (*ibid.*, 7-11), before moving to the subject of identity or difference between *puggala* and *dhammas* (*ibid.*, No.17 onward, 11f). The

method in which the initial topic *puggala* is discussed in detail according to the full process of logical analysis, while each discussion of the subsequent topics is progressively condensed and yet is to be understood in the framework of the analysis of Puggalakathā, is called 'successive discourse' [*peyyālamukha*]. Jayawickrama, *op. cit.*, xviii.

14. *Op.cit.*, xlvii-li.

15 Cf. Ichimura: 'A Study of the Mādhyamika Method of Refutation, Especially of its Affinity to that of Kathāvatthu,' *Journal of International Association of Buddhist Studies, III*, 2 (1980), 10-15, esp. 10-11.

16. Kathāvatthu up to No.157, 28.

17. *Ibid.*, up to No.169, 34.

18. Respectively the former contained in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* which was edited and published by Louis de La Vallée Poussin (*Bibliotheca Buddhica, IV*, (St-Pétersbourg: 1903-1913)), and the latter edited by E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst, a Romanized Sanskrit text, *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, Vol. IX* (1951), Appendix (also, See. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya's edition and translation: *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna: Vigrahavyāvartanī* (second edition), (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), and Christopher Lintner's edition accompanied by the Tibetan version, *Nāgārjuniana, Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna (Buddhist Traditions Vol.II)* ((Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), 76-86).

19. The text in question (Taisho. 50; 297ff [No.2058]) is recorded as jointly translated by Chi-ch'ieh-yeh and T'an-yao during the period of Northern Wei. H. Maspero, however, challenged the authenticity of this text as a work of translation in 1911, concluding that it was a composition and compilation in China. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the text contains some degree of historical information. [Cf. Maspero: 'Sur la date et l'autheticité du Fou-ta-tsung-yin-yuan,' *Mélanges d'Indianisme* (Paris, 1911)(out of print)].

20. Cf. 'Succession of the Line of Kaniṣka,' *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XX* (1959), 77-88; 'A New Study of the Śaka Kuṣāṇa Period,' *ibid., XV* (1953), 80-97.

21. Buddhist logicians called this positive class of referential entities as the class of similar entities [*sapakṣa*] (which can be symbolized as 'x') and defined its function as verifying the two logically related propositions 'p·q' as true; namely, that 'x has smoke' and 'x has fire' are equally true[(x)p.(x)q], if 'x' is a member of the 'similar class,' such as, a kitchen, a hill, etc. This constitutes the logical criterion of 'affirmative instantiation' [*anvaya*].

22. Besides the principle of *anvaya*, logically valid inference requires the principle of 'negative instantiation' [*vyatireka*], calling for the presence of the class of negative instances [*vipakṣa*](which are symbolized as 'y'). Buddhist logicians defined the function of contrapositive instances to demonstrate the absence of concurrence of fire and smoke in any member of that class, and hence to falsify the two logically related propositions as"'y' has no fire" and "'y' has no smoke" ['(y)-q·(y)-p'], if 'y' is a member of the 'dissimilar class,' such as, a pond or a lake. The presence of the contrapositive class is very important for valid logical inference as part of inductive reasoning in distinguishing the logical boundary between the group of similar entities and that of dissimilar ones. Take a hill for example. The hill may be observed in some occasions as having smoke but no fire, and vice versa in some other occasions. Despite this kind of irregularity, we cannot preclude the possibility of concurrence of smoke and fire from it. So that, when we see a billow of smoke on the hill, it is probably correct to infer an outbreak of fire there. This probability can be asserted only when negative instances, such as, a water tank, are known as having neither fire nor smoke jointly, as well as separately.

23. *yad indhanaṃ sa ced agnir ekatvaṃ kartṛkarmaṇoḥ/*
anyaś ced indhanād agnir indhanād apy ṛte bhavet// 1
nityapradīpradiptapta eva syād apradīpanahetukaḥ/
punar ārambhavaiyarthyam evaṃ cākarmakaḥ sati// 2
tatraitasmād idhyamānam indhanaṃ bhavatīti cet/

kenedhyatām indhanaṃ tat tāvan mātram idaṃ yadā// 4
anyo na prāpsyāte 'prāpto na dhakṣyaty adahan punaḥ/
na nirvāsyati anirvāṇaḥ sthāsyate vā svaliṅgavān// 5

24. *yadīndhanam apekṣyāgnir apekṣyāgniṃ yadīndhanam/*
katarat pūrvaniṣpannaṃ yat apekṣyāgnir indhanam// 8
apekṣyendhanam agnir na nānapekṣyāgnir indhanam/
apekṣyendhanam agnim na nānapekṣyāgnim indhanam// 12
āgacchaty anyato nāgnir indhane 'gnir na vidyate/
atrendhane śeṣam uktaṃ gamyamānagatāgataiḥ// 13
indhanaṃ punar agnir na nāgnir anyatra cendhanāt/
nāgnir indhanavān nāgnav indhanāni na teṣu saḥ//14

25. The verses in English are quoted from K. Bhattacharya's work of translation: *The Dialectical Method of Nagārjuna: Vigrahavyāvartanī* (second edition), (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 117-119.
yadi ca svaparātmānau tvadvacanena prakāśayaty agniḥ/
pracchādayiṣyati tamaḥ svaparātmānau hutāśa iva// 36
nāsti tamaśca jvalane yatra ca tiṣṭhati parātmani jvalanaḥ/
kurute kathaṃ prakāśaṃ sa hi prakāśo 'ndhakāravadhaḥ// 37
utpadyamāna eva prakāśayaty agnir ity asadvādaḥ/
utpadhyamāna eva prāpnoti tamo na hi hutāśaḥ// 38
aprāpto 'pi jvalano yadi vā punar andhakāram upahanyāt/
sarveṣu lokadhātuṣu tamo 'yam iha saṃsthito hānyat// 39

26. Cf. Ichimura: 'An Analysis of Mādhyamika Dialectic in terms of the Logical Principle of Anvaya and Vyatireka' in: N. H. Samtani and H. S. Prasad (eds.), *Amalā Prajña Aspects of Buddhist Studies (Professor P.V. Bapat Felicitation Volume) Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica No. 63*; (Delhi: Indian Book Centre, 1989), 325-341, esp. 336-337.

27. See Page 61, lines 29 - 43 here.

28. Cf. A. Kunst: 'The Concept of the Principle of Excluded Middle in Buddhism,' *Rocznik Orientalistyczny XXI*, (1957), 146.

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5

Vajrayāna: Origin and Function

Prof. Alexis Sanderson

The Vajrayāna (the Diamond Way), also called the Way of Mantras (Mantrayāna), is examined in its latest phase, that of the Yoginītantras in general and the Śaṃvaratantras in particular. It is shown that the tradition of those texts is modelled on that of the non-Buddhist cults seen in such yet unpublished early Śaiva Tantras as the Picumata, the Yoginīsaṃcāra of the Jayadrathayāmala, and the Siddhayogeśvarīmata. Dependence on this non-Buddhist tradition is proved by evidence that extensive passages in the Śaṃvaratantras have been redacted from those texts. The theory that this form of Buddhism and Tantric Śaivism are similar because they have drawn on a hypothetical common source is redundant. Since the Buddhism of the Yoginītantras entails forms of religious practice which a member of the Saṅgha could not adopt without breaking his vows - this is shown through a summary of the ritual of empowerment [*abhiṣeka*] prescribed in the Vajrāvalī of Abhayākaragupta and the Kriyāsamuccaya of Darpaṇācārya - it may in some sense be described as heretical and non-Buddhist. There were certainly communities of monks in India who were sufficiently offended by these supposedly Buddhist practices to resort to the destruction of Tantric images and the burning of Tantric texts. However, this paper also considers the ways in which Tantric Buddhism is Buddhist, how it imparts a Buddhist meaning and purpose to its rituals, and how it either used the Buddhist doctrines of the Mahāyāna to justify the supposed sinfulness of these rituals or, more commonly, adjusted them so as to avoid this sinfulness. Either way actual transgression of monastic and lay vows is marginalized.

From about the third to the ninth century C.E. the corpus of scripture recognized by the mainstream of Mahāyāna Buddhists was greatly expanded by the addition of Tantric texts. The Tibetans, who received Indian Buddhism when this development was virtually complete, incorporated in the Tantric section of their canon translations from the Sanskrit of almost five hundred Tantric scriptures and of more than two thousand commentaries and explanatory works. The Chinese Buddhist canon too contains many Tantric works, though the last and most controversial wave

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of Tantric compositions, that of the Yoginītantras, with which this paper will mainly be concerned, is poorly represented.[1]

The term 'Tantric' is used here to denote a form of religious practice which is distinguishable from the rest of Buddhism principally by its ritual character, only secondarily by soteriological doctrine, and hardly at all by specific theories of ultimate reality. The basic character of this Tantric ritual is that it entails the evocation and worship of deities [*devatā*] by means of mantras of which the visualized forms of the deities are transformations [*pariṇāma, parāvṛtti*]. Access to such mantra-ritual is not achieved by virtue of the *prātimokṣasaṃvara*. The *prātimokṣa* vows of a lay Buddhist [*upāsaka / upāsikā*], a *poṣadha* faster, a probationer nun [*śikṣamāṇā*], a novice monk or nun [*śrāmaṇera / śrāmaṇerikā*], or a fully ordained monk [*bhikṣu*] or nun [*bhikṣuṇī*] are not sufficient qualification. It is necessary to undergo in addition an elaborate ritual of empowerment [*abhiṣeka*] during which the initiand is introduced to a particular mantra-deity and its retinue.

EMPOWERMENT RITUAL IN THE YOGINĪTANTRAS

These deities are first installed and worshipped in a maṇḍala made of coloured powders [*rajomaṇḍala*]. The initiands take the Tantric vows [*saṃvara*] and then spend the night sleeping in a room adjoining that in which the maṇḍala has been prepared [*śiṣyādhivāsana*]. The next morning the initiator interprets the initiands' dreams and takes ritual measures to eliminate any obstacles to success which they may reveal. He then goes into the maṇḍala room, bestows on himself the first empowerment, that of the garland [*mālābhiṣeka*], and then imagines that his own guru is bestowing the rest. The initiands are then blindfolded, led in by a female adept [*yoginī*] or male assistant [*karmavajrin*] and presented before the maṇḍala. They are made to take an oath of absolute secrecy [*koṣapāna*] and are then made by means of mantras to become possessed by the maṇḍala-deities [*āveśavidhi*] for the purpose of prognostication. After terminating the possession by dismissing the deities the guru asks each initiand the colour of the lights he saw and interprets the colour as predicting special aptitude for this or that Tantric accomplishment [*siddhi*]. Still blindfolded he is given a flower. He is to identify the flower in his hands with himself, imagine that the deity of the maṇḍala [*maṇḍaleśa*] is standing before him in the maṇḍala, mentally enter the maṇḍala, and throw the flower forward on to the deity. The guru determines the Buddha-family [*kula*] of the initiand from the direction in relation to the centre of the maṇḍala of the point on which the flower falls. The flower is then attached to the initiand's hair. This is the garland-empowerment [*mālābhiṣeka* (1)].

The blindfold is then removed and the initiand is told the inner meaning of each element of the maṇḍala [*maṇḍalatattva*] now revealed to him. He is then 'bathed' by the guru in a ritual area traced on the ground to the east of the maṇḍala. As he does this the guru visualizes the śiṣya undergoing a mystical rebirth which transforms him into the transcendental nature of the deities. This is the water-empowerment [*udakābhiṣeka* (2)]. The śiṣya is then clothed in a red or many-coloured garment, given an umbrella, and venerated by the guru. Imagining that the śiṣya is being empowered by the deities themselves as he touches his head, brow, two temples, and the back of

his head, he ties a band of cloth about his head (the crown-empowerment [*mukuṭābhiṣeka* (3)]). The two characteristic implements of Vajrayānist worhip, the vajra and the bell, are now placed in his right and left hands. The śiṣya crosses them over in front of his chest, so entering the posture of embracing a consort [*āliṅganamudrā*]. The giving of the *vajra* is the *vajra*-empowerment [*vajrābhiṣeka* (4)], and the rest is the bell-empowerment [*ghaṇṭābhiṣeka* (5)]. The guru then takes the two implements, touches the śiṣya's head with them, meditates upon him as fused with the deity Vajravairocana, and gives him his Vajrayānist name. This is the empowerment of the Vajra-name [*vajranāmābhiṣeka* (6)]. The name is determined in part by the śiṣya's Buddha-family established earlier by the casting of the flower.

The vows taken on the previous day were either the common Tantric vows [*sāmānyasaṃvara*] or those of a Vajra Master [*vajrācārya*]. The difference in outcome is that a Vajra Master is empowered and required to perform rituals for the benefit of others, such as this rite of initiation, and the consecration of idols, temples, monasteries and the like. He must worship for his own benefit as well; but he is also a priest-like officiant [*ācārya*], whereas the ordinary initiate is qualified only for his personal mantra-cult. If he took the vows of a Vajra Master he now requests the empowerment of a Vajra Master [*ācāryābhiṣeka* (7)]. This has the appearance of being a repetition of the concluding rites of the phase just completed. The guru places the *vajra* in the śiṣya's right hand and the bell in his left. The śiṣya rings the bell. Then the guru makes him enter the embrace-pose as before; but this time the symbolic meaning of this act is made more explicit: the guru empowers him by mentally bestowing on him an immaterial female consort [*jñānamudrā*]. The giving of the vajra, bell and consort is not classified as a separate empowerment. It is termed instead 'the rite of bestowing the three pledges' [*trisamayadānavidhi*]. The guru now imagines that all the Tathāgatas and the goddesses [*devī*] who are their consorts assemble before him in the sky and consecrate the śiṣya in his new office by pouring water upon his head. Proclaiming that he is giving the śiṣya the empowerment of all the Buddhas [*sarvabuddhābhiṣeka*] he inundates him. He then visualizes the Tathāgata Akṣobhya on the śiṣya's head and the other Tathāgatas and their consorts merging into his body, worships him with offerings of flowers and the like, and then explains again the meaning the maṇḍala and its components [*maṇḍalaviśuddhi*]. This is the *ācāryābhiṣeka* (7) proper. It is followed by a series of concluding rites. First the guru gives the mantra(s) [*mantrasamarpaṇavidhi*]. Then he anoints the śiṣya's eyes in a symbolic removal of the blindness of ignorance [*añjanavidhi*], and shows him a mirror. All phenomena, he explains, are like reflections and the deity Vajrasattva, who rests in the heart of all beings, is the mirror in which they appear. The śiṣya should recognize that no entity has any instrinsic reality [*svabhāva*] and should act with this knowledge for the benefit of others [*darpaṇadarśanavidhi*]. Finally the guru shoots arrows in the various directions to remove all obstacles from the new officiant's path [*śarakṣepavidhi*].

Candidates for the highest and most esoteric mantra-cults, those of the Yoginī tantras must now receive a series of further empowerments whose bizarre and apparently sinful nature has been the cause of much controversy in India and Tibet. The following account, like that of the rest of the ritual of empowerment described

here, summarizes the Vajrāvalī of Abhayākaragupta, a *mahāpaṇḍita* of the great Vikramaśīla monastery around the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and the Kriyāsamuccaya of Darpaṇācārya, a work of uncertain date based on the Vajrāvalī. The rituals of Vajrayānist initiation still practised by the Newars of the Kathmandu valley in Nepal and found in handbooks which combine the text of a Sanskrit liturgy with glosses and instructions in Newari, are based on these same sources, though they have completely removed all that might be compromising in these rituals.

After the rituals described so far have been completed a Tantric ritual feast [*samayacakra*] is served. A candidate for these higher empowerments must leave the feast with the girl who will be his consort, go in to the guru, give her to him, and return to the group outside. The guru copulates with the girl. The candidate is then led in by an assisant [*karmavajrin*]. He kneels down and offers a flower. The guru them gives him his semen, which the śiṣya must place on his tongue and swallow, thinking of it as the embodiment of all the Buddhas. The female rises and gives him from her sex 'a drop of the pollen of all the Tathāgatas.' He must swallow it in the same way. This is termed the 'secret empowerment' [*guhyābhiṣeka*]. The guru then returns the girl to the disciple, or gives him another who is bound by the pledges and vows, or is at least endowed with beauty and youth. He unites with her and experiences the four blisses [*ānanda*]. This is 'the consecration of the knowledge of wisdom' [*prajñā-jñānābhiṣeka*].

Finally the śiṣya requests what is termed 'the fourth empowerment' [*caturthābhi-ṣeka*], so called because it is the fourth if all the empowerments up to that of the Vajra Master are counted as one 'vase-empowerment' [*kalaśābhiṣeka*]. It takes the form of the guru's reciting an exposition of the nature of the four blisses, consisting for the most part of quotations from the esoteric Tantras and of Apabhraṃśa and Sanskrit verses attributed to Siddhas.

The guru then joins the hands of the couple and ties them together with a garlānd of flowers. He calls the company to be witnesses in the presence of the maṇḍala that this woman has been bestowed on this man before the eyes of the Buddhas. He must never abandon her [*vidyāvratadānavidhi*]. The guru then gives the vajra into the disciple's right hand [*vajravratavidhi*].

The guru now gives the implements needed for the performance of the post-initiatory period of mantra-observance [*caryāvrata*]. He gives the skull-topped staff [*khaṭvāṅga*], the rattle-drum [*ḍamaru*] and the bowl made from a human skull [*padmabhājana*]. A woman who adopts this observance must be visualized as Nairātmyā, the consort of Hevajra, as Vajravārāhī, the consort of Cakrasaṃvara, or as the goddess of the Buddha-family determined by the flower-casting. A man should be visualized correspondingly as Hevajra, Cakrasaṃvara, or the family Buddha. He then gives the *mudrās* or sect-marks of human bone. They are a chaplet [*cakrī*], earrings, a necklace, bracelets [*rucaka*], and a girdle-skirt [*mekhalā*]. A man receives a sixth *mudrā*, namely ashes with which to smear his body. This is 'the rite of bestowing the observance' [*caryāvratadānavidhi*].

This empowerment is confined, it seems, to ritual time. The implements are immediately

returned. However 'the vow of the observance of Heroes' [*vīracaryāvrata*] can be adopted. In this case the śiṣya is empowered for a period of paripatetic observance during which he will carry these implements and wear these sect-marks. Here the divine identities of the practitioners are no longer optional: a man must be identified with Śaṃvara and a woman with his consort Vajravārāhī. The śiṣya is given the sect-marks as before, a garland of skulls [*muṇḍamālā*], a tiger-skin as lower garment, a skull-bowl, a skull-staff [*khaṭvāṅga*], a rattle-drum, a brahmanical caste-thread made of sinews or the hair (of human corpses [*keśayajñopavīta*]), ashes, a head-dress made out of the hair of a thief twisted into two coils [*kacaḍorī*], a garland, a vajra, armlets, anklets, and little bells. This observance is also called the 'the Diamond (i.e. Vajrayānist) Kāpālika observance' [*vajrakāpālikacaryāvrata*].[2]

The guru then adopts the Buddha's prediction posture and predicts the initiate's liberation [*vyākaraṇavidhi*], gives him formal permission and encouragement to practise his office [*anujñāvidhi, āśvāsadānavidhi*], dictates the various rules of discipline which will bind him [*samayaśrāvaṇavidhi*], requests and receives a sacrificial fee [*dakṣiṇā*], and finally explains to him the inner meaning of all the consecrations [*abhiṣeka*] he has received [*sekaśuddhi*].

In taking up the implements and adornments of the postinitiatory observance the initiate takes on the basic character of the deities of the Yoginītantras. Śaṃvara, for example, is visualized as follows:[3]

"In the Śaṃvara-maṇḍala there is a circular enclosure of vajras. In its centre is the cosmic mountain Sumeru. On that is a double lotus seat. On that is a pair of crossed vajras supporting a temple. In the centre of that temple the Lord [Śaṃvara] stands in the pose of the archer, with his left leg bent at the knee and his right leg straight. He treads Bhairava beneath one foot and Kālarātri beneath the other. Both lie on a sun-disc which rests the top of the pericarp of a double lotus throne. He is black and has four faces looking in the [four directions]. Beginning from that which looks towards the front [*pūrva*], [and proceeding to those which face to his right, behind him, and to his left] they are black, green, red and yellow. In each he has three eyes. He wears a tiger skin and has twelve arms. With two of these holding a vajra and a bell he embraces [his consort] Vajravārāhī. With two he holds up over his back a white elephant hide dripping with blood. In his other right hands he holds a rattle-drum [*ḍamaru*], a hatchet, a chopper-knife and a trident, and in the remaining left hands a skull-staff [*khaṭvāṅga*] adorned with vajras , a skull-bowl filled with blood, a vajra-noose, and the head of Brahmā. Hanging about his neck he has a string of fifty freshly severed human heads. He has all six sect-marks [*mudrā*], a caste-thread made of human sinew,[4] a series of five skulls above his forehead, and a left-facing new moon and a pair of crossed vajras upon a black head-dress of matted locks,. His faces are wrathful and sharp fangs protude at the corners of his mouths. He combines all nine dramatic sentiments.

His consort Vajravārāhī is red, three eyed and single faced. Her long hair is

unbound and she is naked. Her hips are adorned with [a skirt made of] fragments of human skulls and she quenches the thirst of her Lord with a stream of blood pouring from the skull-bowl held to his lips by the hand that embraces him. With her other hand reaching up holding a vajra and with its index finger outstretched in the gesture of intimidation she threatens the evil. She wears a garland of blood-drained and shrivelled human heads and the five or the six sect-marks. Menstruating, she laughs, with all the hairs on her body standing erect."

Tantric initiation was not open only to those who had taken monastic vows. It could also be received by married laypersons [*gṛhastha*]; and there is some evidence that the traditional superiority of monks over laymen was undermined. This appears from the fact that there are authorities, such as the Vimalaprabhā commentary on the Kālacakratantra, which condemn the practice of monks venerating married Vajra Masters [*gṛhasthācārya*] as their gurus if any ordained Vajra Master is available, and of married Vajra Masters being engaged as officiants for such rituals as the consecration of monasteries. The text insists that it is the duty of the king to ensure that this hierarchical distinction between the white-robed and the red-robed Vajra Masters is preserved, and compares the situation in India, where this distinction was obviously precarious, with that in China [*mañjuśrīviṣaya*]. There, he says, the Emperor sees to it that any novice or monk who is guilty of a grave transgression [*pārājika*] is stripped of his monastic robe, dressed in white, and expelled from the monastery; and this applies even to a Vajra Master in a Tantric monastery [*mantrivihāra*].[5]

ŚAIVA ORIGINS

Let us now consider the senses in which this tradition of the Yoginītantras is and is not Buddhist. The present author's view is that almost everything concrete in the system is non-Buddhist in origin even though the whole is entirely Buddhist in its function. The non-Buddhist origin claimed is a specific area of the Hindu Tantric tradition. This view opposes a school of thought which, while recognizing that Tantric Buddhism, especially the systems of the Yoginītantras, has drawn on a non-Buddhist source, prefers to locate this source at a level deeper than either the Hindu Tantric systems or the Buddhist. This source has been referred to as the 'Indian religious substratum'.[6] It is held that similarities between Tantric Buddhism and Tantric Śaivism are to be explained as far as possible as the result of independent derivation from a common source, rather than as a direct dependence of the Buddhist materials on the Śaivite. Stephan Beyer has given us a good, unambiguous example of this kind of thinking when he writes the following about the deities of the Yoginītantras:[7]

> Although there are iconographic variations among these general high patron deities, they share instantly recognizable similarities: they are all derived from the same cultic stock that produced the Śiva figure...

The problem with this concept of a 'religious substratum' or 'common cultic stock' is that they are by their very nature entities inferred but never perceived. Whatever we perceive is always Śaiva or Buddhist, or Vaiṣṇava, or something else specific. Derivation from this hidden source cannot therefore be the preferred explanation for

similarities between these specific traditions unless those similarities cannot be explained in any other way.

This is not say that all the cults of the Yoginītantras are identifiable with specific Śaivite cults once they have been stripped of whatever Buddhist doctrinal and soteriological content they may have and are taken simply as rituals based on certain sets of deities, mantras, maṇḍalas and the rest. The evidence indicates rather that those who put the Yoginītantras together drew on Śaiva textual materials from a specific area of the Śaiva canon to assemble wholes which were identical with no particular Śaiva system except in this or that constituent, but resembled all the Śaiva systems of this area of the canon in their general character, structure and method.

This conclusion derives from a reading of the early Śaiva Tantric literature, mostly unpublished, that was authoritative at the time of the emergence of the Yoginītantras That the redactors of these Tantras depended on the Śaiva scriptures was obvious enough to those Śaivas who knew the literature. This is evident from a Kashmirian version of a well known Śaiva myth included by Jayadratha in the thirteenth century in his Haracaritacintāmaṇi. The Hindu gods are being oppressed by the demons Vidyunmālin, Tāraka and Kamala. They can do nothing to destroy them, since devotion to the Śaiva liṅga cult has made them invincible. However, Bṛhaspati, the teacher of the gods, comes up with the following ruse: [8]

> "I shall propagate the following system and call it Bauddha (/ Buddhist) - truthfully enough, since it will be no more than the invention of my intellect [*buddhi*].[9] In it the famous Buddha will be represented as master over the [Hindu] gods. In his visualizations even our great Cause-Deities, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Iśvara, Sadāśiva and Bhairava, will be portrayed as his parasol-bearers, and the Buddhist idols will be shown standing on the heads of Gaṇapati and other high Śaiva deities. When the demons get to know of these falsely conceived icons, they will undoubtedly fall into the delusion of believing that these deities really are superior to Śiva. Once I have established these icons and seen to it that they are widely recognized, I shall add certain mantras culled from the Śaiva Tantras; and lifting various passages out of these scriptures of Śiva I shall fabricate and propagate a system of [Buddhist] Tantric ritual. I shall also write passages of a more learned kind dealing with the question of bondage and liberation, displaying a level of intelligence that will prove extremely seductive. My definition of the state of bondage will include references to the worship of the liṅga, and my liberation will be a 'voidness' calculated to undermine their faith in their Śaiva rituals. Indeed I shall attack the practice of sacrifice and all [Hindu] rituals; and I shall deny the existence of the Supreme Lord by arguing that there is no Self. By putting this system together and insinuating it into their hearts I shall succeed in destroying their devotion to Śiva."

By converting the demons to Buddhism behind the back of their Śaiva guru Śukra Bṛhaspati removes the sole obstacle in the way of their destruction, enabling Śiva to accomplish the Kashmirian version of his famous exploit as Destroyer of the Three Cities (Tripurāntaka).

The form of Tantric Buddhism to which this sectarian myth refers is evidently that which includes the Yoginītantra traditions. That to attack Buddhism before a Kashmirian audience in the thirteenth century was to attack a system that culminated in these Tantras is confirmed by another piece of Śaivite propagandist mythology in the same work.[10] Once again three demons have defeated all the gods. They have destroyed heaven itself and brought about the end of orthodox religion. Śiva restores the Hindu order through Garuḍa, the winged vehicle of Viṣṇu. Empowered for his great task by Śiva's touch he flies to the golden mountain Meru, on which the demons have enthroned themselves. Turning himself into a she-ass he wraps his tail three times round the mountain's summit and hurls them down into the world of the dead [*pretaloka*]. The three demons are the two Vajraḍākas, namely Hevajra and Śaṃvara, and the Ādibuddha. Their leader is Hevajra, eight-faced, four-legged, sixteen armed and embraced by his consort Nairātmyā. He is surrounded by Mahāyānists, Vajrayānists, Śrāvakayānists and copulating Buddhas, all intent on the subversion of Hindu society.[11] Thus, when Jayadratha represents the Buddhist scriptures as built up out of elements of Śaiva mantra-ritual, the works he has in mind are above all the Yoginītantras, which authorize the cults of these demonized gods.

The mythological account of the relation between the two groups of Tantras is no doubt highly biased. But it rests on facts. The Yoginītantras have indeed drawn on the Śaiva Tantras. Specifically, there are extensive parallels between these texts and the group of Tantras classified as the Vidyāpīṭha of the Bhairava section of the Śaiva canon. These Tantras are related to the rest of the Śaiva Tantric tradition in much the same way that the Yoginītantras are related to the other classes of Buddhist Tantras. They see themselves as the most esoteric revelations of the canon; and like the Yoginītantras they stand apart by reason of their Kāpālika character.

The principal texts to have survived are the Siddhayogeśvarīmata, the Tantrasadbhāva, the Jayadrathayāmala and the Brahmayāmala. The first is the earliest scriptural basis of the system known as the Trika, which is expounded by Abhinavagupta (fl. c. C.E. 975-1025) in his Tantrāloka and is the core of 'Kashmir Śaivism'. The second too belongs to this system. The third, also known as the Tantrarājabhaṭṭāraka, is in the tradition of that other great component of esoteric Kashmirian Śaivism, the system of Kālī worship known as the Krama. The fourth, also known as the Picumata, is the basic Tantra of the cult of Kapālīśabhairava and his consort Caṇḍā Kāpālinī, a system known to Abhinavagupta, who frequently quotes the work on matters applicable to all the systems of the Vidyāpīṭha. These ~~three~~ works were the main pillars of the esoteric Śaiva tradition.

A comparison of the two groups of texts shows a general similarity in ritual procedures, style of observance, deities, mantras, maṇḍalas, ritual dress, Kāpālika accoutrements, specialized terminology, secret gestures, and secret jargons. There is even direct borrowing of passages from the Śaiva texts. Chapters 15 to 17 of the Buddhist Laghusaṃvara (Herukābhidhāna),[12] which teach a secret jargon of monosyllables [*ekākṣaracchoma*] (15), and the characteristics by means of which the Buddhist adept may recognize females as belonging to one or the other of seven

Yoginī-families (16) and seven Dākinī-families (17), equal the *samayācāracestā vidhāna* chapter of the Yoginīsaṃcāra section of the Jayadrathayāmala.[13] Chapter 19 of the Laghusamvara, on the characteristics of the Yoginīs known as Lāmās, equals chapter 29 of the Siddhayogeśvarīmata.[14] Chapter 43 of the Buddhist Abhidhānottara,[15] on the rules [*samaya*] that bind initiates, equals chapter 85 of the Picumata.[16] And the fifteenth chapter of the Buddhist Samvarodaya,[17] on the classification of skull-bowls, is closely related to the fourth chapter of that work.[18]

Dependence on the Śaiva literature is also apparent in passages in the Tantras of Śaṃvara (the Laghusaṃvara, the Abhidhānottara, the Samvarodaya, the Vajraḍāka and the Ḍākārṇava) that teach the sequences of *pīṭhas* or holy places that figure prominently in the ritual and yoga of this system. The system of *pīṭhas* from Pullī ramalaya (Pū-rṇagiri) to Arbuda given in the Śaṃvarodaya[19] and elsewhere is found in the Trika's Tantrasadbhāva.[20] The direction of transmission is evident from the fact that there is an anomaly in the Buddhist list which can best be explained as the result of a distortion of the Śaiva model. This anomaly is the occurrence of Gṛhadevatā after Pretapurī and before Saurāṣṭra in the series of the Saṃvarodaya. This Gṛhadevatā is the only place name that does not occur in the Tantrasadbhāva's list; and it is the only name that is puzzling. It is puzzling because the meaning of the word is 'household deity', hardly a likely name for a place. Now, in the version in the Tantrasadbhāva we are told not only the names of the *pīṭhas* but also classes of deities associated with each. The class associated with Saurāstra is that of the *Grhadevatās*, the household deities. Evidently, while intending to extract only the place names from a list pairing names and deities, the redactor's mind has drifted without his being aware of it from the name-list to that of the deity-list and back again.

There is no need, then, to postulate the existence of a common substratum or cultic stock to explain the similarities between the two systems. Examination of the texts reveals these similarities to be detailed and pervasive. It also enables us to explain them as direct borrowings by redactors producing what was obviously intended to be a Buddhist system parallel to the Śaiva Kāpālika cults but, of course, superior to them. Even the some of the titles of the Buddhist Yoginītantras are borrowed. Within the division of the the Śaiva Vidyāpītha that contains the Śaktitantras there are besides the Siddhayogeśvarīmata, the following works listed: Sarvavīrasamāyoga, Śrīcakra, Viśvādya, Yoginījālaśaṃvara and Vidyābheda. Among the Yoginītantras there are the Sarvabuddhasamāyoga-Dākinījālasaṃvara,[21] the Hevajraḍākinījālasaṃvara (the full title of the Hevajratantra) and the Dākinījālasamvara (as the Abhidhānottara also calls itself).[22] The expression Dākinījālaśamvara/-saṃvara occurs frequently in the Śamvara texts as a description of their subject matter; and it is part of Śaṃvara's heart-mantra: *om śrīvajra he he ru ru kam hūm phat dākinījālasaṃvaraṃ svāhā.*[23] In the Dākārnavamahāyoginītantra the term *sarvavīrasamāyoga*, 'the fusion of all the Heroes' qualifies ultimate reality[24] and in the Samvarodaya we have the expression *sarvavīrasamāyogadākinījālasatsukham*,[25] where *satsukham*, 'excellent bliss', is evidently an etymological substitute for *śamvara* [Tib. *bdem-mchog*].

The redactors' belief in the superiority of their systems over those on which they

drew is eloquently expressed in the iconography of their deities. Śamvara tramples Bhairava and Kālarātri (/ Kālī), the principal deities of the Tantras of the Vidyāpītha. In some visualizations he wears the flayed skin of Mahābhairava as his lower garment.[26] This subjection has an esoteric meaning, of course. We are told in the Abhidhānottara that Bhairava is *vikalpa*, 'objectification' and *trsnā*, 'craving';[27] and these are to be overcome by the knowledge of Emptiness, or the Great Bliss filled with Emptiness and Compassion, or the Dharmadhātu, which are the essence of the enthroned deity (*śūnyatājñāna*[28]: *mahāsukha* + *śūnyatā* and *karunā*[29]; *dharma-dhātu*[30]). But this metaphysical meaning does not exclude the other. This appears from visualizations in the same text in which the deity is said to wear the flayed skins of Brahmā and Viṣṇu, to carry the head of Śiva in his hand, and also to stand upon the non-Buddhists [*tīrthika*] and their religious systems [*darśana*], wearing the flayed skins of Brahmā and Viṣṇu and carrying the severed head of Śiva in his hand[31]. The Buddhist redactors were simply adapting yet another feature of the Śaiva Tantric tradition. For the esoteric Śaivas' Bhairavas and Kālīs are enthroned upon the corpse of Sadāśiva, the icon of Śiva worshipped in the more exoteric Śaiva Siddhānta, and Bhairava enthroned on Sadāśiva became himself the corpse-throne of certain forms of Kālī in the tradition of the Jayadrathayāmala. Here too there is no shortage of metaphysical explanation of this iconography of subjection; but our authors are also alive to the sectarian meaning. In due course the Śaiva tradition of Kashmir responded to the Buddhist Tantric iconography by creating Kālī Sugatasamhārinī, 'the destroyer of the Buddhas'. She embraces a ferocious Bhairava who wears a garland made from the severed heads of Heruka and the Buddhist Krodharājas. Hanging from his ears as ornaments are the bodies of the Buddhas, while Tārā and other Buddhist goddesses provide the hair twisted together to form his sacred thread.[32] There is also Trailokyadāmarā Kālī, who tramples the severed head of Mahākāla beneath one foot and the skeleton of Heruka beneath the other.[33]

BUDDHIST FUNCTION

When we consider Tantric Buddhism in terms of its origin we see Śaiva influences at every turn; and the higher one goes up the hierarchy of the Buddhist Tantras, the more pervasive these influences become. However, Tantric Buddhism is, of course, entirely Buddhist in terms of its function and self-perception; and in transforming Śaiva elements it gave them meanings which obscure these origins. You will recall that the ritual of initiation includes two explanations of the meaning of the elements of the maṇḍala, and an explanation of the significance of the various consecrations. The process of worship itself is structured by purely Buddhist meditations. For example, one carries out the second evocation of Śaṃvara as follows. After reciting the Mahāyānist formulae: confessing sins, delighting in the merit of others, tranferring one's own merit for the benefit of others, and taking the vow of the bodhisattva, one contemplates the four *brahmavihāras*: benevolence, compassion, joy and patience. One then meditates on the essential purity of all phenomena and oneself, sees oneself and all things as nothing but mind [*cittamātra*], realizes their emptiness, and then out of this emptiness generates the deity's icon. Later one meditates on the mandala as

being resorbed stage by stage into the syllable *hūṃ*, the syllable gradually disappearing into a single point, and this point into a formless resonance which one is to contemplate as the mind devoid of objectification, the Great Bliss.[34]

The Śaiva rituals also contain meditations which see the pantheon as emerging out of consciousness and returning into seed-syllables which gradually dissolve into pure awareness.[35] But here we see that the basic pattern of emanation and resorption has been given a thoroughly Buddhist interpretation.

There remains the problem of the sinfulness of esoteric Buddhist ritual. By adapting the sexual rites of the Śaivas and their ritual consumption of the five jewels and other impure substances they were establishing a kind of Buddhism that would have to be seen as transcending the scope of the Prātimokṣa disciplines. That a Buddhism which sanctioned such heterodox practices should have been accepted in the high seats of monastic learning in India was offensive enough to some communities of monks to prompt them to destroy Tantric images and burn Tantric texts.[36] The tradition of Abhayākaragupta and Darpaṇācārya remained true to the early tradition, insisting that any Buddhist, layperson or monk, may take the Tantric vows and receive all the consecrations, including the problematic consecrations involving sexual intercourse, provided he has achieved insight into the doctrine of emptiness. The problem of the infringement of the exoteric Buddhist vows is transcended then by means of the Mahāyānist doctrine of a higher and a lower truth.[37] The general trend, however, has been to modify the rituals so that they longer involve these infringements. The great Tantric Master Atīśa considered that the sexual elements of Vajrayānist ritual were permissible only for married householders. Monks could receive all the consecrations, including the most esoteric, but would receive the latter only in a symbolic or mental form. Among the Newar Buddhists of Nepal an even more thorough expurgation has been achieved. Though their ritual handbooks are based on the works of Abhayākaragupta and Darpaṇācārya and though all those who receive the initiation of the Yoginītantras are married men and women, all explicit sexuality has been removed from the ritual, leaving only alcohol, meat, possession, and the Kāpālika accoutrements.[38]

NOTES

1. The term Yoginītantra [Tib. *rnal ḥbyor maḥi rgyud*] refers here to the class of Sanskrit works whose Tibetan translations are Nos. 360-441 in the Tohoku catalogue. The principal components of these are the Tantra groups of the following deities: Kālacakra, Śaṃvara (and Vajravārāhī), Hevajra (and Nairātmyā), Buddhakapāla, Mahāmāyāhva, Yogāmbara, Candamahārosana and Vajrāmṛta, among which the first three were by far the most influential. These same Yoginītantras were also known as the Yogānuttara-/Yoganiruttaratantras [Tib. *rnal hbyor bla med kyi rgyud*], 'the Tantras of the Ultimate [Division] of the Yoga [Class]'. The term Yoginītantra is opposed to Yogatantra. Within the latter the texts distinguish between the Yogatantras proper (Tohoku 479-493) and the Yogottaratantras 'the Tantras of the Higher [Division] of the Yoga [Class] (Tohoku 442-478). The Yogatantras proper, of which the foremost is the Tattvasaṃgrahasūtra, together with the Mahāvairocanābhisaṃbodhisūtra, the principal Tantra of the small Caryātantra class (Tohoku 494-501) placed below the Yogatantras, formed the basis of the esoteric Tantric Buddhism that was propagated in China during the eighth century C.E. by the Indian missionary translators Śubhakarasiṃha (Zemmui), Vajrabodhi (Bodaikongō) and Amoghavajra (Fukū), and was brought to Japan at the beginning of the ninth by Kūkai (Kōbō

Daishi), where it survives as the Buddhism of the Shingon sect. The Yogottaratantras, principally the Guhyasamāja, have more in common with the Yoginītantras than with the Yogatantras. Both teach rites involving sexual intercourse and the consumption of alcohol and other impure substances; and in both the deities are worshipped embracing consorts. Sexual practice appears in the Yogatantras too; but it is marginal there. The common character of the Yogottaratantras and the Yogānuttara-/Yoginītantras is recognized in a classification which groups them together as the Anuttaratantras [Tib. *bla med kyi rgyud*], 'the Ultimate Tantras'. In Tibetan Buddhism the Yogottaratantras and the Yogānuttara-/Yoginītantras jointly occupy the position of the most esoteric level of the Buddha's revelation. In the Indian subcontinent, where Tantric Buddhism survives among the Newars of the Kathmandu valley, the Yogottara tradition has died away leaving that of the Yoginītantras in command; and among these that of the worship of Śaṃvara and his consort Vajravārāhī is overwhelmingly dominant. Two major Yogottaratantras, the Guhyasamāja and the Advayasamatāvijaya, reached the Sino-Japanese Buddhist canon in translations (Taishō 885 and 887) by the Indian Sego (Skt. Dānapāla ?), who was working as a translator in China from 982 to 1017 C.E. Also Yogottara is a ritual of Vajrabhairava translated around 1000 C.E. (Taishō 1242; cf. Tōhoku 468). Of the Yoginītantras, the last and most unconventional wave of the Tantras, only the Hevajra [Ḍākinījālaśaṃvara] entered that canon (Taishō 892). It was translated by Hōgo (Skt. Dharmapāla ?), who was in China from 1004 C.E. until his death in 1058. The most striking difference between the Yogottara and Yogānuttara-/Yoginītantra traditions is that the latter bring to the centre the symbolism, practices and deities of the Śaiva culture of the cremation grounds. Beneath the Yogatantras and the Caryātantras are the Kriyātantras (Tohoku 502-827). These texts, which form the lowest category, are entirely concerned with the attainment of supernatural benefits; and the majority of the works so classified are undoubtedly the earliest specimens of Buddhist Tantrism. Texts of this class were translated into Chinese from the third century C.E. However, they were never supplanted by later developments in the way that the Yoga- and Yogottaratantras were by the Yoginītantras. They continued to be used in important apotropaic rituals in Newar, Tibetan and Japanese Buddhism. Nor did the later scholars who translated the soteriological Tantras consider them beneath their dignity. Amoghavajra, for example, produced new translations of the Anantamukhasādhakadhāraṇī (Taishō 1009 [Tohoku 525]), the Mahāmeghasūtra (Taishō 989, 990 [Tohoku 658]), and the Mahāmāyūrīvidyārājñī (Taishō 982, 983 [Tohoku 559]). Chinese translations of the first go back to the third century (Taishō 1011), of the second and third to the fourth century (Taishō 388 and 988).

2. Abhayākaragupta, Vajrāvalī (ed. Lokesh Chandra, Satapiṭaka Series Vol., Delhi: Sharada Rani, 1977 [photographic reproduction of a Ms]) $219^{5\text{-}6}$: *vīracaryāvratam eva yauvarājyavratacaryeti vajrakāpālikacaryāvratam iti coktaṃ śrīsaṃpuṭatantre /*.

3. Translating Abhayākaragupta, Niṣpannayogāvalī (ed. Benoytosh Bhattacharyya, Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 109, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1949), $26^{1\text{-}13}$.

4. Following MS B *naharuyajñopavītī* against the editor's *nāgayajñopavītī*. See Vajrāvalī $219^{2\text{-}3}$: *nṛ(nū)naharumayaṃ keśakṛtaṃ vā brahmasūtram /*, "The sacred thread should be made from human sinews or hair." For the form *naharu* cf. Pali *nahāru* (<Old Indic **snāru*), Nepali *nahar*, Maithilī *nahru*.

5. Vimalaprabhā (Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project, Running No. E13746, Reel No. E618/5. Place of Deposit: Asha Kaji Bajracharya, Lalitpur) folio 175r1-5: *tathādibuddhe - yo gṛhī maṭhikābhoktā sevako lāṅgalī vaṇik / saddharmavikrayī mūrkho na sa vajradharo bhuvi // ityādinā trividho gurur ācāryaparīkṣāyām uktaḥ // daśatattvaparijñānāt trayāṇāṃ bhikṣur uttamaḥ / madhyamaḥ śrāvanerākhyo gṛhasthas tv adhamas tayor iti / tathā — na kartavyo gurur ājñābhūmilābhaṃ vinā gṛhī / tatra śrutaparijñānair liṅgī kartavya eva yaḥ / bhūmilābhaṃ vinācāryo gṛhasthaḥ pūjyate yadā / tadā buddhaś ca dharmaś ca saṃgho gacchaty agauravam / atha — vihārādeḥ pratiṣṭhādyaṃ kartavyaṃ liṅginā sadā / satsu triṣv ekadeśe ca na gṛhiṇā ṣvetavāsinā iti / evam anekaprakāreṇācāryaparīkṣāyāṃ bhagavatokto guruḥ śiṣyenārādhanīya iti /*; ibid. folio 175v7-176r9: *iha triṣkālaṃ bhikṣubhiḥ kaṣāyadhāribhir vajrācāryo vandyate na gṛhī na navakaḥ saddharmavyākhyānena vinā / saddharmādīn*

puraskṛtya gṛhī vā navako 'pi vā / vandyo vratadharair buddhyā lokāvadhyānahānaye / tathā —āsanadānasamutthānam arthakriyādigauravam / sarvam etad vratī kuryāt tyaktvāsatkarmavandanam iti / iha yadi gṛhī navako 'pi vā bhikṣuvajrācāryeṇa tulyo bhavati tadā kim asatkarma pādaprakṣālanādikam pañcāṅgavandanāṃ tyaktvā svasthāne guror āgatasyārthādigauravaṃ kartavyaṃ vyākhyānakāle saddharmādīn puraskṛtya vandanā kartavyā lokāvadhyānahānaye / iha lokāvadhyānaṃ yat gṛhasthacellakānāṃ tatkausīdyatvenottaraliṅgāgrahaṇāt prātimokṣaśrutaparijñānena yadi kausīdyābhimāno nāsti tadā kimarthaṃ prāg bhikṣusaṃvaraṃ jñātvā paścān mahāyānaṃ jñātavyam iti hevajrādike bhagavato vākyaṃ na kurvanti / tasmād — gṛhasthācāryo bhikṣubhir nārādhanīyo bhikṣau vajradhare sati / rājñā punaḥ sarvaprakāreṇa nārādhanīya iti / tathācāryaparīkṣāyāṃ bhikṣayā raktavastreṇa lajjā yasya durātmanaḥ / vandyaḥ pūjyaḥ saraṅgānāṃ bauddhānāṃ naṣ-ṭamārgiṇām iti saṃbandhaḥ / raktāmbaraṃ yadā dṛṣṭvā dveṣaṃ gacchanti pāpinaḥ / mlecchadharmaratā bauddhās tathā śvetāmbarapriyā" iti / iha bauddhadarśanaṃ sarvadā na śuklapaṭam / tathā mañjuśrīviṣaye vihāre yadā bhikṣuś cellako vā pārājikam āpadyate tadā śuklavastraṃ dattvā kaṣāyaṃ gṛhītvā vihārān nirdhāyate / vajrācāryo 'pi mantrivihārād rājño niyamena / iha punar āryaviṣaye kathaṃ kaṣāyadhāriṇāṃ śvetāmbaradharo gṛhastho gurur vihārādipratiṣṭhākartā / mahān ayaṃ paribhavaḥ / mahatī khalv iyaṃ vivekavikalatā saugatānām yadā amī aparādhadaśāpannān ārādhayanti saty api bhikṣuvajradhare /.

6. See David Seyfort Ruegg, Review of David Snellgrove, Indo-Tibetan Buddhism: Indian Buddhists and their Tibetan Successors, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1989 (1), p. 173; and 'Sur les Rapports entre le Bouddhisme et le 'substrat religieux' indien et tibétain', *Journal Asiatique* 252 (1964), 7 -95.

7. Stephan Beyer, *The Cult of Tārā: Magic and Ritual in Tibet* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 42.

8. Translating Haracaritacintāmaṇi 13.74c - 83.

9. A pun on the word *bauddha*, which means 'Buddhist' (<*buddha*) or 'intellectual' (<*buddhi*).

10. Haracaritacintāmaṇi, paṭala 17.

11. Ibid. 17.4-9.

12. Herukābhidhānatantra, also called Laghusaṃvaratantra: Kaiser Library Kathmandu, Manuscript 410; Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project, Reel No. C 44/3.

13. Jayadrathayāmala, ṣaṭka 3, Yoginīsaṃcāra, samayācāraceṣṭāvidhānapatala, verses 116 - 148: National Archives, Kathmandu Manuscript 5/1975, Śaivatantra 429; Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project, Reel No. A 152/9, folios 208r6-209v2.

14. Siddhayogeśvarīmata, paṭala 29 (unnamed), verses 22c - 50: Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, Manuscript 5465 (Government Collection), folios 69v6-71v3.

15. Abhidhānottarottaratantra, paṭala 43 (dūtīsaukhyāmbupaṭala): Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project, Running No. E 15505, Reel No. E 695/3, Place of Deposit: Ashakaji Vajracharya, Lalitpur, folios 179r2 - 183r2.

16. Picumata, paṭala 85: National Archives, Kathmandu, Manuscript 3-370 ('Brahmayāmalatantra'): Nepal German Manuscript Preservation Project, Reel No. A 42/6, folios 326r1 - 327v3.

17. Saṃvarodaya, paṭala 15: Kaiser Library, Kathmandu, Manuscript No. 749b: Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project, Reel No. C 74/1, folios 26r4-27v1.

18. The present author is preparing a monograph in which he edits these parallel passages and demonstrates the relation between them.

19. See Saṃvarodaya, paṭalas 7 and 9 (Shiníchi Tsuda [ed & tr], The Saṃvarodaya-Tantra: Selected Chapters, Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1974); also Abhidhānottara, paṭalas 9 and 14; Yoginīsaṃcāra (Buddhist), paṭalas 5 and 13 (National Archives, Kathmandu, Manuscript No. 5-22/vi ['Saṃcāratantrapañjikā']).

20. Tantrasadbhāva, adhikāra 16 (yoginīlakṣaṇa-), verses 60c-68b: National Archives, Kathmandu.

Manuscript No. 5-1985, folio 78v9-13: *kulūtāyāṃ araṇyeśe sindhudeśe nageśvare / 60 / samudrakukṣyā<ṃ> saurāṣṭre pretapuryāṃ himālaye / kāñcyāṃ* (Ms: *kaṃcyo*) *lampākaviṣaye kaliṅge kauśale sthale / 61 / triśaṅkunau* (Ms: *triśaṅkunis*) *tathā cauḍre* (Ms: *coḍre*) *kāmarūpe ca mālave / devikoṭe sudhārāme godāvaryās* (Ms: *godāvaryāṃ*) *taṭe 'rbude / 62 / eṣu* (Ms: *eṣa*) *deśeṣu yāḥ kanyāḥ* (Ms: *kanyā*) *striyo vā klinnayonayaḥ / sarvās tāḥ kāmarūpiṇyo manovegānuvṛttayaḥ / 63 / śeṣeṣu yāḥ samutpannā<ḥ> śākinyo ghoramātaraḥ / ṣaḍ yoginyaḥ kulūtāyāṃ araṇyeśe ca mātaraḥ / 64 / sindhudeśe bhaginyas tu nageśe kulanāyikāḥ / samudrakukṣyāṃ* (Ms: *samudrakukṣya*) *kāmpilyaḥ saurāṣṭre gṛhadevatāḥ / 65 / pretapuryāṃ mahākālyo rūpiṇyo himavadgirau / kāñcyām* (Ms: *kaṃcyām*) *ambā<ḥ> samākhyātā lampākaviṣaye 'mṛtāḥ / 66 / kaliṅge vratadhāriṇya<ḥ> kauśale piśitāśanāḥ / cakravākyā <ḥ> sthale proktā<s> triśaṅ<ku>nyām* amarā *<ḥ> smṛtāḥ / 67 / deśadvaye ca śākinyo nāvikā vīranāyikā <ḥ> /.*

21. Tohoku 366.

22. Abhidhānottara, paṭala 1, prose after verse 3 (Ms cit., folio 1v5-6).

23. See, e.g., Niṣpannayogāvalī 26^{6-7}.

24. Ḍākārṇavatantra, paṭala 1, last verse (National Archives, Kathmandu, Manuscript No. 3-447, folio 7v2): *sarvavīrasamāyogād vajrasattvaḥ paraṃ sukham*; paṭala 49 (Ms cit., folio 149r1): *sarvavīrasamāyogaṃ dhātu<ṃ> sarveṣu cāntaram /.*

25. Saṃvarodaya (ed. Tsuda) 3.6cd; 26.10cd.

26. Abhidhānottara, paṭala 29, verse 7cd: *mahābhairavacarmmeṇa kaṭim āveṣṭya* (Ms: *āveṣṭha*) *saṃsthitam /.*

27. Ibid. paṭala 27, verses 4c-5b: *vikalpa bhairavañ caiva tṛṣṇā†rṣā† kālarātryayoḥ / pādākrāntatale kṛtvā sarvadurdāntadāmakaḥ /.*

28. Ibid. paṭala 30, verse 7cd: *bhujadvādaśabhir* (Ms: *-ābhi*) *yu<k>taṃ śūnyatājñānam uttamam /.*

29. Ibid. paṭala 48, verses 1c-3b: *hūṃkārākṣaraniṣpannaṃ vajraḍākaṃ mahāsukham* (Ms: *māhāsukham*) */ 1 / ṣaḍbhujaṃ trinetraṃ sarvalakṣaṇalakṣitam / vyañjanāśītisaṃyuktam* (Ms: *-āśiti-*) *ālikālyudbhavaṃ prabhum / 2 / vārāhyā ca samāpannaṃ śūnyatākaruṇākulam /.*

30. Ibid. paṭala 34, verse 13cd: *mahāmudrāsamāpannaṃ dharmadhātusvabhāvakam /.*

31. Ibid. paṭala 28 (on cult of Praṇavaḍāka), verse 5 to 9: *adha<ḥ>pādatalābje tu durbhagā<n>tīrthikā<n> kṛtvā / pañcadarśanam ākramya pratyālīḍhapadakramāt* (Ms: *līḍhapratyālīḍhapadākramāt*) */ 5 / … viṣṇucarmanivasanaṃ muṇḍamālāvibhūṣitaṃ* (Ms: *-tāḥ*) */ 6 / … brahmacarmavitānāṅgakaradvayena tu dhāryatam* (Ms: *-tāṃ*) */ kapālakhaṭvāṅgadharaṃ* (Ms: *-rā*) *maheśvaramuṇḍadhāryatam* (Ms: *tāṃ*) */.*

32. Jayadrathayāmala, ṣaṭka 2, paṭala 21, verses 8c to 14 (National Archives, Kathmandu, Manuscript No. 5-4650, folio 80r1-5): *catuścakreśvarīśeyaṃ bhairavotsaṅgagāminī / 8 / prathamaṃ bhairavaṃ devaṃ mahāpātakanāśanam / … daśabhūmīsvara-ṃ-buddhapratikarṇāvalambitam / aṣṭā ye krodharājāno herukādyā mahābalā<ḥ> / 12 / teṣāṃ muṇḍāntrasragdāmavasāmāṃsāsthibhojanam / manaścandramahāsthāne tārādyā yāś ca śaktayaḥ / 13 / tāsāṃ cūḍākalāpena †vaktrayuktera† bhāsvatā / yajñopavītam urasā dhārayantaṃ subhairavam / 14 / …*

33. Jayadrathayāmala, ṣaṭka 3, paṭala 4, verses 26 to 27 (Ms cit., folio 28r8-v1): *kopolbaṇamahākāla-* (Ms: *-laṃ*) *muṇḍadattaika* (Ms: *-daṃtaika-*) *pādikām / ghoraherukakaṅkālanyastapādadvitīyakām / 25 / krodharājāṣṭakaṃ bhīma<ṃ> bhairavendratathāgatān* (MS: *-tāḥ*) */ saṃcūrṇayantīṃ tān* (?. Ms: *-aṃtīsā*) *ghorapādāghātair bhayānakām / 26 /.*

34. For the formulae, and the meditations on the four *brahmavihāras*, mind-only and emptiness as the prelimaries of sādhana see Sādhanamālā (ed. Benoytosh Bhattacharyya, Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 26, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1925), 458^{18} - 459^{8} (Mahāmāyāsādhana), 466^{3-12} (Vajraḍākasādhana), 468^{19-20} (Herukasādhana) etc. For the resorption of *hūṃ* see, e.g., the Cakrasaṃvarapūjāvidhi (Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project, Running No. 791 D, Reel No. D 35/28, folios

1v-23v), folio 20r4-1: *hūṃkāraṃ mahāsukhamayaṃ bhāvayet / candram ūkāre ūkāraṃ hakāre hakāraṃ śirasi śiro 'rdhacandre 'rdhacandraṃ bindau binduṃ nāde nādaṃ bālāgraś atasahasrabhāgarūpaṃ nirvikalpaṃ mahāsukhamayaṃ cittaṃ nirūpayet /*

35. See, e.g., Svacchandatantra (ed. Paṇḍit Madhusudan Kaul, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies. Bombay: Research Department, Jammu and Kashmir State, 1921-1935) 4.525-529c. Here two the seed-syllable is *hūṃ* (the seed of Niṣkala-Svacchandabhairava, the high deity of this Tantra).

36. See Debala Mitra, *Buddhist Monuments* (Calcutta: Sahitya Samsad, 1971), 19: "The radically-reoriented religion evoked protests from the orthodox monks of Ceylon and Sindh. According to the Tibetan monk Dharmasvāmin (p. 64) and Lāmā Tāranātha, the Ceylonese Śrāvakas at Vajrāsana described Vajrayāna as being foreign to the teachings of the Buddha. They put into fire many mantra books, destroyed the silver image of Heruka and tried to convince the pilgrims about the uselessness of the Vajrayāna teachings."

37. See Kriyāsamuccaya (ed. Lokesh Chandra, Śatapiṭaka Series Vol. 237, Delhi: Sharada Rani, 1977 [photographic reproduction of a Ms]) 323[8] - 324[4]: *anena manaḥkarmapradhānatām asya yānasya darśayaty avirodhārtham / prakṛtisāvadye 'pi hi karmaṇi samutthānaviśeṣād anāpattir bhagavatā bahuśaḥ prakāśitā / tathā ca "caṇḍālaveṇukārādyā māraṇārthārthacintakāḥ / te 'pi hevajramārgasthāḥ siddhyante nātra saṃśayaḥ /" api ca "nāpattiḥ śubhacittasya snehāc caiva dayāvataḥ / niṣiddhaṃ apy anujñātaṃ kṛpālor arthadarśinaḥ" iti / yaḥ punar upacitapuṇyabāhuśrutyādibhiḥ sarvadharmān svapnasamān śūnyataikarasān sadṛḍham adhimuñcati tasya bhikṣuvajradharasaṃvarayoḥ kva virodhagandho 'pi / ata evoktaṃ bhagavatā "bhikṣuṃ vajradharaṃ kuryād" ity avaśyaṃ caitad abhyupeyam /*, "Hereby he shows, in order to avoid contradiction, that the emphasis of this Way is upon mental action. For the Lord has taught many times that even if the action is sinful by nature there is no offence if it has an (appropriate) cause. Thus: "Even untouchables, reed-cutters and the like, men who profit by killing (?), attain the goal if they enter this path of Hevajra. Of this there is no doubt." And: "There is no offence when the action is of one whose intention is good, who acts out of affection, who is compassionate. Even the forbidden is allowed in the case of the man who is compassionate and intent on the welfare of others." But he who by virtue of such factors as his accumulated merit and great learning has achieved the firm conviction that all phenomena are like illusions or dream images and identical with emptiness cannot be subject even to the slightest trace of a contradiction between his vows as a monk and his vows as a Vajra Master. Therefore the Lord has said: "One may make a monk a Vajra Master ..." This must be recognized"; ibid. 324[7]-: *yadi punar durjanagocaraḥ pradeśaḥ syāt tadā tasyāpi jñānamudrayā guhyaprajñājñānābhiṣekau dātavyau / durjanāsaṃbhave tu karmamudraiva / adṛḍhādhimokṣasya tu bhikṣoḥ śrāddhasyāpi bāhyaprajñayābhiṣekagrahaṇaṃ niṣiddham / anyathā pūrvasaṃvarabhraṃśān mahān anarthaḥ syāt / yadi punar guruḥ sthirabhāvako bhavati tadā tenārpitāyāṃ jñānārpitāyāṃ jñānamudrāyāṃ tasyāpi prajñājñānābhiṣeko deyo gṛhṇataś ca nābrahmacaryeṇa kāpy āpattir bhavet / karmakāyābhāvāt / tasya tu prāggṛhasthāvasthāyām anubhūtasukhasya smaraṇenānandādibhedāḥ pratipādayitavyāḥ / guror api sati bhikṣutve guhyābhiṣekādidāne sarvam uktam anusaṃdheyam /*, "But if the region is the home of evil men, then he may give the candidate the Secret Empowerment [*guhyābhiṣeka*] and the Empowerment of the Knowledge of Wisdom [*prajñājñānābhiṣeka*] through a Knowledge Seal [i.e. a non-physical consort]. However, if there are no such evil men, only the Action Seal [i.e. the physical consort] will be adequate. This is so unless the monk lacks firm conviction [in the illusory nature of phenomena]. In that case, even if he is a faithful Buddhist, he is forbidden to take these empowerments with an external Wisdom [i.e. consort]. If he were to do so, it would be a great ill: for he would then be guilty of breaking his vows. Rather, if his guru is capable of sustained contemplative realization he must impart the Empowerment of the Knowledge of Wisdom to him by giving him a Knowledge Seal; for in receiving 'her' he will not be guilty of abandoning his chastity. If he has been a married man before [his ordination] he can be taught the various Joys (*ānanda* etc.) [in the fourth Empowerment [*caturthābhiṣeka*]] through his memory of the sexual pleasure he experienced then. All that has been said about giving the Empowerments that begin with the Secret should be applied to the case of the initiating guru, if he is

a monk."

38. See David Gellner, *Monk, Householder, and Tantric Priest: Newar Buddhism and its Hierarchy of Ritual* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 273-281, 297-304. Gellner gives an ordered account of the ritual of initiation in the cult of Śaṃvara and Vajravārāhī following the verbal testimony of Newar Vajrācāryas. This account agrees almost entirely with the record of Newar practice preserved in the ritual manuals; see, e.g., Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project, Running No. E 1093/5 (Dīkṣāvidhi), E 1203/3; Asha Saphu Kuti Bubi 84 (Dīkṣāvidhāna), ibid. 85 (Dīkṣā-vidhāna), ibid. 45 (Dīkṣāvidhāna), ibid. 47.

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6

Buddhism in Cambodia and its Prospects

Mr. Son Soubert

The history of Cambodia started from the first century A.D. with the kingdom of Funan, but Buddhism was to flourish in the Kingdom only in the twelfth century under the reign of Dharmarāja Jayavarman VII. Originally Buddhism was practised in the Mahāyāna tradition, with Theravāda Buddhism gaining ground in the fourteenth century: eventually to become a central mainstay to the education and cultural identity of the Khmer Empire, continuing even through the reforms of the French Protectorate (1863-1953). Buddhism was to gain an increasing involvement in national politics, becoming the state religion. With the declaration of the Khmer Republic (1970-1975), Buddhism was unable to arbitrate peace between the opposing factions. Buddhism, along with other religions was virtually eradicated from Cambodia under the ensuing Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979). The traditional stability of society was uprooted by the destruction of Buddhism. This paper concludes with a description of the first efforts of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) in the present day to revive Buddhism as the key to rebuilding Cambodian society.

The history of Cambodia started from the first century A.D. with the kingdom of Funan, the Chinese name for the Khmer word '*phnom*', or '*bnam*' in old Khmer, which means 'mountain': the kings of the Funan were, according to the Indian tradition, 'kings of the mountain', the title used also by the Śailendra of Java. Since that early stage, Buddhism was already known in Southeast Asia and in Cambodia, with its zenith in the eighth to ninth century in Java as testified by the magnificent monument of Borobudur, and at the end of the twelfth century in Cambodia as testified

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by the temples of Banteay-Chmar and Bayon during the reign of Jayavarman VII. Relevant to the Buddhist teaching is the fate of the Khmer kingdom with its successes and failures, like the rolling of the *Dhammacakra* on stony ground. Thus as written in the Dhammapada:[1] "Come, behold this world, like unto an ornamented royal chariot! Herein fools flounder, but for the wise there is no attraction". There is also an escape-route, according to the Dhammapada:[2]

> "He who seeks Refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha, he who sees with Right Knowledge the Four Noble Truths - Sorrow, the cause of Sorrow, the transcending of Sorrow, and the Noble Eightfold Path which leads to the cessation of Sorrow; this indeed is Refuge secure; this indeed is Refuge supreme. Seeking such Refuge, one is released from all Sorrow."

When speaking about Buddhism in Cambodia past, present and future, it is necessary to look at its implemention of the Buddha's Teachings towards release or liberation, [*mokṣa*, *mokkha*] in all aspects of the social life, and notice where the people have fallen short of these Teachings.

FIRST TO FOURTEENTH CENTURY A.D.

At an early stage, Buddhism co-existed with Brahmanism which was the official royal religion. It seems that Buddhism was already popular among the common people, and that Brahmanism was confined mostly to the élite and the royal circle. An inscription in the reign of Rajendravarman (944-968) however, talked about the philosophical concept of Buddhism concerning the 'ātman'.[3] The Chinese emissary, Chou Ta-Kuan sent by Timur Khan to the Cambodian court of King Indravarman III from 1290-1297 mentioned in his account of Cambodian customs the existence of three religious groups: the Brahmins [*paṇḍita*], the Buddhist monks [*chao ku*], and the Taoists [*passu-wei*]: possibly the worshippers of Pashupati, Lord Śiva in the form of the *liṅga*;. The role of the Buddhist monasteries as centres of education was known already at that time. Worship of the Buddha was universal among the common people. Another bizarre role for the Buddhist priest, as well as for the Taoist priest, was to deflower maidens, in a ceremony called '*chen-t'an*', at age seven-to-nine years old for the rich families, and eleven years old for poor people.

King Jayavarman VII, like Emperor Aśoka of Kāliṅga, after waging extensive wars, converted himself to Buddhism, sickened by all the killing. Ironically, as witnessed by the carvings of the Banteay-Chmar and Bayon temples, it was Mahāyāna Buddhism which was adopted in Cambodia in the end. The king himself was so imbued with the spirit of compassion of Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara that he recorded in an inscription that, "The king felt the afflictions of his subjects more than his own, because the suffering of the people constitutes the suffering of the king more than his own suffering".[4] Therefore to manifest the compassion he felt for his people, he built 102 hospitals throughout the empire. That the empire still shows traces as far away as Khonkhaen in Thailand, bears witness to the past history recorded in stone inscriptions. Not only did he build hospitals, but also 121 rest-houses [*dhammasālā*] called 'houses with fire', for the travellers and pilgrims, as well as shelters along the roads of his kingdom. All the four castes were admitted for care in the hospitals. After a period of

reaction against Buddhism and the return to Śaivism; under King Jayavarman VIII (1248-1298), Buddhism continued to survive among the common people.

FOURTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURY AND THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE

Besides the official Mahāyāna Buddhism introduced by Jayavarman VII, Theravāda Buddhism imported from Sri Lanka via Burma and Siam continued to be popular among ordinary people into the thirteenth century. It was mostly in the fourteenth century that Theravāda Buddhism gained ground as a result of the revolution in the 'multi-century' ideology of the Devarāja cult introduced by King Jayavarman II in the beginning of the ninth century. Theravāda Buddhism emphasizes moral values and the notion of individual merits: one does not earn kingship by divine rights, but through the merit of good deeds in previous lives. With the introduction of Theravāda Buddhism came the decline of the Khmer empire, with attacks from the Siamese who took over the Angkor capital in 1352. This capital was abandoned in 1432, under King Ponhea Yat. After the Siamese dynastic interventions, the Annamites of the Dai Viets under the Nguyen of Hue also intervened in Cambodia in the middle of the seventeeth century, and colonized Khmer territories.

In this unstable context of wars, of political assassinations and misery, Buddhism made a large contribution to solving the problems. The Buddhist monasteries continued to play their role as centres for education, during that period, at least at the primary school level. They were the preservers of the Cambodian cultural traditions. The monasteries served also as shelters for poor students and elderly people who had renounced the world or were without family support. In the Mekong Delta known as 'Kampuchea Krom', temples were the Cambodian cultural centres resisting the attempts to assimilate the Khmer population by Annamite ancestors of the present-day Vietnamese. Some Khmers died as martyrs to defend Theravāda Buddhism as a part of the Khmer cultural heritage. Until the present day the Khmer Krom have succeeded in maintaining the Cambodian identity through the preservation of Theravāda Buddhism, their distinctive way of dressing and their language. During the French colonization, the Khmer Buddhist monasteries in Cochinchina dispensed teaching as scripts to the Cambodian children in Khmer language. In the present day, however, the Communist Vietnamese authorities forbid the teaching of Khmer scripts, by depriving the children of monastery schools and restricting the number of Khmer Buddhist monks, if not persecuting them. The exact figure of the Cambodian Buddhist monasteries in Kampuchea Krom is no longer known.

In Cambodia, the life of the village centred on the Buddhist monasteries. Buddhist monks, especially the chief monks, acted as advisers to the villagers, because of their knowledge and connections through the Saṅgha network with the political authorities. The kings of Cambodia were protectors of Buddhism. There have been only two occasions, both during the mid-seventeenth century, when kings have converted themselves briefly to other religions: one to Islam and another to Christianity. Buddhism played an indirect political role by maintaining cohesion among the Cambodian people, during their time of trial and suffering; the Buddhist monks were

the conscience of the people.

During the French protectorate of Cambodia, from 1863 to 1953, Buddhist monasteries continued their vocation as centres of education despite the French introduction of state-run schools. The monasteries' primary schools still continued to teach the children to read and write, and also to teach basic arithmetic and Buddhist texts. Thanks to the people's offerings, the Buddhist monks built schools in the remotest villages. They played a social role at the same time as exhibiting a political role. In 1942, the Buddhist Saṅgha demonstrated against the French colonial power in what was known as the 'umbrella demonstration'.

With the creation in 1887 of the 'Indochinese Union', a French federation in which Cambodia beside Laos, Cochinchina, Annam and Tonkin were integrated, Buddhism lost its political and economic autonomy in favour of the Cambodian identity. The most dangerous facet of this federation was that it tended to make people believe that the Indochinese were threatening to absorb the Cambodian, Annamite and Laotion ethnic minorities.

When the French arrived in Cambodia, they found a wide variety of alphabets among male Cambodians, thanks to Buddhist monastery schools. The French protectorate thus modernized the teaching given in the Buddhist monasteries, by codifying it and making it homogeneous throughout the country. Training of Buddhist monks as teachers was also available. In 1939, 108 renovated monastery schools served some 38,000 schoolboys; in 1947, the number rose to 53,000. However, after the 1946 *modus vivendi*, the situation was changed in favour of the secular schools.

From 1842, under King Ang Duong, who was a Buddhist monk contemporary to King Mongkut, the Siamese influence was felt with the introduction in Cambodia of another Buddhist order linked to the royal family and called 'Dhammayuttikanikāya' while the Mahānikāya remained largely popular among the people. The difference between these two orders lies mostly in external observances: the 'Dhammayuttika' monks maintained strict observance of monastic rules, for example by going barefoot, by not accepting offerings in cash or gold and by reading and chanting the prayers in the Pāli way. Mahānikāya monks were more liberal and modernized and somehow more intellectual: they could receive money offerings directly, and they pronounced the chanting in the Cambodian way. While the Mahānikāya order became widespread throughout the country, the 'Dhammayuttika' was more confined to the capital and the big cities. Although some points of rivalry existed between these two orders, they never touched upon issues of Doctrine.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF CAMBODIA FROM 1953 TO 1989

During Prince Norodom Sihanouk's reign, Buddhism enjoyed much freedom and development. The Prah Saṅgharāja (Supreme Patriarch) Chuon Nath was not only well versed in religion, but also a scholar in linguistics and other related sciences. The Buddhist Institute was one of the best centres for Buddhist monks training, with a well-equipped library. In Battambang city, thanks to the Chief Abbot of Vatt Po, Prah Vannarat, Khmer antiques and artifacts were collected and preserved in the compound of the monastery, and later the Khmer Royal Government built a museum on the spot.

Before 1975, there were sixty-thousand Cambodian Buddhist monks and three-thousand monasteries. Children over seven years of age could enter the monkhood as *samaṇera* since there was no age limit for being monk. Besides the traditional services offered by the Buddhist monks to society, such as education, social and religious services, the monks themselves were educated to university level. Prince Norodom Sihanouk imbued by the Buddhist spirit launched a political platform for a 'Buddhist Socialism' in Cambodia, largely practised in the countryside. Even the foreign policy of neutrality was inspired by the Buddhist teaching of the 'Middle Path'. Buddhism was a state religion, and remained as such during the Khmer Republic.

From 1970 to 1975, when the Khmer Republic was proclaimed, the two Buddhist orders previously mentioned, took side with the related political factions. The royal-sponsored Dhammayuttikanikāya remained loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk's movement and the American-backed regime of General Lon Nöt was supported by the Mahānikāya. The Buddhist monks failed to play any positive role in the process of reconciliation started by former Prime Minister Son Sann in 1972. The (then) Saṅgharāja, Venerable Huot Tath, when asked to lead a procession of monks to beg [*piṇḍapat*] for peace for Cambodia in 1973 by Prime Minister Son Sann dared not to do so after consulting the Khmer Republic Officials. This failure to achieve peace was fatal to the Khmer Republic, as well as to the Buddhist Saṅgha.

From 1975 to 1979, during the absolute power, of the Khmer Rouge the Buddhist Saṅgha suffered much from the persecution of the Communist regime. Not only were monks defrocked and sentenced to hard labour in remote areas where they died from unhealthy conditions and diseases, but also they were eliminated by starvation. The Buddhist monasteries were either closed, knocked-down or turned into hen-houses and pig-sties. The Buddha images were mutilated, destroyed or desecrated. The same fate awaited the other religious denominations: Islam and the Catholic church.

Theravāda Buddhism, through its demoraling ideal of 'renunciation', was accused of being the cause of the decline of the Khmer nation by the Communist Khmer Rouge. (However, was the same Theravāda Buddhism, in Siam not on the contrary, dynamic and conquering?) In spite the constitution recognizing the freedom of religion, most of the religious denominations were systematically eliminated. From the Communist point of view, religion is the 'opium of the people', and the Buddhist monks were considered as unproductive: parasitic upon society. The Buddhist Saṅgha was nearly completely decimated, excepting those monks who succeeded in escaping abroad.

From 1979 to 1989, under the Vietnamese occupation, for obvious political reasons, the Heng Samrin regime revived Buddhism, but not in the traditional form. The Vietnamese imposed restrictions. They established a 'Religious Direction Office' (RDO) as a controlling organisation, personnel of which set up a committee in each monastery. This RDO issued orders or decrees for the monks:

4.1 a monk cannot be under fifty years old;
4.2 he must be educated in Communist ideology and help propagate it during his sermons;
4.3 the monastery pays taxes to the RDO, after each religious ceremony;

4.4 the monk must pay a monthly tax of 10 riels;
4.5 the monastery pays a monthly tax of 100 riels;
4.6 a donation box must be put in the monastery to raise funds for the RDO every month;
4.7 in every monastery, the number of monks cannot exceed five;
4.8 Lay people are discouraged from merit-making, such as the celebration of Kaṭhina, flower-processions or other religious ceremonies. Instead the religious meaning of such celebrations is turned into trading, the profit of which is shared for a small part to the monastery and the greater part for one's own selfish pleasures and enjoyment.[5]

In 1989, Murray-Hiebert reported[6] from Phnom Penh that the Phnom-Penh radio had started broadcasting prayers; that some restrictions, such as taxing pagodas and prohibiting men under the age of fifty-five from becoming monks, had been lifted; that 2,800 pagodas were functioning and there were eight thousand Buddhist monks. However the ordination of monks still required the approval of local officials. Vatt Onalom, centre for training monks, had been closed. The Buddhist Saṅgha hierarchy was under the control of the Cambodian State organization 'National United Front for Construction and Defence'. Leading Khmer monk, Tep Vong, had become a National Assembly member, whereas the Buddhist monks had traditionally been barred from participating in political activities.

On the sixth of December 1989, a Buddhist monk, Prah Indara, aged twenty-five, from Vatt Sdei Botum, in the village of Sré Kakoy (Kang Meas district, Kampong Cham province), fled to the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) liberated zone, and reported that in Kampong Cham province, each monastery is still allowed only five monks. Those who enter monkhood have to pay 1,000 Riels (US $3.25) and fifty-two kilogrammes of rice every month. They can be ordained only for three years, and would have to serve in the army for a further three years, before being allowed to be re-ordained. They have also to pay 300 riels every month.

In contrast, Buddhism in its original form is now encouraged at the border camps under the administration of the non-Communist resistance, as in Site 2 and Sokh Sonn under the KPNLF, or in Site B under Prince Sihanouk's party. The monkhood is open to people of all ages, without discrimination of social status. There is no restriction of religious freedom, except for the restriction of movement which is contingent on all living in refugee camps.

CONCLUSION

There can be revival of true Buddhism only if all the Buddhist monks in the border camps can have the chance to be educated properly in Buddhist scripture and teachings. The KPNLF that the present author represents, has made many approaches to the Thai Saṅgha, to the Sri-Lankan authorities and even to the Dalai Lama, but somehow there are obstacles to the education of Khmer monks. The present author has appealed to all friendly countries to accept some of the Khmer monks to be trained in Pāli and in Buddhist scripture. If Buddhist practices remain ritual ceremonies without being properly understood and implemented in daily life, then the same old causes will

bring about the same effects again. For many centuries Buddhism has managed to temper the violent nature of the Khmers, which was most manifest during the time of Pol Pot.

Under the KPNLF, a Khmer Buddhist Research Centre has been created to find out why Buddhism failed to prevent the misfortunes of these past decades, not because the Buddha's Teachings are imperfect, but because men have not correctly practised the Teachings or have failed to implement them. Finding ways in which Buddhism can help prevent future misfortunes in Cambodia is also the objective of the Research Centre, presently situated in the KPNLF border camp. This is the only hope for the future. It is also a challenge for all friends of Cambodia, by helping to create a peaceful environment in Cambodia and in Southeast Asia.

For real peace, emphasis must be put on the social role of the Buddhist monks in educational and social work, such as care for the orphans and for the elderly people, as is seen in Thailand. The Buddhist monks have to show themselves intellectually able to assist society. Scientific research is a new field of activity for the Buddhist monk, but not outside the scope of the aim of the Buddha's Teachings: release or liberation [*mokkha*], which is interpreted here as psychological liberation from frustration and modern stress, social liberation from poverty and injustice, and moral liberation from decay and decadence.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The KPNLF would like to renew its gratitude to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany, for its precious help and assistance in the setting up of the Khmer Buddhist Research Centre. Without this help the information presented in this paper might never have been gathered.

NOTES

1. Dhammapada 13, Lokavagga 171
2. Dhammapada 14, Buddhavagga 190
3. K.806, Prerup Stele, I.C. (Inscriptions du Cambodge), Vol.1, pp. 73-142
4. L. Finot, "L'Inscription Sanskrite de Say-Fong, *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1903, pp. 18-33. See also G. Coedes, "Les Hôpitaux de Jayavarman VII, *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient*, Vol. 40, (1940), pp. 344-347
5. Decree of the Religious Direction Office of the VN-backed Phnom-Penh regime.
6. Murray-Hiebert, *Far Eastern Economic Review* : 3 August 1989, pp. 36-37

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7
Thai Buddhism Today: Crisis?[1]

Natayada na Songkhla

Given the amount of social change that has occurred in Thailand over the past half century in reaction to the twin influences of its own history, and nowadays more urgently, westernization in the form of industrialization, it could be said that Thai Buddhism has reached a critical point in its history. There are complaints that Buddhism, like many other traditional institutions, is in decline, that Buddhist education is insufficient for the needs of the people and that the Saṅgha is ill-equipped to meet the demands of a modern society. Buddhism must serve the interests of sectors of society made diverse by their various degrees of westernization. This factor, along with the dynamics of devotion of individual Buddhists as to their choice of temple or spiritual teacher has the tendency to fragment Buddhism in Thailand. Buddhism's destiny must lie in the hearts and minds of the country's practising Buddhists, however the concensus of interest of Buddhists in Thailand tends to be with solving ephemeral problems. Thus, when there is talk of 'orthodoxy', unity can be found only in the Buddhism of the 'here-and-now', while unsolved philosophical disagreements remain the object of media interest. Such a situation makes uncertain the likely direction of successful development for the Thai Buddhism of future years.

Ninety-five percent of the Thai population is Buddhist: in actual terms, fifty-million people. Buddhist festivals and holidays are celebrated with regularity, to such an extent that it seems obvious to the foreign visitor that religion in Thailand is of high priority. The debate as to the course of Buddhism in the country seems to be a topic of general discussion which is taken up daily in the mass media. On the basis of such evidence, it would seem most likely that Buddhism is alive and well in Thailand rather than being in a state of crisis. It is therefore first necessary to make a more detailed examination of the evidence for the existence of such a crisis.

Thailand has been undergoing a great deal of social change, visible not only in the

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space of the present century, but even within the space of the present decade. The embrace of westernization in the form of industrialization has put such pressure on social institutions that there has been considerable deterioration. This is not to say that such institutions have been obliterated, but merely that they are under threat. The most important aspect of westernization is that there has been an emphasis on the superiority of 'the modern' over 'the traditional'.

Modernization has lead to changes in basic social structure. Relations within the family unit are changing. To use an example, a father of the modern day complains that his daughter feels that it is within her rights whether or not to answer her father's questions; if this scenario had occurred a generation ago, his daughter would have lied to him rather than refuse him an answer! Extended families, although still quite common, are going out of fashion; children are moving out of their parents' home to live on their own. Much of this has to do with the Western rates of pay which allow the children more financial independence.

Along with Western rates of pay, are Western hours of work. People are working less on an agricultural calendar (where hours are dictated by the seasons) and are working more on a Western five-day week. The repercussions of this change in calendar are felt most strongly in the religious institutions. People are no longer free to come to the temple on Buddhist holy days that fall in the middle of the week, because they are free only at the weekends.

Another repercussion of westernization on Buddhism is that there is more of a separation of religion and education. Historically, the temples had always been centres of education. Although many schools are still located in temples, now there has been a move away from a Buddhist educational system to a degree that there are now Christian schools and schools independent of any religious institutions. This departure from Buddhist education has brought about a new kind of logic and process of thought which will be examined in more detail later.

The growth of the tourist industry has presented another great area of change. Whereas twenty years ago the major source of foreign exchange was the export of rice, now it is tourism. This has been an influence which has contributed to the decadence of traditional art forms, packaged to make them more attractive and marketable to foreign visitors. There is the rejection of traditional cultural practices in favour of those that will better entertain the tourists. On a more positive note, the trend in the West to conserve old buildings as cultural landmarks has led to a greater public interest in the preservation and restoration of old temple buildings.

In addition to the general problem areas already mentioned, there are many more specific problems have been blamed on westernization and industrialization. There are displaced people, homeless people and jobless people due to the migration into Bangkok in search of a better life.

DIVISIONS IN SOCIETY

Differences in education and available technology create vast divisions in society: there are people who use satellites to 'fax' their work to clients in Europe and Americas, while not two hundred miles away, a rice farmer is still driving his buffalo to plough

the fields. There is the problem of prostitution. There are serious traffic jams. On the whole however, so much has happened so quickly in Thai society that Buddhism is not alone amongst the institutions scrambling to keep up with progress.

With modern communication, regional differences in religious practice have been made more obvious and a demand for one comprehensive and coherent religious policy has grown out of Thailand's need for national integration in response to the Communist threat during the sixties and seventies. Part of the crisis people see in Buddhism has been this lack of integration in the face of a society that is demanding unity. The problem however, is that Thai Buddhism, historically-speaking, has not been one coherent whole, but rather a varied group holding loosely to common beliefs. The majority of members of the Saṅgha belong to one of two sects: the older '*Mahānikāya*' and the newer '*Dhammayutthikanikāya*' (which was established by King Rama IV in the last century. Even today, there are regional differences throughout the country. Most influential are the teachings of the late Kru Ba Siwichai in the North of Thailand, Tan Ajahn Chah in the Northeast, and still preaching with immense popularity in the South is Buddhadasa Bhikkhu. Moves to unify the Saṅgha, which have been made since the late nineteenth century, under King Chulalongkorn (King Rama V), have met with varied success.

The problems that the Thai Saṅgha has encountered in Thailand most recently, extend beyond the move to unification. There have been complaints that the Saṅgha has lost the faith and the trust of the Thai people and that the Saṅgha has not remained relevant to the demands of the modern world. More specifically, people complain that those who are secluded from the secular world are in no position to understand it enough to help it. There are those who say that a monk's education is insufficient to deal with modern society's pressing needs. People not only need monks who can preach the Dhamma, they need experts in animal husbandry, agricultural technology and industrial relations. Where are monks to become educated in order to satisfy such demands? Should they be educated to satisfy such demands? In addition to this basic debate as to the role of monks in the modern world, there have been sufficient scandals and disputes highlighted by the media, to bring into question the validity of having monks in the modern world at all. The Saṅgha was recently brought to the point of protesting about a magazine cover with a model representing a monk surrounded by various iconography depicting corruption. A protest was held to point out that most of the Saṅgha is not corrupt, and is actually very concerned about its credability. The debate did not end with this protest however, for there were those who felt that monks should be open to criticism, even in its more severe forms.

RESPONSE OF BUDDHISM

The response to criticism by the Saṅgha has been as varied as the criticism itself. New temples and policies have been established to meet the demands of a modern lay public. Most respected of the new monks to embrace foreign and modern ideas are Buddhadasa Bhikkhu and Phra Thepwedi. The mainstream has initiated the '*Phaendin Tham Phaendin Thong*'[2] programme to teach meditation along with rural and urban development. Wat Phra Dhammakāya has responded with modernized iconography

and administration. The (now discredited) Santi Asoke has attempted to lead a return to strict observance of the Buddhist precepts. Development monks (*nak phatana*)[3] have initiated immensely successful programmes in rural areas, often working in conjunction with royal projects such as 'buffalo banks' which allow the poorer farmers access to buffaloes to plough their fields.

Buddhism has adapted to become more available to the people. Many temples hold services at the weekends. There is extensive use of modern technology with tape recordings of sermons sold in stores and on the streets. Video-tape recordings are common as well as television and radio broadcasts. The publication and distribution of religious tracts makes use of burgeoning literacy; Buddhist institutions have not been stagnant in the face of change in Thai society!

LAY BUDDHIST CONCENCUS

Orthodoxy

On the part of laymen, the response has also been varied. Due to changes in society's demands, there is generally confusion as to the nature of orthodoxy in Thai Buddhism. An understanding of Buddhist orthodoxy in Thailand is very rare amongst the people. Only one interviewee in the present research felt that he had a true understanding of orthodoxy in Thai Buddhism. His understanding had come from Phra Thepwedi's book *Buddhadhamma*. While such a book is of great significance and can be of great use to those who are confused, the book is a good three inches thick! Those lay devotees who are unable to attend holy days at the temple due to time constraints are hardly likely to make an effort to read such a large tome. The same problem occurs for those who define orthodoxy by the Tipiṭaka. Who has time to learn Pāli and read it all? There are perhaps a few conscientious individuals who are willing to devote themselves to such daunting tasks, but for the most part, people resort to the interpretations that are the most appealing, thereby defining their own orthodoxy.

Individual Devotion

A term often used to discuss monastic appeal in Thailand is '*satha*'[4]. Dictionaries define the word as 'faith' or 'devotion'. Through the result of the present research, *satha* seems to refer to a relationship that goes beyond mere faith; it is a highly personal interaction between a monk (or a temple) and a layman. The religious figure or institution, through certain attributes inspires an interest in a layman such that the layman feels that to follow the teaching of this monk or this temple would provide spiritual gain. The extent that this inspiration becomes devotion is by reaching a level of exclusivity; the layman may find other monks or temples which are good, but his own choice is the best. The monk or institution which inspires the most '*satha*' will achieve the largest following by sheer weight of numbers, and this will influence orthodoxy. This progression is more easily described than realised, however, due to individual preferences and priorities. There are those laymen inspired by excellence in Pāli scholarship who will settle for nothing less. Others prefer a monk to preach in common everyday jargon, rejecting the Pāli scholars as outdated. The success of Phra Payom is one example of the preference by certain laymen for sermons in youthful

vernacular. The factor of *satha*, of gaining it and spreading it, is the challenge that Buddhism faces.

The differences in preference and priority can often be traced to factors of social status. Differences in social class and education bring about differing demands on the behalf of the layman. The businessman using the 'fax', due to a different life experience, is not going to have the same demands as a rice farmer who uses buffalo to plough his fields. The decline of traditional Thai 'logic' also contributes to the gulf in demands placed on Buddhist institutions. To certain parts of society comes a loss of confidence in such practices as spirit worship, fortune-telling, astrological divination, charms, amulets and ritual. By contrast, there are still other parts of society who believe strongly in such traditions. There is a trend towards an individual sense of correctness amongst lay devotees, resulting in further confusion as to the concept of orthodoxy. There may be any number of texts which define orthodoxy, but these are of limited use if few people have the interest or opportunity to read them, or if, once the books are read, few agree on the interpretation. While such texts are very important to scholars of Buddhism, it is ultimately the common worshipper who decides on the popularity of a religious figure or institution.

Buddhism of the Here-and-Now

Although the *satha* relationship is a highly individual one that involves each lay devotee and his monk or temple, there are general trends on popularity that should be noted. Each one of the laymen interviewed in connection with the current research showed a marked interest in the present. Despite talk of 'rebirth', 'kamma' and 'past and future lives', the greatest interest seemed to be for a Buddhism of the here-and-now. Rather than discuss the rewards of merit in the next life, informants stressed the benefits of the Buddha's Teaching in solving the dilemmas of the present and making this life's sufferings more intelligible. None of the interviewees spoke of accumulating merit for the next life, and when asked about 'rebirth', would display greater concern for how Buddhism can make life more liveable. Such responses concerning the next life and Nirvāṇa ranged from the indifferent,"*Chat na loe? Khong yang ngan duai!*"[5] (...the next life?..well, that too, I suppose...), to the flippant,"*Niphan loe? Mai ao! Chat na yak du lakon*"[6] (...Nirvāṇa?..Forget it!..I want to go to the theatre in the next life...).

FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

While the existence of a common interest in the present should give encouragement to those demanding a united, coherent Saṅgha policy, this agreement rarely extends beyond Buddhism for the here-and-now. The myriad factors that attract individuals can vary to such an extent and with such fervour that Buddhist unity is at risk. The crisis is not from a lack of interest in Buddhism, but rather from a lack of agreement as to how Buddhism should develop its involvement in the lives of the laypeople.

Success cannot be attributed solely to philosophical policy, however. It is necessary to take into account the pragmatics of proliferating such ideas. A monk may be particularly wise, but his teachings extend no further than himself if he is isolated from the rest of society. The most successful Buddhist institutions in Thailand (and any

other religious institutions anywhere, for that matter) are those with the best facilities for spreading the word of their teachings. This means good administration and financial resources. Both have been subjects of heated debate, along with philosophical policy.

The challenge which Buddhism faces in Thailand is adapting to the demands of a society that is in various stages of westernization. The problem is how to meet everyone's demands and yet still retain the vital unity that will prevent the Saṅgha from splitting into many small sects. The questions are firstly, whether such unity can be maintained alongside philosophical and spiritual correctness, and secondly, how to ensure a proper understanding by the laypeople of what is correct. Ultimately, it is the lay public, through their acceptance or rejection of a religious institution that grants success or failure. In conclusion, it can be said that Buddhism is indeed alive and well in Thailand, but the problem lies in how it will develop.

NOTES

1. This paper sets out to explore the popular opinion that Thai Buddhism is in crisis, examining both this viewpoint and the responses that have been made to it. In doing so, the present author draws on data derived from seventeen months of anthropological research conducted between 1988 and 1989, in an attempt to discover the layman's perspective on the changes that have taken place in the Thai Saṅgha during recent years.

2. แผ่นดินธรรม แผ่นดินทอง

3. นักพัฒนา

4. ศรัทธา

5. ชาติหน้าเหลอ? คงอย่างงั้นด่วย

6. นิพพานเหลอ? ไม่เอา ชาติหน้าอยากดูละคร

8
Buddhism in Southeast Asia

Phra Kru Vinaithorn Virasak Kittivaro

Early Buddhism adapted itself and was able to spread, during the reign of the Emperor Aśoka (264-227BC), who sent missionaries out to all parts of the then known world. It was during this epoch that Buddhism spread to Thailand, Laos, China, Cambodia and Vietnam. Today, Southeast Asia is considered the heart of Buddhism in the modern world, because there are more people practising, studying and teaching Buddhism in Southeast Asia than anywhere else. Moreover, it is in this part of the world that the original practices of the Buddha from his own Teachings, are followed in their purity.

In order to understand the influence of the Buddha on the spiritual life of Southeast Asia, it must be appreciated that He was not a religious teacher in the sense that He was attempting to persuade others to accept a set of beliefs. The Buddha was an individual who had stepped outside the religious world of Brahmanism and had practised deep introspection to the point of complete spiritual liberation, teaching all those who would listen how to go beyond all forms of thought-bound limitation, and the Suffering implicit therein. Buddhism has always kept its essentially mystical and yogic inner focus, and has thus always been a potent source of spiritual renewal in Southeast Asia. Throughout its development, Southeast Asia has never lost touch with the spiritual revolution that Gotama, the Buddha, brought about during his own existence and which He offered to humanity 2500 years ago.

While Buddhism elsewhere in the world often teaches that the householder can achieve liberation while remaining in the world, the practice of Buddhism in Southeast Asia has always placed a special value upon and attached a deep reverence to the life of the monk or nun. Real Buddhism in Southeast Asia, as distinguished from its popular cultural and religious accretions, is centred on the practice of meditation. To be a monk is to be committed to meditation. Even so, many monks in Southeast Asia do not actually meditate. They may practise selfless service, or they may study: often falling into the trap of thinking that study and service are ends in themselves. Originally, these other activities were seen as forms of self-preparation and inner purification which helped to create a state of inner clarity suitable for meditation and

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even today, whatever form monastic Buddhism has taken, Southeast Asia has always kept meditation, mystical experience, and the ultimate goal of Enlightenment at the very centre of its existence. Whatever its religious impact, this has always been the essential *spiritual* influence of Buddhism in Southeast Asia, and throughout the world.

9

Characteristics of Japanese Buddhism

Prof. Dr. Kiyotaka Kimura

Buddhism was officially introduced to Japan in 538 and since that time has grown and diversified to become the main religion of ninety-three million people in Japan: nearly half of the religious population. The oldest Buddhist sects are still in existence, but they have less social influence than the newer Buddhist movements: especially the lay Buddhist movements established since the Second World War. The major characteristics of modern Japanese Buddhism are three-fold: the ability to form syncretic relationships with other popular religions in the country, the emphasis on 'Buddha-nature' in the Scriptures and the wide variety of Buddhist practices advocated by the different sects. The character of Japanese Buddhism as a whole may be called a sort of 'secularism'.

Since Buddhism was introduced in the sixth century, it has been accepted, learned, and believed in by many Japanese people. However, in the process of acceptance, Buddhism itself has changed to a great extent, gradually in some aspects, and dramatically in others.What then, are the characteristics of Japanese Buddhism which differentiate it from Buddhism in other countries? Are the differences related to the economical and social development of Japan in the present day?


Major Schools

The most recent Annual Report, that was compiled by the Agency for Cultural Affairs of the Government of Japan in 1989, shows the 1987 statistics for religious adherents in Japan. Table 13.1. shows that there were more than ninety-three million people were confirmed (or professed) Buddhists in 1987. The number indicated here is not necessarily accurate, as is obvious when comparing it to Japan's real population which numbers about 120 million. This discrepancy mainly relates to the very fact that a lot of Japanese believe in two or more religions at the same time. In any case, it seems to be certain that half of the population of Japan is involved in Buddhism at this time.

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There are many Buddhist schools and sects in modern Japan which are working in society.

Table 13.1
Adherents of Religion in Modern Japan (31.12.1987)



The statistics in Table 13.2. show the names and popularity of the main schools and sects in Japan in 1987. Firstly, from the number of temples and churches, it is clear that some sects of Pure-Land Buddhism and Zen Buddhism (specifically Shinshū-honganjiha, Shinshū-ōtaniha, and Sōtōshū) are outstandingly popular.

As shown in Table 13.3. these sects have more than seven-hundred years of tradition. Besides, they were supported and exploited in a political manner by the administration of the Edo period. The predominance of the number of temples and churches in these sects is largely for this reason. This data seems to indicate that these three sects have

a numerical advantage in propagation of their doctrines. However, their activities do not seem so influential in the life of Japanese people as many sects of the 'New Buddhism'.

Secular Developments

Shinnyoen and Risshōkōseikai, together with the three traditional sects already mentioned, are particularly notable with regard to their religious leaders. Both Shinnyoen and Risshōkōseikai originated from religious movements established after


Table 13.2
Statistics on Buddhism in Modern Japan (31.12.1987)

Main Schools & Sects	Temples & Churches	Priests, Nuns & Instructors	Adherents
NARA BUDDHISM	545	2,282	2,397,251
Hossōshū	169	288	576,703
Kegonshū	143	1.117	45,830
TENDAI	5,173	20,310	3,079,357
Tendaishū	3,277	4,521	608,960
Jimonshū	243	843	298,770
Shinzeishū	426	356	13,368
Nempōshinkyō	94	5,406	807,486
Kōdōkyōdan	4	1,437	401,452
SHINGON (Esotericism)	14,839	43,481	15,607,203
Kōyasan-shingonshū	3,594	6,300	5,445,360
Shingonshūchizanha	2,877	4,061	1,536,982
Shingonshūbuzanha	2,628	2,872	1,186,878
Shinnyoen	67	12,999	2,455,015
JYŌDO (Pure Land)	30,380	57,986	20,441,569
Jyōdoshū	7,095	9,529	6,021,900
Shinshūhonganjiha	10,517	26,996	7,508,883
Shinshūōtaniha	8,890	15,718	5,533,194
Jishū	415	480	82,800
Yūzūnembutsushū	358	395	128,940
ZEN	21,096	24,334	9,523,505
Rinzaishūkenchōjiha	407	357	242,995
Rinzaishūmyōshinjiha	3,428	3,527	1,022,500
Sōtōshū	14,763	17,224	6,935,817
Ōbakushū	456	470	353,472
NICHIREN	12,969	47,917	35,541,430
Nichirenshū	5,273	7,898	2,570,109
Hokkeshū	521	720	566,370
Reiyūkai	3,435	3,382	3,150,000
Risshōkōseikai	614	18,852	6,248,419
Nichirenshōshū-Sokagakkai	671	564	17,566,501

1930, just a few years before the Second World War. Because they are founded upon Secularism, their instructors do not renounce the world. These two religions aim at the realization of peace in everyday (worldly) life, greatly relying on instructors as the core of their movement.

The three traditional sects mentioned above might seem to have the largest potential for propagation in light of the number of clergy. However, the influence is quite negligible because the majority of Buddhists who belong to these sects are not active

Table 13.3
Historical Chart of Main Schools and Sects of Japanese Buddhism



in their vocation: their activities being restricted to services for the dead and earning money for good management of the temple.

Social Influence

Nichirenshōshū-Sokagakkai is notable by way of the proportion of its clergy to lay followers. This organization consists of a small group of priests and priestesses named Nichirenshōshū and an enormously large group of secular followers named Sokagakkai. This is one of the most vigorous bodies among the field of religious activity in Japan and takes part in the politics of Japan through the agency of the party named 'Komeitō'.

Traditional Schools

The general name given to the oldest group of sects is 'Nara Buddhism'. The reason for that name is because they were imported from Silla and T'ang in the Asuka-Nara period. None of the six sects of Nara Buddhism have much power as a religious bodies in the society of Japan these days. Nevertheless, their social influence cannot be forgotten as some of them attract a large number of people who pray for happiness, sometimes while doing sightseeing. The present situation of Nara Buddhism seems to suggest one trend for Japanese Buddhism in the future.

FUNDEMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE BUDDHISM

Syncretism with other Religions

The question of what course Japanese Buddhism has taken until the present day and what characteristics it has produced in its history is not easy to answer concisely, however, three main issues can be proposed as a basis of discussion for the fundamental characteristics of Japanese Buddhism: syncetism with other religions, the emphasis on Buddhist scripture and the emphasis on Buddhist practice.

The first issue is that Japanese Buddhism is basically a syncretism with Shintō. In today's Japan, Shintō, which literally means 'the way of gods', can be regarded as having four main forms; the Shintō of the Imperial House, Shrine Shintō, Sectarian Shintō, and Fork Shintō. The Shintō referred to here is, so to speak, 'Basic Shintō'. It is this culture which has basically orientated the value-judgement of Japanese people to everything, especially urging the original purity of the mind of human beings and the importance of purification of the mind from defilements accumulated later on. Professor Edwin O. Reishauer made the following observation on Shintō in this respect:

> "It has been an unchanging warp on which a rich and varied woof of other threads has been woven into the constantly changing patterns of Japanese civilization".[1]

In Japan, many examples can be seen of the syncretism of religions; take, for example, the life of a typical Japanese person... they are born to their mother who has received amulets for safe and good birth at a Shintō shrine or a Buddhist temple; they take the entrance examination for school or university after praying at a shrine and/or a temple; they marry at a shrine or a Christian church; they finally pass away as a Buddhist monk recites sūtras. How about the Japanese calendar? In January, they go to a shrine and/

or a Buddhist temple to worship the gods and/or the Buddha in hope of happiness in the New Year; in February, they present their lover and/or superiors with Saint Valentine's Day gifts in the Christian manner, if they are female; in March and September, they visit their ancestors' tombs to make their souls peaceful for the Equinox Day; in August, they hold the Bon-festival to welcome their ancestors' souls as one of the family in a Buddhist way, and; in December, they celebrate Christmas in various ways so to speak, as a temporary Christian.

As if responding to such a Japanese lifestyle, Buddhism and Shintō are on particularly good terms with each other, for example, gods of Shintō are still now enshrined in the temples of several sects of Japanese Buddhism, although these two religions were legally divided in 1869 by the Government of the Meiji Restoration. In fact, the syncretic relationship between Buddhism and Shintō has a long tradition in the history of Japan. Dr. Masaharu Anesaki (1873-1949) describes the first amalgamation of the two religions in modern Japan as follows:

> "The link between the two religions had been inaugurated since the eighth century, and subsequently steps were taken to make a more systematic combination. Kūkai's Shingon Buddhism was especially well-suited to this purpose. His followers used their conception of the two aspects of cosmic life to justify the union: the Buddhist deities were assumed to be the real entities of the Shintō deities. The Buddhist pantheon in general was thought to represent the 'Indestructibles', while the deities of the Shintō pantheon were interpreted as their partial appearances. The real entity, or prime noumenon, was called 'the original' [*honji*], and the 'manifestated trace' [*suijaku*]. In carrying out this combination or parallelism, every god [*kami*] was regarded as a manifestation of a certain Buddhist deity, and the majority of the Shintō sanctuaries were furnished with an 'inner sanctuary' [*oku-no-in*], where a Buddhist cult was observed, while the front sanctuary was left comparatively intact. This syncretic religion is known as 'Double-aspect' [*ryobu*] Shintō; it was an extension of the Buddhist communion to Shintō deities and at the same time an adaptation of Buddhism to the native religion."[2]

Since this era, it seems that the Japanese have understood in general that Buddhas and *bodhisattva*s in Buddhism conform to the Shintō gods in essence, in spite of some differences of characters between deities in the two religions.

Emphasis on Buddhist Scripture

The second important issue in the characteristics of Japanese Buddhism is the emphasis on Buddhist Teaching the Japanese prefer and in which they most deeply believe. Particulary relevant to this issue is the strong faith of the majority of Japanese Buddhists in the 'Buddha-nature' inherent in every sentient being. The root of the teaching of 'Buddha-nature' may be traced back to the early Buddhist canons. However, as is well known, this teaching was most developed in the stream of Tathāgatagarbha thought in Mahāyāna Buddhism, and was gladly welcomed by Buddhists in Eastern Asia. Because East Asian Buddhists tend to believe in the ability

of human beings to become a saint and attach importance to the reality of this world, the teaching of 'Buddha-nature' was closely compatible with their way of thinking. In Japan, this philosophy typically bore fruit as the idea that one can become a Buddha within the present life [*sokushin-jōbutsu*] The former belief was established by Kūkai (774-835), the founder of the Shingon school. He writes;

"The Six Great Elements of the Universe are interfused and are in a state of eternal harmony,

> The Four Maṇḍalas are inseparably related to one another,
> When the grace of the Three Mysteries is retained by our religious activities,
> The realm of Enlightenment will be quickly realized,
> Infinitely interrelated like the meshes of Indra's net are those which we call existences."[3]

This stanza is not easy to understand, because it is poetic language and contains some technical terms from Vajrayāna Buddhism. However, the point of the idea Kūkai expresses here seems to be comparatively simple and concise. He seems to assert that one should practice the 'Three Mysteries' to realize the Truth itself, trusting in all existences as the manifestation of the Original Buddha.

The Japanese Tendai school goes one step beyond Kūkai's standpoint and preaches the philosophy of Inherent Enlightenment [*hongaku*]. This concept was primarily used as a doctrinal term in the '*Awakening of Faith*':[4] one of the most important texts of Mahāyāna Buddhism in Eastern Asia. However, the doctrine of Inherent Enlightenment as taught in Japanese Tendai school is remote from the meaning given in that text. Japanese Tendai insists that all sentient beings are in fact already Buddhas: they are Inherently enlightened (and thus have no need to endeavour to become a Buddha). What each of them need to do is only to realized the fact that they are a Buddha.

Still in present-day Japan, it is sometimes said of an extremely kind and gentle person, that they are a 'Buddha'. The dead can also be referred to as 'Buddha' [*hotoke*]. These matters seem to reflect the common belief of Japanese that the Buddha is a being attainable in the present life, and that everybody, good or bad, can attain enlightenment after death.

Emphasis on Buddhist Practice

The third important issue is the simplicity of Buddhist religious practice which is set up from the practical viewpoint. According to the philosophy of 'Inherent Enlightenment' mentioned religious practices need not used at all. This philosophy has influenced almost the whole of Japanese Buddhism since the later time of the Heian period. However, some excellent Buddhists recognized the questionability of this view and insisted on the importance of religious practice. What kinds of practices did they advocate? In the Kamakura period, when it is said that the Japanese truly awakened to religious or spiritual life, Shinran (1173-1262), the founder of the Jyōdoshinshū, after seeking for the essence of the practice in Pure Land Buddhism, taught the

following:

> "The Buddha Amitābha [Amitāyus] vowed to take into Perfect Bliss, all those who say the name of him, and thus to entrust oneself deeply and to say the name is to be in perfect accord with the Primal Vow. Even though a person may have the mind believing in Amitābha, if he does not say the name, it is of no avail, and conversely, even though he fervently says the name, if his mind is shallow, he can not attain birth in the Buddha Land. Thus, it is the person who both deeply entrusts himself to birth through chanting the name of Amitābha and undertakes to say the name, who is certain to be born in the true Buddha Land".[5]

As is clear from this assertion, Shinran urges solely the uttering of the name of Amītabha, from the pure mind of believing in Amitābha, to ensure birth in the true Buddha Land and attain merit of Buddhahood. Dōgen (1200-1253), the founder of the Sōtōshū of Japanese Zen Buddhism, also emphasizes one simple practice: that is the practice in meditation of 'just sitting'. He insists:

> "According to the authentic tradition of Buddhism, the Dharma the Buddha taught is the supreme of the supreme, that has been transmitted rightly and directly from one to another. From the first time you meet your master and receive his teaching, you have no need for either incense offerings, homage-paying, chanting the name of the Buddha, penance disciplines, or silent sūtra-readings; only cast-off body and mind in the pure meditation. When even for a short period of time you sit properly in Samādhi, imprinting the Buddha-seal in your body, mouth, and mind, each and every thing excluding none, is covered by the Buddha-seal, and all space without exception manifests Enlightenment".[6]

Lastly, it is necessary to refer to Nichiren's (1222-1282) religion, because it is the main source of the new sects of Japanese Buddhism after the Meiji Restoration in the nineteenth century. Nichiren was a faithful follower of Chi-i (538-599), the founder of the Tiantai school in China. His primal intention as a Buddhist was the renewal of Chi-i's thought, which was fundamentally based on the teaching of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra.* To Nichiren, this sūtra was the sole root of the true gospel of the Buddha. He had difficulty to propagate the tenet of this sūtra, while criticizing all other sects standing against it's absolute supremacy. He declared:

> "Here we see that slandering the Right Law is the gravest sin. Alas! The people of our country have gone out of the gate of the Right Law and entered into the hell of wrong teachings. How foolish! They are bound up by ropes of wrong teachings and caught by the net of slandering the Right Law. They are blinded by the mist of wrong teachings and sunk deep into the flames of the hell. How lamentable! How terrible! You should convert yourself to the faith in the Good Law of the True Vehicle of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* at once. Then, the three worlds of suffering will become the realm of the Buddha".[7]

From the standpoint shown here, Nichiren teaches very simple way of practice, that is: simply to chant the name of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* with heart and soul.

These three philosophies (Shinran, Dōgen and Nichiren) represent the so-called 'Kamakura New Buddhism'. Of course, there are many important Buddhist groups besides these, however, the fundamental direction of Kamakura New Buddhism is representative of typical practice in Japanese Buddhism.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Having introduced the present-day situation of Japanese Buddhism as a whole and described its characteristics at least establishes that Japanese Buddhism has its own character. It may be called a sort of 'secularism'. The present author hopes that these observations may serve as a route to knowing the nature of Japanese Buddhism and help readers to gain a perspective for the future of Buddhism!

NOTES

1. Stuart D.B. Picken, *Shintō: Japan's Spiritual Roots* (Tokyo: 1980), introduction
2. Masahuru Anesaki, *History of Japanese Religion*, (Tokyo: 1963)
3. *Sokushin-jōbutsu-gi*, (attaining enlightenment in this very existence) in Yoshito S. Hakeda, *Kūkai: Major Works* (New York: 1972)
4. Yoshito S. Hakeda (tr.), *The Awakening of Faith* (New York: 1967)
5. Yoshifumi Ueda *et al.* (trans.), *Mattōshō* (letters of Shinran), (Kyoto: 1978)
6. Bendōwa, (a treatise on the significance of Zen practice) in Norman Waddell and Masao Abe (trans.), *The Eastern Buddhist*, 4-1 (Kyoto: 1971)
7. Senchū Murano (trans.), *Risshō-ankokuron* (an essay on establishing the right law and saving the country), (Tokyo: 1977)

FURTHER READING

Ichirō Hori *et al.*, *Japanese Religion* (A Survey by the Agency fo Cultural Affairs), (Tokyo-New York: 1972)

Daisetz Suzuki, *Japanese Spirituality* (Tokyo: 1972)

10

Buddhist Monasticism in European Culture with Special Reference to France

Bhikkhu Pāsādika

France, has had contacts with Southeast Asian religious culture since the seventeenth century and it has been largely due to the work of French-speaking scholars that this culture has been received in the West. In the 1950's the first French-born Saṅgha members started to develop Buddhist monastic culture in France but it was not until Saṅgha members made refugee from politically unstable Asian countries came to settle in France during the sixties and seventies that successful Theravāda and Mahāyāna monastic communities were established in France. The work of l'Association bouddhique Linh-Sơn [Gijjhakūṭa-Vihāra] is given as an example. Some reflections are made as to the impact, if any, of Buddhist monasticism on European culture at present and in the future.

Having been invited to give a paper on 'Buddhist Monasticism in European Culture', at the outset I have to say a few words justifying the extension of the title by the addition of "with Special Reference to France". In the English-speaking world, a much-read book in the fifties was C. Humphrey's *Buddhism* (London 1951ff.). Discussing Buddhism in Europe, he deals with the Buddha-Dhamma in France in no more than 128 words (op. cit., p. 228), mentioning a) the French Buddhist society 'Les amis du Buddhisme' founded by Constant Lounsbery in 1929, and its quarterly - the by and large Theravāda-orientated - '*La pensée bouddhique*'; b) the famous French Tibetologist Alexandra David-Neel. Perhaps the most attractive publication in recent years of almost encyclopaedic order is *The World of Buddhism* (London 1984), edited by H. Bechert and R. Gombrich. In the last chapter of this work the "Buddhist Revival in East and West" is treated. On page 274 the French scholar Eugène Burnouf is credited with having initiated "a detailed academic

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research" on Buddhism through his publication of *Introduction à l'histoire du bouddhisme indien* which appeared in 1845.

Apart from mentioning the founder of Buddhology, in this chapter, Buddhism in France has not been taken into account - certainly due to the fact that, excepting the brilliant research work on Buddhism carried out by French-speaking scholars since Burnouf, Buddhism as a way of life practised by Buddhists was almost conspicuous by its absence in this country until the mid-sixties of this century. Since, as far as I know, even in recent years accounts of Buddhism in France seem comparatively scarce when considering all that has appeared in print on Buddhism in English-speaking countries, I may be permitted in my dealing with Buddhist monasticism in European culture to focus on the Buddha-Dhamma in France. Moreover, myself being a member of a monastic Buddhist community in that country, it must be left to Saṅgha members or to those in close contact with them, resident in other European countries, especially in Great Britain, to offer their observations on Buddhist monasticism in their respective countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany or Italy.

In the following I am going to talk about four subjects, the first two of which will be put in a nutshell, whilst the others will have to be set out in some detail: a) about early contacts of France with Southeast Asian religious culture and French-speaking scholars preparing the ground for receiving the Buddha-Dhamma in the West; b) about French-born members of the Saṅgha and decisive factors for the formation of Buddhist monasticism in Europe, viz. the repercussions of political events in Central and Southeast Asia during the sixties and seventies; c) about the recent setting up of Theravādin and Mahāyāna monastic establishments with special reference to L'Association bouddhique Linh-Sơn (Gijjhakūṭa Buddhist Society) and its activities; d) some reflections on the impact, if any, of Buddhist monasticism on European culture at present and in future.

EARLY FRENCH CONTACT WITH SOUTHEAST ASIAN CULTURE

Extremely useful is J.W. de Jong's *A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America* (2nd ed., Delhi 1987) in which is found the following on a publication by the 'father of Buddhology' and his colleague:

> "The first Pāli grammar to be published in Europe was written by Burnouf (1801-1852) and Lassen (1800-1876): E. Burnouf et Chr. Lassen: *Essai sur le Pali ou langue sacrée de la presqu'île au-delà du Gange*, Paris, 1826... According to Burnouf the first to mention Pāli was Simon de La Loubère who visited Siam in 1687-1688 as envoy of King Louis XIV. In 1691 he published a *Description du royaume de Siam*. La Loubère's book contains a translation of the life of Devadatta (La vie de Thevetat,le frère de Sommona-Codom, traduite du Bali, t.II, pp. 35-37)."[1]

De Jong refers to Burnouf as the 'dominating figure'[2] in the first period of academic research on Buddhism (1826-1877) who, besides his vast knowledge of Sanskrit, Tibetan, Avestan and Pehlevi texts and his acquaintance with modern Indian languages such as Bengali, Marathi and Gujarati, in connection with his Pāli studies, consulted Sinhalese, Burmese and Siamese translations and commentaries.[3] "The amount of

work done by Burnouf in the last fifteen years of his life," writes de Jong, "is staggering."[4] The huge amount of Buddhological research, lexicography and translations of works pertaining to Indian, Central Asian and Far Eastern Buddhism that has been done so far and is being done by scholars all over the world is really impressive, and it is largely due to French-speaking scholars that the soil for appreciation and reception of Buddhism in western countries has been well prepared. Complete information on contributions to Buddhist Studies in French can be gathered from de Jong's aforementioned *History*. Suffice it here to cite just a few names standing for impeccable and inspiring scholarship: Sylvain Lévi, L. de La Vallée Poussin, Paul Demiéville, Étienne Lamotte, André Bareau. Although there exists nothing that could not be improved upon (albeit just a tiny little bit in the case of really great works), their publications, as well as those of other eminent scholars in the field of Buddhist Studies, will continue to be works of *aprameyaḥ puṇyaskandhaḥ*, meaningfully challenging many generations of future students of the Buddha-Dhamma.

FRENCH MONASTICISM

Pioneering French-born Saṅgha Members

As far as I know, the first Frenchman to don the yellow robe was Bhikkhu Āryadeva who was among the first batch of students at the newly established Nālandā Pāli Institute (founded in 1951). In the sixties, Āryadeva had shifted to the Mithila Institute at Darbhanga where he taught modern European languages. In his studies he had by that time developed a preference for Sanskrit and Vajrayāna. He spent the last few years of his life in France where in the second half of the seventies he was associated with 'Les amis du Bouddhisme', the oldest Buddhist society in France. The second French-born monk, whose life as a *bhikṣu* roughly coincided with that of Āryadeva, was a Mahāyāna monk whose main sphere of activities was Sweden.

The Impact of the 2500th Anniversary Celebration

There is no denying the fact that in 1956 the jubilee of the 2500th anniversary of Buddhism, celebrated on a grand scale in Asian countries, also affected, predominantly on a cultural level, western countries. The mass media reported not only on political events in connection with the jubilee; I remember a radio broadcast in French in which the translation of a discourse from the Pāli canon was read; at some places even in the countryside you could attend lectures on Buddhism and visit exhibitions of Buddhist art. Public interest in Buddhism did not ebb away in subsequent years. On the contrary, it was strengthened thanks to the efforts of a number of Buddhist scholars, parts of whose works in English, French and German were made accessible in popular paperback series.

All these factors, besides strictly personal considerations, may in the sixties and seventies have prevailed upon young Frenchmen to leave home for the East where they spent several years in the Saṅgha. I know of some Frenchmen who underwent Zen monastic training in the Far East, and two of them, after taking orders according to the Geluk ordination procedure, made remarkable headway in their Dharma studies through the medium of Tibetan.

Formation of Buddhist Monasticism in Europe

Nevertheless, it was not these western monks or later on also, western nuns, who managed to initiate - on however humble a scale - Buddhist monasticism in France or other western countries. The annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic and the raging war in Indochina was to cause many Tibetans, Vietnamese, Laotians and Khmers to flee their respective countries. Considerable numbers of Buddhists hailing from countries that were formerly under French rule, took refuge in France where - it must be stressed - municipal and county authorities have always been well disposed towards Asian Buddhists organizing themselves anew, founding Buddhist associations or establishing 'temples' called by them 'pagodes'.

In the late sixties the Ven. Thích Thiện-Châu, besides his specialisation in Pudgalavāda Buddhism, his subject of research at the Sorbonne, headed a Vietnamese Buddhist Students' Organization, and in due course became the spiritual director of the Association des bouddhistes Vietnamiens en France.[5] Eventually, by dint of his and his followers' indefatigable efforts, the largest and most beautiful Vietnamese-style temple in France was erected near the southern outskirts of Paris. As abbot of Chùa Trúc-Lâm (Veḷuvana Temple) Ven. Thiện-Châu has been doing invaluable Dhammadūta work for many years both in France and Southern Germany. What is so remarkable with respect to his activities is the fact that he has actually been implementing the resolutions of the Buddhist National Congress held in 1963 in Saigon when the history-making unification of Vietnamese Theravādins and Mahāyāna Buddhists was achieved.[6] What then does his own way of implementing those resolutions look like? While soft-pedalling typical Mahāyāna doctrines regarding, for instance, Bodhisattva vows or Amidism, he tries his best to revive the indigenous Dhyāna/Zen tradition of ancient Vietnam (pupils of the third Chinese Zen patriarch already propagated Ch'an Buddhism in Vietnam). To accomplish this, besides his having translated Pāli texts into Vietnamese (for example the Dhammapada), he makes use of all elements of Pāli Buddhism concerning meditational practice.

Theravada Traditions

Now what about monastic beginnings in France pertaining to Theravāda Buddhism proper? There are in fact, a few French Theravāda-orientated groups, without however, any *bhikkhus*. The most influential of these Buddhist circles, I suppose has its seat at Gretz, in a calm rural area about one hour's car from Paris to the Southeast. M. Jolly, alias Anagārika Prajñānanda, the president of this Theravādin study group, offers meditation classes (*ānāpānasati*), besides his translating and publishing key Pāli texts in French. In the eighties, interest in Theravāda Buddhism has grown in France significantly surely due to the increasing number of Asian *bhikkhus* staying in and around Paris. There are some '*vihāras*', i.e. flats or villas, converted into '*vihāras*', with small groups of resident monks from Cambodia, Laos, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam. Some *bhikkhus* from Sri Lanka and Thailand are staying in Paris, *inter alia*, to study French and pursue higher studies so as to acquaint themselves with scientific methods for their Dhamma studies. All these *vihāras* are supported by lay Buddhists from Asian countries, but there are also some French people who have been

joining the Asian Theravādin communities as *upāsaka*s and *upāsikā*s.

Mahayana Traditions

So far in Theravādin communities, the majority of members have always been Asian Buddhists, whereas the opposite holds true for Zen and Tibetan Buddhist groups in Paris and elsewhere in France: Zen and Tibetan Dharma centres are to a great extent run by western Buddhists; however, as a rule, they originate with the presence and powerful teachings of strong personalities such as the Sōtō Zen master Deshimaru, Kalu Rinpoche, Thubten Yeshe or the Geshes Lobsang Tengya and Champa Thekchog. Deshimaru Rōshi's Paris Zazen centre must have been rather influential, because about ten years ago, I met western disciples of his who mentioned affiliated Sōtō Zen groups in other places in France and Germany. Some fine publications are also due to the efforts of the Paris Sōtō centre. Another French-born Rinzai Zen master, a disciple of the famous Mumon Yamada Rōshi of Kyoto, had founded a retreat-centre, in the seventies, in the mountains of l'Ardèche in Southern France.

Most attractive for French people, it seems, have proved Tibetan forms of Buddhism. Throughout the country there exist retreat-cum-study centres of all the major Tibetan schools of Buddhist practice: Nyingma, Kagyü, Sakya and Geluk centres. Owing to the rural exodus observable in France, property with land including old manor-houses or even small palaces are comparatively cheap to purchase. Furthermore, in the case of historically important buildings, the French government used to grant financial aid towards their maintenance or restoration. Thus Tibetan masters, assisted by their western disciples and well-wishers, made use of this opportunity to create the material prerequisites to western Buddhist monasticism. I have personally visited two Geluk monastic centres about thirty kilometres to the east of Toulouse in Southern France. At Marzens, Château d'En Clausade near Lavaur there exists Institut Vajra Yogini opened by the well-known Tibetan Lamas Thubten Yeshe and Thubten Zopa Rinpoche in 1979 and ever since has been under the spiritual directorship of Geshe Lobsang Tengya. Attached to Institut Vajra Yogini is a convent with resident Tibetan-style nuns [*ani-la*] coming from France, Germany, New Zealand, Spain and the USA. A few kilometres from Château d'En Clausade you can visit 'Nālandā', a *bhikṣu* [*gelong*] training centre directed by Geshe Champa Thekchog. The monks studying at Nālandā are from Australia, England, France, Germany, Spain and the USA, altogether about twenty in number. High-ranking Tibetan monks from India, Nepal and other countries, that have granted them asylum, have regularly visited the Tibetan monastic establishments in France in order to give courses, ordinations or initiations.

L'Association bouddhique Linh-Sơn

Doubtlessly the largest contribution to the formation of Buddhist monasticism in France can be ascribed to the vigorous activities of the Ven. Thích Huyên-Vi, abbot of Monastère bouddhique Linh-Sơn and director of both l'Association bouddhique and Institut de recherche bouddhique Linh-Sơn, and to the unstinted co-operation of the members of these institutions. To substantiate this statement, a brief history of this Gijjhakūṭa-Vihāra (Linh-Sơn) movement has to be sketched out.

Already in his native country Ven. Huyên-Vi was a well-known preacher in charge of higher education of Saṅgha members. Before a short tenure of professorship at Vanh Hanh Buddhist University in Saigon and before his settling in France, he stayed in India for thirteen years, where he graduated from Nālandā and Magadh University in Pāli and English, completed a doctoral thesis on the "Life and Works of Sāriputta Thera" according to Pāli, Sanskrit and Chinese sources, and was a lecturer in ancient and modern Chinese. Endowed with vast experience in handling Saṅgha affairs, he shifted to Joinville-le-Pont (Paris) where, in 1975, he was invited to found the Linh-Sởn Buddhist Association. Within a relatively short period - despite obligatory 'saṃsāric' ups-and-downs - he succeeded in laying the foundation of an astonishingly efficient ordination and training centre for Buddhist monks and nuns[7]. Due to the continual exodus of Vietnamese refugees particularly to France, to the USA and many other countries, throughout the eighties, the Linh-Sởn Saṅgha's tasks, as understood according to the Vietnamese Mahāyāna tradition, of meeting the spiritual needs of great numbers of Southeast Asian Buddhists have been overwhelming.

Hardly had Monastère bouddhique Linh-Sởn been opened, when its abbot was invited to visit practically all countries where Vietnamese refugees had found new homes and had organized into Buddhist groups. The corollary of these Dhammadūta tours has been that Linh-Sởn at Joinville-le-Pont has had to be developed into the headquarters of Linh-Sởn branch temples and associations on all continents. Thus in the eighties Linh-Sởn branches were established at quite a few places in France, in the United Kingdon, Canada, the USA (including Hawaii), India, Taiwan, Belgium, Switzerland, Australia and Zaire. (This latter centre in Kinshasa, though, is entirely run by Linh-Sởn-trained Africans.)

The making of qualified and responsible incumbents for all these branch temples has always been one of the main objectives of the director of Linh-Sởn headquarters in France. Here too, as in Buddhist countries, *vassāvāsa*, observing the rains retreat (in Europe summer retreat) as a special period of intensive monastic training plays a very important role. Moreover, since for the most part the vacation time of lay followers coincides with the monastic rains retreat, many lay members of the association regularly weekend at the headquarters. A particular feature with Vietnamese Mahāyāna Buddhists are *upāsaka/upāsikā* ordinations, i.e. ceremonies of solemnly giving Dhamma-names to those who have devoted much time to Dhamma practice and study. Because of the urgent need to raise the standards of training monks and nuns, Ven. Huyên-Vi has also initiated a Buddhist Research Institute in which, to start with, he as director and other graduate Saṅgha members teach, respectively, meditation, Buddhist doctrine in Vietnamese or French, and Pāli (grammar, *suttas* and Abhidhamma). This is not the place to enumerate all the manifold activities of Linh-Sởn headquarters. One point though, is well worth mentioning as an example of characteristic monastic activity: Linh-Sởn has printing facilities, and as a result, numerous brochures, booklets, and voluminous books (some also in French and English) have been published[8]. Of vital importance are anastatic reprints of rare Buddhist books in Vietnamese that have already appeared in no small numbers. The printing section of the Linh-Sởn community - and of other Vietnamese communities

in the West too - have thus been doing, according to Buddhist thought, inestimable service for the perpetuation of Buddhist literature in Vietnamese.

Although the Linh-Sơn headquarters is situated, strictly speaking, in a suburban district of Paris without factories and heavy air pollution, it is not sufficiently calm for all those intent on prolonged meditation. In addition, the ever expanding activities of Linh-Sơn soon made the centre into a rather congested place. It was therefore a matter of much relief when the abbot succeeded, with the help and advice of UNESCO, in acquiring thirty hectares of grounds about 350 kilometres south of Paris and forty kilometres north of Limoges, situated in charming and peaceful surroundings. The property acquired for the Linh-Sơn community includes a hamlet which, nearly completely deserted and ramshackle some years ago, is being converted, thanks to the enthusiastic and devoted co-operation of members of Linh-Sơn Buddhist youth organizations and lay followers of various Buddhist associations with Saṅgha members, into what has been named 'Dhammaville', Centre culturel bouddhique international Linh-Sơn or 'Tùng Lâm' in Vietnamese. When Dhammaville was inaugurated in August 1987, an impressive Buddha-hall, monks' quarters, a convent, accomodation for as yet a limited number of guests, a library building and a refectory, had been completed. At present a building designed as a meditation centre is under construction. Plenty of farm land surrounding Dhammaville is utilized so that nowadays Tùng Lâm and Linh-Sơn headquarters are self-sufficient in horticultural products[9].

The Impact of Buddhist Monasticism on European Culture

In conclusion, some random thought may be given to the impact, if any, of Buddhist monasticism on European culture at present and in future. As a matter of fact, the Linh-Sơn communities in France include some thirty Saṅgha members or slightly more, thus being the numerically strongest Saṅgha in this country, and their own, as well as other Buddhist communities' efforts in practising the Dhamma, more often than not, are unflagging. Buddhism in Europe, none the less, can be compared to a fragile raft - and similarly, native Christian monasticism perhaps to a big ocean-going ship more or less in distress, in the turbulent waters of secularism, commercialism or materialism which daily enhance the dangers of global self-destruction. On the whole, the majority of 'up-to-date' Europeans seem to consider monasticism an anachronism and Buddhist monasticism an exotic anachronism! For Asian Buddhists, as long as they live in the West, their *vihāras* are most important institutions for preserving their religio-cultural identity. For Asian Saṅgha members (and likewise western Buddhist monks and nuns staying in Europe), *vihāras* in the West are places of refuge. Simultaneously their *vihāras* are bases whence they can survey western modes of thought and state of affairs in modern life, trying to develop their "skill in means" [*upāya-kusala*] in order to survive and help survive into the next millennium as genuine Buddhists, but hopefully not oblivious of what this proverb implies: "The fly that plays too long in the candle, singes his wings at last".

Nobody can tell whether Buddhist monasticism will actually be one facet of the religio-cultural life in a pluralistic, multi-cultural and unified Europe, (although nowadays European politicians are very fond of using such words as 'pluralism', 'democracy' and 'unification of Europe'). In spite of a large number of Asians staying

in Europe, an absolute minimum of the population here takes interest in things Buddhist, although among the intelligentsia, notably among university students, a certain receptivity and open-mindedness can be observed, even the willingness to sit down from time to time and try to practise the development of recollection [*satipaṭṭhāna*].

It may be a fact, occasionally even documented in the western mass media, that the miracle of contemporary Japanese efficiency in high technology and global economics, can to some extent be attributed to the spiritual/meditative training in Japan received at the hands of Zen monks and other Buddhist priests. So also in Europe, monasteries, preferably in the countryside with meditation-centres attached to them, might after some time be in no small demand when the common scatterbrainedness, owing to the steadily increasing complexity of modern life, will have brought matters to a climax.

The Udenarājavatthu in the Cullavagga (Vin. II, 290) may remind us of another positive aspect of monasticism (like the above aspect of introspection more or less found in all monastic traditions): Ānanda, after having been presented with an apparent surplus of five hundred robes by King Udena's harem, successfully convinces Udena of the scrupulousness with which the Saṅgha makes use of everything offered without wasting anything whatsoever. Udena, greatly pleased with Ānanda's statement, offers him another five hundred robes all of which are then distributed among the Saṅgha. To date, after all, many a Buddhist monastery in Asia is still in this respect, a shining model of healthy frugality, in which 'not a single drop of water or a single grain of rice must go to waste'.

Especially in the West, monastic institutions if succeeding as of yore, in holding frugality, fewness of wishes and, above all, non-violence [*ahiṃsā*] in great esteem should, I think, be allowed to exert some wholesome influence on our largely glutted societies, irresponsibly spending, wasting, exploiting and gradually destroying the very basis of all life on this planet. A good number of people in the West definitely know what is really going on. Rhetoricians among them discuss endlessly what should be done in this awkward predicament; others have become altogether pessimistic. Is there any reason for being pessimistic regarding the all too limited possibilities in Buddhist monasticism in Europe? In this connection, Ven. Thích Huyền-Vi, director of Dhammaville, has often quoted SN II, 25:

> "*uppādā vā Tathāgatānam anuppādā vā Tathāgatānaṃ* //
> *ṭhitā va sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā idappaccayatā* //
>
> "... whether.. there be an arising of Tathāgatas,
> or whether be no such arising,
> this nature of things just stands,
> this causal status, this causal orderliness,
> the relatedness of this to that."[10]

And H. Bechert in his contribution to H. Küng's *Christianity and the World Religions* (New York 1986), p. 408, has nicely put it thus:

> "The Buddhists do not think that the world has any meaning (outside itself), but they believe that an order prevails in it that is valid above and beyond the

existence of the individual. This conviction has, it seems to me, given them the strength to endure suffering in this world. After all, they always have the hope of arriving, on some distant day, at the end of suffering in a future existence."

Finally, let me quote a typical traditional Buddhist viewpoint, *sub specie aeternitatis*, concerning Dhamma activities, however insignificant they may appear. The following is a citation from the Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarīkasūtra occurring in the Sūtrasamuccaya (which the Tibetans ascribe to Nāgārjuna):

> "Look, Ānanda, how forcible are the [results of] offering one's veneration to Lord Buddha and how forcible [the results when] one's mind is pure and filled with trust. Saying the words 'homage to the Buddha', Ānanda, one should be aware of the following: the sound 'Lord Buddha', that is to say when reciting 'homage to the Buddha', is pregnant with meaning. However insignificant one's planting 'roots of merit' in respect of *tathāgatas* may be, everything will bear due fruit. Even letting arise just one thought [-moment of] pure faith - all that will finally culminate in *nirvāṇa*."[11]

NOTES

1. J.W. de Jong, *op. cit.*, p. 13f.

2. Op. cit., p. 2.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

4. *Ibid.*

5. On his and other leading Vietnamese monks' scholarly activities see R. Webb, 'Vietnamese Buddhist Literature: An Introduction', in *Buddhist Studies Review*, I, 1, (London, 1983-84), p. 29f.

6. On the 'Unified Buddhist Congregation of Vietnam' (with references) see Bh. Pāsādika, 'Traditional Buddhist Chronological Systems:Vietnamese Traditions', in Heinz Bechert (ed.), *The Dating of the Historical Buddha/Die Datierung des historischen Buddha*, Part 1 (Göttingen, 1991), p. 498, note.34.

7. Cf. *Thanh Quy Tự-Viện Linh-Son, Reglement du monastère Linh-Sơn, Rules of Linh-Sơn Monastery*, (Joinville-le-Pont, 1985).

8. Linh-Sơn publications, just a few of which can be cited here, are listed in the catalogues of the oriental bookshop and publishing house Thanh-Long, Éditions/Librairie (34 rue Dekens, 1040 Bruxelles, Belgium):
a) Thích Huệ-Hưng, *Kinh Duy Ma Cật* (Vietnamese transl. of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra, anastatic reprint of the 1951 Saigon ed.), (Joinville-le-Pont, 1984);
b) Thích Huyền-Vi, *Sūtrasamuccaya, Luận Về Các Nghĩa Thiết Yếu Quý Báo Của Đại Thừa*, 'L'Essentiel du Bouddhisme' (Vietnamese and French transl. of the Chinese version of Nāgārjuna's Sūtrasamuccaya)(Joinville-le-Pont, 1986);
c) Thích Huyền-Vi, *Buddhist Doctrine, Dhamma Talked* (including in the appendix, an English transl. of liturgical texts regularly chanted in all Linh-Sơn centres) (Linh-Sơn Monastery Detroit, 1983);
d) Thích Huyền-Vi, *The Four Abhidhammic Reals*, (Buddhist Philosophy and Psychology) (Joinville-le-Pont: Institut de recherche bouddhique Linh-Sơn, 1982);
e) *"Linh-Sơn"- publication d'études bouddhologiques*, Nos. 1-20 (a quarterly carrying articles, reviews and translations of Buddhological interest) (Joinville-le-Pont, 1977-1982).

9. Apart from what French mass media have reported on Tùng Lâm and its activities, the following brochures and articles/notes have been published:
a) *Tùng-Lâm Linh-Sơn* (in Vietnamese and French on the historical significance of the name 'Tùng-Lâm Linh-Sơn' [叢 林 靈], objectives, programmes etc.) (Châteauponsac, 1987);
b) 'Tùng-Lâm Linh-Sơn International' in *Buddhist Studies Review* V, 2 (London, 1988), p.145f.;

c) *Dhammaville (Tùng Lâm)* (Un appel aux Bouddhistes à travers le monde) (Châteauponsac, 1987); d) 'La Pagode du Limousin' (le plus grand temple bouddhiste d'Europe en voie de construction) in *sudestasie*, Nos. 55-56, (Paris, 1989), 72f.

10. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, F.H. Woodward, *Kindred Sayings* II, 21 (London: Pāli Text Society, 1922ff.)

11. Cf. Bhikkhu Pāsādika, 'The Sūtrasamuccaya - Nāgārjuna's Anthology of [Quotations from] Discourses', English translation (XI), in *"Linh-Sơn"- publication d'études bouddhologiques*, No.12, (Joinville-le-Pont, 1980), p. 34f.

11
Theravāda Buddhism in England

L.S. Cousins

A brief examination is made of some aspects of the history of Theravāda Buddhism in England from its roots in the nineteenth century to the present day. Issues examined include the pioneers of English Buddhism, the growth and diversification of Buddhist societies, and the way in which the Buddhist religion has been adapted to English culture.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Buddhism as a whole was largely unknown in England. A certain amount was known of the practices in particular Buddhist countries; information (and a liberal admixture of misinformation) was available from travellers, traders, missionaries and diplomats. However, it is clear that 'Buddhism' as a single religious phenomenon extending from Ceylon to Japan, and from Thailand to Mongolia, was not generally recognised, even by relatively well-informed observers. The case is quite different to that of Islam, long recognised as a potent rival to Christianity. Similarly, the Buddha was not yet widely perceived as a historical figure or as the founder of a world religion.[1]

Towards the end of the eighteenth century and in the early decades of the nineteenth century, the awareness gradually started to strengthen amongst the educated public that there existed a religion that was widely spread across diverse regions of further Asia. By the mid-1830's, the term 'Buddhism' was in established usage.[2] In a recent book P.C. Almond has tried to argue that this period sees the effective creation of Buddhism:

"...what we are witnessing is the *creation* of Buddhism. It *becomes* an object, is constituted as such; it takes form as an entity that 'exists' over against the various cultures which can now be perceived as instancing it, manifesting it, in an enormous variety of ways."[3]

In the case of Buddhism this kind of argument seems rather unsatisfactory. (It perhaps makes rather more sense in the case of Hinduism.) Buddhism has clearly had a sense of its own identity from a relatively early date and this must have remained strong,

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even amongst divergent overseas communities, as long as Indian Buddhism continued to provide a unifying focus and pilgrimage area. Even after the disappearance of Buddhism from India, Buddhism probably retained a greater sense of its own unity than is now obvious. After all, the fact that recognisable forms of the Buddha image are to be found in every Buddhist country, can hardly have escaped the notice of travellers, of whom there were certainly some.

There is one sense, however, in which Almond's analysis seems to be correct; as far as the educated English public is concerned, this period does indeed witness the creation of 'Buddhism' as an object of discourse. At first, the term 'Buddhism' was probably primarily geographical, functioning to give a unified perception of religious phenomena in different geographical areas. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the focus was rather more on Buddhist texts as opposed to Buddhist countries. Buddhism was was tending to become a set of ideas and teachings based on normative literary accounts.

This shift of focus is important because it made it possible for Buddhism to be religiously challenging. As long as Buddhism was mainly presented as the religious practices of people in far-away places, it could hardly be considered as something personally significant. With the publication in 1879 of Sir Edwin Arnold's *The Light of Asia*, a verse account of the life of the Buddha based on textual sources, Buddhism had made an impact at a more direct and popular level. This work was extremely successful, partly because the labours of scholarship had prepared the ground and widespread interest had already been aroused.[4]

Such interest in Buddhism was certainly present in England from the 1850's to the end of the nineteenth century. It does not, however, seem to have led to any significant attempt actually to practise Buddhism until towards the end of this period.[5] In part, this must be because the practice of Buddhism as a living religion would have required contact with the Buddhism of Asia. This, however, was generally seen as being, to a greater or lesser extent, degenerate. Indeed, it could hardly have been seen as otherwise; the prevailing view in Western Europe during this period emphasized very strongly the cultural superiority of Europe. No doubt, such a view was inevitable at a time of widespread European cultural, political and economic hegemony. Indeed, to seriously challenge it would certainly have seemed unacceptably disloyal to most English people at this time.

BUDDHIST PRACTICE: BEGINNINGS

The Buddhist Society of Great Britain and Ireland

A new phase of Buddhist activities was inaugurated with the ordination of Allan Bennett (1872-1923) under the name of Ānanda Metteyya (initially 'Maitreya') in Burma in 1902. He was not the first British Theravādin monk, but he was the first to become a significant factor in the home country.[6] Working from Burma, he was able to stimulate interest in Buddhism, and eventually, in 1907, one of his co-workers opened a bookshop in London as a focus for Buddhist activities. This led, late in the same year to the formation of 'The Buddhist Society of Great Britain and Ireland'. The first president was the influential T. W. Rhys Davids, well known as the founder of the

Pali Text Society and at this time, the first holder of the Chair of Comparative Religion at the University of Manchester.

The new society was initially quite successful. By 1909 it claimed 150 members and had held fifty weekly meetings.[7] A quarterly journal, *The Buddhist Review* was started in 1909 and that year it printed some 310 pages. It was to continue in publication until 1922. In 1910, a meeting was held to celebrate the full moon of Vesākha and the following year a larger meeting ("between three hundred and four hundred people") was held to celebrate the 2500th anniversary of the Buddha's enlightenment.[8] Vesākha meetings have been held in London every year since that date. Some activities and branches were also organised from time to time in the provinces (especially in Liverpool).

From the beginning, it was the aim of many of the members to establish premises for the residence of English Buddhist monks: either Venerable Ānanda Metteyya or his disciple, Venerable Sīlācāra (J.F. McKechnie, 1871-1951). The establishment of premises was not achieved until 1915, but both the timing and the location[9] chosen proved unfortunate. The side-effects of the First World War seem to have had a harmful effect on membership. The decision of Ānanda Metteyya (in late 1914) to disrobe due to extremely bad health probably also undermined morale. Whatever the reasons, the period from 1915-20 was clearly one of difficulty and decline. Ānanda Metteyya was able to inspire a renewal of activities between 1920 and 1922, but his health then deteriorated and he died in early 1923.

The Society ceased most formal activities at this point, although several of its stalwarts continued to give lectures on Buddhism for the next few years. Some of its members continued to be active in English Theravāda Buddhism until the 1950's, but the Society was formally dissolved in 1926 in favour of the newly-formed British Maha Bodhi Society.

Membership of the First Buddhist Society

Although the first British Buddhist society was relatively short-lived, it had a deep influence on subsequent developments in the country. It was certainly the most prestigious Buddhist organisation that was to be seen for a long time, with a number of socially distinguished members. Its substantial literary output was to be inherited by subsequent generations. Most important of all, it seems to exemplify very well the make-up of most subsequent Buddhist activities until the 1960's. This is clear if the motivations and backgrounds of its membership are examined. They can be considered under seven headings:

1. ***Members self-converted through reading***. Evidently the widespread interest in Buddhism during the last decades of the nineteenth century had created a number of isolated individuals who identified with Buddhism to a greater or lesser extent. The new society was able to attract some of these; it may be that there were others;
2. ***Ex-colonials***. A number of members had contacted Buddhism in Asia, mostly through colonial service in Burma and Ceylon;
3. ***Scholars***. A number of scholars were involved with the work of the Society,

notably the Rhys Davids and F.L. Woodward. Some of the interest which had been created in Buddhism was undoubtedly due to their work;

4. ***Esotericists*** a)***Theosophists***. Some Theosophists joined from the beginning, perhaps influenced by the close connections their movement had formed with the Buddhism of Ceylon in the days of Col. Olcott and Mme. Blavatsky;

b) ***Kabbalists***. Another group came from the Order of the Golden Dawn, with magical inclinations and Masonic antecedents. It was from this background that Ānanda Metteyya had himself come. He had been a leading figure there (although young) and seems to have had a considerable reputation in Golden Dawn circles. This attracted some interest to the new society. It should also be added that these two groups sometimes have a certain animosity. Kabbalists tend to regard the Theosophists as unhelpfully sentimental and superstitious, while Theosophists often regard those with magical interests as dangerous and over-interested in power;

5. ***Asians***. The Society had a number of Asian members and supporters. Some of these were young students, later to have distinguished careers in their home countries. Throughout its history, the Society received major financial support from Burma and Ceylon, but not, apparently, from Thailand. This is surprising as the King of Siam was the Patron of the Society from its inception and the Siamese Ambassador was generally one of its Vice-presidents;

6. ***'Sentimental Universalists'***. Some members and supporters were Unitarians and other believers in the value of studying all religions;

7. ***'The Curious'***. It seems probable that, at any given time, a part of the membership would consist of the mainly curious.

Obviously, these seven categories are not, for the most part, mutually exclusive.

ENGLISH VIEWS OF THEIR BUDDHISM

The most important group were undoubtedly the first category, 'self-converted through reading', partly because it was initially the most numerous and partly because this group already manifests a division of approach between the study and practice of Buddhism, which, to some extent, endures to this day. This division clearly has its roots in the late nineteenth century understanding of Buddhism.

Part of the attraction of Buddhism in the late nineteenth century was the fact that it was perceived as a great world religion, an effective potential rival to Christianity. It also came to be perceived, rightly or wrongly, as inherently less dogmatic and inherently more scientific. This gave it great appeal to those who on the one hand found a rationalistic critique of Christianity persuasive, but who, on the other hand, felt that to reject religion altogether would be, as the English proverb goes, "to throw the baby out with the bathwater"! Inevitably, some of those with such a motivation would see Buddhism in rather 'political' terms, as a movement to win people to a set of ideas. This is clear in the rather grandiose aims of some English Buddhists who seem to envisage the imminent conversion of the British Isles to Buddhism and are then disproportionately disappointed by slow progress! In the long run, Buddhism may indeed succeed in establishing itself in Britain on a large scale, but it is likely that this

is a process that will take centuries rather than decades.

It is clear, at any rate, that at the Second Annual Meeting of the Society in June 1909, some disappointment was expressed at the slow progress. In this connection, the rather apposite remarks of one member at that meeting are illustrative, as recorded in the *Buddhist Review*:[10]

"Mr. A.L. Fieldson expressed the opinion that the difficulty was probably due to the anomalous nature of the Society, which he described as semi-literary and semi-philosophical with a dash of religion. Very few people were interested in Buddhism, from the purely intellectual or historical standpoints, but it was likely that a large number would be attracted to it by its religious aspect. He fully recognised the devoted and able efforts of the secretaries and other officers of the Society; but without being pessimistic he feared that, so long as the Society worked on the present lines, no great progress was to be looked for. Some of those present were able to avow themselves convinced Buddhists and he thought they were to be envied; personally he was unable to give entire adhesion to Buddhist principles, although he found the subject intensely interesting, but he felt that a successful appeal might be made to a wider circle if a more distinctly religious or emotional side of Buddhism could be put forward. He thought that if the use of a suitable room or small hall could be obtained, and meetings of a frankly missionary character were held — that is, meetings that partook of the nature of "services" (to use an inappropriate term): many people would be drawn and a considerable number permanently held, also that such a movement would probably soon be self-supporting. He would not say that this was properly work for the Buddhist Society, but he believed that only in this way could the practical and vital influence of Buddhism be diffused."

In many ways this has proved an accurate statement as subsequent events have shown.

Indicated clearly in these remarks is the inherent tension between simple study and discussion of Buddhism on the one hand, and its actual practice as a religion on the other. This tension has often been aggravated by two more specific tendencies: distrust of religion and eclecticism. Because many English Buddhists come from a rejection of Christianity, there is a tendency to reject religious elements in Buddhism. Often these elements were seen as a later corruption of Buddhism due to 'animism', superstition or even Hindu influences. Such ideas were supported by a protestant-type analysis of Buddhist history, seeking an authentic, original, 'pure Buddhism'. There is also a complex relationship with the developing movements of Buddhist modernism and reformism in the Buddhist countries.

On the other hand the fact that many were attracted to Buddhism precisely because they saw it as a great world religion which could rival Christianity as an international movement meant that they would be inherently eclectic in their approach to Buddhism. They would tend to resist any tendency to align themselves with particular forms of Buddhism. Initially this would lead to resistance towards Theravāda Buddhism in particular, as this was the precise form of Buddhism available at that time in England at a practical level. Since the Second World War, such eclecticism has produced similar resistance to the various schools of Tibetan and Japanese Buddhism as they

have begun to establish themselves in England.

It is very difficult to actually practice Buddhism eclectically. Imagine for example that a group spends the first month meditating on a crystal ball; it spends the next month doing Zen *koans*; the month after, *vipassanā* meditation; and the month after that, some Tibetan *pūjās*. Very confusing, and not likely to be effective! In practice, eclecticism has to be highly selective and is often very arbitary and idiosyncratic. At the end of the day, it may simply produce yet another form of Buddhism to choose from!

Finally, there is the problem of acculturation, usually presented in terms of 'Western' versus 'Eastern' approaches. This unfortunately tends to perpetuate a view of the world which was certainly appropriate and understandable for Europeans in the nineteenth century, but hardly so today. There are not just two great literary and cultural traditions in the world, 'East' and 'West', but rather between four and seven, shading into one another and influencing one another in complex ways.

The problem, however, is a very real one. When an attempt is made to present Buddhism as it actually is in a particular Asian society, it is bound to appear alien in one respect or another. The problem can of course be avoided by concentrating on study instead of practice or by selective eclecticism. For many, however, such approaches are doomed to superficiality and lack of heart. Such difficulties must be confronted by every Buddhist group in Britain, and indeed elsewhere. Some focus on study with less practice; others on meditation practice with less theory; some emphasize a 'Western' approach; others stress the authenticity of their Asian roots. In actuality, all involve some degree of Europeanization. Some minimize religious or devotional elements; others allow them a larger place. Devotional elements are rarely completely absent, however.

THE MAHA BODHI SOCIETY & THE BUDDHIST LODGE

Returning to the history of Buddhist activities in England, it seems that the crucial influence in the next period was that of the Anagārika Dharmapāla (formerly David Hewavitarne) of Ceylon. In fact, the Hewavitarne family had always been significant supporters of the earlier Buddhist Society. With the slackening of activities after the death of Ānanda Metteyya, the Anagārika seems to have decided that the time was ripe to establish a branch of the Maha Bodhi Society in England. He was able to gather funds and purchase a house in London. A journal was started and monks were brought from Ceylon in order to establish a *vihāra*. His new venture succeeded in gathering most of the surviving membership of the old Society. Until the Second World War this was to be the only Buddhist organisation in Britain with its own premises. It was primarily Theravādin in its orientation, and always drew support from the Sinhalese community but far from exclusively so.

In 1924 Christmas Humphreys had formed the Buddhist Lodge of the Theosophical Society. Two years later, the Lodge seceded from that organization due to its growing emphasis on theism. The Lodge stressed that: "Their Buddhism is of no one School but of all, as they look upon the Schools as complementary aspects of a common central Truth". In practice, their orientation tended towards the Mahāyāna with a

slowly diminishing tinge of Theosophy. During this period, the Lodge was a rather small organisation, with just a few committed members and an effectively distributed journal. Indeed it is clear that there was little or no increase in committed involvement in Buddhist activities in England between 1909 and 1929.[11] This largely static condition continued until just after the Second World War.

It is interesting to note, however, that the main financial support for the Lodge during this period was from Burma. In 1929 comment was made specifically about the lack of support from Siam. "Siam remains in peculiar isolation".[12] A remarkable comment! Only in about 1948 was contact developed with Siam and subsequently some significant financial support was sent. By then, however, the situation had changed drastically, and indeed in subsequent years the situation in relation to support from Thailand changed very substantially!

In 1940, the Maha Bodhi Society suspended activities. This was originally intended to be for the duration of the War. The Buddhist Lodge was left as the only active organisation in England and its membership started to increase. At the same time, the Burmese monk Venerable U Thittila arrived, and (from 1940) began gradually to become active in London. In this situation, the Lodge took the bold decision to re-name itself 'The Buddhist Society, London' and to take its own premises for the first time. Activities which had always consisted of a fortnightly meeting now increased, and by 1944 were taking place twice a week. This change, and the presence of Ven. U Thittila, attracted support which had originally been given to the Maha Bodhi Society.

At all events, the new Buddhist Society rapidly established itself as the largest Buddhist organization the United Kingdom had ever seen. In 1949, we learn that "over the past two-and-a-half years...[membership had increased to]...five times what it was before...". It seems, in fact to have grown steadily in the early 1950's, and by 1954 the circulation of its periodical had grown to some 2,000.[14] It is not clear how much of this was overseas. This was the start of an increase which was to continue to the present time.

In 1951, the formation of the Buddhist Society of Manchester (still-existing) signals the extension of activities outside London on a permanent basis. By 1952, *The Middle Way* was able to list five addresses in the provinces. This had increased by 1965 to ten. Over the following years, the number of addresses of groups increased rapidly until it became too large to include in the journal. In 1979, a booklet was issued listing some sixty-five 'out-of-London' addresses. A similar number are listed in 1983, but it is incomplete and a more complete survey by another organisation in 1985 gives around 150 'out-of-London' addresses.[15] About a fifth of these give Theravāda as their affiliation. Perhaps twice as many have Mahāyāna links, but that includes many different schools of Mahāyāna: Zen, some Tibetan traditions and groups involved with Shin, Shingon and more recently Nichiren. In fact Theravāda Buddhism is probably the strongest single tradition in the United Kingdom. This appears to be very different to the situation in France.[16]

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

Returning to the specific development of Theravāda Buddhism in England, it is clear

that some of those who had been involved in the old Maha Bodhi Society felt the need for the presence of the Saṅgha on a permanent basis, a need no doubt stimulated by the evidently inspiring presence of Ven. U Thittila. Eventually this led to the formation of a Buddhist Vihara Society. During 1950-52 this met in premises 'provided by the Burmese community', known as the Sasana Kiri Vihara. Although this centre was closed with the departure of Ven. U Thittila in 1952, it was soon replaced (in 1954) by a Vihara established by the Sinhalese. For a brief period the resident monk was the well-known Ven. Nārada, but he was soon succeeded by the widely-respected Ven. H. Saddhatissa who remained in England for most the period until his death in 1990. Whatever may have been the case initially, this became in due course an 'ethnic' centre for the Sinhalese community — at least as far as the majority of those attending are concerned. There were, however, often a small number of quite active supporters of English descent and some of the monks resident there have been frequent speakers both to local Buddhist groups and to schools and organisations in the community at large. Much the same is the case with a number of other viharas/wats established by monks from Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia.

Perhaps more significant for the progress of English Buddhism in the long-term was another development. Ven. U Thittila had for some while before his departure ordained an English disciple as a sāmaṇera under the name of Kapilavaḍḍho. The disciple (W. A. Purfurst) was subsequently ordained as a monk in Bangkok in May 1954. His teacher was the famous Abbot of Wat Paknam Bhasicharoen. The energy and foresight of Ven. Kapilavaḍḍho was to prove crucial to the formation of the Saṅgha in England. He was responsible with a number of lay supporters for the establishment of the English Saṅgha Trust. His labours (and those of his disciples Ven. Paññāvaḍḍho and Ven. Ānanda Bodhi) resulted in the creation of a very strong financial base for the Trust. Despite a period of difficulties a substantial inheritance survived and when the Trust's Chairman subsequently invited *Acharn* Cha to visit England, it was possible to set up a 'forest monastery' for the *Acharn's* western disciples under the leadership of Ven. Sumedho. This subsequently attracted significant support both from England and from Thailand.

THE PRESENT-DAY SITUATION

To briefly assess the situation as it appears at the moment, there are four main forms in which Theravāda Buddhism is found in Britain.

The first category consists of ethnic groups. These have established *vihāras* — organised by the Sinhalese, Burmese and Thais in London, by the Burmese and Thais in the Birmingham area and by Indians associated with the Ambedkar movement. These centres are mainly frequented by people of these nationalities, but there is nearly always a sprinkling of English people as well.

The second category can be termed 'generalist'. The most notable example is the Buddhist Society which is still the largest single Buddhist organisation in the United Kingdom, but there are many local groups with a similar orientation. These and also most university groups include some members whose main interest is in Theravāda

Buddhism.

Thirdly, there are centres established by the disciples of *Acharn* Cha. These are run by western monks trained in the forest tradition of northern Thailand. A number of 'monasteries' have been set up. Buddhism is practised in accordance with this tradition as well as can be done in English conditions. There is no doubt that this has proven quite a breakthrough, very much in line with the assessment made in the early days that Buddhism could not succeed until the Saṅgha had been established in England. This proved very difficult to do, but the prediction has certainly been born out by subsequent events. Since the Saṅgha has been to some extent established, there has been considerable growth and success.

A fourth development, perhaps less well-known abroad, is the creation of lay meditation centres. There are a number of these. Some have been set up by the pupils of Ven. Kapilavaḍḍho and others; some are derived from the various Burmese *vipassanā* traditions such as that of Mahasi Sayadaw or, more importantly now, from the pupils of U Ba Khin. There is also the present author's own tradition, from Thailand, laying more emphasis on *samatha* meditation.

IN CONCLUSION

It is difficult to assess the number of English Buddhists. All that can be done is to give approximate figures which should be of the right order of magnitude. In the period up to the end of the Second World War, the number of Buddhists would have been in the hundreds, no more than that. By the time the present author came into contact with Buddhist activities in the late fifties, there were probably thousands of English Buddhists. There is no way to obtain reliable figures, but it is probable that at the present time the number is in the tens of thousands. These estimates include all the Buddhist traditions, but do not cover Buddhists of Asian origin resident in the United Kingdom. If these were included the figure would no doubt be considerably higher.

It may be thought that this is rather slow progress, but probably that would not be correct. More probably a slow and steady rate of growth of this kind is healthier in the long run and should lead to a firm establishment of Buddhism in the British Isles.

NOTES

1. On the development of awareness of other religions in England during this period, see Pailin 1984. On Buddhism specifically, see in particular p. 53 (and pp. 52; 123; 228ff.; 238ff.; 250).
2. Almond 1988 p.11
3. Ibid. p. 12
4. Ibid. p. 3
5. Ibid. p. 36
6. e.g. Gordon Douglas, ordained under the name of Asoka, who died in 1900 (*The Buddhist Review* II,3 (1910) 236).
7. *The Buddhist Review* I,4 (1909) 291-2.
8. *The Buddhist Review* II,3 (1910) 237 and III,3 (1911) 205-12.
9. *The Buddhist Review* VII,I (1915) 2 and 76 (cf. XI (1920) 183f.).
10. I,4 (1909) 298-9.
11. In 1929 the membership of the Maha Bodhi Society and the Buddhist Lodge were according to Christmas Humphreys, 'about the same' ... 'close upon 70' (*Buddhism in England* IV,6 (1929) 122). It is clear, however, that the Society was the more active at this time.

12. *Buddhism in England* III,9 (1929) 198. Note the references to support from Burma here and at IV,7 (1930) 146; V,2 (1930) 53; VII,1 (1932) 2; XI,5 (1937) 129.
13. *The Middle Way* XXIV,1 (1949) 2.
14. Ibid. XXIX,1 (1954) 70.
15. *International Buddhist Directory*, Wisdom Publications, London, 1985. Some of the addresses given are unconfirmed, but on the other hand, a number of omissions are observable.
16. See Pāsādika, "Buddhist Monasticism in European Culture with special reference to France", Chapter 10 of this volume.

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12

Buddhism in the Netherlands: History and Present Status[1]

Prof. Dr. R.H.C. Jannsen

In this paper the development of Buddhism in the Netherlands is sketched, from the Middle Ages up to the present time. Theravāda, Zen and Tibetan Buddhism are discussed next to a non-denominational foundation which sees its aim as the study of the principles of Buddhism in all their diversity, in close co-operation with Buddhist organizations and institutions. Finally, an estimate is given concerning the number of Buddhists in the Netherlands.

The first sign of Buddhism in the Netherlands can be traced back to the Middle Ages. In a book published by Philip van Utenbroeke in the thirteenth century, the story about Barlaam en Joasaph was included. It contained the Buddha legend in Christian disguise. The name 'Barlaam' is derived from '*Bhagavan*' (Lord) and 'Joasaph' or 'Josaphat' is a corruption of '*bodhisattva*'. The story came from India to the Middle East and was translated into Persian, Syrian, Arab, Ethiopian, Hebrew and Greek. The Dutch version by Philip van Utenbroeke was based on a Greek manuscript by the patriarch Johannes Damascenus who lived around 700 A.D..

In 1651 the name of the Buddha appears in a book by the Dutch missionary Rogerius who had worked on the Coromandel coast of India. He mentions the Buddha as the ninth Avatar of Viṣnu.

The scientific study of Buddhism began in the Netherlands with the appointment of Hendrik Kern (1833-1917) as the first professor on the chair for Sanskrit at Leiden university. He published a study '*Geschiedenis van het Buddhisme in Indië*' (History of Buddhism in India) in two volumes in 1882 and 1884. It was followed by a '*Manual of Indian Buddhism*' in 1896. Kern shares the opinion of the French scientist Senart who considers the Buddha as a legendary being, a hero representing the sun.

In 1905, Felix Ortt published a Dutch translation of the well known work by Paul

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Carus '*The Gospel of the Buddha*'. It was and is very popular; after many reprints it can still be obtained in Dutch bookshops. Also '*The Light of Asia*' by Edwin Arnold proved to be very successful. The fifth edition had already been printed by 1910 in the Netherlands.

Around the beginning of this century some works by Dutch authors were published: '*Het boeddhisme en zijn wereldbeschouwing*' (Buddhism and its world-view) by C. J. Wijnaendts Francken in 1897 and '*Boeddhisme en Christendom*' (Buddhism and Christianity) by H. Bouwman in 1906. An influential Dutch minister (S. van Houten, 1889) translated from German a Buddhist catechism, destined for Singhalese and Burmese children: '*De leer van de Boeddha naar de heilige boeken van het zuidelijke Boeddhisme voor Europeanen bewerkt*' (The Teaching of the Buddha according to the holy books of Southern Buddhism, adapted for Europeans). He rejected the idea of rebirth and saw no place in Buddhism for the fruitful principle of solidarity.

The scientific study of Buddhism continued at Leiden university. Kern was succeeded by Speyer who translated several Mahāyāna texts and translated the *Jātakamālā* for the series '*The Sacred Books of the Buddhists*'. After Speyer J. Ph. Vogel was appointed. He became famous as an archaeologist by proving that Kasia in India must have been Kusinara, the place of the Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha. He also conducted investigations on the Borobudur, the great Buddhist monument on the Isle of Java.

After these early beginnings in the field of science, a practical interest in Buddhism as a living religion began to take form after the Second World War. It came from the theosophical movement. The Dutch secretary of the Theosophical Union in Adyar (India), Mrs. Spruitenburg, after the war came back to the Netherlands and started 'gatherings' in her home in Huizen that attracted some tens of people from all over the country. Among them was Ernst Verwaal who founded the'Buddhistische Vriendenkring Den Haag' (Circle of Friends of Buddhism The Hague), later renamed as 'Nederlandse Buddhistische Vriendenkring' (Dutch Circle of Friends of Buddhism). He issued a simple journal, called '*De Samenspraak*' (The Dialogue). Verwaal published two books on Zen. The centre of the 'Circle' was in The Hague, where in 1966 the wife of the Thai Ambassador, Mrs. Bhakdi, started receiving on Saturdays its members in the Thai Embassy. Later the group was presided by Ronald Poelmeijer.

One of the people who had a regular contact with Mrs. Spruitenburg in Huizen was Peter van der Beek. In 1953 he became a member of The Western Buddhist Order, represented in Europe by the well known British Buddhist Jack Austin. The Western Buddhist Order had been founded in the USA in 1951 by Ven. Sumaṅgalo (Robert Stuart Clifton) as an organization dedicated to interpreting the Dharma to the West and establishing groups where none existed.

National Buddhist Organisation

Some years later Peter van der Beek was appointed as a lay missionary of the Mahāyāna Saṅgha and representative of the Western Buddhist Order for the Netherlands. On New Year's eve 1965, in a letter to Ernst Verwaal he conceived the idea to create an 'umbrella' organization in order to bring together the small Buddhist groups arising

here and there -- like in Germany "die Deutsche Buddhistische Union" (the German Buddhist Union). Besides, he did not welcome the close connection to the Embassy of Thailand and the resulting strong influence of Theravāda Buddhism. If Buddhism were to have a chance in the West, then it should be free from any school or sect. Against Buddhism as an 'organized religion', many of the objections can be raised as against Christianity or any other institutionalized religion. This was his conviction.

On 8 October 1966 the board of the Circle wrote a letter to him in English, signed by the Hon. President V. Busaparoek, first secretary of the Thai Embassy in The Hague, that one "was not convinced of the necessity of calling into being a 'so-called' Nederlands Buddhistisch Centrum". A month later the members of the Circle received a circular letter stating that, in concert with a Thai monk of the Buddhapadipa Temple in London who functioned as a supervisor to the Circle, its name was changed into 'Buddhist Society in the Netherlands'. The reason given was that it was more an international than a specifically Dutch union. This opinion was probably based on the growing number of Thai immigrants who became members of the Circle. The activities of the new Society were continued on an 'ecumenical' basis. This resulted in contacts with Tibetan lama's and finally to a serious conflict about the coming of the Lama Chögyam Trungpa from London. The board resigned and the Buddhist Society was dissolved, as it had "no real Buddhist basis any more".

Now Peter van der Beek, Leo Boer, Miss Perk, Bruno Mertens, and Miss Laterveer grasped the opportunity to fill in the gap that was produced, and created the 'Stichting Nederlands Buddhistisch Centrum' (Dutch Buddhist Centre Foundation) on the eighth of November 1967, a memorable day for Buddhists in the Netherlands. This foundation saw as its aim 'the study of the principles of Buddhism in all its diversity and to encourage the practical application of these principles; the Foundation strives after doing its work in close cooperation with Buddhist organizations and institutions in the Netherlands'. In 1968 the Centre issued the first number of the journal '*Saddharma*' that is still flourishing and has existed now for 22 years.

In 1973 Leo Boer (1919-1983) took over the presidency of the Centre. It was due to his driving-power and directing capabilities that the Centre managed to survive, in spite of the many centrifugal forces. What happened? The Centre did not succeed in being the 'umbrella' organization for all Buddhist denominations it had wished to become. Many new *saṅgha*s came into being under the guidance of monks, lamas and Zen masters from the East and their members saw no necessity in using the Dutch Buddhist Centre as a common meeting place. Because the Centre could not function as a 'centre', it changed its name in 1978 into 'Stichting Vrienden van het Boeddhisme' (Friends of Buddhism Foundation), as it is still called at present. A second reason for this re-baptism was the establishment in 1978 of the 'Boeddhistische Unie van Nederland' (Buddhist Union of the Netherlands) consisting only of *representatives* of Buddhist groups and thereby taking over the (unsuccessful) overall function of the former Centre. Dr. Tony Kurpershoek-Scherft was its first President. This Union became a member of the European Buddhist Union. In 1989 Aad Verboom took over the presidency -- he has also been elected as Vice-President of the European Buddhist

Union. The common meeting place for Buddhist groups of diverse origin, sought for a long time, seems to have been realized at last. The Friends of Buddhism Foundation has become more and more attractive for those people who do not want to commit themselves to one of the traditions imported from the East, but strive for a complete adaptation of Buddhism to the cultural pattern of the West. Fortunately many followers of *bhikkhus*, lamas and Zen teachers still contribute to this Foundation, of which the present writer has the honour to be the President.

SPECIALIZATION OF BUDDHIST GROUPS

Zen Buddhism

Now some attention must be paid to the growth of more specific groups, led by members of oriental *saṅghas* or westerners trained in the East. In 1968 Leo Boer and Janwillem van de Wetering founded a Zen group. The latter one had spent some time in a Japanese Zen monastery and had written a book about it: '*The Empty Mirror*' (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973). He moved to a Zen settlement in the USA and wrote another book: '*Het dagende niets*' (The Dawning of Nothingness) (1973). These books were very influential in our country -- they made Zen popular. The guidance of the group was taken over by Erik Bruijn who is still in charge of a flourishing community.

The largest Zen group at this moment is the Kanzeon Saṅgha, led by Nico Tydeman under the supervision of the American Roshi Genpo Merzel Sensei, a former pupil of Maezumi Roshi in Los Angeles. This group is planning to found a centre in the near future where a teacher and some students will live permanently. Nico Tydeman also organizes many lectures by Buddhist teachers from all over the world in the 'Kosmos' -- a general centre for meditation and all kinds of spirituality. Besides, the 'Nederlands Boeddhistisch Studiecentrum' (Dutch Buddhist Study Centre), under the direction of Nico Tydeman, the present writer and others, offers courses on Buddhist topics and instruction in meditation, in the building of the Kosmos.

Theravāda Buddhism

Theravāda started its career in the Netherlands with the meetings in the Thai Embassy, as already mentioned, led by Mrs. Bhakdi who was herself a qualified teacher of meditation. The meditation-master Chao Khun Sobhana Dhammasuddhi (now known as Dhiravaṃsa) came several times from the Buddhapadipa Temple in London to teach vipassana-meditation. In 1971 the Dutch merchant Monshouwer gathered some people in order to discuss the possibility of founding a Theravāda temple. The new ambassador of Thailand, Mr. Sompong Sucharitkul, was strongly in favour of this initiative and supported the undertaking wholeheartedly. In 1973 the temple was officially founded, as the first Buddhist temple in the Netherlands. Two monks came from Thailand: Phra Maha Theeraphan Mettāvihārī and Phra Samuh Pherm Ariyavaṃso. The temple was located in Waalwijk. The opening ceremony and consecration were performed by the Chief Abbot of the Buddhapadīpa Temple in London, Chao Khun Phra Medhidhammacariya. The temple was named Wat Dhammasucaritanucharee, but two years later renamed as Buddharama Temple, which is easier for Dutch people to pronounce. At the same time the Foundation

'Young Buddhists Netherlands' came into being as a support to the temple. The foundation has its own journal: '*Vipassanā-Sāra*'. The Ven. Mettāvihārī moved to Amsterdam and is leading there a large community of *vipassanā* practitioners.

From the workgroup that had prepared the foundation of the temple in Waalwijk, another foundation had issued: the 'Nederlandse Buddha Dhamma Stichting' (Dutch Buddha Dhamma Foundation). This organization invited in 1974 an Indonesian monk (Ven. Jinamitto) to come to the Netherlands. He accepted as his pupil a young man, called Pierre Krul. In 1977 he was ordained in Indonesia and received the name 'Dharmaviranatha'. The new monk erected the 'Buddhayana Centre' in The Hague, which is still under his active guidance. He issued quite a number of booklets and a regular journal '*Boeddhayana*', now in its thirteenth year.

Tibetan Buddhism

Tibetan Buddhism became established through contacts between people who went to study with lamas in Scotland, the USA, Switzerland and India where the Dalai Lama and many lamas had settled in 1959 after the Chinese invasion of Tibet. In 1977 Dr. Han de Wit, an authorized pupil of the Kargü lama Chögyam Trungpa, founded a centre in Amsterdam which is engaged in teaching the Dharma and meditation according to Tibetan tradition. The building of this centre is probably the largest in the Netherlands. There is a smaller centre in Oegstgeest, also founded by Dr. de Wit, and groups in two other towns (Utrecht and Nijmegen).

The Tibetan Nyingma tradition is represented by several groups. They have a centre (Nyingma Centrum Nederland) and a bookshop in Amsterdam. These groups belong to the organization of Tarthang Tulku who resides in California.

The Gelugpas own an estate in the woods around Emst. On this piece of land the Maitreya Institute has been erected, based on the initiative of Paula Koolkin in 1976. In August 1979 lama Thubten Yeshe and lama Zopa Rinpoche came to teach. At present lama Geshe Konchog Lhundup is the teacher in permanent residence.

The Sakya tradition of Tibetan Buddhism took a foothold in 1976 as Geshe Lama Sherab Gyaltsen Amipa established the 'Sakya Thegchen Ling' in The Hague. Lama Amipa is connected to the Tibetan Institute near Zürich in Switzerland where he has his home address. He founded centres in France, England, Sweden and Western Germany as well.

Buddhism & Christianity

Zen has an interesting relationship with Christianity as testified by father Dr. Enomiya Lassalle S.J. who in his advanced age still comes almost every year to the Tiltenberg, originally a Grale centre in Vogelenzang. The Tiltenberg organized in 1988 and in 1990 very successful international conferences concerning the dialogue between Buddhism and Christianity. On the Buddhist side, the contribution of the Japanese Kyoto school, represented on these conferences by Prof. Dr. Masao Abe, was most conspicuous. Well known Christian theologians like Waldenfels, Knitter, Vroom and van Bragt showed a considerable understanding and sympathy for Buddhist points of view and discussed similarities and differences between these two religions.

Other Groups

Finally two smaller groups should be mentioned. In the first place the 'Friends of the Western Buddhist Order', connected with the large movement of Ven. Sangharakshita in England and secondly the Ārya Maitreya Mandala, a group of pupils of Lama Anagārika Govinda, to which the present writer belongs. This group has separated itself from the larger group in Germany after the death of Lama Govinda.

SUMMARY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION

Summarizing the above, one may come to the conclusion that Theravāda, Zen and Vajrayāna Buddhism are present in the Netherlands, distributed over many groups and centres. The question may be raised: how many persons are actually involved? There is no central registration by the government concerning religious denomination, as state and religion are completely (and fortunately) separated. In 1971 we had the last census. Nine hundred people declared to be Buddhists. One may suspect that these persons were mostly unorganized. At that time there was not so much choice, as there is now, among Buddhist centres. Since 1971 the number of Buddhists has increased considerably, probably in connection with the rise of 'alternative' views in society and the decline of Christianity. The increased interest in Buddhism is evident from the growth in number of Buddhist centres. At this moment there are twelve general Buddhist centres belonging to no specific denomination, seven centres belonging to the Theravāda tradition, twelve belonging to the Vajrayāna and eleven belonging to the Zen tradition. In total there are forty-two groups.

Recently, in 1986, we tried to get an idea of the number of people related to these centres. This was not an easy task. Many centres were reluctant to disclose the number of their adherants. Yet, we managed to come to a reasonable estimate. We distinguished between 'Buddhists' and 'people interested in Buddhism'. The latter category consisted of 'visitors', 'subscribers to Buddhist periodicals', 'participants in courses in Buddhism' and so on. We reached the following estimate: 610 Buddhists engaged in Vajrayāna centres; 540 in Zen centres; 500 in 'general' Buddhist centres, 150 in Theravāda centres. In total there were 1,800 Buddhists. The people interested in Buddhism numbered 2,300. Thus, in the present day, there are about 2,000 organized Dutch Buddhists and about 2,500 unorganized persons moving within the sphere of Buddhist centres. There are also Buddhists of Asian origin. Their number is estimated at about 12,600. Altogether, some 17,000 people are more-or-less committed to the Buddhist Dharma. This is 0.1% of the population of the Netherlands (around fifteen million at present). The impression seems warranted that the number of Buddhists in our country is slowly, but gradually increasing, depending on the adaptability of Buddhism to western culture.

NOTES

1. The historical data in this contribution are derived from three articles by I. den Boer, 'Boeddhisme in Nederland', *Saddharma, 19(2), 19(4), 20(1)*. The quantitative estimations are based on a survey by V. van Gemert.

13
Buddhism in Latin America

Prof. Arnoldo de Hoyos

We are living on a rapidly changing world of increasing communication, interdependence and globalization. In particular, Eastbound Buddhism is re-encountering Westbound Christianity, and so Buddhism is becoming increasingly popular in Latin America particularly among the intelligentsia, mostly because of its links with psychotherapy, self-development and new scientific views. In Brazil, Buddhism became popular because of its very large Japanese immigrant community, and all over America, Buddhism may become a key to Recover Values and to give a New World View.

The year of 1989 was considered by the press as an *annus mirabilis* and according to the French president François Mittèrand, whatever happened was at least as important as the French Revolution two-hundred years ago. In fact, we are living at a critical turning point in the history of fast, turbulent, structural changes, that are both internal and external, local and global. While the 'feminine principle' becomes more active, old, patriarchal, closed, rigid orders start crumbling. Walls separating East and West, Left and Right etc. are imploding under the pressure of increasing worldwide communication, interdependence and globalisation. 'Future Shocks' are becoming natural, and we start to deal with a permanent state of unstable equilibria, accepting greater levels of uncertainty and complexity into our day-to-day life.

NEW BLOCKS & TRANSCULTURISATION

As a result of this process, we observe clear trends towards a re-structuring of the power systems, and particularly the arising of new 'continental' blocks and polarities (European, Asiatic, American, African) based on more cultural and geo-ethnical than geo-political aspects. This centrifugal trend is perhaps trying to compensate for the more centripetal effects of transculturisation of the post-industrial era. Be that as it may, there is a renewed interest all over the world in the cultural aspects of development, and its mostly from this point of view that Buddhism in Latin America needs to be discussed.

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THE SPREADING OF RELIGIONS
First of all, such as all other great religions, the spreading and mutation from the original source seems to obey biological-type principles. In particular, inner strength and limitations, as well as outer acceptance and needs, may determine population dynamics. Moreover, considered as 'cultural products' they follow successive cycles of growth and decay. Now, due to the scale of these phenomena these type of cycles possibly take up to a millenium.

EASTBOUND BUDDHISM RE-ENCOUNTERS WESTBOUND CHRISTIANITY
Even today, this kind of change takes a much longer time than the ones happening in the techno-economic or even in the socio-institutional dimensions. Actually, regarding their diffusion, today's great religions, Christianity and Buddhism, were born half a millennia apart. While the former moved mostly to the West, to Europe and then to America, the latter was to move Eastbound to Tibet, China and Japan, before reaching America half a millennia after the former. This meeting may have marked the proper place and time for the 'ecumenic approximation' that Arnold J. Toynbee considered to be the most significant event for this century. A recent peace meeting in Assisi of a whole spectrum of spiritual leaders, and the Dalai Lama's winning of the Nobel Peace Prize may very well be indications of the same phenomenon.

EARLY BUDDHISM & LATE PROBLEMS
To be more specific, Buddhism was established twenty-five centuries ago and apparently began spreading and mutating rapidly under the patronage of King Aśoka a couple of centuries later (just as with Christianity and the Roman emperor Adriano). However, in spite of the first two councils, it took four centuries before the first Pāli Canon was recorded and the Theravāda tradition established. By that time, many lineages had come into existence. In the long run, the most resistant were the Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna traditions that sprouted and started spreading respectively towards the south and north of India respectively. As a result of the diffusion process and thanks to their isolated seclusion in Ceylon and elsewhere, Theravādin genes survived the spiritual and political revolutions on mainland India.

OVERCOMING CULTURAL RESISTANCES
An important contribution to the process of diffusion was the great spiritual strength of both Bodhidharma in China and later on, of Padmasambhava in Tibet, which was able to overcome the native cultural resistances of puritanistic Confucianism and shamanistic Bon respectively. After a millenium since it origin, it had formed some powerful hybrids that were eventually to give rise to two of the most important living traditions for westerners: the Zen and the Tibetan traditions.

EASTERN BUDDHISM MAY BE DYING SO LONG LIVE WESTERN BUDDHISM
Buddhism in Latin America is still in a very early stage of development, but everything seems to indicate that with a delay of some decades, it may basically follow a similar process as the one in the United States. So we start by considering some relevant aspects of the development of Buddhism in the United States. First of all, Zen Buddhism was imported from Japan at the beginning of this century, thanks to the

visionary Rinzai Roshi Soyen Shaku, who insisted that Zen in Japan was aging and lacking true spiritual enquiry. His hope for recovery was with the 'barbarians' of the West and so he sent his disciple Daisetz T. Suzuki to America and through the high quality of his work, was able to settle down Zen with a firm footing in this land. Tibetan Buddhism, on the other hand, was imported only some time later, mostly through the work of Chögyam Trumpa and Tarthang Tulku and, this time, thanks to the Chinese invasion of Tibet as predicted by Padmasambhava more than a thousand years ago.

AMERICAN LANDING OF RISHIS & LAMAS

Although D.T. Suzuki's '*Essays on Zen Buddhism*' of 1927 was considered as important for Americans as the first Latin translations of Plato and Aristotle, the first large Zen Centre of San Francisco was only opened much later: by the Sōtō Zen teacher, Shunryu Suzuki. The Lamas Chögyam Trumpa and Tarthang Tulku on the other hand, were able to publish their books through the Dharma and Shambhala Press and to establish their Naropa and Nyingma training centres at a faster pace. This was particularly due to the fact that 'counter-culture' freedom and 'consciousness-expansion' movements were part of the 'New Wave' only in the last few decades. It is interesting to observe that Zen was most appealing to the 'intelligentsia', artists and the refined transcendentalists of the United States East Coast. A similar situation may have been true for Canada.

PROBLEMS WITH DHARMA ASSIMILATION & MISCONCEPTIONS

Some problems regarding Dharma assimilation in the United States were indicated in a recent article in the *Yoga Journal.* According to Jack Cornfield, one of the best-known teachers in the United States today with a Theravāda background, the sign of the twenty or so most important Buddhist groups that grew out of this type of process, successfully adapted eastern medicines (concepts, techniques, rituals and so on) for healing the more 'schizophrenic' western mind. However, at the same time they were contaminated by local socio-cultural viruses for which they were perhaps not psychologically immune and may, or else they may have suffered from cultural resistances, misunderstandings and mystifications that they were not able to overcome. These factors may have actually limited the success of Buddhism in America, and they are a good source of historical lessons the for the development of Buddhism in Latin America.

INCREASING RICH-POOR POLARIZATION

Now, while we may be living at the end of the East-West polarity, the North-South (rich-poor) polarity keeps going on in strength. Moreover, there is as much socio-economic difference between the United States and Latin America (Third World) as there is among and within the very same countries of Latin America, and even within the countries themselves.

In fact, while the United States is basically formed by a more-or-less homogenous European WASP population with growing Latin and Black minorities, Latin America, in spite of being mostly Catholic, is the opposite. It consists of European minorities within a large socio-economically and culturally heterogenous population. Brazil, for

example, in spite of being 'eighth' in the world economy, is the country with the worst income distribution in the world.

BRAZIL AS THE LARGEST WESTERN BUDDHIST COUNTRY

Brazil has however, always welcomed racial mixtures and for example numbers only second to Japan for Japanese blood (one million people), and therefore can be considered the largest Buddhist country in the West. Such a large Japanese colony, has inheritied a large proportion of followers of Pure Land Buddhism (50%).

Although as mentioned before, Latin America is extremely heterogeneous from the socio-economic and cultural point of view; for our purposes we may think of three broad cultural groups in Latin America that may be represented by countries as follows:

1. ***European Background***: (from Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Costa Rica)
2. ***Native Culture***: (from Mexico, Peru and neighbouring countries)
3. ***Tropical and Narcissist***: (from Brazil and Venezuala)

DHARMA CENTERS IN LATIN AMERICA

Now, besides the more traditional places where people with Eastern origins practise their native Buddhism, there are at the moment but a handful of active Dharma Centres in Latin America for native Latin Americans: and then, mostly Zen and Tibetan. A list of Tibetan Centres may be seen in the appendix.. Since these are the fields where the seeds of Dharma are being planted, we might as well consider the following facts concerning the above groups.

BUDDHIST SHRINKERS INCREASING POPULARITY

To some extent or another, most of the large cities in Latin America may be considered as accommodating the first group. Collectively speaking, this group has been slowly moving from a more western to a more Eastern mind. Actually, at the moment, Latin American Buddhism seems to be most appealling to people interested in psychotherapy, growth and self-development than to the artists and intelligentsia. It's in this sense that the work of people like M. Fryba, interpreting the Abhidhamma for the modern world, is so important and timely.

NATIVE AMERICAN TRADITIONS ARE STILL ALIVE

Regarding the second group, we find many places on the American continent which although eroded, impoverished and forgotten over time, still represent valid expressions of the *philosophia perennis* and may still be alive in the soul of its people. This may be seen for example, in the popular books of Carlos Castenada or the less well-known work of J. Grinberg on Mexican shamans.

To some extent, these traditions include the basic elements of 'purification' or 'spiritual rebirth'; 'integration' or 'spiritual expansion', and; 'Oneness' or 'spiritual identification'. Moreover, they may have followed parallel developments as elsewhere. As an example, one may mention the existence of 'Quetzalcoatl': a Latin American equivalent of Buddha or Christ, considered as a being, state, and teacher of High Wisdom and Compassion.

Finally, we have a third group, that perhaps is not mature enough for Buddhism,

where there is no demand for inner work, and in any case it tends to be more superficial without creating deep roots. For this group, which is the largest, existential problems still haven't arisen or are not as important for the collective mind. Actually, a large proportion of Latin Americans are still living on the breadline.

FROM GNOSTIC SOCIETIES TO NEW AGE GURUS

Another aspect that needs to be considered regarding Dharma assimilation in Latin America is the fact that secret, gnostic-type societies such as the Freemasons and the Theosophists, have been active for some time and almost everywhere in Latin America, so concepts such as 'karma' and 'reincarnation' are known within these groups, just as they were in the primitive Christian Church. Lately, the work of these societies has been more open, and their esoteric concepts are rapidly mixing and becoming more popular everywhere in America. A good example of this process, showing perhaps even a change of values and evolution at the collective level, is the American artist Shirley McLaine, who went through mystical experiences in Peru, transforming herself from a Hollywood movie-star into a 'New Age' symbol for America. Like many others, she became popular through sharing her own spiritual quest. Her latest book, '*In Search of Self*' was translated almost immediately into Spanish and Portuguese.

Finally, there are countries like Brazil where spiritualism is very strong and where syncretism between Christian and African animistic beliefs brought by the slaves are still very popular, and hence they have already assimilated some Eastern-type esoteric concepts.

In general terms, the above considerations describe the most important aspects of the cultural background and collective karma that may be of some interest for the future developments of Buddhism in Latin America.

FROM A COLD WAR INTO A WARM PEACE ECONOMY

Because of its Pacific Revolution of worldwide impact, Mikhail Gorbachov has been declared the 'man of the decade'. With or without him, the next decade will now have to continue as one of great transitions. During this time, the superpowers will hopefully transform its military industry and lobbies into something more amenable, directed towards environmental or space industry for example. The peace economy will then help to reduce their budget defecits, lower interest rates and enhance public as well as private investments in infrastructure and socilal areas such as education and health care. Cutting in half defence expenditures (16% of GNP for Soviet Union; 6% for the United States), will bring them general welfare and some worries to their fierce ethno-economy rival Japan that may be spending less than 1% of GNP in defence.

A PROPOSAL FOR A PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS

Even changes are changing nowadays, and we must expect the unexpected, like the possible re-awakening of the sleeping giant: China. Nonetheless, we'll consider two scenarios for the last decade of the century: a pessimistic one of basic continuation of present trends, where in general, regional specific interests will prevail over global interests, and; an optimistic one where there will be a balance between local and

global interests and a growing global consciousness.

One may consider the possible effects of these two scenarios through the following matrices (Table 19.1., Table 19.2.).

Table 19.1.
Cross Impact Matrix: Pessimistic Scenario

Changes	Effects: Degree of Improvement			
	Environmental	Quality of Life	Social Justice	Higher Consc.
Techno-Econ. [M]	M	L	L	L
Socio-Instit. [M]	M	L	L	L
Cultural [M]	M	M	L	L

L = Low, M = Medium, H = High

Table 19.2. Optimistic Scenario

Changes	Effects: Degree of Improvement			
	Environmental	Quality of Life	Social Justice	Higher Consc.
Techno-Econ. [H]	H	H	H	H
Socio-Instit. [M]	M	M	H	M
Cultural [H]	H	M	H	H

L = Low, M = Medium, H = High

These matrices can be used as simulation models for the comparison of the two scenarios in relation the possible improvements of values (such as 'environmental care', 'quality of life', 'social justice' 'higher consciousness' and 'freedom'), that may come in response or impact from developments of certain 'principle factors' (such as the techno-economical, socio-institutional and the cultural).

TOWARDS A ROBOTIC SOCIETY

The matrices as they are now, are just a first approximation. Moreover, the effects of some issues are actually complex to analyse: for example, technological progress of media and telecommunication may help as an educational device to spread Dharma rapidly all over the world giving rise to Higher Consciousness. On the other hand, it may be misused to reinforce 'Big Brother'-type of conditioned behaviour in a highly consumer-orientated society. Actually, with the restructuring of local and global power systems, it might turn out to be a mixture of the extreme situations above, with feedback effects and catastrophic kinds of dynamics (in Thom's technical sense of great discontinuities).

As mentioned above, with the breaking of the East-West polarity and corresponding decay of the 'super-powers', new geo-ethnical blocks will be formed, with no basic changes in the Third World countries in the near future, except for the expansion of Japan's techno-economical empire helping the development of new NIC's through the recent Asian-Pacific Economic Co-operation Council.

THE ROSIEST WORLD

On the other hand, recommendations such as those of the Pugwash Committee will be taken into consideration and there will be a growing concern for environmental and global problems with progress towards breaking the North-South polarity, and assuming a more responsible model of sustainable development with a corresponding improvement in ethics and the development of a global 'brain' and 'heart'.

THE HUMAN FAMILY CONDITION

That there is a chance for this to happen, may be seen through the increasing awareness and agreement that it's no longer acceptable to live in a world where, according to UNICEF, a million children will die per year before they reach five years of age because of lack of proper nourishment and health care: and moreover, to solve this problem will take only 2.5 billion dollars or the equivalent of the vodka consumed in the Soviet Union, or the annual expenses used in propaganda for cigarettes in the United States (less than 1% of the U.S. defence budget).

THE GLOBAL VILLAGE IDEAL

With this sort of information rapidly available, one doesn't have to be Mother Tereza to be willing to help, and to awaken to compassion. Moreover, recent meetings on 'global warming', the 'ozone layer' (the Montreal Protocol), rainforests protection, recycling and 'clean energy' indicate increasing awareness and worldwide pressures towards a more responsible behaviour regarding the planet as a whole. In a 'global village', all issues will soon turn into 'human issues'!

U.S. DEVELOPMENTS AS LEADING INDICATORS FOR LATIN AMERICA

Now, as previously mentioned, Buddhist developments in Latin America will depend heavily on all these general developments. Moreover, although there are cultural differences between Latin America and the United States, previous local experiences allow us to consider U.S. developments in Buddhism as leading indicators and warning posts for delayed developments regarding Buddhism in Latin America.

Under the pessimistic scenario, Dharma will continue slowly spreading in Latin America and we may find at best, one major group in every large city by the year 2000, run for and by Latin Americans - again, mostly belonging to the Zen or Tibetan traditions. Moreover, there will be at least one major publisher of Dharma books in every large country, but still little integration will be found amongst the different groups within or amongst countries.

DREAMS THAT MAY COME TRUE

Under the optimistic scenario, Latin America will be hit by a wave of large shifts of political, economic, scientific and even religious paradigms, leading towards more holistic, unified global views and values. These changes will spread rapidly worldwide

and to every area of human endeavour. Inner space exploration will be complementary and as least as important as Outer Space exploration. Human and spiritual values will be recovered. Science and tradition will become inseparable once more, and as a 'new common sense' arises, permeated by Wisdom and Compassion, as indicated by Naisbitt Man will discover Man.

Next century could be then be an era of inner and outer peace: generally increasing welfare and consciousness, if not secular enlightenment. Humankind may overcome some of its dualities with an understanding of the 'jewelled net of Indra', and Man's main discoveries regarding 'reality', 'human nature' and the 'meaning of life' will be but footnotes to the Buddha's *sūtras*.

As part of this process, 'human potential' movements may grow very fast, intensive and extensive spreading of the Dharma will then take place, all over the world. In particular, Latin American Buddhist centres will be working as an efficient integrated network using all kinds of multimedia. Theravāda teachings will then perhaps, become even more important for deeper understanding of our True Nature.

A NEW WE-STERN CIVILISATION

As the East-West 'approximation' and 'transculturisation' continues, Buddhism will develop and merge with other religions all over the world. Just as western civilisation already gave its scientific and technological (left-brain) contributions to Eastern countries, in a similar manner, the time has come when Eastern civilisation will give its (right brain) contributions to Western civilisation through the recovery of human and spiritual values and visions, leading to a new 'extended' Science and common sense.

In this process, Buddhism could be essential for a new understanding of reality, creativity and mind, but mostly its role would lie in the development of a 'higher consciousness' and a 'Planetary', or even a more 'Cosmic Man'. In America, and particularly in Latin America, Buddhism will continue to be more appealing mostly to an 'élite': but now, this 'élite' may become a critical mass for transformations of collective consciousness. Moreover, this 'élite' will continue to be formed largely by women, indicating that in many ways it is the men who really need to be liberated.

On the other hand, under the present trend, the Catholic Church will continue to lose ground in the West and in particular in Latin America, which used to be ninety percent Catholic, opening a large cultural space for a more devotional kind of Buddhism such as Pure Land Buddhism. This process may be reinforced by the present shifts of economic power to Buddhist countries in the East.

GROWING TOWARDS FREEDOM

Be that as it may, some natural resistances will have to be overcome. We are beginning a new age where no dogmatism - scientific, political or religious orthodox - will be acceptable any longer. An extended period of '*glasnost*' and '*perestroika*' strategic vision may be needed in the religious arena. On the other hand, Graeco-Roman-based Western civilisation has a Judeo-Christian heritage which means Semitic roots, which are far more dualistic than the corresponding Brahmanistic roots of Buddhism.

Metaphysical shifts towards less dualistic visions will be needed, but this evolutionary growth through shifts of paradigm may take longer than expected.

Now, in spite of the fact that science is moving towards non-Dualistic and more Holistic models overcoming Causality and Consistency: accepting more dimensions of reality: and concepts such as *sūnyatā* are becoming more popular still as mentioned before from a cultural point of view, it may be more natural for Latin America to be more open to syncretism with Vajrayāna Buddhism than Hinayāna Buddhism, or even Mahāyāna traditions. A similar situation may be happening in relation to Japanese Amidism and Sōtō and Rinzai Zen. However, it is known that difficulties of assimilation are generic to acculturation itself. Thus, given previous experiences, in the long run, traditions stressing gradual awakening may be more suitable for Latin America at its present stage of development, than the traditions stressing sudden awakening.

It is said that, "When a student is ready, then teacher appears". Thus, given its embryonic stage, even under an optimistic scenario, it make take some time before Latin America will have the conditions to develop deep Dharma roots: and even when it is ready, it may still need an updated version of a mixture between Bodhidharma or Padmasambhava to contribute with the proper 'spiritual thrust' for sparking the Buddha-fields. Perhaps the Dalai Lama, with His recent visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may be trying to fulfil this role. However, even figures like the Pope may be somewhat limited and conditioned by their own political roles. Moreover, at the end of the Patriarchal-Messianic Age with the questioning of spiritual as well as other kinds of authorities, 'New Wave' and 'Human Potential' movements may become at least as important for sustaining the Buddha-fields as the top spiritual leaders.

SOME FINAL SUGGESTIONS

Hence, from a practical point of view, besides training and supporting local male, as well as female teachers, what may be needed now is a new breed of more autonomous and interdisciplinary teachers. One such example of a teacher is Lama Lamkhai Norbu, who has his own way of working directly with the very essential and easily-acceptable Tibetan Dzogchen teachings and who, moreover, has a firm foothold as a professor at a Western university. As we move into the twenty-first century and a 'New Age of Consciousness' it is necessary to pave creatively the way towards a post-industrial merging of scientific knowledge and spiritual insight. In this process, and just as in the 'old times' with China and Tibet, America may provide a fresh and fertile field for the purest and richest seeds of Dharma.

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APPENDIX: A Listing of Tibetan Centres in Latin America

(A partial list of the most active Tibetan Centres in Latin America courtesy of Lia Disking)
There are actually two or three centres in each of the countries mentioned. Zen Centres are somewhat less numerous, except for Brazil where a Zen monk came in 1968 and slowly developed a few centres here and there. Regarding other groups, Brazil is an exception in the sense that it has a large Japanese population with eight groups organised in a Buddhist Federation, and there are many other small groups located mainly in San Paulo.

Centro Drukpa Kagyu de Budismo Tibetano, Tongyuling
Calle Soldado de la Independencia 1086
Buenos Aires
Argentina

Instituto Nyingma de Brasil
Rua Herculano 72
01257 Sao Paolo, SP
Brazil

Mosteiro Morro da Vargem
Ibiracu, ES 29670
Brasilia
Tel. 027 2671150

Mosteiro Zen Pico dos Raios
Morro Sao Sebastiao, C.P. 101
Ouro Preto, MG 35400
Brasilia

Templo Soto Zenh
R. Sao Joaquim 285, Liberdade, Sao Paulo, S.P. 01508, Brasilia
Tel. 011 2784515

Templo Soto Zen Sanguen Dojo
R. Barao do Cerro Largo 487
Porto Alegre, RS 90650
Brasilia
Tel. 0512 334976

Centro de Dharma Shi-De Choe Tsong
R. Aimbare 2008, Perdizes
Sao Paulo, S.P. 01258
Brasilia
Tel. 011 8714827

Templo Budista Hompa
SQS 315
Brasilia, DF 70384
Tel. 061 2452469

Centro de Estudos do Budismo Tibtano
R. Ribiero de Almeida 50, Laranjeiras
Rio de Janeiro, RJ 22240
Brasilia

Karma Kagyü Center
Casilla 2229
Santiago
Chile

Karma Thegsun Choling-Bogota
Apartado Postal 91053
Bogota
Colombia

Casa Tibet Mexico
Calle Orizaba 93-A
Colonia Roma
Mexico, D.F.
Mexico

Karma Thegsun Choling-Caracas
Apartado 2755
Carmelitas
Caracas
Venezuela

14

Buddhist Contribution to Inter-religious Dialogue

H.E. Dr. Ananda W.P. Guruge

The desire to discover an intrinsic unity among religions is as perennial as it is universal. Contemporary inter-religious dialogue however, has to aim at a more complex goal as prevailing patterns of religious organizations make the task of arriving at a universally accepted "intrinsic truth" well nigh impossible. A note of satisfaction has to be made in respect of intra-religious dialogue within Christianity and Buddhism which has promoted significant ecumenical co-ordination and co-operation. The primary objective of inter-religious dialogue should be to combat bigotry and fundamentalism. The difference between the academic pursuit of comparative religion and inter-religious dialogue is that latter emphasizes the sympathetic understanding of the diversity in the expression and practice of spirituality. The Buddhist attitude to other religions makes Buddhists competent and effective participants in inter-religious dialogue. The toleration of other religions was exemplified by the Buddha himself in precept and practice. Most valuable guidance in maintaining inter-religious amity was also laid down by Emperor Aśoka. Buddhism has eschewed proselytisation and it has never been a threat to any other religion. Inter-religious dialogue should not be a search for shallow slogans and meaningless simplifications. It must concentrate on the vital differences in the doctrines and practices of each religion and lead to a state of mind where the differences are respected. There are irreconciliable differences among religions and they need not be belittled or ignored. Buddhists have no difficulty in allowing their doctrines and practices to be examined critically by others because of the Buddha's own policy of "*ehipassika*" (come and see). Buddhism has no dogmas and nothing needs to be taken on trust or faith or authority or revelation. Inter-religious dialogue should, however, highlight the commonality of the ethical principles in which all religions demonstrate a very high degree of convergence. This would be the most effective way of utilizing inter-religious dialogue for a universal spiritual awakening and for the propagation of lofty ethical values and corresponding improvement of relations of individual with individual and nation with nation.

While religions of a wide variety have grown in response to diversified spiritual demands of particular socio-cultural milieus, the desire to discover an intrinsic unity among them dates to time immemorial. The earliest recorded instance is in the Ṛgveda where the poet asserts "*Ekaṃ sad viprā bahudhā vadanti*"

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(The Reality is one but the priests say it differently). The Bhagavadgītā is a magnificent example of an effort to synthesize the prevailing Hindu thought of the time into a logical whole. About a century ago, the Theosphical Movement, with the inspiration of Mme. H.P. Blavatsky and the active involvement of Col. Henry Steele Olcott, sought "the substratum of Truth on which all religions are based". In more recent times, a tendency which began as intra-religious dialogue has shown signs of expanding into a inter-religious dialogue. The intra-religious dialogue developed almost simultaneously but independently among the different denominations of Christians and among the various schools and sects of Buddhism.

In Christianity, intra-religious dialogue has been ecumenical in character and the effort is to generate closer association, co-operation and understanding among Catholics, Eastern Orthodox churches and Protestants, who until recent times have had more conflict than consensus among them.

In Buddhist circles, the intra-religious dialogue has been directed to the identification of what is basic and common in the teachings of Theravāda, Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna schools and sects. Among the Buddhists, who fortunately have no bad memories of religious wars or historical hostilities, on the one hand, and no ecclesiastical authority or hierarchy, on the other, this dialogue has already begun to show constructive results. Such world forums as the World Fellowship of Buddhists and the International Saṅgha Council, besides joint celebration of Wesak and increasing participation in joint conferences, are proof of an ever-increasing intra-religious dialogue among the Buddhists. A particularly convincing of evidence of its success comes from the excellent non-sectarian anthology "*The Teachings of Buddha*" which Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai of Japan has made available to thousands of hotels throughout the world.

On the contrary, inter-religious dialogue has taken too long a time to evolve and take shape. It is sad but true that religions have not always met in amity. Wherever religion is made a tool for political, economic or cultural suppression of weak and unsuspecting communities and proselytisation is the secret agenda of overtly altruistic educational, poor relief and social services, bitter and acrimonious inter-religious controversy, debates and hostility are more in evidence. It was rife under Western colonial rule and it continues where religions compete for numerical superiority. It is only where such abuse of religion is absent that any worthwhile inter-religious dialogue could take place. It is, therefore, significant that inter-religious dialogue is a phenomenon of the West and particularly of Europe. Europe, which has seen the futility of centuries of self-destructive religious wars and the holocaust by religio-racial persecution in this century, has become exemplarily receptive to all religions and Buddhism has been a noteworthy beneficiary. With the Summit for Peace in Assisi as a spectacular landmark, innumerable instances can be recounted of successful collaboration of Christians and Buddhists in Europe in a common spiritual quest whether it be meditation or doctrinal comparison.

The topic for discussion here assumes, that such experiences are worthy of being promoted and encouraged. The question at hand is what actually "could" and "should" be the contribution of the Buddhists to make it a success. It is the view of the present

author that our analysis should commence with an examination of the feasibility of the assumed objectives of inter-religious dialogue.

THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

Dialogue is a proven antidote to tension. The need for a dialogue presupposes the existence of tension due to diverse points of view which have a valid claim to be considered with respect and tolerance in an effort to reach a point of convergence or agreement. It is the day-to-day experience of the international community comprising multilateral negotiating mechanisms like the United Nations system, to engage itself in such dialogues in fashioning their courses of actions and, moreso, their joint declarations on crucial world events and problems. Anyone who has functioned in drafting and negotiating such decisions or declarations knows full well how in the ultimate analysis the "truth" gets mangled or at least blurred amidst a plethora of caveats, reservations and explanatory comments couched in the increasingly unintelligible language of long preambles.

With such experience in mind, I would at the very outset urge that inter-religious dialogue should not be directed to the achievement of verbal agreement or compromise among the participating religions. Some of the proponents of dialogue assert that for the sake of effective dialogue a Buddhist should not be "too Buddhist" or a Christian "too Christian". But what do they actually mean? If they mean that participants should be tolerant, flexible and open-minded, I have no difficulty in agreeing. But, on the other, if their point of view is that Christianity and Buddhism are entities like the free-market economy and the centrally-planned economy where the only alternatives are the complete elimination of one or the other or else the evolution of a mixed economy, I do not see any value in the parallel. Christianity and Buddhism cannot be eliminated any more than a half-way house can be created between them. Christianity without the belief in the Trinity or Buddhism without the emphasis on Suffering and its cessation could no longer be Christianity or Buddhism. It is absurd even to think of such compromises. The contention here, therefore, is that inter-religious dialogue should aim at releasing tensions caused by prejudice and bigotry, which are themselves caused by mutual ignorance of the contending parties.

Bigotry, which the dictionary defines as the "attachment of disproportionate weight to some creed or view, irrespective of reason", is a state of mind nurtured by intellectual isolation and exclusive indoctrination. None is born a bigot. It is education and environment which creates a bigot. Inter-religious dialogue is most needed in societies where intellectual isolation or exclusive religious indoctrination takes place or is likely to take place. Bigotry can only be eradicated with knowledge and sympathetic understanding of the diversity in the expression and practice of spirituality. It is this second element of sympathetic understanding which distinguishes inter-religious dialogue from the purely academic pursuit of comparative religion. The purpose of dialogue goes beyond the exchange of knowledge to the appreciation of the identity and specificity of knowledge to the appreciation of the identity and specificity of the beliefs and practices, values and spiritual goals of the participants in the dialogue. This, to my mind is the most feasible objective of inter-religious dialogue.

It is in a dialogue designed to accomplish such an objective of eradicating bigotry, wherever it exists, that the Buddhists could make their most effective contribution.

BUDDHIST ATTITUDE TO OTHER RELIGIONS

Buddhism did not evolve in a religious vacuum. The Buddha was continually engaged in debates with Brahmins, Jains, Ājīvakās, philosophers and teachers expounding a vast variety of doctrines. In every one of them the Buddha's personal attitude was to get the opponent to examine critically his own doctrines or practices rather than to insist on the validity or correctness of the Buddha's own point of view. For example, in the Tevijja Sutta of the Dīghanikāya, the Buddha did not proceed to reject or criticize the idea of a creator god; instead he made his interlocutors admit through a series of queries that his religious practices with the sole objective of "going to the presence of such a creator-god" was in no way different from loving a girl whom he had not seen and hence could not describe.

In a similar process of questioning which was characteristic of the Buddha's method of instruction, Upāli was persuaded to admit that the restraint of the mind was more important than external bodily discipline. But the Buddha was not prepared to have Upāli as an adherent to His Teachings unless Upāli agreed to continue his support to rival religious teachers whom he had hitherto followed. Interpreted in modern terms, this remarkable attitude of the Buddha would be like saying,"You may accept the validity of the Buddhist Teachings but it does not mean that you have to abandon your present religious affiliations". Elsewhere the Buddha had been quite generous in the appraisal of his contemporary rivals. For examples, he declared the teachings of Nigaṇṭhā Nātaputta (Mahāvira) as quite satisfactory.

Right through the centuries, the propagators of Buddhism have understood and followed the Buddha's message in the Upāli-Gahapatisutta of the Majjhimanikāya and his example in the Udumbara-Sīhanāda Sutta of the Dīghanikāya: it is in the latter that he asserted, "I do not preach with the desire to gain followers." As a result, ancient customs, beliefs and practices have survived under the benign shadow of Buddhism in every country where Buddhism gained foothold. Buddhism replaced nothing. Nor does it want to replace anything today. In the current inter-religious dialogue, this is a point worthy of being highlighted. Buddhism presents no threat to any religion, sect or denomination.

The spirit of tolerence which Buddhism has nurtured is best exemplified by a number of statements of Emperor Aśoka. He said;

> "The growth of the essentials of righteousness is possible in many ways. But its root lies in restraint in regard to speech. That means that:
>
> (i) there should be no extolment of one's own sect or disparagement of other sects *on inappropriate occasion* and;
>
> (ii) extolment should be moderate in every case on *appropriate occasions. On the contrary, other sects should be duly honoured in every way on all occasions*".
>
> "If one acts in this way, one not only promotes one's own sect but also benefits

other sects. If one acts otherwise, one not only injures one's sect but also harms other sects".

"Truly if one extols one's own sect and disparages other sects with a view to *glorifying one's own sect, owing to one's attachment to it*, one injures one's own sect very severely by acting in that way".

"Restraint in regard to speech is, therefore, commendable because *people should learn respect the fundamentals of one another's doctrines*. It is indeed the of the Beloved of Gods [i.e. Emperor Aśoka] that *persons of all sects become well-informed about the doctrines of different religions and acquire pure knowledge*". (Emphasis mine)(Rock Edict XII)

The Buddha's precept and example and Emperor Aśoka's practical injunctions would provide the basic guidelines to Buddhists as regards their attitude to other religions. They could be summarized as follows:-

A. Proselytisation or converting a person from another religion to one's own is not the purpose of the propagation of Buddhist thought. This is aptly emphasized when Buddhism is described as a way of life or a philosophy rather than an organized religion.

B. Dialogue is a process of self-introspection and questions should certainly be raised for the interlocutors to re-examine their own views and beliefs and arrive at their own conclusions. Buddhism does not demand belief or faith as a basis for spiritual endeavour. On the contrary, it seeks recognition for one's capacity to think critically, to evaluate good and evil on the basis of empirical criteria, to develop self-reliance and find motivation from a deep conviction that whatever be the problem there is a solution to be found diligently and patiently.

C. Emperor Aśoka concedes the necessity to criticize other religions "on appropriate occasions" and his admonition is that it should be moderate and in restrained language. Conflicts exist due to divergence of value judgements. In a dialogue, the Buddhists have always welcomed the critical examination of their own doctrines, which the Buddha Himself had described as "open to come and see" [*ehipassika*] and "to be examined individually by the wise" [*paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhī*]. A Buddhist would claim a similar concession from his interlocuters representing other religions.

D. The first-hand knowledge of all religions is fundamental firstly, to honouring all religious alike and secondly, to benefitting from their essentials of righteousness. Dialogue based on little knowledge would undoubtedly be dangerous as all contenders will agree or disagree on false or unfounded premises.

E. All religions have an essential core of righteousness: namely, the ethical or moral codes which define and guide the individual conduct and interpersonal relations of their adherents. The external rites and ritual which more often than not divide religions are of little importance in comparison to the moral teachings. There is so much in common in the ethical concepts expounded in the Dhammapada, the Holy Bible (specially, Proverbs, Psalms, the Sermon on the Mount, Letters of Paul to the Corinthians and innumerable parables used by Jesus Christ in his sermons), the Koran

(especially Surah II - the Cow, Surah IV - Women, Surah XXIV - Light) and Taoist Tao-te-ching. Underlying all of them is a value system which is universal and could and should be upheld. This, by itself, gives more than enough reason for all religions to be equally respected and appreciated.

DISCUSSION OF VITAL DIFFERENCES

Points of Inter-Religious Difference

It is somewhat disturbing that quite a number of proponents of inter-religious dialogue consider it an essential pre-condition that all differences among religions should be "swept under the carpet" in a gesture of friendly co-existence. As I see it, this is neither necessary nor helpful. Religions have existed in their diversity because they differ in their approaches. Each approach provides the kind of spiritual solace and guidance, a particular individual or a group requires. Thus, these differences are need-based and serve a vital purpose in society. Besides the diversity in the expression and practice of spirituality is in itself a rich heritage of humanity.

The fundamental differences among religions stem from:

1. Dogmas which have to be accepted without question: e.g. Immaculate Birth, Trinity, Monotheism, Revelation, Last Judgement;
2. The preferred summum bonum: e.g. *Nibbāna*, Eternal life;
3. Path of Deliverance: e.g. Mental development, Moral life, Charity, Submission in faith and prayer either on grounds of independent individual choice or as commanded by a supernatural power through a messenger;
4. Role of teachers and priests: especially in respect of priesthoods which stand as intermediaries between God and Man, and;
5. Rites, Cults, Rituals and Customs including the exclusion of non-adherents from places of worship and ceremonies.

Buddhist Position in Inter-Religious Dialogue

The Buddhists have a tremendous advantage in being well-equipped to handle discussions on points of inter-religious difference. Buddhism is virtually dogma-free. There is no central ecclesiastical authority or clerical hierarchy to demand adherence to belief. No punitive measures such as excommunication are in force. Each Buddhist acts according to his own conviction and his devotion to virtue is on simple empirical criteria like:

1. Do unto others as you would others do unto you [*attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā*];
2. Avoid what a wise man sees and decries as faults in another [*yena viññu pare upavadeyyuṃ*];
3. Refrain from what you would later repent [*yaṃ katvā nānutappati*];
4. Decide on what to do on the basis that your action is conducive to the good and happiness of the many [*bāhujanahitāya, bāhujanasukhāya*], and;
5. Similarly decide on what to avoid.

Another advantage which Buddhism has, is that it places no importance at all to ritual and cults as an integral part of its Path of Deliverance. Not only is worship or ritual conspicuously absent from the Noble Eightfold Path and discouraged specifically by

the Buddha himself but at the very entry into the Path of Deliverance one attains freedom from reliance on cult and ritual [*silabbataparāmāsa*]. In practice, the Buddhists have demonstrated this attitude to ritual by being able to worship in any temple, Theravāda, Mahāyāna, Vajrayāna or even Hindu, and participate in all forms of religious ceremonies. Similarly, no Buddhist temple is closed to anyone whatever be their creed, the sex or the race.

The third advantage is that the Buddhist participating in inter-religious dialogue is intellectually emancipated to the extent that he is dependent neither on a particular church nor a particular text. His own religious teacher, the Buddha, had proclaimed himself to be nothing more than a teacher pointing the way and had enjoined the critical examination of even his own Teachings before they are accepted. He ridiculed the diehard conservative as one who clings on to his bundle of jute even when he could have exchanged it for gold. He could make assertions of this nature because he was convinced that his doctrines could be safely opened to critical examination with the invitation: "come, see, learn and try". Even the *summum bonum*, the *Nirvāṇa*, was described in general terms underlining that it was "beyond logical speculation" [*atakkāvacāra*] and to be approached in steady steps. With these advantages, Buddhists should be able to cut short futile debates on subjects which contribute little to the peaceful co-existence of religions.

I have found it easy to explain to interlocuters in dialogue, that dogmas which have to be accepted without reasoning on the authority of someone else can hardly be discussed because there is no room for the exercise of an individual's critical acumen. I have, without exception rejected such opening gambits as "Let us begin by accepting the concept of a God and recognize the Buddha as your God". I would explain firstly that the Buddha neither claimed nor is he recognized by Buddhists to be God, and secondly, that in a philosophy which assumes everything to be in a state of flux, change and evolution I could not find a place for not only a permanent God, but also a permanent soul.

But I have always offered to respect genuinely the assumptions made by interlocuters: (N.B *assumptions* rather than *dogmas*) in the same as others would be expected to respect the assumptions which Buddhists make, for example, about the cycle of rebirth, the law of action and retribution, multiplicity of worlds and states of existence, efficacy of meditation, and individual's capacity to develop himself through the training of the mind to reach liberation from Suffering and repeated death.

I would go further to explain how Buddhism has developed a logically reasoned conceptual structure as the basis for a spiritual quest leading to liberation. Here, attention would be drawn to the empirically testable assumption that everything around us is impermanent [*aniccā*]. From this the conclusion would be drawn that whatever is always changing could only produce dissatisfaction, misery and suffering [*dukkha*]: another empirically testable assumption of Buddhism. The next demonstrable conclusion would be that no personal identification of one's self or personality can be claimed in connection with anything which causes Suffering through its impermanence [*anattā*]. I would invite my interlocuters to explain the reality of life and existence as it is, starting with the premise that they themselves have no guarantee of their own

survival to the end of the dialogue!

Discussion of differences when embarked on with mutual respect for intellectual honesty and mutually recognizable levels of in-depth knowledge and understanding of the issues involved, are not only intellectually satisfying but also helpful to ease tensions which grow out of ignorance and more dangerously out of little knowledge. It is the recognition of irreconciliable differences in the doctrinal base which enables a better understanding to be gained on the fundamental objective of each religion as regards means of satisfying humankind's spiritual quest. Our differences do highlight and bring to the foreground the commonality of interests and the universality of a valid commitment to spirituality.

CONCLUSION

The foremost Buddhist contribution inter-religious dialogue should be the readiness to participate in any effort which eradicates bigotry born out of prejudice and ignorance, and all forms of fundamentalism arising from misplaced religious fervour. As crucial to their participation should be the promotion of tolerance and mutual respect. But, such tolerance and respect should not be founded on shallow slogans like "After all, every religion is the same" or "One religion is as good as the other". On the contrary, respect must be generated on a full understanding of the distinctive characteristics of each religion. Similarly, tolerance must emanate from the conviction that the spiritual needs of humanity are diverse and, therefore, what caters for them should be equally diverse. With the lofty example of the Buddha himself, and the admonitions of Emperor Aśoka, Buddhists cannot afford to be disparaging in their assessment of other religions.

Another equally significant contribution would be to promote in-depth discussions of vital differences. Inter-religious dialogue is not an effort to make concessions or equations. Whether *Nirvāṇa* is the same as Heaven, or; whether the Law of Kamma is another expression for Will of God, or; whether meditation and prayer are identical in process and result, or; whether the Buddha believed in a creator-god or not, or; whether the Saṅgha is identical to the Church are not issues for which any authoritative conclusions are possible or necessary. What is important and invaluable is how each religion is built upon either empirical assumptions or dogmas and promises as the final reward a state of deathlessness or immortality.

Last but not least, the Buddhist contribution should be in the form of underscoring the ethical importance of religion in the present-day context of materialistic preoccupation, which generates violence and threatens peace, generates ruthless exploitation of the weak and the helpless, and leads to deteriorating interpersonal relations. Here, there could be nothing but agreement on the values concerned and the types of behaviour recommended. Buddhism has a remarkable ethical base. Its strength comes from the fact that it is expected to emanate from one's own conviction that a particular behaviour is desirable because it is for the good of the many and the happiness of the many. To modern humankind, such a message could be more appealing and relevant than threats of hell-fire and brimstone.

The Buddhists should not only encourage but also support, with all the moral

strength and material resources at their command, inter-religious dialogue as a preparation and a base for a universal spiritual awakening founded on lofty ethical values: contributing to the improvement of relations of individual with individual, between nation with nation and within humanity as a whole.

22
Buddhism and Environmental Ethics: Some Reflections[1]

Lambert Schmithausen

The present paper concentrates on some points of Buddhist theory or practice which pose problems in connection with the vital task of conservation and protection of nature: problems of environmental ethics connected with the precept not to kill living beings and the practice of non-injury (*ahiṃsā*) in traditional (especially Theravāda) Buddhism (§ II); nature and the ultimate analysis of existence in traditional Buddhism (§ III); civilization and nature in the perspective of an intramundane hierarchy of values in the Buddhist tradition (§ IV); the question whether, in case of conflict, priority is accorded to non-injury or to compassion and the practical consequences of the priority of compassion in Mahāyāna Buddhism (§ VI); the idea of Buddha-Nature in the insentient in Far Eastern Mahāyāna Buddhism and its practical consequences (§ VII). My aim is to point out difficulties in order to heighten our awareness and contribute to a conceptual, spiritual and practical reassessment of our attitude towards nature. In this connection, an "ecological" extension of the Five Precepts is proposed (§ V).

I.

When we use the word "environment" we usually presuppose, intentionally or unintentionally, the ordinary Western anthropocentric view of nature. For, what is meant is *man's* environment, which he perceives himself to be quite different from, at that.[2] Animals, at least wild animals, are merely a part of environment thus viewed. When we look for a Buddhist term coming close to our notion of "environment", what occurs to one's mind is *bhājana-loka*[3], the "container world". Significantly enough, its opposite is *sattva-loka*[4], the world in so far as it consists of living or sentient beings, which of course is not confined to men but includes other living beings as well, especially *animals*. From this point of view at least, the Buddhist position would not be anthropocentric but rather "sentient-centric".

A similar result is obtained by comparing the usual implication of the Western term "ethics" with that of a possible Buddhist counterpart. In Western tradition, ethics has, at least until recently, mostly been understood as referring to man's behaviour

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towards *men*.[5] On the other hand, the Buddhist concept which would seem to come closest to the domain of "ethics", namely *śīla/sīla*, includes abstention from killing *any* living being, hence also *animals*. The seriousness of this aspect is easily verified from Aśoka's inscriptions - repeatedly interdicting the slaughter and killing of animals[6]-, or from the fact that traditional village Buddhists in Sri Lanka, asked by M. Southwold what they were required to do as Buddhists, replied: "not to kill animals".[7]

Under these circumstances, one would expect that in Buddhist countries, unlike Western countries, environmental problems, or destruction of nature, are absent or at least by far less serious. After all, most animals need intact eco-systems, and deforestation or pollution means death for them. Besides, Buddhism emphatically disapproves of greed and wastefulness, which are, along with overpopulation, the main cause of environmental destruction.[8] Hence, Buddhists - one thinks - must be conservationists. But everybody knows that the reality is quite different: in Japan, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, and, last but unfortunately not least, in Thailand. On the other hand, at least in traditional Sri Lanka, Buddhists did observe the precept not to kill animals to a remarkable degree;[9] e.g., though there is inscriptional reference to hunting ferocious animals as a part of royal fitness training,[10] so to speak, and though there was some hunting and fishing as means of living,[11] hunting and fishing for mere fun appears to have been unusual.[12] In Thailand, according to Terwiel[13], a certain tendency toward exploitation of nature set in in the beginning of the nineteenth century, but the decisive change for the worse seems to have taken place only after the Second World War, the pastime of rich people to kill off thousands of wild animals just for fun being symptomatic.[14]

Therefore, actual behaviour towards nature would seem to be dependent on various factors, of which religious norm is only one among others, like economic or political needs, or mere thoughtlessness, lack of sensitivity, or sheer greed. And the effectiveness of the religious norm, particularly under the impact of Western civilization and its values, attitudes and allurements, may also depend on how deeply or superficially Buddhist ethical values had actually been interiorized by the different strata of society.[15] Finally - and this brings me to my subject proper -there may even be aspects in Buddhism itself, in its doctrines or practices, which can contribute to explaining why environmental destruction and pollution encountered less resistance in Buddhist countries than one would have expected in view of the fundamental precept not to kill animals.

I think there are such aspects: in Early Buddhism and Theravāda as well as, still more palpably, in Mahāyāna Buddhism. When trying to point out some of these aspects, I do it in a quite provisional and incomplete way, open to debate, and I do not want my remarks to be misunderstood as criticism for its own sake or even as an attempt to prove, by implication, the superiority of Western thought or attitudes, which is definitely not my intention. But I think that if Buddhists are willing to contribute to a change - as many of them obviously are -, they must also be fully aware of the problems involved in the matter, and must try to find viable solutions; and I shall try to make a

few albeit tentative suggestions myself.

I am fully aware of the fact that besides the issues treated in this paper there are others, too, which may be relevant to the problem under discussion: e.g., the Buddhist attitude towards wealth and property, a critical analysis of which may likewise turn out to include some problematic aspects as soon as the entire Buddhist tradition in its complexity is taken into account; or the emphasis on the precedence of personal moral and spiritual perfection over organized communal activities. However, limitation of time prevents me from investigating these issues more closely.

II.

Let me start with traditional Buddhist (i.e. Early Buddhist and Theravāda) ethics, more precisely: with the precept not to kill animals. For people who have to live on fishing or hunting, violaton of this precept is inevitable, and so it is, practically, also for peasants[16] who have to plough the soil and to protect their crops against what we anthropocentrically call "pests"; hence, they may think the use of pesticides - herbicides as well as insecticides - necessary[17] (in spite of the ecological problems involved, of which they may not yet be fully aware). To avoid such killing one would have to avoid these professions, as Jainas actually do. But many people may not have such a chance, since agriculture and, in some countries, fishery are vital for the economy. Hence, Buddhism, trying to encompass the whole of a society, has to offer some compensation to the people in such occupations, and has actually done so by stressing the importance of intention[18] and by admitting the possibility of countervailing, or postponing the effects of bad karma by merit.[19] But there are other -not necessarily dogmatically "orthodox" - strategies.

One is the acceptance, in practice, of the intuitive view that killing a small animal is less serious than killing a big one.[20] This view may be adapted to Buddhist standards by presupposing that the evil intention to slay is usually much stronger in the case of a big animal.[21] Hence, there is a tendency of underrating the killing of minute animals like insects,[22] in favour of practicability, which has always been an important consideration in Buddhism (as, e.g., in the question of plants as sentient beings)[23]. From the point of view of environmental ethics this practical attitude of killing where it is more or less unavoidable for survival (but not killing beyond need or even for mere fun) is no problem as long as a country is thinly peopled and natural methods are used; but it becomes highly problematic with the overgrowth of population and with the use of poisonous chemicals, particularly non-decomposing ones.

Another strategy is a tendency to reduce the idea of killing to *direct* killing. Extreme cases, limitating the killing to be avoided more or less to bloody killing with one's own hands, are recorded by Terwiel for Buddhist peasants in Thailand. "Sometimes", he says, "a farmer will evade the act of chopping a fish to death by letting it die out of the water, or by ordering a servant to do so."[24] And "pigs and buffaloes are usually not slaughtered by farmers ..., but often ... sold to professional butchers."[25]

Such behaviour shows, to be sure, some inhibition with regard to brutal, bloody killing, but the main motive may just as well be avoiding bad karma, hence quite selfish; and in the case of the fishes the indirect way of putting them to death inflicts

much more pain on the victim than direct killing would do, and hence shows a remarkable lack of pity, and is clearly not in harmony with the true spirit of Buddhist ethics. For although the wording of the first Precept merely prohibits the grossest form of injuring living beings, viz. killing them (*pāṇātipāta*), this can hardly be taken to mean that other forms of injuring them are allowed. There is plenty of canonical and post-canonical material that condemns unspecified injuring (*(vi)hiṃsā*, *(vi)heṭhana*)[26] of living beings as well as various forms of torture,[27] or enjoins protection,[28] benevolence and compassion.[29] In the Pāṭimokkha, too, only intentional killing (*jīvitā voropeyya*) is prohibited,[30] but the Vinayavibhaṅga supplies evidence that also causing pain to an animal (or man) is considered an offence, albeit a less serious one.[31]

The afore-mentioned behaviour of the peasants also disregards the Buddhist principle that intention is decisive. For at least in the case of the fishes the intention is clearly to put them to death (or at best to eat them, but when taking them out of the water one clearly knows that they will die thereby).

From the environmental point of view, reduction of forbidden killing to direct or even bloody killing is simply pernicious. For, polluting water or the air or cutting down forests usually means indirect killing only, and even the use of insecticides, apart from long-term damage, is rarely experienced as direct killing like swatting an insect. Therefore, modern Buddhist ethics should emphasize that *any* killing is real killing, be it direct or indirect.

This holds good also for indirect killing by consumption. For whether we like it or not, at least in modern societies and economies slaughtering of animals (and, what is perhaps worse, cruel forms of rearing them) and much of environmental destruction are largely committed for the sake of money, and hence their extent is largely determined by consumer demand. This has, by the way, already been clearly recognized by the Laṅkāvatārasūtra: "If nobody ate meat, nobody would kill for that purpose, for mostly innocuous animals are killed for the sake of money."[32] In such a situation, the old rule that a monk may eat meat or fish when he can be sure that the animal was not expressly killed for him[33] would seem to become problematic; for, the animals are killed for the anonymous consumer, and whoever consumes meat or fish is one of them, and thereby inevitably encourages the production of meat involving killing.[34] The same logic applies to all kinds of consumption of things the production of which involves deterioration of environment. The consumer is as responsible as the producer, at least as long as he has alternative choices.

One might argue that from a Buddhist point of view indirect killing is, to be sure, sinful, provided that it is intentional. And the peasant using pesticides or the entrepreneur polluting a river might argue that their intention is not to kill animals but to protect crops or to get rid of sewage. But "intentionally" (*saṃcicca*) is explained as "knowingly", "consciously" (*jānanto, saṃjānanto*),[35] and this would seem to mean that as soon as one knows that an action entails the death of living beings, one has to refrain from it.

One could even go one step further. In the Vinaya,[36] the case is mentioned that a

monk, sitting down on a stool, kills a baby which was lying on it but was hidden under a piece of cloth. The monk is not guilty of the *pārājika* offence of murder, but the Buddha adds that one should not sit down without scrutinizing the seat, and that doing so is a *dukkaṭa* offence.[37] If one applies this injunction to the (admittedly different) field of environmental ethics, it would mean that one should not easily interfere with nature unless one has made sure that no danger for living beings ensues therefrom. Of course, the peasant would say that he cannot help hurting tiny creatures while ploughing, or even has to kill animals spoiling his crops. My answer would be that he should do so as little as possible, and that he should "make merit" by resorting to biological methods of agriculture and by sparing or planting some native trees and shrubs in compensation.

Another point that raises problems in the context of environmental ethics is the fact that the first Precept as well as non-injuring, benevolence and compassion clearly refer to *individuals*, i.e., in the context of nature, to individual animals, not to species, or to whole ecosystems.[38] What counts, in this connection at least, is not, e.g., the diversity or beauty of nature; it is solely animals as living and sentient individuals that count. Therefore, from the point of view of traditional Buddhist ethics at least, conservation of species and protection or even restoration of ecosystems can only be argued for if it can be based on protection of individuals. This, however, is not so easy; for according to a view which is wide-spread in Indian Buddhism[39] and also in Jainism[40] and Hinduism[41], existence as an animal is a particularly unhappy one, at least if compared with human existence. Hence, though one should not kill animals - because they want to live nonetheless,[42] or because on account of the karma doctrine killing them would merely postpone their suffering to another existence, or simply because killing is bad karma or spiritually pollutive[43] -, yet from a theoretical point of view one might say that it would be better if there were no animals at all. Actually, in the ideal world there are none, as we shall see later.

As long as the natural balance is not disturbed, protecting individuals would automatically imply protection of species. But difficulties arise when this is no longer the case. From the point of view of Buddhist ethics it would, e.g., be difficult to save a species if this involves killing individuals of another, intrusive one, as, e.g., in the case of certain native Australian marsupials endangered by the rabbit or by foxes and stray cats introduced from abroad. And arguing for active measures to re-establish a species on the verge of extinction would seem to be quite difficult from the standpoint of traditional Buddhist ethics, at least as long as the view of the peculiar unhappiness of existence as an animal is upheld.

Similarly, destruction or pollution of ecosystems is, to be sure, clearly in contradiction with Buddhist ethics since it entails the killing or at least the displacing of many individual animals.[44] On the other hand, restoration of natural eco-systems is not so easily justified since it would lead to an increase of animals, i.e., augment the number of beings existing as animals, which is not desirable as long as the idea that animal existence is especially painful is clung to.

As long as they uphold this latter idea, Buddhists may therefore have to argue that

protection of the environment, including conservation of species requiring conservation or even restoration of eco-systems, is indispensable for the future existence, or at least comfortable existence,[45] of *man*, since in Buddhism human existence is, in spite of the suffering it involves, valued as a good form of existence (*sugati*), and the only one at that in which one is capable of liberating insight. As an example for such an anthropocentric line of argumentation, one may perhaps adduce a verse of Milarepa's, recommending to the Nepalese to preserve the woods in order to be safe from the Mon intruders.[46] To be sure, protecting or even restoring nature for the sake of human interests is much better than not doing it at all; but in my opinion it would be ethically more convincing to protect nature on the basis of acknowledging that non-human beings *themselves*, as individuals and as species, have an independent right to exist and to be treated with respect. Besides, there is still considerable disagreement as to the extent to which protection of environment and conservation of nature is in fact indispensable for, and not rather an obstacle to, the existence or comfort of humans. But let me come back to this issue later.

III.

When we now consider the environmental problems from the point of view of the traditional Buddhist analysis of existence, we cannot but acknowledge that nature, too, is regarded to be subject to change, impermanent (*anitya*),[47] and, for that reason, unsatisfactory (*duḥkha*).[48]

From this point of view, the present extirpation of species or destruction of beautiful landscapes is nothing but an acceleration or anticipation of their decay which is anyway inevitable, sooner or later. There is no sense in deploring it; the wise can only face up to it with equanimity.

Such an attitude would not appear to be a good basis for active conservation or restoration of nature, but it does not favour active destruction for the sake of so-called progress either; for external, technological "progress" or "development" will never be able to change the basic unsatisfactoriness of existence.

This has two implications. One is that one should leave nature in peace.[49] The other is that salvation can only be attained in a transmundane state. Nirvāṇa, at least according to the canonical texts and traditional dogmatics, transcends the whole realm of impermanence, nature as well as civilization. In Nirvāṇa, there is no earth, water, fire or wind, nor sun and moon,[50] nor - so one may add - plants or animals; but, since one who has entered Nirvāṇa cannot be subsumed under any class of living beings anymore[51], there are, in Nirvāṇa, no men either (and hence, fortunately, none of the noisy, stinking and ugly so-called blessings of progress).

IV.

However, from an intramundane point of view, nature and civilization may be evaluated in accordance with relative criteria, e.g.: whether they involve more suffering or less - either for living beings in general or for man in particular -, or whether they are more or less suitable for spiritual progress. Actually, Buddhist tradition reflects different attitudes, which may - very roughly, to be sure - be reduced to two types: one favouring civilization, and one favouring nature, particularly wild

nature.[52]

IV.1.

For the attitude favouring civilization (which appears to have been the dominant one among the majority of Buddhists, especially among lay people but probably also among those monks who lived in towns and villages)[53], wild nature - wilderness, virgin forests, thickets, steep mountains or ravines - is something frightful and uncomfortable.[54] With this view, the idea that animals are unhappy[55] and even malevolent[56] fits in quite well, especially if it refers to wild animals and is based on the argument that they devour each other.[57] The ideal is a densely populated continent, one village close to the other,[58] with 80,000 wealthy big cities full of people.[59] Even Nirvāṇa is occasionally called a city (*nibbāna-nagara*,[60] *nirvāna-pura*[61]).[62]

In early Mahāyāna, the paradise Sukhāvatī - an ideal intramundane place, so to speak - is plain, without mountains, furnished with quadrangular (i.e. unnatural) ponds, crowded with people all looking alike, but devoid of animals (except artificial birds), and the trees and flowers are not living plants but, like the soil, made of jewels.[63] Thus, the ideal world is entirely unnatural.

This attitude of glorifying civilization and being afraid of, and hostile to, wild nature is hardly a specifically Buddhist one but seems to be wide-spread among agricultural and animal husbandry societies,[64] especially at a period in which, as one Sūtra puts it, there was still plenty of wilderness but little cultivated land.[65] Nowadays, however, the situation has been reversed, and the pro-civilization and anti-wilderness attitude has almost won the game. We are, at last, close to a variant of Sukhāvatī on this earth, promised by the prophets of progress, but unfortunately vitiated by a lot of pollution, noise, ugliness and even poverty, and by the fact that jewels have to be supplanted by plastic, to keep expenses low. Hence, this seems to be a dead end. Therefore, Buddhism should dissociate itself from an attitude which regards nature, more precisely wild nature - virgin forests, wild animals, wild plants - as something undesirable or even inimical.

IV.2.

In fact, Buddhist tradition fortunately also contains plenty of evidence for another attitude towards (wild) nature.[66] Usually, it is the forest-dwelling monk, the hermit, by or in connection with whom life in the wilderness, in wild nature, is praised[67] as favourable to meditation[68] and agreeable.[69] Sometimes, the beauty of nature is emphasized,[70] and its contemplation is recommended especially to people who need encouragement.[71] Natural things (especially plants) may even arouse discriminating insight by exhibiting impermanence, e.g., by the falling of leaves, the withering of flowers, or the change of the seasons.[72]

Occasionally, even Nirvāna is compared to a shadowy wood (*vanasanda*), in contrast to temporary heaven compared to a palace.[73] And in Thailand even the city of Nirvāna is sometimes painted with some animals and flowers around it.[74]

This evaluation of nature appears to be well suited for environmental ethics because what is valued positively is nature, especially wild nature, as an *ambiance*, i.e., as a whole, as an ecosystem. And because this is positively valued it ought to be not only

preserved but also restored (in case it has been destroyed for some reason).[75] As an ambiance or ecosystem, nature is, moreover, complete, and perhaps viable, only if also the *species* of plants and animals peculiar to it are preserved, to a large extent at least. Hence, the evaluation of nature which appears to be associated with the Buddhist hermit, the *āraññaka bhikkhu*, should, perhaps, today become part of the attitude of *all* Buddhists, in order to supplement, on the level of environment, the traditional Buddhist ethics of not killing living beings and of compassion.

Besides, the idea that animals, even in open nature, are particularly unhappy and unfortunate, or even malevolent, should be reconsidered. To be sure, there *is* suffering in nature; it would be idle to deny that nature has its sombre, nay horrible aspects. And stressing them may be useful in certain spiritual contexts, and stimulate effort[76] or compassion. But stressing the dark side and ignoring the equally true aspect of natural harmony and beauty is counterproductive in the context of environmental ethics. In this context, another, more positive evaluation should be cultivated.

Such an evaluation is, by the way, also found in the popular (and perhaps more archaic) attitude towards animals found in the Jātakas, where animals - often the Buddha in a previous life - are frequently both happy and good,[77] or in texts like the Tibetan Bya-chos ("The Buddha's Law among the Birds")[78] where Avalokiteśvara assumes the form of a cuckoo to preach the Dharma to the birds.[79]

V.

Let me add another suggestion. The Five Precepts are obviously (at least also) intended to consolidate society, i.e. human society. The precept not to kill animals, however, can obviously not be reduced to such a function since it holds good also for all animals that may serve for human food[80] and even for such as are noxious to man, including even insects.[81] If there is any "social" function in this precept, it is the idea of mutual peace or even friendship between man and animals. Snakes and other dangerous animals do not bite or injure him who encompasses them with friendship or benevolence.[82] Be that as it may:[83] it is at any rate possible to explicate this view in the sense of, or at least develop it to, the idea of a universal society or community of all living beings, which is in fact occasionally envisaged on the basis of the view that all living beings have already been one another's kin in the course of *saṃsāra*[84] - a community in which each species has its function and its place, and hence a right to survive or even to be restored to its rights if they have been violated by man.

In such a perspective, displacing living beings from their habitat, or destroying or polluting it, would be a case of "taking what was not given" (*adattādāna*), i.e. theft. To be sure, according to Vin III 58, dealing with monks who have eaten the remains of the quarry (*vighāsa*) of a beast of prey[85], appropriating what belongs to an animal (*tiracchānagatapariggaha*) is stated to be no offence[86]; but Buddhaghosa[87] specifies that this concerns what has been left over and abandoned by the beast of prey, and that one should not chase the animal away from its quarry while it is still eating - even though this too would not constitute an offence in the sense of the Vinaya - because it is dangerous for oneself *and* out of *compassion*.[88]

Finally, in the context of environmental ethics, even abstention from sexual

misbehaviour may be reinterpreted so as to include abstention from excessive or irresponsible begetting of children, since overgrowth of human population sooner or later invariably leads to environmental destruction or pollution and thereby to the displacement or even extirpation of other kinds of living beings. And abstaining from intoxicants ought to include abstention not only from alcohol and other drugs but also from such modern intoxicants like unnecessary or careless use of cars, planes or motor-boats, which pollute air and water and kill a great many creatures.

VI.

Let me proceed to a few considerations regarding Mahāyāna Buddhism. H. Nakamura writes that especially in the case of the Jains traditional values prevent the development of technology, the precept not to kill animals excluding, for them, e.g., the use of insecticides, animal experiments, or the draining of marshes. Nakamura then states that for the Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans, who profess Mahāyāna Buddhism, there are no such problems.[89] But the question is *why*; for on the whole, the Mahāyāna, too, prohibits the killing of animals[90] just like traditional Buddhism. In the case of insecticides or the draining of marshes (or, one may add, the destruction of forests and other ecosystems), the reasons may be more or less the same as for Theravāda countries: e.g., tendency to disregard the precept in the case of small animals, unawareness of indirect killing (or simply ignoring it), adaptation to economic needs (as fishing in Japan), prevalence of a more anthropocentric attitude in both urban and rural society, and - contrary to at least traditional Buddhist values - the Western attitude of unrestrained consumption. But there may be other reasons as well, such as would seem to be typical of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

In early Buddhism, the precept not to kill living beings is a categoric one, which strictly speaking does not allow of exception even in the case of self-defence,[91] or out of compassion.[92] No euthanasia,[93] not even for animals.[94] There are, to be sure, exceptions. E.g., according to Gombrich[95] most Ceylonese monks sanction Duṭṭhagāmaṇi's war against the Tamils threatening Buddhism, i.e., they admit killing in order to save the Buddhist religion. And in the Vinaya of the Mahīśāsakas killing, at least of an animal, out of compassion is considered no offence.[96] But such occasional exceptions rather look like anticipations or reflections of the Mahāyāna stance. For in at least some currents of Mahāyāna and in some Tantric texts, it is expressly stated that there are certain situations of conflict in which compassion does in fact prevail even over the precept not to kill, and puts it out of force.

One of the most obvious conflicts between the precept not to kill and compassion in connection with the natural world arises in the case of a decrepit or incurably sick or injured animal suffering great pains. Why not put an end to its suffering by killing it, if compassion prevails over the precept not to kill? What is of importance for *environmental* ethics is the fact that for Buddhists an analoguous situation could obtain on a general level since the view that animals as such are particularly unhappy may give rise to the general idea that killing them in order to liberate them from their miserable state would be an act of mercy[97] - an idea actually ascribed in Indian sources to the so-called Saṃsāramocakas.[98] One might even argue that the basic unhappiness

of existence as an animal ultimately justifies even the present-day extirpation of whole species, or even of animals altogether. However, as far as I can see the Mahāyāna sources do not favour such conclusions any more than the traditional texts. So far, I have not noted in them any passage sanctioning (not to mention recommending) the killing, out of compassion, of an individual animal suffering acute pains,[99] let alone the killing of animals in general as a matter of principle, as ascribed to the Saṃsāramocakas. On the contrary, in one text the position of the latter is expressly rejected, and clearly distinguished from the cases where killing out of compassion is justified (see below), by pointing out that it is based on misorientation (*moha*), i. e. ignorance of the law of karma.[100]

The situations of conflict in which the Mahāyāna sources do accord priority to compassion over the precept not to kill are of a somewhat different kind. One such situation is when (just as in the case of Dutthagāmani) the Buddhist religion or its representatives - the Buddha or the Saṅgha or one's spiritual teacher - are threatened or abused. In such cases, the aggressors or insultors may be killed,[101] out of compassion.[102] This pattern is, however, not applicable to animals unless one imputes to them hostility towards the Buddhist Doctrine or clergy.

But there are other situations, as, e.g., when a bandit, a dacoit, is about to kill many innocuous persons. In this case, a bodhisattva may, out of compassion, kill the bandit in order to save him from the sin of murder he is about to commit and from the rebirth in hell it would entail.[103] Other texts merely state that the bodhisattva, or Tantric adept, kills mischievous or malevolent beings out of compassion.[104]

From such cases, one might derive the right to kill noxious animals like beasts of prey, or to use insecticides against vermins destroying people's crops. But if one were to keep to the specific features of the above examples, this would imply that the animals concerned are malevolent and do even accumulate bad karma by attacking people or by killing one another or by damaging people's crops. As we have seen above (§ IV.1), such a highly problematic view is in fact documented even in pre-Mahāyāna Buddhist texts. Still, killing noxious or troublesome animals is expressly discarded as an un-Buddhist habit not only in Śrāvakayāna but also in Mahāyāna sources.[105]

However, one may argue that the afore-mentioned Mahāyāna and Tantric sources which put the precept not to kill out of force in certain situations are not concerned with situations where there is conflict between an evildoer and one's own interests, and hence a possibility to abstain from killing by sacrificing oneself. Rather, what they are concerned with are more complicated cases: cases where one is not personally involved but where only other people's interests are concerned, and where there is merely a choice between killing, or letting be killed or injured, the one side or the other. In these cases, the texts take the part of the innocuous side and allow to kill the evil one. One could derive from this the principle that in case of vital conflicts it is justified to use force against, or even kill, the morally or spiritually inferior side. Such a view would seem to be confirmed by the fact that in the case described by the Bodhisatt vabhūmi the motive of the aggressor is base (namely material gain)[106] and that among

the persons in danger there may be noble Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas.[107] Now, the Mahāyāna-Mahāparinirvānasūtra expressly states that, since men are spiritually on a higher level than animals, killing an animal, though, to be sure, an offence, is still less sinful than killing a human.[108] From this one might deduce - provided that no distinction is made between killing and letting be killed or letting die - that in case of conflict of interests it is justified to kill animals if otherwise humans would have to die (e.g. by starvation). From this point of view, then, one could also justify draining marshes, clearing forests or even animal experiments (for serious medicinal purposes only, of course), and it may well be that this is one of the reasons why, as Nakamura states,[109] Mahāyāna Buddhist countries seem to have no problems with regard to such activities.

But all this rests on the ultimately anthropocentric presupposition that man is spiritually (or otherwise) superior to and hence at any rate more valuable than animals, let alone plants. However, from a "cosmocentric" point of view - one for which the global ecosystem as an intact whole, with all its species and landscapes, is the highest value - such an evaluation of the clever but excessively troublemaking species of man is highly problematic. Even the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra,[110] though in a specific context,[111] questions the intuitive distinction between killing a man and killing an animal by pointing out that both of them equally love life and fear death. And according to the same Sūtra *icchantikas*, i.e. people utterly adverse to the Buddhist Doctrine, are spiritually inferior even to animals, and therefore killing an *icchantika* is less grave than killing an animal, nay, even no bad karma at all, just like digging the earth, mowing grass, felling a tree or cutting a corpse to pieces.[112] Doubtless a dangerous doctrine; but nowadays it may not be easy to resist the temptation to envisage people who ruthlessly and stubbornly continue destroying the environment as a kind of "environmental *icchantikas*".

In some of the above-mentioned sources,[113] one person is killed in order to save a large number of people. Though in these sources themselves this quantitative aspect is not expressly used to justify the killing, it is understood so in the Far Eastern tradition (殺多生 : "one being killed, many stay alive").[114] This principle would lend itself to justifying (medically serious) animal tests (but why not also tests on humans?). It would, however, surely not lend itself to justifying environmental destruction and pollution, where the animals killed by far outnumber the human lives saved - let alone the fact that the motive is often not saving people's lives but rather money or luxury, and the fact that many forms of environmental destruction and pollution, as, e.g., the destruction of most tropical rain forests, yield only short-time relief and will in the end certainly cost even more human lives than those which, if any, were saved by them in the beginning.

Another idea worth mentioning in this connection is the Tantric view, prefigurated in the Madhyamaka tradition[115] and shared by some schools of Far Eastern Buddhism like Tendai,[116] that from the highest standpoint there is no distinction between good and bad, between keeping the precepts and breaking them,[117] and that the perfect saint is not stained[118] even by killing people[119] or animals[120]. Such a view, if secularized,[121]

is doubtless likely to reduce inhibitions with regard to killing, especially killing animals.

But there are other aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism which may have had much more influence on the attitude of the masses towards nature than such primarily theoretical or esoteric ideas. One of them appears to be the idea that bad karma like having killed an animal is easily annulled[122] by worshipping or merely evoking a Buddha or his name,[123] or by muttering *dhāraṇīs*[124] or performing ceremonies of atonement.[125]

Such an idea, which is, as far as I can see, alien to early Buddhism, may, to be sure, relieve the mind of persons who, like peasants or fishermen, have no chance to avoid killing animals. But at the same time it may lead to reduce inhibitions to the extent of rendering the very precept not to kill animals virtually ineffectual; the more so when for common lay people Buddhism is, as it seems to be the case in the Far East, largely reduced to ceremonies.

VII.

On the other hand, Far Eastern Mahāyāna and Mantrayāna Buddhism also seem to provide a kind of ontological or rather "buddhological" basis for a positive view of nature. Its starting point is the doctrine of *tathāgatagarbha*, of all sentient beings possessing, from the very outset, Buddhahood in a hidden form or as a latent disposition. This Buddha-Nature of living beings is equated with the all-pervasive true essence of all dharmas, *tathatā* or *dharmatā*.[126] From this (among other reasons), Chinese masters developed the view that hence Buddha-Nature, too, must, like the *dharmatā*, also be present in the insentient, i.e. in plants and even in earth or stones.[127]

This does not necessarily mean that plants or even stones can actually become Buddha. For this is usually taken to imply that they are sentient, i.e., have some form of mind - an idea rejected even by some of the masters who accept the presence of Buddha-Nature in the insentient.[128] But other masters, especially in Japan, accepted the idea that even the so-called insentient, as, e.g., plants, do have some form of mind[129] and hence may actually become Buddhas.[130]

One of these masters is Kūkai (774-835)[131], for whom matter and mind are always interconnected.[132] According to Kūkai, the world, including nature, is identical with, or a manifestation of, the Buddha's *dharmakāya*.[133] Hence, plants, e.g., are already Buddha, actually, as they stand, although for want of the Buddha-eye we do not see them as such but only in their coarse form of plants.[134]

For the Tendai master Chūjin (1065-1138), too, plants are awakened to Buddhahood just as they stand. There is no need for them to display the thirty-two marks: in their actual form itself, i.e., by having roots, stems, branches and leaves, each in its own way has Buddhahood.[135] According to the American Japanologist William LaFleur, this view of taking plants as they are to have actual Buddhahood means to attribute religious meaning and value to the natural world.[136] And he goes on to show how nature judged thus is even experienced as soteric, as leading to release, in the poems of the monk-poet Saigyō (1118-1190): Plants and other forms of nature, by revealing themselves as being in harmony with the *dharmatā*, "are to man as a 'master' or

demonstrator of the way".[137]

Such a position would seem to be an excellent basis for environmental ethics. Of course, there was, at that time, no such disastrous destruction and pollution of the environment as today, and hence no comparable awareness of this issue, but one would still expect some practical consequences. In fact, an Indian *tathāgatagarbha* text[138] concludes from the presence of latent or potential Buddhahood in all living beings, here not including plants but at least animals,[139] that they all have to be treated with the same respect (*gaurava*) as the Buddha. And as Seyfort Ruegg[140] has pointed out, there is a connection between the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine and vegetarianism. Thus, it would be interesting to see what practical consequences were drawn from the view that Buddhahood is also present in the insentient.

Actually Chūjin, in connection with the Buddhahood and sentiency of plants, does raise the argument that, if plants are sentient beings, cutting them would - contrary to the usual Buddhist view[141] - be an act of killing.[142] But this idea is discarded by him by pointing out that the view that plants are endowed with mind belongs to the ultimate standpoint, and that from this standpoint good and bad, or observing the precepts and breaking them, are not different.[143] This wholesale rejection of practical consequences is no doubt unsatisfactory from the point of view of environmental ethics.

Another problem arises from the equation of Buddha-Nature with the true nature of all dharmas. For this equation would clearly seem to imply that not only forms of nature but also the products of civilization possess Buddha-Nature. In fact, the texts sometimes do mention, in this connection, walls and tiles;[144] but why not also stinking cars, industrial sewage, or nuclear bombs? If Buddha-Nature is equated with mere impermanence, as seems to be the case in Dōgen,[145] this consequence poses no problems, but the principle of Buddha-Nature would not be useful for establishing environmental ethics either. Deriving environmental ethics from the idea of the presence of Buddha-Nature not only in animals but also in the so-called insentient presupposes that the presence of Buddha-Nature, or at least its full or essentially unspoilt presence, is somehow limited to *natural* things and beings, and at any rate *not* admitted for destructive or *pollutive* elements of civilization. This may, to be sure, run counter to the fundamental intention of at least part of the tradition concerned. But according to LaFleur, Saigyō, indeed, seems to have had some limitation of this kind in mind,[146] and Ryōgen may have tended towards limiting Buddhahood to plants since what he expressly states to be sentient is only plants (but not stones, walls, etc.).[147]

In any case, respect for and protection of plants and other "insentient" forms of nature would have to be, somehow, reconciled with the necessity to live on them. This could be achieved either by according plants merely some rudimentary degree of sentiency, compatible with cautious use, or by simply by accepting the inevitability of (direct or at any rate indirect) killing for sustaining one's life, but still acknowledging its evil character and therefore trying to reduce it to a minimum and to compensate for it as far as possible. Mental or ritual acts of excuse can, as in the case of killing animals, serve the purpose of cultivating awareness and may thus help to keep inhibitions alive, but one must prevent them from becoming more or less automatic means of atonement

since such a development easily leads to a weakening or even to the entire break-down of inhibitions and thus opens the way for ruthless exploitation of nature.

Let me conclude with an (abbreviated) quotation from the booklet "Tree of Life",[148] published by the Buddhist Perception of Nature Project. There, the Buddhist scholar Nay Htun remarks, virtually appealing, respectively, to the traditional Buddhist attitude, to the Taoist or traditional Japanese one (and also that of the Buddhist hermit), and to the better version of the anthropocentric Western attitude:

> "Compassion ... toward all living beings, ... harmony with nature ..., (and) responsible stewardship of nature for the benefit of present and future generations ... - these are some of the ... attitudes ... to be strengthened."

Let us hope that in the year 2000 we will, in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, be fully justified in using the perfect tense "have been strengthened".

POSTSCRIPT

Most issues of this article have been incorporated, in a revised form, into my essay *Buddhism and Nature, The Lecture delivered on the Occasion of the EXPO 1990. An Enlarged Version with Notes*, Tokyo 1991, ISBN 4-906267-23-8. Copies can be obtained gratis from the publisher, i.e. the International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 5-3-23 Toranomon, Minato-ku, Tokyo-105, Japan, by sending three (3) sheets of the coupon-résponse international per copy in order to cover the packing and postal expenses.

NOTES

1. The author wishes to make clear beforehand that in the present paper, though trying his best to be faithful to the historical facts, he deliberately refers traditional views and attitudes to a present-day problem for which they were not originally conceived. He regards this procedure as justified because it is likely that those views and attitudes have contributed to the way Buddhists have reacted, or are reacting, to these problems, and because they, as well as critical reflection on them, may also have a bearing on how Buddhists will react, or act, in the future. The author, moreover, frankly admits his personal concern for the conservation of nature, which he deliberately presupposes as a value, and has not tried to avoid evaluative judgment.

Abbreviations for Pāli texts are those of the Critical Pāli Dictionary. Besides, the following abbreviations are used:

AKBh = Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Vasubandhu), ed. P. Pradhan, Patna 1967.
CMT = Caṇḍamahāroṣaṇatantra, ed. Chr. S. George, New Haven 1974.
EB = Encyclopedia of Buddhism, Colombo 1961-.
LAS = Laṅkāvatārasūtra, ed. B. Nanjio, repr. Kyoto 1956.
MPPU = Mahāprajñāpāramitā-Upadeśa: T vol. 25.
MPSMah = Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra: T vol. 12.
RGV(V) = Ratnagotravibhāga(vṛtti), ed. E. H. Johnston, Patna 1950.
SDPT = Sarvadurgatipariśodhanatantra, ed. T. Skorupski, Delhi 1983.
Śikṣ= Śikṣāsamuccaya (Śántideva), ed. C. Bendall, repr. 's-Gravenhage 1957.
ŚrBh = Śrāvakabhūmi (ascribed to Asaṅga), ed. K. Shukla, Patna 1973.
STTS = Sarvathāgatatattvasaṃgraha, ed. Lokesh Chandra, Delhi 1987.
T = Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (Buddh. Tripiṭaka in Chinese, Taishō ed.).
Vi = (Abhidharma-)Mahā-Vibhāṣā(-śāstra): T vol. 27.
VisM = Visuddhimagga (Buddhaghosa), ed. Warren and Kosambi, Cambridge, Mass. 1950.

2. My personal view is that man is, of course, a product and part of nature (and that there would be no problem if he behaved accordingly), but that he has actually developed in a way comparable to cancer in a body. It is from this point of view that I treat man and his civilization as being opposed to nature.

3. E.g., AKBh 157,22f.

4. E.g., AKBh 157,10 and 22.

5. E.g., Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. J. Ritter, vol. 2 (Basel 1972), pp. 771; 773; 780 (Kant); 798.

6. Rock Edict I B; F-H; III D; IV C; IX G; XI C; Pillar Edict 5 (merely restricting the killing of animals); PE 7 ("Circular Inscr.", line 9-10). See also EB I 290(r) and, for Sri Lanka, Mudagamuwe Maithri Murthi, Das Verhalten der ceylonesischen Buddhisten gegenüber Tieren und Pflanzen (MA thesis, Hamburg 1986), 19ff; for China, cp. EB I 291(r).

7. M. Southwold, Buddhism in Life (Manchester 1983), 7.

8. Cp., e.g., Lily de Silva in: S. J. Samartha and Lynn de Silva (eds.), Man in Nature - Guest or Engineer? (Colombo 1979), 13f; Padmasiri de Silva, ibid., 81 and 85.

9. Maithri Murthi, op. cit. [n. 6], 35ff. Similarly, for traditional Burma, Spiro [see n.19], 45f.

10. Ibid., 21.

11. Ibid., 30f; 34; R. Gombrich, Precept and Practice (Oxford 1971), 261.

12. Maithri Murthi, op. cit. [n. 6], 28; 34.

13. B. J. Terwiel, Through Travellers' Eyes (Bangkok 1989), esp. 255-257.

14. Wolf Donner, Thailand ohne Tempel (^{2}Frankfurt 1989), 101f.

15. Cp., for a more detailed investigation of this kind of problems, the Epilogue in: J. Baird Callicott and Roger T. Ames, Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought (SUNY 1989), 279ff, esp. 283ff.

16. Cp. Gombrich, op. cit. [n. 11], 245; Maithri Murthi, op. cit. [n. 6], 48; cp. also Sn 220cd.

17. For unrestrained use of pesticides in Buddhist countries, cp., e.g., B. J. Terwiel, "The Five Precepts and Ritual in Rural Thailand". In: The Journal of the Siam Society 60.1/1972, 340; Maithri Murthi, op. cit., 49. But cp. also Spiro [see n.19], 45.

18. Cp. Maithri Murthi, op. cit., 48.

19. I.e. good karma which is so strong that its maturation postpones or modifies the maturation of the bad karma (cp. the *upapīḷaka* and *upaghātaka kamma* of VisM XIX.16). Cp. also Melford E. Spiro, Buddhism and Society (Berkeley & Los Angeles ^{2}1982), 119f.

20. Gombrich, op. cit [n. 11], 256f; T. O. Ling, Buddhist Factors in Population Growth and Control, in: *Population Studies* 23.1/1969, 58.

21. Gombrich, op. cit., 257. Cp. Sp 864 (on Pāc. 61)

22. Ibid., 262 (but cp. Maithri Murthi, op. cit. [n. 6], 43ff); Terwiel 1972 [see n. 17], 340.

23. See my paper "On the Status of Plants in Earliest Buddhism" in this volume.

24. Terwiel 1972 [see n. 17], 340. For a very bad though probably exceptional example from Sri Lanka see Maithri Murthi, op. cit [n. 6], 61. As for playing down indirect killing, cp. also Terwiel 1989 [see n. 13], 256: "Thai Buddhists have always sheltered behind the idea that the deed of killing was only on the killer's conscience, not on the conscience of those who sent the hunter to kill or who paid for the fisherman's catch."

25. Terwiel 1972, 340f; L. Alsdorf, Beiträge zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien (Mainz 1961) 571; conspicuously greater inhibitions in Sri Lanka: Maithri Murthi, op. cit., 53ff.

26. E.g., SN I 21. According to the explanations of the commentaries, *ahiṃsā* and related expressions

include, among other things, 1. not killing (e.g., Pj II ad 117 (*jīvitā voropeti*) and 247 (*vadha*)); 2. not fettering or confining (*bandha*, Pj II ad Sn 247); 3. not injuring by means of the hands, lumps of earth, sticks, weapons, etc. (ib.; Ud-a 275); 4. not torturing (*pīḷana*, Th-a ad Th 757; cp. VisM I.92 stating that *vihiṃsā* has the sense of *ābādha*, "affliction, pain"); 5. compassion (Pj II ad Sn 292; Dhp-a ad Dhp 261; Sv 982). Cp. also (for Jainism) R. Williams, Jaina Yoga (²Delhi 1983), 64ff, and (for Hinduism) I. Proudfoot, Ahiṃsā and a Mahābhārata Story (Canberra 1987), 1.

27. Cp., e.g., DN I 64: *chedana-vadha-bandhana-...-paṭivirato hoti.*

28. Sn 220d; Th 876.

29. E.g., DN II 28f; Vin III 42; SN I 208 and V 169.

30. Pācittiya 61; Pārājika 3.

31. Vin III 76; cp. James P. MacDermott, Animals and Humans in Early Buddhism, in: Indo-Iranian Journal 32/1989, 272.

32. LAS 252,15ff. Cp. also Manu V.48 and Mahābhārata (crit. ed.) XIII.116.29 (cp. Alsdorf, op. cit. [n. 25], 561).

33. Vin I 237f; MN I 368f.

34. This line of argumentation is also set forth by the Ven. Piyasilo in: The Nearer the Bone, the Sweeter the Meat? (Petaling Jaya 1989), 22f.

35. Vin IV 124.

36. Vin III 79; T vol. 23, 10b29ff (cp. V. Rosen, Der Vinayavibhaṅga zum Bhikṣuprātimokṣa der Sarvāstivādins, Berlin 1959, 56).

37. Against this, we find an all too rigid restriction of responsibility to intended damage at Vin III 86 where killing people by setting fire to a forest is stated to be no offence when unintended, or at Sp 454 where it is stated that when a monk has dug a pitfall for a certain person he incurs no offence if another man falls into it and dies (*aññasmiṃ patitvā mate anāpatti*); cp. also Sp 455f (*manussaṃ odissa khate yakkhādīsu patitvā matesu anāpatti*) and 457 (*odissa kate yaṃ odissa oḍḍito, tato aññesaṃ bandhane anāpatti*). On the other hand, Sp 455f clearly (though within certain limits) stresses responsibility for late consequences, which is an important consideration in the context of environmental issues. A detailed investigation would be interesting but exceeds the limits of this paper.

38. This difficulty is usually overlooked when *ahiṃsā* or *mettā*, etc., are stated to entail an "ecological" behaviour.

39. Cp., e.g., MN I 74f; III 169; Suhṛllekha vs. 89-90; MPPU 156a4 (cp. É. Lamotte, Le Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de Nāgārjuna, II, Louvain 1949, 794); Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya (Peking-Tanjur, sems-tsam, li) 152b6f; Vivṛtagūḍhārthapiṇḍavyākhyā (Peking-Tanjur, sems-tsam, li) 391b7f; EB I, 669(r).

40. H. v. Glasenapp, Der Jainismus (Berlin 1925), 188.

41. Explicitly so, e.g., Medhātithi, Kullūka and Govindarāja ad Manusmṛti XII.77; cp. also P.V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, IV, 153f (implicit evidence only).

42. SN V 353f.

43. Cp., in this connection, M. Palihawadana in: Man in Nature [n. 8], 36, suggesting that conscious tampering with life or doing unnecessary harm to other livings beings entails desensitization of man's finer feelings.

44. Cp., in this connection, my paper "On the Status of Plants in Earliest Buddhism", p. 13 + n. 102.

45. Cp., e.g., Padmasiri de Silva in: Man in Nature [see n. 8], 87f.

46. M. Aris, Man and Nature in the Buddhist Himalayas, in: N.K. Rustomji and Ch. Ramble, Himalayan Environment and Culture (New Delhi 1990), 85f.

47. Cp. also Lily de Silva in: Man in Nature [see n. 8], 12.

48. Cp., e.g., Th 1133; ŚrBh 483,2ff; cp. also A. Bloom, Buddhism, Nature and the Environment, in: The Eastern Buddhist (N.S.) 5.1/1972, 119.

49. Cp. T. Ling in: Man in Nature [see n. 8], 74.

50. Ud VIII.1.

51. Udānavarga (ed. F. Bernhard) VI.10cd: *kāyasya bhedāt ... saṅkhyāṃ nopaiti nirvṛtaḥ*; cp. Sn 1074; MN I 487f; L. Schmithausen, Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī der Yogācārabhūmiḥ (Wien 1969), 48f.

52. Cp. also M. Aris, op. cit [n. 46], 94-99 - Cultivated nature in the sense of groves, parks and gardens (*ārāma*, *uyyāna*, etc.) is a kind of intermediate sphere mostly connected with the domain of civilization (cp., e.g., SN II 106). Cultivated nature is usually not part of *araṇya/arañña*, but from the point of view of Buddhist monks who may stay in both *arañña* and *ārāma*, etc., the distinction may not always be important. - It seems that in the canonical Buddhist texts *vana* is often closely associated with, or part of, *arañña* (cp., e.g., MN I 17; 79; SN I 180; Th 244); but occasionally (e.g., SN I 33; II 106; AN I 35) *vana* has preserved its original closeness to the sphere of civilization (for which cp. J. F. Sprockhoff, "Āraṇyaka and Vānaprastha in der vedischen Literatur", in: Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 25/1981, 31ff and 84).- For the opposition between the inhabited area or the "village" (*grāma*) and the wilderness (*araṇya*) see, e.g., MN I 286; 472f; III 104). Cp. also Ch. Malamoud, "Village et forêt dans l'idéologie brâhmanique", in: Archives Européennes de Sociologie 17.1/1976, 3-20; Sprockhoff, op. cit., 31ff; G.-D. Sontheimer, The *Vana* and the *Kṣetra*, in: G.C. Tripathi / H. Kulke (eds.), Eschmann Memorial Lectures, I (Bhuvaneswar 1978), 117ff, esp. 127ff and 143ff.

53. Cp., e.g., Dhp 99 or SN I 180f (evaluation of *arañña* by ordinary people in contrast to persons free from passions). Even untrained monks or bodhisattvas are afraid of the wilderness: cp. Th 887f; Śikṣ 198,19f.

54. DN I 73 = MN I 276; 378; SN III 108f; Vv 77f; Ratnāvalī I.13a; Sthiramati ad Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra IX.43 (Peking-Tanjur, sems-tsam, mi, 143a4). Cp. also Aris, op. cit. [n. 46], 95. For the Vedic period, cp. W. Rau, Staat und Gesellschaft im Alten Indien nach den Brāhmaṇa-Texten dargestellt (Wiesbaden 1957), 53.

55. See n. 39.

56. MN III 169. Cp. also MPPU 156a4 (Lamotte, op. cit. [n. 39], 794); McDermott, op. cit. [n. 31], 270.

57. Ibid.; cp. also Yogācārabhūmi (ed. Bhattacharya) 87,13f; EB, I, 669(r).

58. Similarly already in the Vedic period: cp. Rau, loc. cit. [n. 54].

59. E.g., DN III 75; AN I 159f; SN II 106. - On the other hand, the Aggaññasutta shows a more sceptical attitude towards civilization, describing its evolution in terms of decadence of morality as well as happiness.

60. Mil 333,2.

61. LAS 155,1; 361,2; cp. Ap 530;

62. Cp. also the comparison, at SN III 109, of Nirvāṇa with a plain (as against unwholesome factors compared to a woody thicket, etc.).

63. Cp. L. Schmithausen, "Buddhismus und Natur", in: R. Panikkar and W. Strolz (eds.), Die Verantwortung des Menschen für eine bewohnbare Welt in Christentum, Hinduismus und Buddhismus (Freiburg 1985), 105-107.

64. Cp. ns. 54 and 58. For a similar attitude in non-Indian post-hunter-gatherer societies, cp., e.g., A. Gebhart-Sayer, "Die Spitze des Bewußtseins" (PhD diss., Tübingen 1987), 102; 110; 285ff (Shipibo-Conibo, Peru); Mark Münzel, Medizinmannwesen und Geistervorstellungen bei den Kamayurá (Alto Xingú, Brasilien) (Wiesbaden 1971), 27f; 99.

65. AN I 35.

66. In the four Nikāyas as well as in the old verse texts of the Khuddakanikāya, most of which are for

monks (and nuns), this attitude towards *araṇya* is by far the dominant one.

67. Dhp 99; SN II 202; AN III 343f; Śikṣ193ff.

68. E.g., MN I 56; 181; 333; Sn 221; 709; VisM II.54. Still, dwelling in the wilderness is not automatically conducive to liberation: cp. AN I 241; 281.

69. E.g., Vin II 183f; MN I 23; SN II 202; VisM II.55.

70. Th 13; 113; 307-310; 1135-1137; Bodhicaryāvatāra VIII.86. Cp., however, also S. Lienhard, "Sur la structure poétique des Theratherīgāthā", in: Journal Asiatique 263/1975, 375ff, esp. 381ff.; Schmithausen, op. cit. [n. 63], 109f.

71. Vi 436b17f.- Cp., in this connection, P. de Silva's suggestion (Man in Nature [see n. 8], 79) that from a general psychological point of view an intact environment is conducive to gentleness and serenity, whereas a polluted and deteriorated one breeds vandalism and aggression.

72. Vi 840b23ff; VisM II.58; ŚrBh 483,2ff.

73. MN I 76f + Ps II 40.

74. Cp., e.g., K. Wenk, Thailändische Miniaturen (Wiesbaden 1965), 25. The matter was kindly brought to my attention by B. J. Terwiel. - It should, however, be borne in mind that nature in this context is more likely of the *ārāma* than of the *arañña* type.

75. Cp., in this connection, the simile at MN I 117 where a man helps a flock of deer in a forest to recover after it had been decimated by another person. To be sure, this is merely a simile, but I for one cannot help feeling some subtle, inexplicit sympathy for the deer and the person who helps them emanating from it.

76. As would seem to be the purpose of MN No. 129 containing the passage indicated in n. 56.

77. EB, I, 668. Cp. also Vin II 161; cp. McDermott, op. cit. [n. 31], 269 and 278 n.7.

78. Trsl. E. Conze, Oxford 1955.

79. Cp. also the nice story in Aris, op. cit. [n. 46], 99.

80. AKBh 241,1.

81. Thus expressly AKBh 240,21+24, discarding, as resulting from misorientation (*moha*), the idea of certain people that killing animals noxious to man (*manuṣyāṇām upaghātakāḥ*) like snakes, scorpions, wasps (*tryambuka*; Yaśomitra 403,9: = *varaṭa*) or (as Yaśomitra and Vi 605c15 add) tigers, etc., as well as animals serving for food is legitimate. Cp. also MPSMah 460a26ff, ascribing, strangely enough, to the Brahmanical *dharma* the idea that killing any amount of noxious or troublesome animals like *ants*, mosquitos, fleas, lice or beasts of prey is no offence. The mention, in the first place, of ants would rather point to the Iranian Magas (cp. Bhāvaviveka, Madhyamakahṛdyakārikā IX.31 + Tarkajvālā: see Sh. Kawasaki, "A Reference to Maga in the Tibetan Translation of the *Tarkajvālā*", in: Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies XXIII.2/1975, (14)ff; cp. also W. Halbfass, Studies in Kumārila and Śaṅkara, Reinbek 1983, 13f); but there may be some contamination with the usual attitude of people whose thought and feeling is not significantly influenced by specific religious or other considerations and inhibitions. And the view described by Vasubandhu hardly differs from this common attitude at all.

82. AN II 72f = Vin II 109f.

83. The effect is clearly regarded as uncertain at Śikṣ 200,15f, but the Bodhisattva is exhorted to be, in case of failure, ready to sacrifice his body to the hungry animals (ibid. 200,16ff).

84. SN II 189f.

85. Cp. A. Wezler, Die wahren "Speiseresteesser" (Mainz/Wiesbaden 1978), 39f.

86. Cp. McDermott, op. cit. [n. 31], 276.

87. Sp 379f. I am, however, not sure that Buddhaghosa is aware of the fact (which seems to form the background of the Vinaya passage itself) that the animal may return to its quarry later on, and that this is what he wants to exclude by *chaḍḍitaṃ*.

88. The first reason is a kind of particular and individualist parallel to the anthropocentric argument for protecting nature, whereas the second one would correspond to arguing for protection of other creatures for their own sake.

89. H. Nakamura, "The Idea of Nature, East and West", in: The Great Ideas Today (Encycl. Britannica, Inc., 1980), 282.

90. Cp. the explicit statements in the (Mahāyāna) *Brahmajālasūtra (T vol. 24, 1004b16ff; cp. EB, I, 290(r); R.K. Heinemann, Der Weg des Übens im ostasiatischen Mahāyāna, Wiesbaden 1979, 121f), or the *Upāsakaśīlasūtra (T vol. 24, 1049a28ff).

91. AKBh 240,20: killing *ātmaparitrāṇāya*, and even *suhṛtparitrāṇāya*, qualified as resulting from greed (*lobha*); AKBh 243,8f: a person conscripted into the army remains unstained by the collective act of killing only if he vows beforehand not to kill even in order to save himself. Cp. Vin I 237: *na ... mayaṃ jīvitahetu pi sañcicca pāṇaṃ jīvitā voropeyyāma*. Cp. also the extreme statements quoted at Sp 768f and 477 prohibiting a monk from cutting a tree that has fallen down upon him or from digging the earth when he has fallen into a pit, even in order to save his life.

92. Cp. Buddhaghosa's criticism (Sp 769) of the argument that a monk is allowed to cut a tree or dig the earth in order to rescue another monk because in this case the motive is not self-love but compassion. Buddhaghosa, though accepting that such kind of help is allowed, still stresses that the reason advanced, viz. the good, unselfish intention, is not sufficient to explain the matter. Cp. also Vin III 86 where exhorting an executioner not to torture the victim but to kill him with one blow is stated to be a *pārājika* offence. To be sure, the passage would be an example of the priority of the precept not to kill over *karuṇā* only if it is justified to assume that the remark of the monk is motivated by compassion. The mere use of the imperative "kill" would then suffice to render the remark a *pārājika*, in spite of the real intention and of the fact that the culprit is going to be killed anyway.

93. AKBh 240,23f; Vi 605c16ff, esp. 20f. Cp. Vin III 79, where even the advice given, out of compassion (*kāruññena*), to a sick person to commit suicide is stated to be a *pārājika* offence; cp. T vol. 23, 10b21ff (Rosen, op. cit. [n. 37], 56). Cp. also Vin III 86 (offering a means for euthanasia to the relatives of a mutilated man is *pārājika*).

94. M. Maithri Murthi, oral communication.

95. Op. cit. [n. 11], 257f.

96. T vol. 22, 9a8-10.

97. For an analogous reasoning with regard to humans cp. P. Demiéville, Le Bouddhisme et la guerre, in: Mélanges publiés par l'Institut des Hautes Études chinoises, I (Paris 1957), 349.

98. On these, A. Wezler, Zur Proklamation religiös-weltanschaulicher Toleranz bei dem indischen Philosophen Jayantabhaṭṭa, in: Saeculum XXVII.4 (1976), 335f; Halbfass, op. cit. [n. 81], 10ff.

99. For a presumable exception in a traditional Vinaya, see above + n. 96.

100. *Sāgaramegha ad Bodhisattvabhūmi 113,18ff (Derge-Tanjur, sems-tsam, yi, 167b3ff). The same holds good, according to *Sāgaramegha, for the Vedic view that the sacrificial victim will go to heaven. Besides, killing in Vedic ritual is based on greed because the sacrificer performs the ritual primarily for the sake of his own attainment of heaven.

101. MPSMah 460a1-3 = 702b3-6 (cp. K. Yamamoto, The Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra (transl.), vol. 2, Tokyo 1974, 393); 383b22ff (Yamamoto, op. cit., vol. 1, Tokyo 1973, 77ff); 434c18-20; SDPT 218,1f; STTS 105,10f; cp. Demiéville, op. cit. [n. 97], 378; D. Snellgrove, Indo-Tibetan Buddhism (London 1987), 175f.

102. Cp. SDPT 218,4 (*kṛpayā*) and 14 (*kṛpayānvitaḥ*); STTS 105,10 (*sarvasattvahitārthāya*), though the logical relation of compassion or other beings' welfare to protecting the Doctrine is not quite clear here; especially in the latter source, they may as well be taken as two different motives. Actually, at MPSMah 383b22ff and 434c18-20, compassion is not mentioned at all. On the other hand, at MPSMah 459c26ff = 702a28ff (cp. Yamamoto, op. cit. [n. 101], vol. 2, 393), the motive for killing the insultor of the

Mahāyāna Doctrine is expressly specified as pity, though not, as one may expect, as pity on the other living beings but as sympathy with the malefactor who is stated to go, to be sure, to hell, but will, due to understanding the reason for this, eventually conceive faith in the Mahāyāna and be reborn in a Buddha's paradise. Cp. also the ritual killing of demons or enemies of religion in Tibetan Buddhism, which too is said to be motivated by compassion and conducive to the liberation of the victim (R.A. Ste in, Le *liṅga* des danses masquées lamaïques et la théorie des âmes, in: Sino-Indian Studies 5/1957, 200ff, esp. 202ff and 219ff).

103. Bodhisattvabhūmi (ed. N. Dutt) 113,18ff; Mahāyānasaṃgraha VI.5.1 and comm.; Śikṣ168,1; cp. also the more complicated situation in T No. 156 (vol. 3, 161b15ff, esp. 29ff.); Demiéville, op. cit. [n. 97], 379f. - Contrast with this the statement (not entirely parallel, it is true) of the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins (T vol. 23, 10b2ff; Rosen, op. cit. [n. 37], 56) that it is a *pārājika* offence when a monk persuades hunters, fishermen or other professional evil-doers to commit suicide in order to prevent them from further wrongdoing.

104. SDPT 218,3f; cp. also STTS 105,10f; Snellgrove, op. cit. [n. 101], 175f.

105. See n. 81.

106. BoBh (Dutt) 113,20.

107. Ibid., 113,19f.

108. MPSMah 460b5ff (Yamamoto, op. cit. [n. 101], vol. 2, 394f) ; cp. also Mochizuki, Bukkyō-Daijiten, 2932f; T. O. Ling, op. cit. [n. 20], 58.

109. See n. 89.

110. MPSMah 484b5f = 727b23f (Yamamoto, op. cit. [n. 101], vol. 2, 491).

111. Viz. relieving the king Ajātaśatru of his qualms for having killed his father.

112. MPSMah 460b15ff (Yamamoto, op. cit. [n. 101], vol. 2, 395). Cp. Ming-Wood Liu, The Problem of the *Icchantika* in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, in: Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 7.1/1984, 68.

113. Viz. Bodhisattvabhūmi and T No. 156 (see n. 103).

114. Cp. Demiéville, op. cit. [n. 97], 379; Mochizuki, Bukkyōdaijiten, 2933.

115. Cp., e.g., MPPU 163b10ff; c1ff; 164a19ff (Lamotte, op. cit. [n. 39] 860f; 864).

116. See below (§ VII and n. 143). Cp. also Demiéville, op. cit. [n. 97], 382f.

117. E.g., CMT p. 32, verses 7.18ff; Snellgrove, op. cit. [n. 101], 174-176.

118. E.g., SDPT p. 218,13f (*sarvakṛt sarvabhug vā kiṃ*) *vajrasattvapade sthitaḥ // sidhyate, naiva duṣyeta* ...); cp. Snellgrove, op. cit., 175f.

119. CMT p. 32, verses 7.24 and 7.36; cp. Snellgrove, op. cit., 174.

120. CMT p. 32, verse 7.38. Cp. also T vol. 74, 381b3f.

121. Cp. Śikṣ171,13ff.

122. Though similar practices are current also in Theravāda Buddhist countries, they seem to be interpreted at best as balancing or outweighing bad karma (cp. Spiro, op. cit. [n. 19], 140ff, esp. 157f).

123. Śikṣ173,13ff.

124. Śikṣ172,13ff.

125. Cp., in this connection, e.g., the report on an old Japanese ivory carver, who, after discovering a bullet in a section of ivory and thereby understanding that most ivory stems from elephants killed by poachers, has placed the ivory section with the bullet on the family altar and sprinkles some water on it every day in order to pacify the spirits of the dead elephants (*Time*, No. 42, Oct. 16, 1989, p. 54). To be sure, this need not be a Buddhist ceremony, but it is probably at least one tolerated, if not integrated, by Buddhism.

126. RGVV 21,8.

127. Cp. Y. Sakamoto, On the "Attainment of Buddhahood" by Trees and Plants, in: Y. Sakamoto Rombunshū, II, xviiff; see also ibid., 384ff; Sh. Miyamoto, On the Cultural Meaning of the Buddhist Motto "Earth, Herbs, and Trees, All attain Buddhahood" and its Author (in Japanese), in: Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 9.2/1961, 672ff; Sh. Kamata, Chūgoku Kegon shisōshi no kenkyū (1965), 434ff; W. LaFleur, Saigyō and the Buddhist value of nature (in: Hist. of Religions 13.2/1973, 93ff, and 13.3/1974, 227ff) 94ff; John Jorgensen, "Sensibility of the Insensible: A Ch'an Poetic Genealogy" (unpublished PhD diss., Canberra), Introd.

128. E.g., Chi-ts'ang (549-623), T vol. 45, 40c23ff (Sakamoto, op. cit. [n. 127], xvii); Ch'êng-kuan (737-838), T vol. 36, 280a23ff, etc. (Kamata, op. cit. [n. 127], 447ff); Shōshin (†1204?), acc. to Sakamoto, op. cit., xx, and Miyamoto, op. cit. [n. 127], 682.

129. Cp., e.g., Annen (841?-?), T vol. 75, 487a26ff; Ryōgen, Sōmoku hosshin shugyō jōbutsu ki, in: Dainihon bukkyō zensho, 1971, vol. 41, 142a10; 1978, vol. 24, 346b10.

130. Annen, T vol 75, 487c19ff.

131. Dates (except Saigyō's) according to Hôbôgirin, Fascicule Annexe (1978).

132. Sakamoto, op. cit. [n. 127], xviii; LaFleur, op. cit. [n. 127], 99; Miranda Shaw, Nature in Dōgen's Philosophy and Poetry, in: The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 8.2/1985, 115f.

133. LaFleur, op. cit., 98f; Shaw, op. cit., 116.

134. LaFleur, op. cit., 98-100.

135. T vol. 74, 380b5f; LaFleur, op. cit., 104ff.

136. LaFleur, op. cit., 110.

137. LaFleur, op. cit., 245.

138. RGV I.(157+)166.

139. RGV I.119.

140. D. Seyfort Ruegg, Ahiṃsā and Vegetarianism in the History of Buddhism, in: Buddhist Studies on Honour of Walpola Rahula, ed. Somaratna Balasooriya et al. (1980), 236ff.

141. Cp. § VI + n. 112.

142. T vol. 74, 381a22f; cp. also T vol. 51, 438b3ff and b12ff.

143. T vol. 74, 381a23ff.

144. E.g., T vol. 36, 280b1f (Kamata, op cit. [n. 127], 449); T vol. 85, 1289b8f (Kamata, 438); the reason for mentioning walls, tiles, etc., is, of course, MPSMah 581a22f where the presence of Buddha-Nature in insentient things like walls, tiles and stones is denied.- Cp. also extreme statements like the Ch'an master Yün-mên's equation of the Buddha with a dried up shit-stick (T vol. 48, 295c6).

145. Shaw, op. cit. [n. 132], 117ff; Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism (London and New York 1989), 115.

146. LaFleur, op. cit. [n. 127], 237ff, esp. 239.

147. LaFleur, op. cit., 103f. But cp. Sōmoku ... [see n. 129] (1978), 345b16ff (stating that *all dharmas* have and realize Buddhahood!).

148. ed. Shann Davies (1987), 29.

16

Buddhism, Science and Technology

Prof. Jacques Martin

It is from the historical emergence of the coupling of science and technology and its growing emphasis since the seventeenth century, that one can explain the tremendous hold of science and technology over today's individual. Techno-science seems to be developing blindly without our realising it, like an autonomous system that is developing its own rules in accordance with its own dynamics, as would a biological self-organising system. The natural sphere has gradually been replaced by the technological sphere in which man deploys his activities through mediating systems born of his own constructive activities and his biological legacy. In short, human beings themselves appear with the collapse of the regulations underlying ordinary biological life - in a social environment shaped by the evolution of technology and science and are marked by the emergence of new desires and new needs. Whatever the degree of socialisation of the individual, he is submitted more or less consciously to the numerous influences of the rational way of thinking, either in the huge technological networks where work is performed and leisure activities are organised or through the incresing hold of computerisation. What is the relevance nowadays of the Buddhist approach to existence in a world where such patterns develop? How can we imagine the link between technological reality and the Buddhist view of existence? What answers can Buddhism provide faced with the negative effects on the individual of the blind development of technology? The main purpose of this paper will be to make an attempt at answering these questions, by trying to express innovative views through a pluridisciplinary approach.

The end of the twentieth century is characterized by the extraordinary explosion of science and technology, namely of the means of communication and information linked to the development of electronics, computer science and data processing.Technology is generally considered as utilitarian, instrumental, that is to say that tools are regarded as a set of means meant to control the environment and to satisfy various needs and desires. According to this approach, the scientific and technological improvements of the last decades are significant and seem to contribute

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to the well-being of humanity. Nevertheless, this is only true at a short-term and relative level.

Indeed, the familiarity of this technological environment conceals something much more important: the fact that the technological sphere reacts according to its own internal rules and that man is the instrument of technological development. The various forms of knowledge, resulting from the hold of rationality, and from the handling of power and their retro-active effects on individuals and society bring about new desires, new needs and numerous negative effects. Today's most urgent task is to destroy the deep opacity of the technological sphere in order to set up regulations and to examine its feasibility and respectability conditions. The two main lines of this paper will be a brief analysis of the conditions that led to the present tecnological world and the effect of science and technology upon man and society and the regulations with which Buddhism can provide modernity.

THE CONDITIONS LEADING TO TODAY'S TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD

We shall try to define the technological sphere by briefly referring to history and by using a systemic approach of science and technology. First, one has to distinguish science from technology. Indeed, originally technology was not related to science. Technology is very ancient and already existed in the Neolithic Age. Tools can be regarded as the continuation of man's organs aiming at appropriating the necessary elements for his survival and for his protection from nature.

As for science, it has developed from Greek rationality. Introduced by Thales de Millet in the sixth century (B.C.), it allowed the development of other fields of knowledge in a unique way in human history. In Greece, science was considered as objective knowledge, without any connections with the various crafts based on empirism, transmitted in a traditional way. The western Middle Ages was a fully active period as regards technology, but there were few contacts with science, especially mathematics, which remained very abstract. At the beginning of the fifteenth century a new kind of occupation appeared in Europe, that of the engineer - clearly different from that of the craftsman: a person for whom 'to invent' is better than 'to imitate his ancestors'. The engineer wants to be inventive and wishes technology to benefit from science.

When at the turning point of the seventeenth century Galileo, who can be regarded as the father of western science, combined the mathematical language, namely the idea of law and scientific experimentation, the qualitative aspect of Greek science from the very beginning was replaced by a quantitative description. Simultaneously, the division between the scientific world and the technological world subsided, namely because scientists had to call on technicians for the building of sensorial multipliers (e.g. the appearance between 1610 and 1630 of the first microscope and Galileo's telescope). Thus, at the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century, mathematics combined with physics, and physics started to take an interest in technology. One could witness the setting up of conceptual architecture and the birth of an ideology of material progress which are the foundations of modern society.

The industrial revolution, that took place in England in the middle of the eighteenth century and although somewhat later in other European countries, brought about a new technological system characterized by three new major components: steel replaced wood in the building of machines (namely in the textile industry); coal used in the steel and iron industry replaced wood; and the steam machine partly replaced other powered machinery. The various technologies were getting more and more inter-dependent and science and technology started to be connected.

The history of the setting up of the technological system of modern times began with a second industrial revolution during the period from the second half of the nineteenth century until the eve of the First World War. The next decades witnessed a growing inter-dependence between the various technologies and an intensification of the coupling of science and technology. All this led to the contemporary technological system with its new sources of energy, (namely, nuclear energy), with the evolution of new materials (alloys, plastics, composite materials and so forth), and the emergence of electronics, computer science, automation and data-processing.

Having referred to various periods of scientific and technological development, the beginning of a technological system of humankind, the period of Greek science an Greek technology, the setting up of a technological society in the seventeenth century and techno-scientific modernity, we are now going to try and find out what techno-science conceals and to try to destroy the deep opacity of the technological sphere through a 'systemic' approach. A 'systemic' approach seems to account more accurately for reality than would an atomic approach reducing facts.The theory of system can be applied to any field of knowledge: from the science of nature to social science; from social science to economics; and is to a certain extent a reaction against the way science is used to explain observable phenomena by reducing them to basic non-interdependent units. A system can be defined as a set of elements related to one another so that the evolution of one element leads to the evolution of the whole, and so that any modif-ication of the whole has an effect on each element. Moreover, a system can be defined as an organized whole made up of inter-acting elements. This whole is within an environment and is developing in the 'time' of the environment.

One can easily put the systemic nature of technology in a quite prominent position. The systemic nature of technology is quite obvious for there is a relationship between the various technological means and the various kinds of technologies. Furthermore, examining its dynamics of growth, technology has managed to develop continuously in spite of regressions, local stagnations in order to reach the sudden expansion we witness now. This common feature of all kinds of new technologies implies the existence both of a relative independence and of a tendency to autonomy, namely because of the coupling of technology and science and the intervention of computer science. An accurate account proving that techno-science is a system working according to its own rules in the same way as a biological, economical or ecological system would be irrelevant here.

In conclusion to the first part; in order to try and find out what is hidden behind the technological environment which is developing very rapidly and is now affecting all

countries, I suggested that we should look back briefly to the history and the development of science and technology. Next, I outlined a systemic approach, asserting that the various technologies acted like biological beings, economic or physical entities and I emphasised the tendency for autonomy of the technological system. In short, I wanted to point out that technology is not neutral, that it has an independent organisation regardless of man and beating him as it is in the case of bio-technologies and other fields which do less to appeal to the media. It seems that man himself, through his clear-mindedness and his material and psychological independence on technology, will create the necessary regulations to modernity.

BUDDHISM AND MODERNITY

Buddhist Rationality

Let us now discuss the second point concerning the effect of science and technology upon today's man and the answers Buddhism can provide. The process of becoming more human occured through symbolic and institutional mediations which brought about exchanges between Man and his background, namely his natural and social environments. Today we witness the striking fact that the technological environment, that can be called the 'technological sphere', tends to be superimposed over the natural and social environments. Although these two environments exist, their power has decreased compared with the power of the technological sphere whose influence on the destiny of the world is increasing. Modern Man is surrounded by technological objects, either those man has been familiar with for centuries (such as knives, forks etc. ...) or those that have only appeared during the last few decades (such as calculators, cars, lifts, television sets, radio sets, telephones, computers, micro-amplifiers and so on). Technological means form a screen of immediate means and cannot be dissociated from ourselves or from our destiny, means which are directly connected with the way we fit into the world. The familiarity with technology through the setting-up of large computerized technological networks in factories, offices and large areas of leisure activities of a technological nature, is the main reason for the widespread development of what can be called "operating rationality".

It is at this stage that the first point of convergence between Buddhism and modernity can be detected. Buddhism, in its intellectual approach, as far as relative truth is concerned, has provided a rational, analytical and linear approach that encourages adherents to examine the contents of teachings through direct observations and experiences. Concentration and meditation practices, being the heart of Buddhism, also refer to rational structures with internal logical codes characterized by their accuracy. Furthermore, there are permanent features in all meditation experiences, points of reference that all practitioners can invariably verify and which are described in detail in the scriptures. This rational as well as the empirical method is quite in accordance with scientific methodology at basic level of research. However, one has to rely on the differences and, at the epistemological level, Buddhism and science differ in many respects.

The rationality imposed by the technological sphere is an operating process and the significant development of computer science and automation, partly sprung from

cybernetics and Bolle's binary system in algebra, is compelling today's man to think and act so that he continuously communicates in terms of "yes or no" , which characterizes Bolle's mathematics. Although at the basic level there is no division between Buddhist rationality and operating rationality, it might become more difficult, when talking to computers, to distance oneself and to think things over. Eventually, and in spite of these restrictions, we can admit that at a rational level, Buddhism combines with techno-scientific modernity quite well at a rational level. It is thanks to the techniques of analysis and intuition advocated by Buddhism that operating rationality can be turned into self-knowledge instead of getting alienating. That will be one of the first contributions Buddhism can make to modernity.

Dependent Phenomena

The other point of convergence concerns the principle of causality underlying all phenomena to which Buddhism adheres. This is also a basic principle of science, whether it be Cartesian causality, quantum causality or cybernetical causality. Buddhism supports this theory, at both material and a psychological levels. Again, the Buddhist view of relative reality combines well with modern mentality quite well. The inter-dependence of all phenomena as described in the theory of Dependent Origination, the ontological relationship between the world and consciousness, the relativity of any dualistic approach, is somewhat related to the fundamental principles of Buddhism to present-day physics. Indeed, the history of scientific research of the twentieth century, namely with quantum mechanics, reveals a basic notion that destroys any hope of objective knowledge: that between observed phenomenon and the observer develops an exchange, a link that modifies the observed object as if the latter did not exist in itself but only as an object of observation.

The systemic approach, aims to prove that reality is a system of organized and inter-dependent elements, but beyond this point of agreement at an intellectual level between Buddhism and modern Science (quantum mechanics and system theory), it is quite obvious that the technological sphere is trapped in the huge network of communication/information means which are computerized and in which everything is inter-dependent. Thus, at the level of knowledge as well as at the concrete level of the technological sphere, Buddhism and modernity agree about the inter-dependence of phenomena.

Buddhism goes further by asserting in a relative approach that the inter-dependence of phenomena is the cause of their emptiness and of their lack of intrinsic existence. Considering the fact that all phenomena born of causes and conditions only exist in dependence on other phenomena, Buddhism claims that they have no intrinsic existence and that they are empty by nature.This approach was developed by the Madhyamaka school of the Mahāyāna tradition founded by Nāgārjuna and the Yogācāra School as well. This provides a good example of the capability of Buddhism to regenerate Man caught in the technological sphere, by developing his wisdom.

Let us come back to the technological background, which as has been said previously is a world made up of artificial objects leading modern man to an existence of pseudo-reality in which he remains an onlooker and endures passively the dictates

of the technological sphere, as well as the level of sounds, images and lights because, the level of transportation, communication and information are of unequalled power and swiftness. This technological environment constitutes a new aspect of conventional reality which the five senses and the sixth, thought, have to face continuously that seems as real as the natural environment itself.

Material Desires

Buddha, by explaining the theory of Dependent Origination, pointed out that the cause of suffering is ignorance, the fundamental ignorance that regards phenomena as existing intrinsically and permanently. Science and technology tend to confine modern man to the opposite belief by emphasizing the delusion of a tangible world with indestructible objects created by reason, dependent only upon the unerring 'law of techno-scientific causality'. However, as things cannot work out according to the wishes and beliefs of modernity, Buddhism proposes a more realistic view of existence, beyond the illusory world of puerile certainties which lead to the tragedies: *anicca*, *anatta* and *dukkha*.

The technological world, by building an artificial sphere apparently only subjected to human law, can even seem to overshadow death, but must eventually be overcome by a trail of miseries at the unescapable moment. Buddhism by contrast, recommends Realism, and invites us to face death in order to find out its origin in the three roots of suffering: basic ignorance, desire that attracts and hatred that repels. Buddhism also claims that a perfect and ultimate liberation from Suffering does exist. All beings do seek happiness and do want to reduce suffering. Modern man wants to be happy, namely by fulfilling his desires. Thus, technology answers the needs and desires which form the essence of the human condition. Furthermore, technology creates new desires, new needs endlessly renewed, insatiable, and leading to inevitable dissatisfaction. Technology is desire-orientated and its matchless ally is advertising. Man is thus continuously harassed and does not enjoy mental peace.

Buddhism does attach importance to the reduction of desires: whereas technology tries to satisfy desires. Buddhism first tries to reduce them through an intellectual approach and through concentration practices and next uproots and transforms them through appropriate methods. Thus, we are faced with man's restlessness and insatiable desires, faced with frustation and great concern, crippled with selfishness linked to desire, and faced with with aggressiveness, hostility, competition, mistrust and sometimes violence. Buddhism answers with a clear and realistic vision of phenomena through the cultivation of calmness.

It has already been said that science and technology tend to be developing in an autonomous way, with their own dynamics, their own rules, their own values, their own meaning of truth. The technological world is not progressing according to an aim: it has its own law. It has freed itself from all limits and considers nothing as unfeasible or forbidden. Therefore it cannot be subjected to any code of ethics, as has been exemplified in the worrying field of the bio-technologies. Buddhism can perhaps, provide a regulation of technological progress by indicating ethical references based on non-attachment, unselfishness and compassion.

Admittedly, starvation and epidemics have disappeared from Europe (but have moved elsewhere), women are freed from the house chores, infant mortality has been almost eradicated, longevity is increasing and educational standards have improved (but the more things one knows, the more commonplace they become, the less one understands them). According to Buddhism, perfect and permanent happiness cannot be achieved from the outside but only through inner development brought about by inner practices, based on a clear understanding of phenomena, on the acceptance of rules of conduct suited to the various temperaments and situations, that have in common the will not to harm other beings, and finally on the experience of methods of concentration and deep insight that enable man to calm and pacify the mind.

CONCLUSION

I wanted to point out through a historical and systemic approach that the whole sphere of technological objects is progressing autonomously. I went on to prove that this technological sphere in which man has to live, forms a screen of means tending to transform him by imposing its own rules and structures. Without wishing to support anti-technological views, which would be in vain, it seems nevertheless necessary and urgent to set up regulations. These regulations, faced with blind technological development, should be set up by man. Thanks to his abilities for independence and clear-mindedness towards the technological sphere, he will be able to find self-regulation with all the retro-active effects on society. Buddhism seems to adjust quite well to technological modernity, namely as concerns rationality, causality and interdependence of phenomena and seems apt to participate in the necessary regulation of modernity.

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17
Buddhism in Europe in the Twenty-First Century

H.E. Dr. Ananda W.P. Guruge

The unique situation of Buddhism in the world today, when it is widely known and admired by the international intelligensia, assures us that Buddhism will not only last, but also thrive in Europe in the coming century. But, in the process, a major transformation will take place and a new form of eclectic Buddhism transcending the current schools and sects is bound to emerge. This will happen as a result of searching for answers to two questions: firstly, how to highlight the integral unity of Buddhism while preserving the conventions and traditions of each school or sect, and secondly; how to explain to non-Buddhist observers in western society that this unity of Buddhism outweighs the visible differences in symbols, rite, ritual and doctrinal emphases. It is necessary that a more refined and universally accepted "common platform" similar to those attempted by Olcott in 1891 and Humphreys in 1945 is worked out during the coming decade. The pressure for this will come from the socio-political imperatives of getting Buddhism recognised by governments in Europe rather than from doctrinal or religious considerations. Challenges which Buddhists will face in Europe relate to three issues: firstly, how to demonstrate that the choice of Buddhism as one's preferred way of life or philosophy is neither an expression of dissent nor a symptom of the primary question of "sharing the common space", will need to be given serious thought, secondly; how the manpower and cultural resources now present in Europe in the form of Asian Buddhist immigrants could be meaningfully utilised, and thirdly; how to cope with the new demand for information, guidance and assistance which will come from Eastern Europe as the process of democratization gives the closed societies of this sub-region greater choice in matters spiritual. The optimism for the future is based on the confidence that Buddhists of Europe have their devotion, dedication and determination as vital resources. It will be a period in which they will need to be more and more self-reliant. Existing national Buddhist organisations as well as their regional umbrella, the Buddhist Union of Europe, will continue to need strengthening. In the process it will be necessary to take stock of numerous resource centres which Europe has developed over the last century. Their potential capacity for service is many times their current coverage. A preliminary stock-taking will need to be followed by an effort to streamline them. Here again, the hitherto unused or underused capacities and resources of the Asian Buddhist immigrants will need to be pressed into service. For this purpose, the

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Asian Buddhists, who now seem to concentrate on their own spiritual needs, will require assistance from European Buddhists to orientate and train themselves linguistically, culturally and pedagogically to work in the European milieu. Finally, it will be vital for European Buddhists to play a more active role in international Buddhist forums such as the World Fellowship of Buddhists.

Whether one dates the preaching of the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta by the Buddha in the Deer Park of Isipatana in modern Sarnath, the first among his many hundreds of sermons over forty-five years, in 598 B.C. or 538 B.C., our topic could more appropriately have been re-worded as 'Buddhism in its Twenty-seventh Century'! Though antiquity, by itself, is no mark of quality, it is important to remember that Buddhism has existed as a formidable moral force and exerted its benign influence on humanity long before the present era began. It is nevertheless, important in the conventional *fin de siècle* mood of the 1990's that we should convene a cross-section of the international Buddhist community to examine the tasks and the challenges which confront Buddhism in the twenty-first century of the calendar era most widely used in many countries.

Five questions come to my mind as I contemplate the topic 'Buddhism in Europe in the Twenty-first Century': namely, whether Buddhism will last in Europe; the form which Buddhism will take; the sort of new challenges Buddhism will face in Europe; whether Buddhism will have the vigour and flexibility (and the European Buddhist Community have the commitment and resources) to face the new challenges, and; the nature of the immediate tasks to be addressed by the international Buddhist community. It is my intention to examine each of these questions briefly.

FUTURE OF BUDDHISM IN EUROPE

Never before in its long and illustrious history could one have made a more confident and optimistic prognosis of the future of Buddhism. Never before has Buddhism been so widely known among people of different cultures encompassing the universality of the world intelligentsia.

The early decades of the nineteenth century saw Buddhism being studied enthusiastically as a hitherto unknown regional religion within the confines of academia in Europe and North America by its early 'discoverers': the pioneering oriental scholars who were enthralled by the depth and richness of Buddhism's philosophical content and spiritual value-system, and the beauty and diversity of the literature and arts which it promoted in the vast continent of Asia. But the century ended with clear indications that many a seeker of a lasting remedy for human problems of the time, had turned to Buddhism with hope. The exotic plant which was nurtured in the nurseries of academic circles had thus blossomed out and inspired a number of inquirers who either came to the traditionally Buddhist countries or sought teachers and guidance therefrom to pave the way for a new generation of practising Buddhists. A welcome boost was given to the traditional missionary zeal of the

Buddhists and particularly Sri Lanka, Burma (now Myanmar) and Japan responded with missions to bring Buddhism to the doorstep of willing students and adherents in the West. An unmistakeable impact of Buddhism on Western thought, literature and arts was noticeable within decades and many prominent thinkers and writers have not hesitated in voicing their sentiments of admiration and even indebtedness to Buddhism.

The twentieth century began with Buddhism as a widely known, recognized and respected world religion and, for the first half of it, Buddhism ranked the highest in terms of the number of professed adherents in the world. However, in the ideological transformation which took place immediately after the Second World War, Buddhism lost its numerical superiority and in a number of traditionally Buddhist countries, its very existence was threatened. The political changes in China and Indo-China brought about what could be called a veritable Buddhist Diaspora: a dispersal of Buddhists throughout the world in a way no different from the Jewish Diaspora. Today many millions of Chinese, Tibetan, Vietnamese, Kampuchean and Laotian Buddhists have founded thriving institutions throughout the industrialized world and are not only serving their own religious and spiritual needs but also facilitating many spiritual seekers in these countries to study and practice Buddhism in all its rich diversity. Recent events in Sri Lanka have similarly brought several thousands of active Buddhists to these countries. Europe and North America have been the main beneficiaries of this spectacular cultural overflow.

After two centuries, Buddhism is no longer viewed as exotic or strange in any part of the world, even though much confusion does exist as to what Buddhism exactly is. There is, however, a fair understanding of its lofty spiritual message, the wisdom and tolerance which characterize it, the efficacy of meditation as taught in Buddhism and the sincerity and commitment of the Buddhist monks and nuns. No more is anyone who wants to pursue the Buddhist Path of Deliverance obliged to travel thousands of miles to an unfamiliar cultural milieu and master local languages to learn the Doctrine. No major literary language is without a modicum of a well-developed Buddhist literature, which leads the present author to the assertion that the future of Buddhism is indeed most promising for the whole world and especially promising as far as Europe is considered.

But that is not all. The 1980's ended with a spectacular socio-political revolution in Eastern Europe which cannot but have had tremendous repercussions in other parts of the world. Its implications for Buddhism are two-fold. Firstly, a political ideology which admittedly was inimical to religion in general is showing signs of waning and, in the upsurge of religious fervour in hitherto suppressed societies, Buddhism, with its inherent emphasis on freedom and tolerance, is bound to be a beneficiary. The invitation, to begin with, and the successful accomplishment of the annual general sessions of the Buddhist Union of Europe in Hungary in September 1989 are harbingers of future developments. The existence of a core of dedicated and active Buddhists in these countries came even to the Buddhist Union of Europe as a welcome surprise. Secondly, the opening of these hitherto closed societies will enable thinking people to search for spiritual alternatives and in a world of free and open communication, Buddhism has a positive advantage.

In the nineteenth century when religion feared that science and technology would arrogate to it a back seat, Buddhism could face the challenge and emerge victorious. That Buddhism is a friend of science and historically the earliest religious system to propound the scientific method has long been acknowledged. In guaranteeing freedom of thought and action to the individual, Buddhism has an even stronger record and this is what the on-going socio-political revolution is all about. Buddhism more than any other religious system can inspire humanity to promote the freedom of the individual, for it was the Buddha who preached that "One is one's own master".

Not only will the world be more receptive to Buddhism in the twenty-first century but the existing international organization of Buddhist institutions will provide a satisfactory infrastructure for further extension of the influence of Buddhism. There can be no doubt that Buddhism will last, but on the contrary it shows every promise that it will thrive and serve humanity even more effectively than it has done at any time in its twenty-seven centuries of history. This assertion is particularly true as regards Europe.

UNIVERSAL BUDDHISM

The Buddhist Community of Europe today comprises three distinct groups whose co-existence and co-operation would surprise anyone who is not thoroughly conversant with the historical evolution of Buddhist schools and sects. They are :-

A. Adherents to traditional schools or sects such as Theravāda, Mahāyāna (including Ch'ang, Jyōdo, Zen) and Vajrayāna (including Shingon): mainly Asian immigrants and some Europeans who have identified themselves, through training or inclination, with a particular school or sect.

B. Europeans whose in-depth study of comparative Buddhism has resulted in the evolution of eclectic 'new' forms of Buddhist thought and practice: notable among such new forms, sometimes identified by newly coined terms like 'Buddhayana' or 'Triyana', are the eclectic movements of Christmas Humphreys, Venerable Sangharakshita (Friends of the Western Buddhist Order) and Anagārika Lama Govinda (Ārya Maitreya Maṇḍala).

C. Non-sectarian 'seekers' or 'wayfarers' who are particularly attracted to Buddhist meditation or philosophy or even ritual; their affiliation, if any, is not to a particular school or sect or any of the 'new' forms but to the generality of the aspect in which they are interested. Some would not even identify themselves as Buddhists, preferring such descriptions as 'friends' or 'admirers' of Buddhism.

The third Congress of the Buddhist Union of Europe, held in UNESCO, Paris in October 1988 saw the active participation of all these groups in a common endeavour to analyse Buddhism's answers to the major problems affecting the European society today. Symbolic of their diversity in unity was that the opening and closing sessions were marked by an impressive series of different religious ceremonies representing Theravāda, Vietnamese and Chinese Ch'ang, Tibetan and Zen schools. Similarly, the Vesak Celebrations in New York in 1989, where I had the privilege of being invited to deliver the keynote address, commenced with as many as ten inspiring religious ceremonies, each by a different tradition in a variety of languages.

The mutual recognition and the resulting readiness to co-operate has already begun to raise two questions. Firstly, there is the question of how the integral unity of Buddhism can be highlighted while still preserving the traditions and conventions of each sect. Secondly, there is the question of how to convey the unity of Buddhism to non-Buddhist observers in a Western society in spite of the visible differences of symbols, rites & rituals and doctrinal emphases.

I forsee in the coming century a more pronounced effort to find answers to both these questions. The search for a unifying core of doctrines has been for Westerners a long and unresolved one. Henry Steele Olcott's 'Fourteen Fundamental Beliefs' were formulated as far back as 1891 and this did not preclude Christmas Humphreys from developing his 'Twelve Principles of Buddhism' in 1945. Both need to be further refined and, more importantly, adopted by a convincingly representative majority of the international Buddhist community. Such an undertaking would constitute a significant effort towards evolving a form of 'Universal Buddhism'. Not only is the need being widely recognized, but the initial discussions appear to be afoot.

What Europe is looking for is a dynamic personality who could provide the kind of enlightened leadership that a task of such magnitude demands. But from where will such leadership emerge? Until then, can Buddhist communities of Europe command the socio-political recognition which they sorely need from a society that is still confused as to what Buddhism actually is. The urge for evolving a form of 'universal Buddhism' is bound to come from such socio-political imperatives than from doctrinal or religious considerations.

CHALLENGES FOR THE EUROPEAN BUDDHIST COMMUNITY

To my mind, the main challenge for the European Buddhist, is to demonstrate that his choice of a philosophy of life and spiritual practices different from those of his social environment is neither an expression of dissent nor a symptom of aberration. That one has chosen to be a Buddhist out of conviction could only be established by drawing attention to the special features of Buddhism which they have found to be more in line with their spiritual needs in the context of modern society. The question is of how the relevance and applicability of Buddhism to their lives be convincingly demonstrated to the Western society. There is no doubt that Buddhism needs to be better known in Europe. The emphasis laid on inter-religious dialogue in recent times stems from this need.

In the last two centuries, scholars have paid generous encomia to Buddhism and its cultural achievements. In those leisurely days, their works were read and commented upon and learned societies virtually 'propagated' Buddhism even though religious propaganda was not their objective. In today's busy world however, Buddhism in Europe suffers from a communication gap particularly in its reach to socio-political decisionmakers. The Buddhist Union of Europe evolved as its theme for the last Congress the concept of 'sharing the common space'. The Buddhist community of Europe, in its efforts to secure governmental recognition of its identity as well as support for its social and cultural activites has to convince those in power that it has a right to share 'the common space'. This would entail new forms of publicity, utilizing

the most advanced communication technology, on the one hand, and vigorous lobbying using equally sophisticated skills, on the other. This I see as the foremost challenge for the Buddhist community of Europe.

The second challenge is to use to the best possible advantage, the influx of Asian Buddhists into European society. It is clear that the Asian immigrants have brought with them an invaluable cultural heritage along with a well-trained and dedicated Saṅgha. Their readiness to establish sustainable institutions to meet their spiritual and cultural needs has been matched by admirable fund-raising and management capacities. It is also to be noted that they have made the presence of Buddhism in Europe more conspicuous. However, what can it be that prevents a greater degree of co-operation and mutual reinforcement?

There appear to be problems on both sides which must be solved with effort and patience. The European 'seekers' may have to grapple with psychological constraints as well as undefined sanctions before they can get closer to Asian immigrants. At the same time, the latter have to overcome linguistic and cultural barriers to develop more meaningful communication. The need for increased endeavours on both sides will become more acutely felt upon reaching the turn of the twenty-first century.

Another challenge would be the need to cater for ever-increasing numbers of seekers who will demand guidance, information, assistance and encouragement. The process of democratization of Eastern Europe, in particular, is expected to create a demand for which the European Buddhist Community does not appear to be adequately equipped. There is bound to be a massive need for literature, teachers and institutions, all of which would call for a enormous investment in terms of money, materials and manpower. The opening of new areas of influence could entail its own problems particularly in the form of unhealthy rivalry, duplication of effort, wasted resources and unfortunate bickerings. To guard against these, while utilizing all available resources to service new Buddhist communities, will again call for mature leadership and wise guidance.

CAPACITY TO FACE THE CHALLENGES

It will be no exaggeration to say that the Buddhist communities anywhere in the world have nothing more than their devotion, dedication and determination as their vital resources. This statement would apply to the European Buddhist community with even greater emphasis. Their material resources (and definitely their human resources) are indeed very meagre. The challenges the community has to face are too ponderous for it to bear alone. From where, then, will it receive the much-needed succour? As the only way open to it, I see nothing more effective than *self-reliance*. A popular Sinhalese proverb underscores that 'the shade for one's head is one's own hand'! Developing self-reliance in the European Buddhist community is, however, to be attempted through a series of well co-ordinated actions. First in such a series is the strengthening of its national and international organizations. National Buddhist unions, with the Buddhist Union of Europe as its umbrella organization, have been progressively evolving since 1975. They need to be streamlined and some minor difficulties of a legal and procedural nature have yet to be resolved. The minimum

infrastructure is already available, however, and what needs to be done is to mobilize wider participation and co-operation both at the national and at the international level. The fourth International Congress in Berlin in 1992 is awaited with the hope to generate an upsurge if interest and commitment.

The second challenge would be to make greater use of the numerous resource centres which Europe has developed over nearly a century. The present author has observed that every one of them is under-utilized simply because the resources for wider dissemination of their services have been limited. Excellent publications have restricted circulation and reputed scholars and meditation masters can serve only a fraction of a potential clientele. Is this always due to lack of material resources? Could the elimination of overlapping and duplication enhance the coverage of these services? No-one has yet taken stock of the situation because no-one hitherto has seen the need. In fact, we have only very recently succeeded in even collating information on the available resources and facilities in Europe. But the challenges of the twenty-first century, make it obligatory that the streamlining of all available facilities is taken up as a matter of urgency.

Along with these, it appears necessary that hitherto unused or under-used resources and facilities available both in institutions established by Asian immigrant Buddhists and in traditionally Buddhist countries of Asia are pressed into more effective service. These are particularly rich in tradition, literary resources and manpower. These resources and facilities cannot be utilized as they are, until they are oriented to serve the specific requirements of the European Buddhist community. The initiative to give the facilities a new orientation has to come from the European Buddhists, whose needs have to be better articulated. The Asian institutions will in turn need both training and material support to service the European Buddhists. What appears urgent in this case is the early commencement of a dialogue in which the pre-conditions to be fulfilled on both sides are identified.

Last, but not least, the European Buddhist community must begin to play a more active role in international Buddhist forums especially the World Fellowship of Buddhists. I would like more European Buddhist organizations join this world forum. The challenges of the twenty-first century make it more than imperative that the Buddhists the world over unite in order to pool their resources and make their voice heard.

CONCLUSION

What I have said of Buddhism in Europe will no doubt apply to other regions of the world as well. The coming decade is a period for positive action. The international Buddhist community has to be prepared for the tasks it will face in the coming century. With a world where peace is positively 'breaking out' all over and the freedom of the individual is getting increasingly recognized, Buddhism has a vital role to play. Humanity needs the wisdom, the sobriety, the serenity, the tolerance and the purposeful determination which Buddhism is known to generate in no mean measure. As humankind will pursue its search into the next century for freedom from dogma and fundamentalism, from strait-jacketed thinking and intellectual restraint and from

greed, hatred and ignorance, the Noble Teaching of the Buddha will be hailed as beacons of enlightenment and a sources of spiritual inspiration and support. This search has visibly begun in the West and, as an interested and closely-involved observer of the Buddhist scene of Europe, it is my fervent hope that Buddhism will emerge in Europe as a foremost fashioner of the conscience of humanity.

May all beings be happy and contented.

18

The Need for Philological Research in the Field of Buddhist Studies

Dr. Akira Yuyama

Buddhism is no doubt a cultural heritage common to all human beings. It is a religion which never collides with science - the *scientia* that promotes universal human knowledge. Buddhology will thus become one of the most important fields of Asian studies, and after all humanistic science. In order to achieve the goal within the framework of humanistic science in pursuit of Buddhist studies the philological approach will without doubt serve to construct the firm basis. "Buddhist Philology" is not just a branch of humanistic sciences to study *only* the language(s), in which is/are written primary or secondary Buddhist materials. Mastering the language(s) concerned is the prime necessity to carry out philological research in Buddhist studies. Without learning the language(s) one can *never* see the bottom of the hearts of cultures. In my paper I wish to demonstrate the diversity of definitions of "philology" and try to seek what are badly needed in Buddhist studies from the viewpoint of "Buddhist Philology".

On this occasion I shall take the liberty of presenting a paper on philological methods in Buddhist studies. This topic may sound somewhat out of place within the framework of a conference on the future of Buddhism. Some may expect philosophical proposals put forward to the century to come. Others may wish to see doctrinal problems to be questioned and answered for the benefit of generations in the next century.

To me it approves equally important for the future of Buddhism to review the present state of Buddhist research. Without a basis of scientific study Buddhism will never survive into future generations. Furthermore, I wish herewith to demonstrate the importance of philological background in pursuing any aspect of Buddhist studies.

This paper is simply a result of my own self-review carried out in the course of my research work in the rather a narrow field of studies, viz. research in Buddhist Sanskrit literature, which I will name "Buddhist Sanskrit philology".

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Nevertheless, this is still an essay on miscellaneous questions. At the moment I strongly feel the need for establishing a kind of discipline in Buddhist studies, i.e. "Buddhist philology", or "philological studies of Buddhism". This discipline is nothing but "*fundamenta buddhologica*" or "fundamental Buddhology".

Although this represents a serious and delicate issue in the area of Buddhist studies, limitations of space and preparation-time oblige me to cut back my illustrations and references. The readers are therefore kindly requested to exercise their imaginations to my behalf when they see any insufficient arguments with improper words. That is to say: the problems may herein be presented one-sidedly in a way within the framework of the studies in Buddhist Sanskrit literature, in which my special interest lies. I am thus eagerly looking forward to hearing the frank opinions, advice or suggestions of my readers.

DEFINITION OF "PHILOLOGY":

When one looks into the term "philology" carefully, one finds that it has been used to express a variety of delicate nuances, not only by individual scholars but also by those engaged in different disciplines, by those living in different countries with different cultural traditions, and those in different periods of the history of humanities. That is to say, whether conscious or not, the term "philology" has been and is used to indicate different topics within the framework of humanistic studies.

Greeks, Romans and Babylonians: It is clear that term itself has derived from the Greek φιλολογία, "love of language, science of language", i.e. φίλος "fond, loving", plus λόγος "word, language": cf. e.g. German *Philologie*. It was established as a branch of science in the Hellenistic world. The Romans are said to have just passed on this tradition. However, it was the Babylonians who had indeed kept the Greek philology for the European world of "renaissance", or in other words of "humanism". "Philology" in its modern sense was revived in the era of "neo-" humanism in the West. Its history from the Hellenistic world to the present is therefore a long one.

The issue is not that simple, and it may be complicated by the very length of its history. Students in classics certainly have different views from those engaged in modern studies.

The Term "Philology" in translation in other languages: The matter becomes still more complicated when "philology" is translated into non-European languages. For instance, the term was beautifully translated into Japanese from the German as *Bunkengaku* (文獻學) by the famed scholar-poet Bin Ueda (上田敏)(1874-1916). But this has unfortunately misled Japanese scholarship of "philology". The Chinese *Yü-yeh-hsüeh* (語言学) may mean "science (to study) word and/or language", and is thus a much more "linguistics-orientated" field of study, something which may well be explained by the fact that the English have long used the term "philology" in the same way, and it is possibly this which has had an influence upon Chinese scholarly circles.

BACKGROUND SCENES OF DEFINING "PHILOLOGY":

A case in England: A good example may be given in connection with the problem of English spelling, a topic debated by a number of eminent scholars in the years up to 1870 in *The Transactions of the Philological Society of Britain*. They are, among

others, an English 'philologer', Alexander John Ellis, originally Sharpe (1814-1890), an English poet-artist-social theorist William Morris (1834-1896), an English lexicographer, Sir James Augustus Henry Murray (1834-1915), another English 'philologer' Walter William Skeat (1835-1912), an English phonetician Henry Sweet (1845-1912). The English have continued to show a penchant for this kind of discussion, even up to our own times.

Explanations in encyclopædias: In seeking to identify differences in the term "philology" in those countries, which have played a great rôle in promoting this field of study a useful short-cut is provided by looking at some important encyclopædic works. In past decades the tendency in England to distinguish both "linguistics" and "philology" has become rather conspicuous.

"Encyclopædia Britannica": This fact is clearly demonstrated in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. If one consults the article "philology" in its 1962 Edition[1], one reads the following description beginning with:

> "a comprehensive name for the study of language and literature, too wide to be exact and therefore tending to fall into disuse in favour of a clear distinction between literary and linguistic scholarship. ..."

In this edition, the article "philology" occupies a full half column. But, in fact, to our surprise, the next edition, *The New Encyclopædia Britannica* (*in thirty volumes*), in its *Micropædia*, VII (Chicago etc.: Helen Hemingway Benton, 1973-1974), spares a mere dozen lines for "philology":

> "in Britain, an old term for comparative linguistics and historical linguistics, the study of the evolution and interrelations of languages and of language change. In American and continental usage, it usually refers to the study of written texts. Comparative philology, now usually called comparative linguistics, became a significant field of study in the 19th century. The principles and methods of comparative philology were used to establish language families on the basis of linguistic relationships." [2]

Then it refers to relevant entries for further information.

German and French encyclopædias: On the other hand, the *Brockhaus Enzyklopädie* (*in zwanzig Bänden*)[3], and the *Grand Larousse encyclopédique* (*en dix volumes*)[4], spare considerable space for this term. In particular, I was much interested to find that even the *Larousse* admits that the French received influence from both German and English scholarship.

It might be of some interest to have a quick look at the attitude shown by those scholars engaged in modern studies. In Dupré's *Encylopédique du bon français dans l'usage contemporain*, one finds the term "philologie":

> "Quelques termes relatifs, l'étude des langues et que l'on confond fréquemment:
> *Linguistique*: étude scientifique, historique et comparative des langues.
>
> *Philologie*: étude d'une langue au point du vue de la grammaire, de la propriété des termes et de la critique des textes."[5]

They are followed by "Morphologie", "Sémantique", "Onomastique", "Terminologie",

"Phraséologie", "Lexicologie", "Lexicographie" and "Stylistique".

It must now be enough for every one of us to see "definitions" further in such encyclopædic dictionaries, which seem to give no solution after all in the field of Indian and Buddhist studies. It might be more important to see rather the question of misunderstanding the term and therefore the rôle of "philology". This is certainly a warning to me of the dangerous pitfalls involved and an encouragement to reflect on my own method of research.

Slaves named "Philologus": Just by the way, the name Philologus appears in *The Epistle of Saint Paul to the Romans*, XVI.15. Ironically enough, I once read somewhere that the name Philologus at that time was quite commonly used for slaves. I just hope that I do not become an academic slave named "philologist"!

DIFFERENCE OF NUANCE IN PHILOLOGY:

Every scholar believes that there are differences of nuance in philological works in various countries, and particularly in the case of Buddhist studies. However, it is not at all an easy task to describe them. Nevertheless, I must try to do it in the hope that I am not totally mistaken. Basically, it may not invite much controversy to say that no serious "philological work" can be pursued without a strong basic training in the languages concerned. Some examples will be given later on.

North America: In spite of the considerable influence of the British a hundred years ago, North Americans have since tried to distinguish clearly between "linguistics" and "philology". In short, "linguistics" on this Continent has become a "scientific research into language", whereas "philology" has turned to more "literary research" within the framework of "humanities".

France and Germany: With regard to the scholarship of Eugène Burnouf (1801-1852), I strongly feel that he was not just interested in translating as many texts as possible and in describing the history of Indian Buddhism with the help of a great deal of material which was unknown to his contemporaries, but he was, I believe, preparing something 'humanistic' within the framework of 'cultural history'. This has been the starting point of the French School of Indian and Buddhist studies up to this day. Students in the "école française" are no doubt required to undergo rigid language training, but, at the same time, must not fail to attend to the cultural background, whereas German scholarship always stands firmly on logical positivism. As far as the discipline of Buddhist studies is concerned, this positivistic attitude, I think, reveals to us the slightly different nuance in Buddhist philology between the two, even though the German influence on French philology at the time of neo-humanism was never negligible. It is to be remembered that France has admittedly adopted the philology of England and Germany in a rather flexible manner during that era.

THE ROOT OF VARIATION IN "MODERN" PHILOLOGY:

The existence of a variety of definitions of "philology" is a phenomenon that may have a deep root in history. It may well go back to the period around the beginning of the last century, when comparative grammarians were shocked at the discovery that Sanskrit belonged firmly empirical to the European family of languages. It was the

time when the so-called "Indo-European Comparative Grammar" was in the process of formation as a significant branch of science. This new discipline was and has been called "Comparative Philology".

Sir William Jones: The news that was to shock European comparative grammarians came with the inaugural volume of a journal named *Asiatick Researches*, published in Calcutta in 1788, in which was included an article by the founding President of the Asiatic Society of Bengal: Sir William Jones (1746-1794). It was his Presidential Address delivered on the occasion of the Third Anniversary on 2 February 1786:

> "The *Sanscrit* language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure; more perfect than the *Greek*, more copious than the *Latin*, and more exquisitely refined than either; yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, both in roots of verbs, and in the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been produced by accident; so strong, indeed, that no philologer could examine them all three without believing them to have sprung from some common source, which, perhaps, no longer exists. There is a similar reason, though not quite so forcible, for supposing that both the *Gothick* and the *Celtick*, though blended with a very different idiom, has the same origin with the *Sanscrit*; and the old *Persian* might be added to the same family, if this were the place for discussing any question concerning the antiquities of *Persia*.".[6]

Some scholars argue, however, that the influence of Jones been greatly exaggerated. True! There was, for instance, a Florentine-born Jesuit Filippo Sessetti (1540-Goa 1588), who sent a report to Rome on the similarity of Italian and Indic. But, I believe, it was the very Jones who had really made a scientific influence on later scholars like Franz Bopp (1791-1867), who became the father of Indo-European Comparative Grammar. --- In any case, it is noteworthy that Jones uses the word "philologer" here.

AN ACCUMULATION OF INTELLECTUAL ENERGY BROUGHT TO BEAR ON "MODERN PHILOLOGY":

It was very fortunate, or rather perhaps an inevitable development in human intellectual history, that modern Buddhist studies started to be pieced together within the framework of "Orientalism" at the time when the basis of Western classical philology was being established. It is to be remembered that, by that time, i.e. before the period of neo-humanism in the West, an enormous amount of intellectual energy with regard to the cultures of the East had been accumulated.

Athanasius Kircher: In Europe, before William Jones, the notorious Fulda-born German Jesuit Athanasius Kircher (1601-1680) has already made his appearance. Better known to the world of natural science, he brought out the so-called *China Illustrata* in 1667 from Amsterdam. Kircher spent forty-five years in Rome, during which time he only once went abroad - if one may so call it - to the island of Malta. In the meantime he had just waited tirelessly and greedily for reports sent by his fellow Jesuits in the Orient. In this book is found the *Nāgarī*-script printed for the first time in Europe.

Heinrich Roth: This lithograph print was made, as a matter of fact, from the handwritten text by his compatriot colleague, Father Heinrich Roth (1620-Agra 1668), who wrote the first European grammar of the Sanskrit language. This grammar had slept on a shelf of the Vatican for more than two centuries until 1989, when it was photomechanically reprinted in Leiden.

Paulinus a S. Bartholomaeo: The first European grammar of Sanskrit appeared in Rome in 1790 from the pen of the Austrian-born Paulinus a S. Bartholomaeo (1749-1804), who often attacked the "Angli Calcuttenses", including William Jones.

Johannes Grueber and Albert d'Orville: An Austrian, Johannes Grueber (1632-1680), and a Belgian, Albert d'Orville (1621-Agra 1662), were the first Europeans to visit the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, in 1661, from where they made a journey to Kathmandu and then to Agra. Having left Peking on 13 April 1661, they arrived in Lhasa on 8 October. Grueber's meticulous sketch of the Potala Palace was also reproduced for the first time in Kircher's *China Illustrata*. This publication is thus not just "China Illustrata", but rather "Orientalia Illustrata".

Papal envoys to the Empire of the Khans: Needless to say, the Vatican had shown a great interest in the areas dominated by Tibetan Buddhism. The papal envoys were sent to the great Khans of Mongolia as early as in the thirteenth century. Such may well have been the influence of the wide-spread tradition of Prester John's Christian Empire in the East.

After da Gama:- Franceso Orazio della Penna: It goes without saying that information from the East flooded into the West, particularly after the discovery of the Indian route via Cape Hope in 1499 by Vasco da Gama (1469-1524). About half a century after the arrival in Lhasa of Grueber and d'Orville, the Italian Cappuccino, of a Franciscan branch, Father Francesco Orazio della Penna (1680-Paṭnā 1745), spent more than ten years in that capital city, from where he despatched to Rome a number of reports, including a Latin translation of the *Prātimokṣa-sūtra* in Tibetan. This seemingly fiirst European translation of a *Vinaya*- text is now lost, if not in a dormant state on a shelf of the Vatican Library.

Indian and Tibetan alphabets: When another half century had passed, an Italian, Augustino Antonio Giorgi (1711-1797), published in 1762 in Rome the voluminous work *Alphabetum Tibetanum* which was followed, from the publishers, by a number of books on Indian alphabets. They must have been initially made for the use of the missionaries, but certainly agitated the curiosity of intellectuals in Europe.

Other figures in ancient times: Yes, alas, I must stop writing this kind of background history. But I wish here to emphasize, whether one likes it or not, that the knowledge accumulated in this way by the Catholic missionaries sowed the seeds for a variety of fields of Asian contemporary study. Of course, before that, one cannot forget figures like Μεγασθενής (ca. 350-280 B.C.), a friend of Seleukos Nikator and his ambassador to Maurya India, nor Marco Polo of Venice (1254-1324), who contributed a great deal to the 'European' view of the East. So many others have helped introduce the knowledge of the East and promoted its study. I regret that I have not enough space here to indulge myself with a sentimental journey to the history of Indian and Buddhist studies in the West.

IMPORTANT FIGURES IN THE EARLIER STAGES OF MODERN BUDDHIST PHILOLOGY IN THE WEST:

Due to the limited size of this paper I have to miss a number of historical aspects and figures in the field of Buddhist studies. This by no means implies that they are unimportant.

Let me go back in haste to the early period of Buddhist philology at the beginning of the last century. I wish to say a few brief words in order to put this period into perspective:

PALI STUDIES:

Rask and Scandinavian Scholars: One cannot help mentioning the name of a Danish linguist, Rasmus Kristian Rask (1787-1832), who became interested in collecting Pāli materials on the island of Lanka. Copenhagen has thus been a renowned centre of Pāli studies since then. After Rask, there appeared a number of leading scholars in the related field of study in Scandinavian countries, such as Niels Ludvig Westergaard (1815-1878), Viggo Fausbøll (1821-1908), Carl Vilhelm Trenckner (1824-1891), Dines Andersen (1861-1940), Helmer Smith (1882-1956).

In particular, mention must be made of the enormous enterprise, which started under the sponsorship of the Royal Danish Academy, i.e. *A Critical Pāli Dictionary*,[7] begun by Carl Vilhelm Trenckner, and which has continued with the international collaboration until now. This indispensable tool is no doubt one of the greatest achievements of this century in the field of Indian and Buddhist studies. Regrettably, however, this dictionary is thought to be just a lexicographical work on the Buddhist vocabulary by a number of Buddhologists, who are naturally never satisfied with it.

Burnouf and Lassen: In connection with Pāli, it is to be remembered that the Frenck school of Indology has shown a great interest in the Pāli language, beginning with Eugène Burnouf (1801-1852). In collaboration with the Norwegian-born Christian Lassen from Bonn (1800-1876) he brought out the first scientific grammar of Pāli. Burnouf became the second chair-holder of Indology at the Collège de France (1832) and Secretary of the Asiatic Society of Paris (1826). It is an interesting fact that the French school of Indian and Buddhist studies has never neglected Pāli studies since Burnouf.

Rhys Davids and the Pali Text Society (PTS): Here one should not forget to mention London, which has become another great center of Pāli and allied studies since the establishment of the Pali Text Society in 1882 by Thomas William Rhys Davids (1843-1922). A great many Pāli texts and English translations, as well as a dictionary, a concordance and a journal, have appeared from the PTS. With the PTS as their centre Pāli studies have returned to an active rôle in England.

Geiger's standard grammar: Mention must also be made of a Munich scholar, Wilhelm Ludwig Geiger (1856-1943), whose *Pāli Literatur und Sprache*[8] is still a standard reference work for every student in the relevant field of study. It is also to be remembered that the German scholars have always shown a keen interest in Pāli, particularly from the linguistic point of view. It has then contributed to promoting Buddhist studies in general.

Pāli studies after World War II: After World War II, Pāli studies rapidly declined. It is a matter of delight to see Pāli and related studies reviving and coming up in recent years. In a sense, it is quite natural, since the corpus of Pāli literature is another enormous treasure house of Buddhist studies. The keen interest shown by linguists is also remarkable. On the other hand, I cannot help confessing with much regret that Buddhist scholarship in South and Southeast Asian countries has relied too much upon Pāli sources alone. These are *not* the only source materials of Buddhism on the Indian Sub-Continent and elsewhere.

SANSKRIT BUDDHOLOGY: Hodgson and Burnouf:
It was in 1828 when the English Resident in Kathmandu, Brian Houghton Hodgson (1800-1894), who seems, according to some recently uncovered history of his time, to have had a sympathetic feelings towards the people of Nepal, published an article on the languages, religions and literatures of the Himalayan region. It did not escape the attention of serious scholars of the West.

At this, Eugène Burnouf (1801-1852) became really excited to learn of this Buddhist literature written in Sanskrit. After some hesitation, in his capacity as Secretary of the Asiatic Society of Paris, he decided to write to Hodgson on 7 July 1834 to ask for Sanskrit manuscripts. Herewith I quote a small portion of his actual letter, since it vividly conveys his excitement. He says:

> "...j'ai éprouvé une bien grande satisfaction en apprenant que les livres de Buddha (Śákya) existaient en sanscrit..."[9]

In response to Burnouf's request a bunch of Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts despatched by Hodgson were delivered to his hands in Paris in April 1837. Burnouf then immediately started translating these texts. In the meantime he asked Hodgson to send some other manuscripts of the same texts to make his readings more certain. Almost all the French translations made by him were incorporated into his monumental work *Introduction a l'histoire du Buddhisme indien*[10]. This is indeed the beginning of modern Buddhist philology, and at the same time "Buddhist Sanskrit philology" as I call it.

TIBETOLOGY: Csoma and Schmidt: Being deep in the Zanskar mountains, to my surprise, almost at the same time in 1829, the pioneer of Tibetology, Kőrösi Csoma Sándor [Alexander Csoma (de Kőrös)] (1784-1842), had already started exchanging views in correspondence with Hodgson in Kathmandu. In 1832 he informed the West of the existence of the Buddhist Canon in Tibetan with the basic material of the Snar-thaṅ edition.

Incidentally, one cannot forget the name of a Russian scholar, who also had access to materials at first hand. His name was Isaak Jakob Schmidt (1779-1847), who made known of the Sde-dge edition from Sankt-Petersburg in 1845. After him appeared a number of Russian scholars, who never forgot the importance of Buddhist Tibetan materials.

SINOLOGY AND BUDDHOLOGY:

Now, again, it is very gratifying to see how the Sinologists in Paris have always shown a keen interest in Buddhism. The first chair holder at the Collège de France, Jean Pierre Abel-Rémusat (1788-1832), translated for the first time the *Travels* by Fa-hsien (法顯) who went to India in search of Sanskrit manuscripts at the beginning of the fifth century. Though published after his untimely death, this drew people's attention to the East. He was succeeded by Stanislas Julien (1799-1873), a good friend of Burnouf's, who did a great deal of service to Sino-Indian Buddhist studies, when there was no complete Buddhist Tripiṭaka in Paris. In 1857-58 he published the voluminous *Travels* of Hsüan-tsang (玄奘) in French translation. In 1859 his translation of Indian narrative stories appeared, preserved in the Chinese Buddhist Canon. This was the beginning of studies in Buddhist narrative literature. Mention must be made of his contribution to the method of reconstructing Indic sounds transcribed in Chinese (published 1849 and 1861). It was from none other than Julien, that Burnouf learned of the existence of Buddhist scripture in Chinese. As for the Tibetan, he learnt of it in particular from the writings of Csoma and also Schmidt.

SOME PRESENT FEATURES AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES IN BUDDHIST STUDIES:

Area Studies: In about the past half century, a discipline centred in the United States of America, which aims at carrying out research on the culture of a specific area after mastering the language(s) of the region concerned, has made rapid and great progress. There have been a great many achievements particularly after the World War II in such fields as linguistics and cultural anthropology. This method, that of "area studies" has explored a totally new aspect of research, including the field of Buddhist studies, in particular living Buddhism.

It is true, however, that those serious scholars engaged in research through this kind of methodology have recently been reconsidering their approach, yes, reconsidering their method, asking if they have not forgotten to take account also of the diachronical method fostered in the long philological tradition and the historical development of doctrinal background. In addition, they question if their language capability, especially regarding the spoken language(s), has really been good enough, and if perhaps their method should be integrated with philological method.

Co-operation with Jain Studies: On this occasion I wish to add here that another important matter for the future of Buddhist studies is the study of Jainism;, the religion founded by the Mahāvīra, a contemporary of the Buddha. The Canon of this rival religion contains a plenitude of similar expressions and doctrines (as well as dissimilar ones). Such materials will doubtlessly be of great help in understanding Buddhism more precisely. In order to pursue such studies one is required to have a thorough knowledge of Middle Indic languages, of which another standard grammar was given as a boon to us in 1900 by Richard Pischel (1849-1908).

Scientific Embryo of Prākrit Studies: It was for instance Albrecht Weber (1825-1901) of Berlin, as early as 1847, for the first time clearly acknowledged a dialectal development of Indo-Aryan languages. He argued that the Sanskrit and Prākrit ;

languages had a common and simultaneous origin, viz. *Indische Studien*, II:

> "... Communis ergo est et simultanea origi Samskritae linguae et Prâkritarum linguarum...".[11]

It is so pleasing to see the growing number of eminent scholars presently working on Middle Indic languages. Without taking account of their results, one cannot properly continue philological work on Buddhist texts, and thus Buddhism itself.

American School of Indology: Concerning the importance of Middle Indic studies, mention must be made of the American School of Indology, as I call it, which has replanted its crystal-cut research in historical principles, deeply into the soil on the North American Continent. The American School, or rather the Yale School (earlier of Johns Hopkins) of Indology, established by William Dwight Whitney (1827-1894), followed by Maurice Bloomfield (1855-1928), Franklin Edgerton (1885-1963), and then Murray Barnson Emeneau (1904-), have introduced and developed the German spirit of profound scholarship, coupled with a flexibility which has since disappeared from Germany and which has been rejected by the French School for so many years. Everyone prays for the continuation of this American tradition.

Incidentally, with regard to Indian studies in the United States, I cannot skip the name of Charles Rockwell Lanman (1850-1941), of Harvard, who encouraged philological studies of Buddhism from his Chair of Sanskrit, as was attested in 1891 by his launching the *Harvard Oriental Series* with the publication of Āryaśūra's *Jātakamālā*, edited by Johan Henndrik Caspar Kern (1833-1971).

Edgerton and Buddhist Sanskrit philology: The very Yale School produced Franklin Edgerton, who brought out another monumental work of this century in the field of Indian and Buddhist studies, i.e. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar*, *Dictionary*, and *Reader*.[12] Similarly to *A Critical Pāli Dictionary* of Copenhagen, it is also a matter of great regret that many Buddhologists do not see the author's methodology, either grammatically, lexicographically, or text-critically. Without having this judgement, one is not qualified to criticise (or rather to consult) his work.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF "PHILOLOGY":

Examples of pitfalls in philological research: There are those who still think that "philology" is a field of study in the "development of language(s)", in particular within a family or a related group of languages. This misunderstanding may well go back to the early nineteenth century, as we have seen above.

"Pitfall A": Every serious scholar knows very well that there has been and still is a pitfall, in which many students were and are trapped. This is the kind of exegetic study of texts. Students who follow this approach are so particular about unimportant, minor details, or feel compelled to over-refine trifles, with out seeing the texts as a whole. A typical example in East Asia is the pitfall called "exegeses", Sino-Japanese *hsün-ku (chih) hsüeh /kunko-no gaku* (訓詁(之)學).

A more serious problem in such cases is that the practioners think that this tradition must be transmitted without fail from teachers to pupils in succession with no break. In these cases their intellectual horizon become naturally narrower and narrower, generation after generation. This pitfall may be called "pseudo-philology", or rather

"technical hermeneutics". One must bear it in mind that "philology" is never a technical study of literature! Unfortunately, there are still too many scholars who think in that way. Needless to say, these are the same scholars who think that "philology" is a science of secondary importance. It is a science with romanticism!

"Pitfall B": There is a still a more serious pitfall, which is to be found in a work done by a scholar who has already made up his/her own mind about their conclusions before starting to do his/her research. Such a scholar naturally looks only for materials that favour their theory. In many cases such a work looks so firmly established that readers are easily misled, because such a work is often presented very logically with the source materials to prove his/her ready-made theory. However, the materials disproving his/her theory are cunningly neglected. I cannot resist comparing such "research" works with a meaninglessly provocative journalistic article.

Furthermore, there are scholars who present their works just by quoting primary source materials from secondary literature. It is dangerous for readers of such works, who are unable to judge the facts through their trained insight and intuition.

It is frustrating to see that these kinds of works impel some scholars, in particularly those engaged in "doctrinal" aspects of Buddhist literature, to sow critical mistrust of "philological" studies of the same literature, although their criticism does not actually relate to "philology".

"Pitfall C": There is also another extreme view of "philology": some claim that "philology" is a field of work which collates original texts in manuscript form. There is indeed a basic construction work involved in philology. Without it, the building named "philology" will easily collapse. Unfortunately, there are a great number of fragile structures in the area of Buddhist studies as a whole. That is to say: there are too many texts which the editors call "critical" editions of texts! In fact, they are not! There are a number of "critically" edited texts which must be "critically" re-edited on the basis of the manuscript readings! Serious students may easily imagine how dangerous it is to build up their ideas or thoughts from such unreliable texts!

It is to be remembered, however, that work such as editing texts or text-critical research represents one extremely important aspect of "philology", but not the whole of it.

Having experience of such basic construction work will no doubt affect the degree to which students in Buddhist studies develop sharp and deep insight in their future research work. Even if they direct themselves to other disciplines they will still be trained to view the subject from various angles. But, again, those who have a misconception of "philology" do not see this important point.

"Pitfall D": Furthermore,there are other extremists who claim that "philologists" must set forth their arguments and build up their theories only on the basis of "extant" written documents. One must remember that there are a great many texts which have been lost in the course of transmission and tradition. Oral traditions cannot be ignored in a number of cases of philological work.

"Pitfall E": There is indeed a counterpart to those who cite only materials convenient to themselves. These are like extremely particular patients who never allow "philologists" to venture a "working hypothesis". It is naturally dangerous to accumulate

too many hypotheses. On the other hand, it is also a dangerous pitfall for "philologists" to be too cowardly or cautious. They must not lose a flexible attitude towards their work. This kind of flexibility is often fostered by insight, nourished from the neighbouring cultural studies within the framework of humanities.

IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING IN THE RELEVANT LANGUAGES

Indic, Tibetan and Chinese: In the first place it must be made clear that, so long as "Buddhology" is a branch of humanistic studies of Asia, the students in this field should be introduced to classical languages of India, Tibet and China as a minimum requirement.

Japanese (classical and/or modern): If at all possible, the Japanese language should be added to this list in order to make students familiar with the enormous corpus of secondary literature in Japanese, one which is becoming more and more indispensable to the pursuit of Buddhist studies as a whole.

Major and minor languages of Asia: The introduction of other major and minor languages of Asia, either classical or modern, will certainly help not just to promote Buddhist studies within the framework of Asian studies but for humanistic studies as a whole. Buddhist philology is, needless to say, not a discipline to which concentrates solely on the study of the languages concerned. Without knowing these languages, however, one cannot touch deep into the heart of the culture.

Modern European languages: In addition, students should have a reading knowledge of not just English, but French and German as well, from which one can easily extend to other European languages whenever necessary. In this connection, I am reminded of an exquisitely phrased passage by the historian Donald Frederic Lach (1917-) in his enlightening book entitled *Asia in the Making of Europe* :

> "Students of history ... have focussed most of their efforts in recent years upon mastering the languages of Asia necessary to the penetration of the native historical sources. In so doing they have often overlooked the Western materials or have been unable to command the languages of the European sources (especially Latin, Portuguese, and the Dutch). This neglect of the European sources has been particularly noticeable among writers of India and southeast Asia. Historians of south Asia, both Western and natives, have depended too exclusively upon the voluminous materials readily available in English."[13]

This is indeed suggestive. If one replaces the word "historians" by "Buddhologists" and the "European languages" by "French and German" as a minimum at the least, the situation in the field of Buddhist studies is not too much different even today. Students in Buddhist philology should be encouraged *not* to take an easy way to the goal. It is our responsibility, I believe, *not* to let the next generation repeat our own mistakes.

IMPORTANCE OF CHINESE BUDDHIST MATERIALS:

In this context, it is to be much regretted that the importance of the Chinese versions are often neglected from the philological point of view. They, too, represent a great treasury which contains an enormous corpus of literature. In many cases the original Indic texts are now lost. And most of the Chinese versions bear the dates of their

translations, which help us a great deal in pursuing the historical development of texts as well as thoughts.

Once again, however, it must be remembered that a Chinese version is after all a translation. Furthermore, a number of scholars believe that the *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō* (大正新脩大藏經) is the most critically-edited canon. As a matter of fact, it is not. Almost all the texts should be referred to with utmost care. As, needless to say, philologists must always consult other Tripiṭakas, which are better collated, for instance the *Chi-hsia edition* (磧沙/沙版) as an older example, published in the early fourteenth century, and *Dainippon Kōtei Daizōkyō* (大日本校訂大藏經), or in the short*Shukusatsu (Dai)zōkyō* [14](縮刷(大)藏經). But, the *Taishō* ;is so widely used throughout the world, that it is extremely useful to quote it so as to allow every scholar easy access to the cited source material.

In this connection, it is also to be regretted that we have very few critical editions of canonical and extra-canonical texts in Tibetan and Chinese. They are often believed to be texts, which need no further critical treatment. At the same time, it is often thought to be an easy task to read Tibetan and Chinese versions critically. Yes, it sounds easy, but it actually never is!

There have also been a great number of traditional scholars, who are so much versed in the Sino-Japanese source materials that they have never thought of using the original Indic or other versions. Even some scholars who are trained with modern methods, tend to build up their theories on the basis of out-dated methodology transmitted from teacher to pupil for generations.

INDO-TIBETAN BUDDHIST STUDIES

It is now foreseeable that a discipline in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist studies will soon be firmly established. Here, many scholars, tend to rely solely upon the Tibetan source materials, which are indeed a treasure house full of canonical and extra-canonical literature --- both in faithful translation, the originals of which are now lost in Indic, and the original writings in Tibetan by native scholars in Tibet, Bhutan, Mongolia and so on. Among them, one may find a reservoir of Indian Buddhist thought. Some scholars believe, that such Tibetan materials should be treated as primary sources for the study of Indian Buddhism. Some believe further that the Indic original can be restored, or rather reconstructed, with the help of the faithful Tibetan translation(s). A few extremists believe furthermore that only the Tibetan source materials can help us reconstruct Indian Buddhism. One must always have it in mind, however, that a translation is after all a translation, and can never be an original text.

SYSTEMATIC SURVEY OF BUDDHIST LITERATURE

Computerized Data Systems/ CD-ROM Project: There exists an enormous corpus of Buddhist literature. Some serious scholars are now looking at the possibility of making a network of databanks of the Buddhist canonical materials in CD-ROM, in order to enable scholars to further deepen their research. It is an approach which seems to have proved successful in Biblical studies. Let us hope that this kind of enterprise will be set on the right path to ensure smooth international co-operation. One must,

needless to say, not lose all sense of perspective in using this kind of hi-tech method, as wise students are aware.

It is a matter of congratulation that the Dhammakāya Foundation in Bangkok has generously offered their computerized data of the Pāli canon (PTS edition) to the data-bank at the University of California, Berkeley. Scholars will soon be better able to approach this enormous corpus of literature. This is said to be a software designed by Chulalongkorn University and it is expected to reach completion, by December 1994.

It is hoped that such a data-bank will be linked to a world-wide network. Some other centres have also agreed to offer their data to this project. The Tibetan and Chinese Canons will then be stored in such data-banks, for the use of scholars.

Critical Survey of Primary and Secondary Materials: Under present circumstances, research materials - either primary or secondary - are incessantly flooding in. The need for a systematic survey in Buddhist philology has been very strongly felt by all scholars working in the related fields.

The objective of a bibliographical work is to survey a great deposit of literature and to facilitate and foster research into the user's field of interest.

In the field of Buddhist Sanskrit philology, for instance, the prime necessity is to have systematic and critical bibliographies of particular texts or topics, which should provide us with essential information, offering accurate references to original manuscripts, editions, translations, studies and so on.

Needless to say, such information should be accompanied by fair and critical evaluations. It is extremely difficult to know exactly how many manuscripts of a Sanskrit text are preserved to date, where they are kept, who has published editions, translations and studies. In order to tackle this kind of work, a compiler of such surveys must not only be a skilled reference librarian but also competent in the subject matter as well as in a number of languages - both Indic, Tibetan, Chinese and other relevant classical languages, and modern languages (either major European or Asian).

It is a great pity that there are still so many scholars who believe that this kind of survey is just a technical work without requiring deep knowledge in the subject. In fact, there are scholars who offer a bibiographical work just by enumerating the items relating to the subject without any evaluation. This may be better than nothing, but does not foster serious academic works. A good philologist *must* be a good bibliographer, but one who knows, at the same time, that one cannot be perfect.

In this connection, attention may be drawn to a project undertaken in the Göttingen Academy of Sciences: "A Systematic Survey of Buddhist Sanskrit Literature" under the direction of Professor Heinz Bechert. Serious scholars engaged in various fields are invited to lend their skilled hands to a project like this.

BASIC STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN BUDDHIST PHILOLOGY:

Preliminary note:

It is to be noted here that all these following items cannot be done independently of the others. These steps are to be constantly worked out in relation to each other step. Such work is to be carried out precisely with the insight and intuition fostered by trained experience. I must also emphasise here that this is not an appeal for

interdisciplinary training, which can be achieved only after one is fully trained in one's own discipline.

Herewith, I would like to put forward my view of the kind of work which should done by young and promising students in the field of "Buddhist philology". Whatever aspect of Buddhist studies one may direct oneself to, one is strongly recommended or advised to undergo "philological" training when young. It will make a difference, I believe. I am now speaking as a result of my own self-examination. Here, I confine myself to Indic literature of Buddhism in mind.

"Step I": The first step is to decipher a manuscript material. If there are more than one manuscript, the scholar must collate, compare different readings, confirm all the variant readings and then record them. If there are more than a single recension, each recension must be treated separately. - If there are any corruptions, misreadings or miscopyings, lacuna(e) in a manuscript or manuscripts, one must emend them on a certain assured basis. A critical edition of a text must clearly demonstrate through what procedures the emendations have been made.

That is to say the critical apparatuses must be given in order to show the readers how the editor has adopted a reading different from the one found in another manuscript or other manuscripts, In this way, whether or not the reader accepts the reader's reasons for adopting a reading, a reliable text becomes available to scholars.

"Step II": In many cases the editor needs to consult Tibetan and Chinese translations, if any and if available, when emending a reading, or adopting one of the variants. A reading knowledge of Buddhist Tibetan and Chinese is thus indispensable. However, it must also be remembered that all Tibetan and Chinese versions are not necessarily or rather *never* the translations of the Indic text at our disposal: the Tibetan and Chinese versions might be based on an Indic text different from the one before us.

At the same time those who are engaged in textual studies as well as history of ideas must always have it in mind that the Indic originals are not necessarily representing the oldest stage of a certain literature, and that the dates recorded in manuscripts of the original Indic and in Tibetan or Chinese versions do not necessarily indicate the historical sequence. Some texts have two, or possibly three, Indic recensions, and two older and one later Tibetan translations and one much later Chinese translation. And yet, every version represents a different recension. Some texts have two Chinese versions. In most cases, it is fortunate that the dates of translations into Chinese are clearly known. But, again, it does not necessarily tell us the historical sequence. One translation made two centuries before the next one may often represents a later stage of the development of a text. - There are some texts which bear the same title both in the Pāli and Sanskrit languages, and yet the contents are totally different. This can apply in the case of Tibetan and Chinese translations, viz. an Indicized title does not always agree with the Indic text bearing that title.

"Step III": Classical commentaries in Indic, if any, are of great help in editing a text. Here, again, one must remember that a commentator might not have used the same text as the one before our eyes. In critical editorial work on an Indic text, furthermore, all the Tibetan and Chinese versions of the Indian commentaries, are not necessarily of

primary assistance, because, in almost all the cases, we can possibly or probably guess but not perfectly detect which version of a text is the Indic original. Yes, indeed it does sound pessimistic!

"Step IV": In some cases, a "philologist" needs help from a historian of ideas As a matter of fact, we often meet such passages both of grave philological and philosophical questions. Such problems are frequently overlooked by scholars when they look at a text without the required critical apparatuses. And, needless to say, this kind of question is extremely important for those scholars engaged with philosophical development within the text - and within the history of Buddhism in general.

There are some texts, the original Indic of which is now lost or survives only in fragmentary form, but which are nevertheless still to be found in translation - two, or sometimes three, Chinese versions. And, furthermore, one of them has been further translated into Tibetan (from the Chinese), while there is within the Tibetan canon another translation direct from the Indic - And so on and so on! Such complicated situations torture Buddhist "philologists", who are particularly interested in the formation and the development of a certain text or a group of literature. It is thus often impossible to make the stemma of a text - those who are engaged in the history of ideas should also bear this complication more seriously in mind. Unfortunately, it has been somewhat neglected both by philologists and philosophers!

"Step V": This concerns the next step: When an "original" text is critically edited with duly recorded variants - the differences between the recensions are confirmed (in case there are any) - then "philologists" must examine and explain how the changes have been made in the course of transmission of the text - grammatically and/or text-historically. It should be apparent by this point that this procedure must be performed simultaneously with the first step. ---Thus, scholars are required to try to arrive at the most original text, say Ur-Text, which is indeed a more difficult task for philologists.

N.B.: Through such an exhaustive - or cool-headed, cool-hearted - textual criticism, the scholar can move on to the job of textual interpretation: exegetic or hermeneutic. When interpreting a text, one often benefits from the neighbouring fields of studies such as history, archaeology, mythology, folklore and so forth.

CO-EXISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL/DOCTRINAL AND PHILOLOGICAL STUDIES:

In the case of Asia where Buddhism has been predominant for thousands of years, the traditional doctrinal methodology has very firmly established itself, through the reinforcement of its defensive attitude generation after generation. Those scholars have now barricaded themselves behind this conservative method. Whether correct or not from the historical or philological view-points, many of them are stuck to it. Some have begun to realize this, but others are becoming more and more conservative. Some serious scholars are trying, however, to find their way out, i.e. they have to struggle for themselves to find how to co-exist with the purely scientific methodology of research in pursuit of a cultural heritage common to all mankind within the framework of the humanities.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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On various occasions I had lectured on such a topic or subject to the students and scholars in Buddhist and allied fields of research. Recently I dedicated such an essay on philological methods in Buddhist studies to my teacher of Pāli, Professor Kōgen Mizuno at the University of Tokyo, in honour of his eighty-eighth birthday (Tokyo: Shunjū-sha, 1990). Nevertheless, I am still hoping to rethink about these problems from more varied angles and discuss them more in detail in the future.

In this paper references are scant in almost all cases due to the limitations of space and time. I am also planning to present a detailed bibliographical survey on such a topic with special emphasis on recent trends in Buddhist studies.

An abundance of hitherto little-known, but very interesting, primary and secondary literature is now available, e.g. on the history of pioneering Orientalists in the West.

NOTES

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[2] *Micropædia of The New Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol.VII (Chicago-London: William Benton, 1973), p. 950c-951a.

[3] *Brockhaus Enzyklopädie (in zwanzig Bänden)*, vol. XIV (17th fully revised edition), (Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1972), p. 540b-542b.

[4] *Grand Larousse encyclopédique (en dix volumes)*, vol. VIII (Paris: Larousse, 1963), p. 421c-422c.

[5] *Dupré's Encyclopédique du bon français dans l'usage contemporain* (*Difficultés -Subtilités - Complexités - Singularités*), tome II (Paris: Editions de Trevise, 1972), p. 1441b-1442a: under the article 'langues - 3'.

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[10] Eugène Burnouf, *Introduction à l'histoire du Buddhisme indien* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1844; deuxième édition: Maisonneuve et C[ie], Paris, 1876).

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[13] Donald Frederic Lach, *Asia in the Making of Europe*, vol. 1, Book I (Chicago-London: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. xiv.

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19

Buddhist Education into the Year 2000: Affirming the Virtue of Filial Respect

Bhiksu Heng Sure

Buddhism and education will be synonymous in the twenty-first century: the success of education will herald the propagation of the Dharma. The success of the Dharma in reforming society will establish good schools as a good priority for every nation, state and town. Buddhist education will flourish from the roots of moral excellence. The lessons of this system will teach that Wisdom and Liberation must be based on solid base of moral and virtuous character. The foundation of a good person is filial respect and practice of a code of ethical Precepts - proper rules held purely. The flowering and fruition of such people appears in bright virtue, clear-minded concentration and humane wisdom that serves all humanity. The Buddha taught that the single matter of filial respect created the good roots that carried Him to Full-Enlightenment. Thus, repaying the kindness of sages, parents, teachers and our nations, becomes an ever-expanding field of blessings for both lay and left-home Buddhist disciples, and also served the causes for the Great Bodhi resolve. Great Maudgalyayana and the Earth Treasury Bodhisattva serve as outstanding examples of filial behaviour. In making their stories known to students of every level of education, as well as introducing the lives of Sages of both Mahāyāna and Theravāda vehicles as exemplars of the rewards of a virtuous life. Buddhist education will guide the way for twenty-first century schools, molding wholesome characters and solid principles for a bright future.

A major reason for the decline of Buddhism in the twentieth century in Asia was the failure of the Saṅgha to train monks in the teachings of Dharma, and the failure to make education the proper work of the Saṅgha. In China, for example, Buddhist studies academies were rare, and many monks remained virtually illiterate in Dharma and Vinaya. Public schools built and run by Buddhists were fewer still. Even though Buddhism had been a Chinese religion for 1700 years, the actual

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teachings of the Buddha failed to reach young people, because the Saṅgha provided little opportunity for them to hear the Teachings. The educated classes in China, by the turn of the century, were much more familiar with the doctrines of the Old Testament, due to the missionary zeal of the Jesuits, who translated the Bible, and set up schools wherever they went.

Furthermore, there was never an organized attempt to translate the massive Buddhist Canon [*Tripiṭaka*] into any other language, the immense wealth of Dharma gathered over seventeen centuries of Chinese Buddhist scholarship, with notable exceptions, is still unavailable to anyone not fluent in Chinese.

Thus Buddhist educators, discussing Buddhism into the twenty-first century, advise us that:

> "In the past in China, Buddhists ignored education, so that the roots of the religion failed to take hold. When the winds of social change blew hard, Buddhism was unable to stand. We are now in the Age of the Dharma's demise; to meet the challenge of making the Buddha-dharma grow strong, and to turn all beings from confusion and towards enlightenment, we must start with education.[1]"

Buddhist Saṅgha members taking up the task of training young minds is not a new idea: In Sri Lanka, "the teaching of reading and writing, and other literate specialities, fell to the Saṅgha's lot very early," according to Carrithers[2]. Bechert[3] agrees:

> "In Burma, it was the Saṅgha that transmitted literary culture. As in ancient Sri Lanka, the monastery was the school for the children of the village. And for that reason, the word '*kyuang*', (school) is still the most common Burmese word for monastic settlement. Reading, writing, and basic religious knowledge were taught there, and students were introduced to culture and knowledge of life with the help of old texts."

Jane Bunnag reports that until this century in Thailand, monks had an important role as teachers, as all schools were in the temple compound during the nineteenth century, Thai monks began to organize schools in the provinces, but state-run schools took over the job of education in the twentieth century.[4]

We can see that in the Buddhist countries of Sri Lanka, Burma, and Thailand, until the advent of public education in the last few decades, Saṅgha-members provided the role-models for teaching children to be morally and ethically virtuous adults. We might conclude that the success of Buddhism in those countries, until education policies changed, was due in some measure, to the monks' efforts in the classrooms.

WHY SAṄGHA MEMBERS SHOULD TEACH

Educational research strongly indicates that the teacher himself, his character and values, makes up the 'hidden curriculum' in the classroom. In other words, children learn as much or more from the personality and behaviour of the teacher as they learn from books and lessons. The unique value and effectiveness of a monk as a teacher lies in his personal virtue. The virtuous conduct that accumulates from constant vigour in cultivating the *Sīla*, or Vinaya, the monastic code of disciplinary rules, makes the monk or nun an ideal teacher and moral role-model for children.

First taught by the Buddha, the precepts of the Vinaya have been the *sine qua non* of monks and nuns in both Theravāda and Mahāyāna traditions since that time. For example, Mahāyāna monks, as they prepare for full ordination, receive sets of moral rules: the Ten Precepts for novices, the two-hundred and fifty *bhikṣu* Precepts, and the Ten Primary and Forty-eight Subsequent Bodhisattva Precepts. In general, the rules stress self-discipline and character development. They are meant to instill wholesome viewpoints and provide ethical guidelines for a Saṅgha member's behaviour in dealing with himself and with the world, along the Path towards 'Bodhi', or spiritual enlightenment. The further one goes in search of Wisdom, the more intense grows the demand for strict morality. The most sublime of the Buddha's prescriptions for virtue are the Bodhisattva Precepts, in which purity or defilement is determined by the subtlety of intention alone: i.e. the thoughts in one's mind.

Thus, a traditionally ordained *bhikṣu* or *bhikṣuni* (monk or nun), should qualify by the moral strength of his training in Precepts, to provide a sound model of ethical behaviour in the classroom. By his full-time cultivation of a wise and compassionate code of rules, the monk or nun's personal example of virtuous conduct can influence students towards wholesome ethical standards, and help shape the character of young people towards the good. Said Yale University President Noah Porter:[5]

> "The most efficient of all moral influences in classrooms are those that proceed from the personal character of its instructors."

Children learn by imitation. If an immoral teacher preaches virtue, the students will soon spot the hypocrisy. They may ridicule or ignore the lessons. Worse, they may learn and imitate the false virtue. Thus, those who teach, must actually practise virtuous conduct, for the teachings on morality to go home. Monks and nuns are especially fit to teach, precisely because their first job is to master the Sīla-rules, to display awesome deportment externally, and to observe stern Vinaya conduct within. In the Mahāyāna tradition, novices in their early years of training meet the injunctions of Vinaya Masters such as Ven. Tao Hsuan of the South-Mountain School in China, who urged young cultivators to spend the first five years of Saṅgha-life studying the precepts, and only then go on to practice meditation and study scriptures.

Buddhaghosa, in the famous *Visuddhimagga* ('*Path of Purification*') lists virtue [*sīla*] as the first, and most noble step to all spiritual growth. A monk or nun whose daily conduct embodies the Buddha's high standards of ethical practice, can realize the goal of educators throughout history: informed and wholesome individuals. Plato answered a challenge to the value of education in this way: "If you ask what is the good of education, the answer is easy: that education makes good men, and that good men act nobly."

THE NEED FOR EDUCATION IN VIRTUE

As many educators in the West now point out, lessons in virtue are weak or missing from the curricula of elementary and secondary schools. Further, there is a growing awareness in academic circles that higher education in the West has abandoned its first duty: to form the moral character of, and to instill ethical values in its students. Leaders

in government, business executives, attorneys, physicians, and professionals in all walks of life perceive a wide spread decline in ethical standards in schools and in their own professions, stemming from mis-education.

Most professions require a minimum of four years in higher education, and often additional years of graduate training. Students can sit in schools for sixteen or more years, and yet never meet a systematic challenge to their values, prejudices, and philosophies. The failure lies with the educational system, its aims and methods, if graduating students cannot wield the rudiments of ethical,'decision-making skills and lack the ability to bring informed opinion to questions of right and wrong. If the future leaders of a society do not forge their values during their school years, if they miss that chance to identify their life-values in harmony with standard social norms, they can hardly be expected to gain unprejudiced, expansive viewpoints and righteous, informed, opinions after entering careers in the marketplace. A society whose senators, judges, teachers, artists, and leaders of opinion cannot bring to bear on important questions facing the community, historical precedent, personal conscience, honesty, and a keen sense of obligation to represent the moral consensus, is a society that will not prosper, and may collapse when crises arise. Thus the future leaders of the world now find themselves woefully ill-equipped to handle the complex ethical issues and choices they inevitably must face.

A spokesman for Buddhist educational policies stated:

> "At this time in history, education has become bankrupt. Disciples of the Buddha must rise to the occasion and shoulder the responsibility of advancing education, so that young people can walk the right road. The job of remolding education is a heavy task, because the moral fibre of today's youth has reached an all-time low, so that salvaging the situation from disaster will require an heroic effort. Why do students study now? If it is not to become a doctor, then it's to become an expert technician, or a specialist of some sort. Why do students want to learn such things? They answer, 'Because those jobs pay the highest salary. You can get fame and high status in these jobs.' For students to think this way during their years of study is to do great harm."[6]

A *Harvard Magazine* poll of entering freshmen over the past two decades shows the values most desired are to be "very well-off financially", to gain personal recognition, and to "have administrative responsibility for the work of others." The goal that has fallen furthest is the desire to find "a meaningful philosophy of life".[7]

The Harvard poll reveals a general lowering of expectations from the learning experience. What students entering that school during the 1970's and 1980's hoped to get from their studies does not echo what Harvard was designed to give them. An early statement of the challenge to Harvard's teachers, written into law in 1789, and reaffirmed in 1826 by the Massachusetts legislature, reads,

> "The President, professors, and tutors of the University at Cambridge, shall exert their best endeavors to impress on the minds of children and youth committed to their care and instruction, the principles of piety and justice, and a sacred love for truth, love of their country, humanity, and universal benevolence,

sobriety, industry and frugality, chastity, moderation, and temperance, and those other virtues which are the ornament of human society, and the basis upon which a republican constitution is founded."[8]

Most universities have fallen far short of the lofty aims expressed in their creeds and founding principles. President Derek Bok of Harvard explains that in practice, as early as the Civil War, the focus in education at Harvard had deteriorated from transforming students' character, to merely transmitting information and skills. This shift in aim was established fact by the 1920's.[9]

Even if most universities have abandoned their original stated ideals, the need for these noble goals has not diminished. The challenge and role of Buddhist educators in contemporary society has been expressed as follows:

"A true education advances filial respect, and fraternity, as well as service to the nation, trustworthiness, righteousness, courtesy, incorruptibility, and shame. Making these Eight Virtues part of every child's thinking enables him to seek happiness for all citizens when the child grows up. It enables him to bring blessings to the entire world, and to benefit all of humanity. When we do a good job of educating people, then there will be no disasters in the world, and problems will be solved by themselves. Children will be obedient and well-behaved. They will naturally practise filial respect for their parents."[10]

Ven. Master Hua identifies filial respect as the fruit of good education. Filial respect, and the other virtues taught to school-children in traditional societies could be easily adapted into teaching materials suitable for western students and English-speaking audiences. Let us briefly consider first the Chinese paradigm, then the Indian background that fostered the Buddha's life-long teaching on filial duty.

FILIAL RESPECT
The Basis of an Education in Virtue

"When I serve my parents with filial respect,
I vow that living beings,
Will serve the Buddhas with skill and care,
Protecting and nourishing all things.[11]

"I have realized Buddhahood because of amassing merit and vigor, and because the parents in each of my successive rebirths allowed me to go forth from the home-life to pursue the Way. All of this is a reflection of my parents' kindness. Therefore, those who pursue the Way must be vigorous when it comes to doing their filial duties. Because once they fall, and lose their human life, they will not be able to regain it in many aeons."[12]

"The source of my rapid accomplishment of the Supreme, Proper, and True Tao was none other than the virtue of filial respect."[13]

The lessons of filial piety are found tightly woven into the social fabric of many Asian civilizations, as well as in the Buddha's teachings. Stories of filial paragons who were vigorous cultivators of the spiritual path, beginning with the lives of the Buddha

himself, have been guiding young people along proper roads for centuries in India, China, and Southeast Asia.

Filial Respect in Chinese Primers

The teachings on virtue from Chinese culture, systematized and transmitted for twenty centuries, provide a rich source of moral lessons. Confucian ethics have molded the thinking of Chinese for thousands of years, and have influenced the customs of nations that contacted China. Confucian classics have provided educational materials for countless generations of Chinese literati. Their contribution to the stabilizing and enriching of one of the worlds' greatest and longest-lived civilizations is inestimable. Confucian virtue, carried by Chinese emigrants around the globe, continues to enlighten and benefit the new societies it reaches. The vehicles for this peaceful "conquest by virtue and reason" are the ancient texts that transmit Confucius's explanations of humaneness, righteousness, the Tao, and its virtues.

The Classic of Filial Piety, (*Hsiao Ching* 孝經) *The Three-character Classic* (*San Tzu Ching* 三字經) and *Standards For Students* (*Ti Tzu Kuei* 弟子規) as well as *The Four Books* (*Szu Shu* 四書), have set the foundations in wholesome attitudes for schoolchildren in China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam for centuries.

The earliest of these textbooks to receive wide acceptance, the *Classic of Filial Piety*, was traditionally committed to memory by primary school students in China since the Han Dynasty (200 B.C. to the second century A.D..) The *Hsiao Ching* presents a systematic approach to filial devotion and duty, introducing young minds to the need to repay the debt of kindness owed to parents for their sacrifices made while raising them to adulthood. Chinese tradition recognizes that the perfection of moral life is rooted in the virtue of filiality. Children are taught the principles of filiality in the *Hsiao Ching* not as abstract theory, but as vital rules for daily human conduct. Filiality is the warp and woof of social intercourse, and its application covers all aspects of life. The many virtues are nothing other than the manifestations of the one virtue, filiality.

Traditionally, children expanded their knowledge of filial conduct by reading *The Twenty-four Paragons of Filial Respect* (*Er Shih Szu Hsiao* 二十四孝), which illustrates the practice of filial piety under the most difficult circumstances. "Such education has deeply influenced the Chinese, and many actually applied the lessons to their conduct of life."[14]

The '*Three Character Classic*' and '*Standards For Students*' contain concrete instructions and exhortations to devotion and humility towards one's parents and elders. The lessons are written in three-word proverbs, each bears a practical moral lesson, or a story from history, teaches a fact of life-science and common sense, or praises a model of exemplary conduct from the past:

> "Little Syang at nine years old,
> Warmed the bed for his father.
> Filial deeds for our parents,
> Are what we all should do."

"Jung was only four,
But could still give up the pears.
Respecting older brothers
Is the younger persons' job."[15]

'*Standards for Students*' is another elementary school primer containing guidelines for molding the character of children along the path of virtue:

"Whenever you injure your body,
Your parents feel grief and alarm.
Whenever you damage your virtue,
Your family's good name comes to harm.
When parents love their children,
Obeying them's not hard.
To obey when parents are hateful
Takes the resolve of a noble heart."[16]

These models of behavior are bound neither by culture nor time. The situations described and the knowledge conveyed by the Confucian textbooks is universal in scope and in application. Because filial devotion is a primary truth of the human condition, its lessons belong to a fund of "heritage learning", that generates a wholesome and heart-felt response, regardless of the language or the milieu.[17]

A Buddhist-run educational program built around translations of these ancient primers will stand the test of time, and will communicate the lessons of virtue to twenty-first century school-children in the West as effectively as it has in Asia for centuries.

Filial Respect in Indian Literature

In India, the society that fostered Siddhartha Gautama, the Prince of the Śákya Clan, worship of the Mother was an standard belief. Hindu scriptures state that one religious teacher is worth ten secular teachers, one father is worth a hundred religious teachers, but one mother is worth a thousand fathers.[18]

The Ramayana relates that after the death of his father, the King, Prince Rama declined the ministers' offer of succession to the throne until his prescribed period of mourning was over. Reverence for parents was integral to Ancient Indian culture.

King Aśoka, centuries later, propagated the dharma of filial devotion in h s second Brahmagiri Edict:

> "Mother and father and teacher must be properly served. Compassion must be showered on all living beings. Truth must be spoken. These virtues must be promoted. Likewise the preceptor must be revered by the pupil. Relations should be properly treated. This is the ancient natural conduct. This makes for longevity of life. Therefore should this be followed."[19]

The Buddha told stories of his past lives to illustrate his principles. Among them was The Soṇadaṇda Jātaka, that eulogizes a mother's kindness. The Temiya Jātaka praises care for one's parents in distress, and The Sigālovāda Sūtra lists five duties appropriate to children, in caring for their parents, as well as five duties parents should fulfill

towards their children. Thus, the Buddha's early education fostered a deep reverence for the virtue of filial piety, and it influenced his teachings profoundly.

The Buddha's Teaching on Filiality

The Buddha taught filial respect throughout his forty-year teaching career, from first to last. Immediately upon realizing enlightenment, the Buddha's first discourse was the Bodhisattva Pratimokṣa precepts, contained in the Net of Brahma Scripture (Brahmajāla Sūtra).[20]

> "At that time, Śákyamuni Buddha first sat beneath the Bodhi tree, after realizing the Supreme Enlightenment, he set forth the Bodhisattva precepts out of filial compliance towards his parents, his masters among the Saṅgha, and the Triple Jewel. Filial compliance is a Dharma of the Ultimate Way. Filiality is called Precepts, and is also called restraint and stopping."[21]

It is important to note that after gaining ultimate liberation from endless lifetimes of suffering in *saṁsāra*, the Buddha's urgent priority was to explain moral rules to his first audience of Bodhisattvas, Devas, and Rulers of the Eight-fold Spiritual Pantheon gathered beneath the Bodhi Tree. His purpose was to provide cultivators who were firmly established on the Path to Bodhi, with the means to repay parents' kindness, and to exhort them to propagate this supreme method. The Buddha, keenly aware of the source of his enlightenment, wished to acknowledge the debt owed his benefactors. Thus he spoke the Bodhisattva Pratimokṣa ("special liberation") code of ethics; this was his highest gift of compassion.

The Net of Brahma Scripture teaches that virtue derived from practicing moral restraint on the "mind-ground", (in the cultivator's deepest thoughts), creates "virtue in the Tao". This virtue, the "art of being a person" gives the means for repaying the weighty kindness of "parents, masters among the Saṅgha, and the Triple Jewel (the Triratna: Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha)."

Enlightened Sages, upon their awakening, turn first to the matter of repaying their debt of kindness. To repay the kindness of parents is a prime motivating factor in spiritual history, a belief shared by the ancients and enlightened teachers the world over. The Buddha gave the Precepts first, to bestow "a Dharma of the Ultimate Way, which is known as filiality". If one can perfect his humanity by holding precepts, he can accomplish his human destiny in the highest measure, attain Great Wisdom, and the means to bestow Dharma on living beings, thus giving them the path to Liberation. The Buddha did it, then left directions to the Ultimate Way that he walked.

As did the Buddha, so did his disciple Ven. Mahāmaudgalyayana, whose great filial compliance is told in The Sūtra of the Buddha's Teaching on Ullambana.[22] After attaining his faculty of spiritual vision, the "Deva-eye", Ven. Maudgalyayana surveyed the various destinies of rebirth, searching for his departed mother. He saw she had fallen into a state of woe, and was suffering grievous torment as a *preta*, "a hungry ghost" in the hells, as retribution for her misdeeds in lives past. The venerable disciple ran tearfully to the Buddha for help in rescuing his mother. By following the Buddha's expedient means, and by employing and transferring the aid of his Saṅgha-brothers, who had assembled from the ten directions to pass the Pravarana summer retreat,

Maudgalyayana amassed enough merit and blessings to counteract his mother's bad karma. She was delivered from aeons of suffering, and the method of deliverance was transmitted for posterity. This historical incident inspired the Ullambana Ceremony, created in China during the sixth Century, by Emperor Wu of Liang, himself a devout Buddhist and a filial son.

Ullambana ("rescuing those hanging upside-down") is celebrated annually in Chinese communities, and in Japan, as the Ubon Matsuri. Its purpose was to make offerings to the Saṅgha, and thus create merit on behalf of deceased relatives. Both acts echo the Buddha's motive in speaking The Net of Brahma Scripture: "Out of filial compliance towards his parents, his masters among the Saṅgha, and the Triple Jewel." Maudgalyayana's devotion to his mother, and the Buddha's compassion and skillful means moved the Liang Emperor, and has touched the hearts of people for centuries.

The universal appeal of Maudgalyayana's story attests to the primacy of the parental bond that enlightened Sages honour first.

> "Alas! My parents,
> Who bore me and toiled on my behalf.
> The debt of kindness I owe them
> Is higher than the heavens."[23]

In China, among the stories of Chan School and Pure Land Patriarchs, many cases exist of filial sons who realized spiritual enlightenment beside the graves of their parents, while observing a traditional three-year period of mourning. The urge to show gratitude to parents by a child is wholesome and proper. Sages and Patriarchs, enlightened men and women who have fully matured their mental and spiritual faculties, attend to and revere their parents' debt of kindness.

For example, when the Buddha's father died, filial service was elevated to magnificent stature. The Buddha, his brother Nanda, his cousin Ānanda, and his son Rāhula, each took a corner of the late King Suddhodana's coffin, serving as pallbearers for their father, and leaving an example of noble filial piety for later generations.[24]

Following the ethical code of the Buddha, one can perfect one's virtue and humanity, and leave the turning wheel of death and rebirth. This liberation is the highest form of gratitude a child can show his parents. For this reason one leaves home to cultivate the Way.

At the end of the Buddha's teaching career, he went to the Trayastriṃsa Heaven to praise the filial conduct and great vows of Ksitigarbha, "Earth Treasury" Bodhisattva, who is foremost in filial compliance among all enlightened beings. The Buddha spoke The Sūtra of Earth Treasury Bodhisattva's Past Vows[25] in order to repay the kindness of his mother, Lady Māyā, who died in childbirth, and who had been reborn in that heaven. Of the Five Modes of Filial Respect[26], the Buddha's sojourn in the Heaven of the Thirty-three at the end of his life represents Ultimate Filiality, a culmination of his successful quest for self-knowledge. He left the palace in search of enlightenment; he renounced the comforts of a King's life for the austerities of a ascetic hermit. His purpose was to transcend death and rebirth, and thereby gain the wisdom and resourcefulness to rescue others from the ocean of Suffering. Having accomplished

Buddhahood, he ascended to the Heavens to repay his mother for the sacrifices she made while bringing him into the world. The Buddha lavishly praised the selfless compassion of Earth Treasury's infinite, filial devotion and vows, the scope of which expands to include all creatures. "I vow that I will not realize Buddha-hood until the hells are emptied. I vow that only after all living beings have been rescued will I myself accomplish Bodhi."

Thus at the end of his life, the Buddha came full circle, having taught the lessons of filial respect throughout his entire forty-years of speaking Dharma. Performing filial duties for one's own parents, one accomplishes Limited Filiality. Expanding one's family-identity to include kinship with all living creatures reaches Ultimate Filiality.

> "All male beings have been a father to me in past lives and all females have been my mother. There is not a single being who has not given birth to me during my previous lives, hence all beings of the six destinies are my parents."[27]

Net of Brahma Scripture

This identity eradicates distinctions of self and others, and prepares one for Unsurpassed, Right and Equal, Proper Enlightenment, the Buddha's accomplishment beneath the Bodhi Tree. At that time, he realized "single-substance Great Compassion", and had the inspiration to embark on a teaching career. This sentiment of Ultimate Filial Piety in its scope and depth, represents the noblest and most inspiring ideal of the Buddha's message to mankind.

Thus, filial respect provided the Buddha with both his first inspiration to cultivate and also the culmination of his efforts towards enlightenment. The Buddha bequeathed a high-level ethical code, the Bodhisattva Precepts, as his first gift, because precepts "open the road to Bodhi", and make possible the highest enlightenment. At that point, one's filial duties are complete, and all debts of kindness have been repaid. As a traditional saying goes,

> "When one child attains the Tao,
> Nine generations of ancestors
> are reborn in the Heavens."

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, educators will find in the Buddha's teachings, as well as in the Confucian materials for "virtue-education", excellent models of proper training for young people. They provide a rich source of moral and ethical principles, effectively illustrated by the life stories of worthy and wise men and women. By translating and presenting this material in classrooms, Buddhist disciples can supply the ethical instructions Western educators are requesting. Once Buddhist-sponsored education revives the fundamental values and purpose of study, the benefits for the world and for humankind are limitless.

> "In the future, Buddhism and education will merge and become one, so that in every Buddhist Way-place, there will be disciples carrying out the work of teaching. And then education and Buddhism will become one and the same: the success of Buddhism will lie in the advancement of education; education's flourishing will mark the establishment of Buddhism."[28]

APPENDICES

Appendix I.: Filial Respect as a Basis for Education

The Sagely City of 10,000 Buddhas in Talmage, California, USA operates Instilling Virtue Elementary School, Cultivating Goodness High School, and Dharma Realm Buddhist University. Its educational policies operate on a Buddhist model, stressing filial compliance, service to the nation, and personal integrity as the basis for virtue-education. Its teachers are members of the Buddhist Saṅgha, and Precept-holding lay-persons from the community. The school emphasizes strict adherence to the Five Precepts, and boys and girls study in separate campuses. Students and faculty-members are not permitted to smoke, drink, dance, gamble, take drugs, or eat meat on campus. The Six Great Guiding Principles of the City of Ten Thousand Buddhas form the creed of the schools: No Fighting, No Greed, No Seeking, No Selfishness, No Personal Gratification, and No Dishonesty.

Does the foundation in virtue-education actually improve the character of students? Can Western children absorb and benefit from the lessons in filial respect?

An elderly Indian woman from the nearby Pomo Indian tribe, native to Mendocino County, entered the office of Dharma Realm Buddhist University early last Autumn. She said, "I've come to sign up my grandson Tommy in your regular-year school program. He just finished the summer program. Then I'm going to walk to the worship hall and try some of that bowing I heard so much about from my grandson.

I don't know exactly what you Buddhists are doing in your school, but it surely works. My little Tommy used to be the baddest-tempered boy I ever saw. He would always fight with anybody, sometimes for no reason, just because of a mean streak in his heart. He never cleaned up his room, and at ten years old he was already giving me lip. I simply couldn't control him, and his own mother quit trying with him years ago. That's when he came to live with me, 'cause I used to be as mean as him when I was his age.

But after six weeks in your school, you wouldn't recognize him. He's a changed boy. I don't have to remind him, he's already got his homework done. He looks for ways to help out at home, without my asking. He's stopped giving me back-talk, and he doesn't fight no more, not even with the rough boys from the Valley. He's told me he wants me to quit smoking, and best of all, he likes to read to me from the newspapers of an evening. I tell you, it's like you've given me a new grandson.

So I just wanted to enroll him again; and say thank you for whatever you're teaching in your school. In fact, I'm a grandmother already, and kind of set in my ways, but if your teaching can transform my grandson, it must have a lot to offer me, too. Do you have any kind of adult education course, for the old folks?"

Appendix II.: Sūtra of the Parinirvāṇa of the White Rice King [T. 512]

At one time, the World Honored One was at Vulture Peak. With his faculty of the Heavenly Eye, he could see his father at a distance, lying sick on his bed, emaciated, gaunt, and haggard. His life was about to come to an end. Thereupon the Buddha told Nanda, "The White Rice King, our father, is bedridden with a serious illness. We should go visit him." Nanda agreed, saying, "Yes, it is fitting that we go before him, to show our gratitude for his kindness in raising us." Then Ānanda spoke, "The White

Rice King is my uncle. It was he who allowed me to leave the home-life to become the Buddha's disciple, so that I could have the Buddha as my teacher. I wish to go with the two of you."

Rāhula also spoke up, saying, "World Honored One, "although the Buddha is my father, and has renounced his country in search of the Way, nonetheless, I am indebted to my grandfather, the king, for having raised me, and for eventually allowing me to leave home. I also wish to go to personally attend upon my grandfather. The Buddha said, "Good indeed!"

When the king saw the Buddha approach, all his pain vanished. The Buddha said, "O Great King, pray do not worry." Thereupon the Buddha reached out his hand and caressed his father's forehead. At that moment, Impermanence arrived. The king heaved his last sigh and passed away.

Then the King's coffin was placed upon his lion's throne. The Buddha and Nanda positioned themselves at the head of the coffin, standing most respectfully, while Ānanda and Rāhula stood at the feet. Then Nanda knelt on the ground and beseeched the Buddha, "The king, my father, reared me. Will you allow me to be his pall-bearer?"

Ānanda also put his palms together and asked the Buddha, "May I be allowed to be a pall-bearer for my uncle's coffin?" Then Rāhula also asked the Buddha, "May I be allowed to help carry my grandfather's coffin?"

At that time, being mindful of how people in the future would be cruel and belligerent, unable to repay their parents' kindness in raising them, and because he wished to establish a model of the proper rules of conduct for people in times to come, the Thus Come One himself also became one of the pall-bearers of the coffin of his father, the king.

At that time, the large, three-fold, thousand world system shook in six ways. All the huge and lofty mountains became temporarily submerged, like boats in the water (*Filiality, The Human Source*, Vol. 2, BTTS, Talmage, CA, 1981).

NOTES

1. Ven. Tripitaka Master Hua, Chancellor Emeritus, Dharma Realm Buddhist University, in *Vajra Bodhi Sea*, Vol. 20, Series 48, Number 237, p.21-22.
2. Michael Carrithers, Buddhism, Gombrich and Bechert eds., Facts on File Publications, New York, 1988, p.120
3. Bechert, ibid. p.128
4. ibid., p.140
5. Derek Bok, "Ethics, the University, and Society", *Harvard Magazine*, May-June 1988, p.41.
6. Ven. Master Hsuan Hua, from an unpublished talk delivered to the Trustees of Dharma Realm Buddhist University in Taibei, Taiwan, November, 1, 1989.
7. Bok, ibid, p.40.
8. Bok, ibid., p.40
9. Bok, ibid, p. 41-42.
10. Ven. Master Hsuan Hua, from Nov. 1st, 1989 Address.
11. T.279, The Flower Adornment Sūtra "Pure Conduct Chapter".
12. T.738, The Sūtra of Differentiation

13. T.174, The Shyamaka-Jataka Sūtra

14. Sister Lelia Makra (trans.), Paul K.T. Sih (ed.), The Hsiao Ching, St. John's University Press, New York, 1961, preface.

15. *The Three Character Classic*: Provisional translation in unpublished manuscript.

16. *Standards for Students*: Provisional translation in unpublished manuscript.

17. (See Appendix I.)

18. Narada Thera, *Parents and Children*, Wisdom Series #8, P.2.

19. N.A. Nikam, Richard McKeon, eds., *The Edicts of Ashoka*, Univ. of Chicago Press, Midway Reprints, Chicago, 1978, P.43.

20. T.1484

21. Ven. Tripitaka Master Hsuan Hua, *The Buddha Speaks the Brahma-net Sūtra*, Buddhist Text Translation Society, San Francisco, CA, 1981, p.40

22. T.685,

23. *The Book of Poetry* (Shih Ching)

24. The Sūtra on The Parinirvana of the White Rice King. T. 512, see Appendix II.

25. T. 412 English Translation: Ven. Tripitaka Master Hsuan Hua, *Sūtra of The Past Vows of Earth Store Bodhisattva*, BTTS\IASWR, New York, 1974.

26. The Five Modes of Filial Respect include 1) Limited Filial Piety, being filial within one's own family; 2) Extensive Filial Piety, taking all fathers and mothers as one's own; 3) Contemporary Filial Piety, according with present-day models and standards of making one's parents happy; 5) Ultimate Filial Piety, accomplishing the Supreme Tao, and rescuing nine generations of ancestors; ultimately vowing to deliver all living beings from suffering.

27. Brahma-net Sūtra, ibid. p.100

28. Ven. Tripitaka Master Hsuan Hua, *Vajra Bodhi Sea*, ibid.

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N.A. Nikam, Richard McKeon, Eds., *The Edicts of King Ashoka*, University of Chicago Press, Midway Reprints, Chicago, 1978, p.43.

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20
Buddhistic Modernism: Present Situation and Current Trends

Prof. Dr. Heinz Bechert

Buddhism has been one of the most influential factors in our human world for more than two millennia. However, with the spread of Islam and the period of colonialism, Buddhism lost much of its dynamics. During the nineteenth century, however, the unfavourable trends were arrested by movements for "Buddhist revivalism". The present author proposed the use of the term "Buddhistic modernism" for these trends in his study of modern Buddhism in 1962. The present paper describes the main features of this modernistic movement in their interdependence with traditionalistic Buddhism. Most of the "modernistic" concepts were formulated more than three decades ago. Therefore, in the final part of the paper, the need of new concepts will be formulated and it will be discussed, if and how Buddhists have responded to the challenges of a rapidly changing world.

Buddhism has been one of the most important factors in our human world for more than two millennia. Its influence over most parts of Asia reached a zenith in the second half of the first millennium A.D.. The expansion of Buddhism came to an end, about a thousand years ago, when the forces of the Muslim conquerors entered Afghanistan and the north-western parts of India. Though the Mongols and some other Central Asian peoples converted to Buddhism even after this period, Buddhism lost its influence in several other parts of Asia. In mainland India, it had almost totally disappeared by 1500 A.D. due to the spread of Islam and the renaissance of Hinduism. Islam also spread in Malaya and in Indonesia at the cost of Buddhism.

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With the rise of colonialism, a rival to Buddhism appeared on the scene: the early sixteenth century brought Christian missions to South and Southeast Asia. The close relation of colonial interests to missionary activities is only too well known, and it may suffice here to mention that conversion to Christianity gave access to a number of privileges in the colonially dominated countries.

In spite of these developments, conversion of Buddhists to Christianity remained the exception rather than the rule. During the nineteenth century, the trend towards the assimilation of Western values was arrested in most Asian countries, and a new feeling of cultural identity began to emerge. The so-called Buddhist revival started amongst the educated middle class almost at the same time as the beginnings of the movement towards national independence.

For an understanding of the relation of this movement of Buddhist revival to the overall history of Buddhism it is helpful to subdivide its development into three main stages: These may be called "original Buddhism", "traditional Buddhism" and "modernistic Buddhism".

"Original Buddhism" and "traditional Buddhism"

I should begin with a few remarks on "original Buddhism". What are the main characteristics of "original Buddhism"? No doubt, Buddhism originated within a Hindu society, and therefore some of its presuppositions may be explained by this fact. On the other hand, however, Buddhism is not just a particular form of Brahmanical or Hindu religion, because the Buddha did not accept the basis upon which Hindu society had been built. This included the sacred origin of the "caste" system and the rules of Dharmaśāstra, or Hindu Law. The Buddha's teaching, as opposed to this, carries no particular concept of an order to be applied for the organization of the secular world. Buddhists of later periods have in fact lived in various types of society which are based on different notions of the secular social order.

The Buddha made it very clear what he had in mind when he preached his Dharma to the world. It was by teaching a new and hitherto unknown method of progress on the way to enlightenment that he became the founder of a separate religious tradition. This method was described as the only way to reach the final goal of Nirvāṇa.

It is also evident that the early Buddhist community was an élite community in the sense of a spiritual élite, since not all members of a given society were considered capable of following the Buddha's instructions in full. This description of the early Buddhist community as an élite within a multi-religious and pluralistic society was formulated in Max Weber's well-known study of the sociology of Indian religion. It is further confirmed by the evidence found in the early Buddhist scriptures. However, this should not mislead us into the belief that there was no place for the laity in early Buddhism. The lay followers were in fact an essential part of the community, and the definition of "*saṅgha*", in its wider sense of all disciples, includes them. On the other hand, only very few laymen could aspire to the higher states of spiritual perfection. For the average layman, only a kind of preliminary stage on the way was provided for: by observing the precepts (*sīla*) he could acquire good karma and, as a consequence, attain to a better form of existence in future existences. In this context, the concept of

merit (*puñña*) is of utmost importance. Originally, "merit" denoted the fruit of good karma in general. Now, detailed advice was given on how to accumulate "merit" by donations. Most effective was the notion that the most valuable donations are those given to the Saṅgha. The Saṅgha is described as the highest "field of merit" (*puñña-kkhetta*). It was particularly this notion which determined the place of the Saṅgha within society, and, at the same time, the structure of any given Buddhist society. Lavish donations to the Saṅgha, however, would not necessarily help the Saṅgha to preserve its ancient ideals of poverty and asceticism, and, as a consequence, the material improvement in the life-style of the Saṅgha became a potential threat to the goal of the monastic life.

This does not mean that there was a one-way street from the original emphasis on "enlightenment" as the only goal towards other goals, as is indicated by the constant presence of movements for a restoration of the original understanding of the doctrine. As a consequence, however, of the main stream of this development, and to a large extent, because of its "temporalities", the Saṅgha became increasingly involved in secular interest. Out of the necessity to take care of and control its possessions, the originally free and independent ascetic community developed into an influential force within state and society. This change resulted in growing formalism in the application of the rules of monastic discipline, and this in turn resulted in the formation of sects and schisms within the Saṅgha.

By the time of King Aśoka in the third century B.C. these changes seem to have become apparent. This is evident from the records on the Saṅgha reform, which this king considered necessary. Originally, the Saṅgha regulated its affairs independently and without the participation of outsiders. Aśoka, however, did, for the first time in history, exercise some degree of state control over the Saṅgha. The "Sāsana Reform" enacted by Aśoka, was generally regarded by Buddhists as a great service in the interest of their religion. However, it cannot be overlooked that the Saṅgha had in fact lost part of its original independence. During the following centuries, the Saṅgha of Theravāda Buddhism became an integral part of a particular socio-political structure which may be described as the system of "traditional Theravāda Buddhism". When Buddhism emerged as a factor of legitimation of political authority and power within society, the structure of the Buddhist community became essentially transformed.

Another phenomenon of traditional Buddhism is the origination of highly sophisticated systems of Buddhist philosophy. Elaborate philosophical systems were created in various schools such as the Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda etc. It was at this stage when, as a protest movement against such scholasticism, a new mystic movement gained momentum, which later on became known as Mahāyāna Buddhism. The second main factor underlying the rise of these new forms of Buddhism was the religious needs of the masses. Buddhism had by now lost its character as the creed of an élite, and therefore answers to the religious needs of all sections of the population were formulated, and these needs were quite different from the original aim of attaining Nirvāṇa. It was in many ways that Buddhists of these early days reacted to the challenge of these new aims. Their answers ranged from the dichotomy of the religious

spheres as a "supermundane" and a "worldly" sphere in theory and in practice, being the Theravāda response on the one hand, to the fundamentally different concept of "salvation through others" which was the doctrine preached by the so-called "Pure Land Schools" of East Asian Mahāyāna.

"Modernistic Buddhism"

If Buddhism has been subject to change during all these centuries of its history, what then is the particular nature of the more recent changes which have resulted in the growth of modern Buddhist revivalism, and how do these relate to the other forms of Buddhist tradition? No doubt, Buddhism and its influence substantially declined during the so-called colonial age. This was felt in most countries of the Buddhist world, in spite of efforts to revive Buddhism along traditional lines.

However, at the time when harsh confrontation between the "West" and the Buddhist countries gave way to increased cultural exchange, and when "Western" ideas were becoming understood in the Buddhist countries, simultaneously, more exact notions of Buddhism became available in the West. Some of the important turning points in this development were the reform of Buddhism initiated by King Mongkut of Thailand, as well as the famous "Great Debate" of Panadurā in Sri Lanka. Most important in this respect was Col. Olcott's visit to Sri Lanka in 1880 and the activities of the Anagārika Dharmapāla, the founder of the Maha Bodhi Society. The Anagārika Dharmapāla did not at all stress the need for progress on the way to Nirvāna as the primary goal of this effort; he propagated the need for the reconstruction of a "Buddhist society" in our modern secular world. This "reconstruction" was determined as a necessary precondition for progress towards the final goal, because spiritual progress, according to the Anagārika Dharmapāla, always presupposes a congenial environment.

The movement which was initiated by Buddhist reformers of this period was then known as "the Buddhist resurgence" or "Buddhist revivalism". By some authors, the term "Neo-Buddhism" was used. The earliest use of the term "le modernisme bouddhiste" i.e. "Buddhist modernism", known to the present author is found in a book by Alexandra David-Neel which was published in 1911. However, Alexandra David-Neel did not use the term to denote modern Buddhist revivalism, but rather for her own reconstruction of the original teaching of the Buddha. As a term for the modern Buddhist movement, it was first used in my report on contemporary Buddhism, submitted in 1962, which formed the basis of my book "Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft", published in 1966. It is now a generally accepted term in Buddhist studies.

Main Features of Buddhistic Modernism

Without claiming to be exhaustive, I would venture to list twelve main features which we encounter in observing various forms of Buddhistic modernism. All of them imply reinterpretation of traditional thought and values.

1. Following the "rediscovery" of the early canonical texts as the main source of our knowledge about what "real" Buddhism was, there is a tendency towards relying on an *independent and non-traditional understanding* of the Buddha's teaching as found

in these early sources.

2. The use of these early sources is being combined with a modernization of the concepts of cosmology and with a symbolic interpretation of traditional myths which were customarily associated with Buddhism. This may be termed a process of "*de-mythologization*" of Buddhism.

3. "De-mythologization" allows us to describe Buddhism as a *scientific religion*. The theme "Buddhism and Science" has been a most important feature of all forms of modernism since the late nineteenth century.

4. Within the same stream of thought, modernistic Buddhist writing carries the notion that Buddhism is a "*philosophy*", not a creed or religion.

5. In the field of values, modernists oppose Western criticism of Buddhist "pessimism" with the notion that Buddhism is in fact a philosophy of *optimism*, e.g. as Dr. Malalasekera, among others, has formulated in several of his books and papers.

6. Proceeding from theoretical to more practical issues, we meet with the notion that Buddhism does not lead to "inactivism", but that in fact *activism* forms an important feature of the Buddhist way of life.

7. With this notion, we enter the field of social relations, and here we meet with the tendency to engage in *social work*, which has become an outstanding feature of modernism indeed.

8. While Buddhism, unlike Islam and Christianity, originally did not, beyond the general rules of Buddhist ethics, have particular prescriptions for the structure of social life, modernists claim that Buddhism has always included a *social philosophy*. This social philosophy is described as a philosophy of equality, not only in religious life, but in the secular order as well.

In this context, the modernistic interpretation of the Buddha's message by Dr. Ambedkar may be quoted. He is well known as the initiatior of Indian Neo-Buddhism and for the conversion of members of the so-called scheduled castes. Like Dharmapāla, he was concerned with the efforts towards establishing a better order in the secular world as a basis which must precede any spiritual progress. For him, Dharma is the moral order in the world, and Nirvāna is then understood as the state of mind which fully conforms with Dharma.

Attempts at constructing a doctrinal system combining Buddhist ideals with various types of modern political thought have been made in several Asian Buddhist countries. These systems are being constructed on the basis of similar arguments. The idea of a Buddhist society as such, however, is not at all a genuinely new argument. It may be traced back to traditional Theravāda ideology where, to use a formula coined by Max Weber, "the power of the *cakravartin* was a necessary supplement to the transcendental spiritual power of the Buddha".

9. Since Buddhism propagates equality in social life, modernistic Buddhists also uphold this ideal in politics, and therefore, a Buddhist society should be a *democratic* society.

10. In the Buddhist societies of South Asia, where Buddhists traditionally form the majority of the population, Buddhism has entered a close alliance with the struggle for independence and for national identity. A kind of "*Buddhist nationalism*" has emerged

in these countries. Though this is not necessarily a modern phenomenon, its presentation has been transformed from traditional into modern patterns. This has been particularly obvious in the case of "Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism" with all its connotations and problematic consequences, but it is also known in Burma and in several other Buddhist societies.

11. Modern Buddhists have undertaken *rewriting history* in accordance with their particular understanding of national history. No doubt, the historiography of the colonial period was unbalanced in several respects, but now it is often replaced by a general glorification of the pre-colonial past.

12. We also meet with an important new development in Buddhist practice. I refer to the *revival and popularization of Buddhist meditation.* In traditional Buddhism, only carefully selected disciples were introduced into the practice of meditation by their respective masters, but the modernist movement not only revived ancient methods of meditation but also made them available to all Buddhists in new "meditation centres". In some instances, we also meet the phenomenon of "mass meditation". The method of meditation which is practised in meditation centres is mostly "mindfulness" (vipassanā).

These are twelve main characteristics of Buddhist modernism as seen from the point of an academic study of these trends in Buddhist societies. In most forms of modernistic thought, not all of them are present, and often they have been combined with various elements of traditional Buddhist thought.

Most of these features may be observed from the very beginnings of the modernistic movement in the last decades of nineteenth century. They may be traced in many of the programmatic publications of contemporary Buddhist organizations, institutions and conferences from the beginning of our century until today. When I formulated this list for the first time in 1984, I referred to the "Souvenir of the World Fellowship of Buddhists 14th General Conference, Sri Lanka" of the same year. These features are, however, equally present in documents from various other communities.

The Lack of Ideological Consensus

There is, however, a lack of ideological consensus in Buddhistic modernism which may be observed from the early days of this movement.

In traditional Buddhism; we meet with models of attempts at improving and restructuring society as a "Buddhist society", and these models have succeeded in obtaining a high degree of acceptance in traditional Buddhist societies. In "modernistic" Buddhism, Buddhists have the "freedom to construct a Buddhist economic and social ethic suited to the age", as Gananath Obeyesekere formulated. Such constructions must be in conformity with or at least not in contradiction to, the teaching of the Buddha. But they are of course, not "Buddhist" in the sense of being legitimized by the original Teachings of the Buddha, because the Buddha clearly stated that such secular doctrines are not to be considered as the Buddha's word; however, as we have seen, modernists rely on their own interpretation of the Buddha's word.

By using Buddhist texts in this way, Buddhist modernists have developed a number of quite different economic and political theories. There are theories which conform

with certain ancient national traditions (e.g. in Burma), or with socialist ideas or with ideas of capitalism, etc. Therefore, "modernistic" Buddhism, has never been able to achieve any reasonable degree of consensus concerning its social, political and economic ideas, whereas traditional Buddhism had been in a position to build up such a consensus. The relevence of these theories always remains limited to certain sections of the Buddhist population.

It is clear that the modernists had to compromise with traditionist tendencies. The modernists who had given the initial impulses to the movement belonged to the highly educated and modernized urban élite, but the Buddhist revival could only succeed as a political force if the rural masses were activated. The rural population and the large majority of the monks, however, were still guided by pre-modern ways of thinking. This situation is responsible for many of the contradictions found in the writings of Buddhist modernists.

The Need for New Concepts

When the early "modernists" formulated their propositions for an improvement of the political, social and economic situation, Buddhism was in a rather precarious situation vis-à-vis the growth of Western influence. This impact was still felt some time after World War II, now in the new form of fear of Americanization. Meanwhile however, the overall political and economic situation has drastically changed. Some Buddhist countries, such as Thailand, are in the process of rapid economic and social progress. On the other hand, Sri Lanka, or Ceylon, which had the second highest standard of living in Asia only forty years ago, is now being confronted with a disastrous political and economic situation. The situation is not much better in Burma either. In China, some Buddhist religious institutions are being tolerated again after their almost total destruction during the Cultural Revolution, but many painful restrictions have remained in force. It is not necessary go on listing facts which are well-known to all of you. I mention them simply because I want to remind you of the totally different problems faced by the Buddhist communities in the various Asian countries as compared with the situation thirty or forty years ago.

When I proposed the term "Buddhistic modernism" in 1962, the questions and answers of the modernists concerning social and political questions were "modern", not only in the sense of being different from the traditional positions, but they were also concerned with the needs of the then contemporary Buddhism. Under the rather different conditions of today, the answers given in those days are no longer new or "modern" in the strict sense of the words. Therefore, I propose to use the new term "standard Buddhistic modernism" for these earlier propositions. The necessity of adjustment does, of course, not relate to Buddhism as such, but only to the questions and answers arising from the new situation.

In spite of the drastic changes of the overall situation, several of the leading figures of contemporary Buddhism go on repeating the old formulae and recommendations for the rebuilding of a Buddhist society which are well known from the classical speeches and writings of this "standard Buddhistic modernism". They have simply forgotten their own primary goal, viz. to adjust Buddhism to the needs of today. These

needs are, of course, rather different in 1989 from those in 1949 or 1959. In the writing of the authors of this school, one encounters all the arguments and judgements — and sometimes the prejudices — which sound familiar from the speeches and publications of those days. I do not deny, of course, that some of these arguments have not lost their importance, and that in several instances the tasks have not much changed so that the earlier questions and answers remain relevant. This may be said, e.g., in relation to the Indian Neo-Buddhists, because their situation is not very different from the situation two or three decades ago. However, the situation in countries like Thailand has completely changed so that the repetitions of the outdated prescriptions is not at all helpful in the present situation.

However, the immobilism of this school of thought, represents only one side of the present situation. There are various other groups of contemporary Buddhists who have formulated new answers to the pressing needs of our time. These new answers represent a wide spectrum of different opinions. In some instances, a return to traditionalism is observed, as a kind of reaction against the radically modernistic tendencies of the last few decades. There are many Buddhists who have recognized that they can no longer afford to stand back from the attempts to tackle the urgent new problems of modern times and that the traditional answers are not sufficient any more.

New Trends in Contemporary Buddhism

I shall now exemplify these remarks with a short survey of some of the new trends, selecting those I consider most characteristic of Buddhism in the 2530's of the Buddhist Era.

(1) In the first place, I would like to stress the importance of what we may call the *Buddhist contribution to the world-wide so-called "Green" Movement*. We know that we are moving towards an ecological catastrophe of gigantic dimensions, if men go on using, or rather misusing natural resources and spoil the environment of our planet. This problem has been very much underestimated in the Western world until rather recently, but, for obvious reasons, it has also been almost totally neglected in "standard" Buddhistic modernism. In the last few years, there has been a change of attitudes, and Buddhists in some countries — particularly in Thailand — have stressed the need for a radical change. Interestingly, the first relevent initiatives were not started by "modernistic" Buddhist writers, but rather by village monks. As an example, I quote a report on the efforts of Phra Acharn Tejadhammo, who lives near Chiengmai, that is illustrative of this trend. He had started preaching the need for conservation already twenty years ago when the villagers still "thought he was a big joke". It was a long time until this need was recognized as a national task by the Thai Government. However, it seems that the international dimension of the problem has not yet been fully recognized in many countries of the world, and this is also true of several Buddhist countries. This problem, which affects all of us, remains a major challenge for the activities of contemporary Buddhists.

(2) In the list of features of "standard" Buddhistic modernism, the phenomenon of "Buddhist nationalism" (above, no. 10) and its sometimes rather problematic concomitants has already been recognised. Some new monastic associations have

been formed in the last few years in Sri Lanka with the aim of overcoming this kind of nationalism as an antiquated view, and to put the *Buddhistic concept of universal tolerance* into practice. Though still a minority, they represent a fundamentally new trend in the Saṅgha which hopefully may contribute towards a solution to problems in this country.

(3) Within contemporary Buddhism, we observe the already mentioned strong reaction against modernism in the shape of a *reassertion of the teaching and values of traditional Buddhism*. This trend is rather strong in Burma where the "Sāsana reform" of 1980 resulted not only in the restitution of a hierarchical structure within the Saṅgha, but also in a restriction of freedom of discussion about the content of dogma among the members of the Saṅgha.

(4) Another trend consists of a *radical return to the roots of Buddhism*, i.e. to the original ideas of an ascetic and simple life outside the established traditions. As an example, I refer to the "Santi Asoke" movement in Thailand. Its followers aim not at a reconstruction of traditional Buddhist values, but at an independent reinterpretation of the earliest canonical texts, thereby questioning the validity of the interpretations handed down by the traditional Saṅgha. In this particular case, the values of the modern conservationist movement mentioned above, are combined with those of original Buddhism.

(5) A more conservative response consists in the *renewal of the ideals of the "forest-dwelling" monks*. This movement may be observed in various Buddhist societies, and it is particularly strong in Thailand and in Sri Lanka.

(6) Another recent trend is the *revival of samatha meditation* while in standard modernism mostly vipassanā meditation was practiced. The most conspicuous example is represented by the Dhammakāya movement in Thailand. It has become a new type of a mass meditation movement with a strong appeal to the middle class.

(7) *The revival of ritualism and the spread of Tantrayāna* may be observed in several Buddhist societies. Followers of Tibetan Buddhist traditions have become rather numerous in countries like Taiwan and Singapore, but also in the rather recent Buddhist communities in the West. At first sight, this trend may seem opposed to the main stream of modernistic thought, but it has often been combined with certain features of modernistic trends. Basically, this tendency represents a reaction against a one-sided interpretation of Buddhism as a system of rationalistic philosophy which I have described as a characteristic feature (no. 4) of "standard" Buddhistic modernism, and against the resulting neglect of the emotional element of religiosity. These emotional needs are being answered by the revival of rituals and related elements of traditional religiosity.

(8) In recent years, we observe a trend towards a *new type of Buddhist syncretism* viz. *the combination of various Buddhist traditions*. As an example, I would like to refer to a development of Buddhist thought in Thailand again. This new direction is represented by Phra Buddhadasa of Suan Mokh. Here, Mahāyāna traditions, methods of East Asian Ch'an meditations have been integrated in a Thai Theravāda surrounding. Another case is the so-called Buddhayana school of Indonesia.

(9) In some Buddhist societies, a strong anti-rationalistic type of traditionalism may be observed. It may be termed *a tendency towards a "re-mythologization"* of the Buddhist tradition. An illustrative example is the speech delivered by U Nu in the Center for Burma Studies on 30th July 1987. In contrast with most modernists, U Nu argues that nats — the gods of traditional Burmese popular belief — exist in reality, and that he himself has "received downright, straightforward help from a nat".

(10) Last but not least, mention should be made of the strong tendency towards *the re-assertion of womens' rights* in contemporary Buddhism. There is a world-wide movement for a renewal of the *bhikṣunī* ordition in the Theravāda and the Tibetan Buddhist communities, where it ceased to exist several centuries ago. *Bhikṣunī* ordination means full or higher ordination in contrast with the now prevailing lower status of Buddhist nuns. In most modern Buddhist communities, nuns have attained to a degree of significance that is without precedent in traditional Buddhism, whether they are considered *anagārika*, *dasasīla-upāsikā* etc., or *bhikkhunī*.

These are ten main points which came to my mind when I was trying to describe recent trends in Buddhist societies. There are, of course, many other trends of more limited importance. And, as was the case with the traditional modernistic movement, some of these trends are contradictory and even incompatible, so that there remains a lack of ideological consensus. After all, we live in a period of pluralism today. We should never forget, however that the Buddha's message is a message for the individual human being. This implies the insight that nobody can escape his personal responsibility for understanding and for practising the Buddhadharma for the benefit of the future of the world.

21

Buddhism in Malaysia and Singapore

Venerable Piyasilo

In this paper, the aim is to present a general social reduction of the Buddhist situation in Malaysia and Singapore, discussing the work being conducted by various Buddhist groups, in particular the work of the author's own group, 'The Community of Dharmafarers'. The aim is to present the philosophy of how The Community of Dharmafarers works.

Buddhists in Malaysia number three million, which is seriously a large number of Buddhists to teach. I have compared experiences with some foreign Buddhists, speakers and scholars, and they agree that it is much easier for them to work in their own countries than to work in Malaysia. In western countries like Australia, or even in the Americas, it is like a clean slate because one can start from scratch with meditation. Immediately noticeable to workers in Malaysia by contrast is that they must start by removing an old layer of miscellaneous superstitious beliefs and materialistic approaches before being able to start teaching Buddhism to the people.

Although Malaysia is a secular state, Islam is seen as her national religion. Buddhists cannot convert Moslems but Moslems can convert Buddhists. Buddhists must be very careful what they say about Islam. There are certain terms which non-Moslems are not allowed to use, but this doesn't affect Buddhists so much because the 'wall' is mainly to guard against other missionary religions. Indeed, the Moslems respect the Buddhists. This is one advantage which Buddhism has in Malaysia: Buddhists behave themselves as a friendly religion!

About one third of the people in Malaysia are of Chinese descent and this accounts for the majority of Malaysian Buddhists following Chinese traditions.

Table 30.1. Religions in Malaysia

Religion	% Population
Islam	53%
Buddhism	29%
Chinese Folk	2%
Hinduism	7%
Christianity	7%
Others	2%

B. Singapore

In Singapore, Buddhism is presently the most popular

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religion, but has Taoism or Shenism as its rival. Indeed, like Japan, many Buddhists in Singapore do not hold just one religion. They are pluralist in their approach: they may be Buddhist but they will attend festivals celebrated by other religions too. The awareness that they are Buddhist and the desire to be 'pure' Buddhist is now more keenly felt, which is a happy development for both Singapore and Malaysia. Of all the religions, Christianity is growing very fast, but forms less than 10% of the population. The rate of growth is very interesting for Christianity in the sense that students at 'A' level (especially) and university level are very attracted to this religion, but as they

Fig. 30.2
Malaysian Buddhists: Ethnic Analysis

Ethnic Group	% Population
Chinese	98%
Thai	1%
Sinhalese	0.7%
Indian/Other	0.3%

Fig. 30.3
Religions in Singapore

Religion	% Population
Buddhism	56%
No Religion	13%
Christianity	10%
Others	21%

grow older, the rate of growth declines and they often revert to their traditional religions.

Another interesting situation in Singapore is that there are a growing number who do not have (or do not want to have) any religion. Here again, as with religious syncretism, the situation is very similar to Japan, which may indicate trends for the future of Singapore. The section 'Others' of Figure 30.3, includes groups which are hard to differentiate and subclassify.

MALAYSIAN AND SINGAPOREAN BUDDHISM: SPECIAL FEATURES

The Influence of Language

1.'*Bahasa Malaysia*': Another interesting phenomenon in Malaysia is the connection between language and Buddhism. The national language in Malaysia is called '*Bahasa Malaysia*'. One of the most difficult situations that a Buddhist worker will have to face when teaching in Malaysia is 'language'. This present point in history is a transition period. More and more young people are speaking *Bahasa Malaysia*. However, the more established Buddhist speakers and monks speak only English or Chinese. Even though a great effort is made to write books about Buddhism in *Bahasa Malaysia*, and the author's organisation, 'The Community of Dharmafarers', have even introduced a *pūjā* in *Bahasa Malaysia*, somehow there is a resistance to *Bahasa Malaysia* by Buddhists.

It may be that the situation this decade may change as it has started to do on the East Coast (which has a Malay-speaking population). To this extent, The Community of Dharmafarers has produced the first Pāli-Sanskrit-English-*Bahasa Malaysia* Buddhist Dictionary, the second enlarged edition currently being published.[1] One advantage of using *Bahasa Malaysia* is that it has very close links with Sanskrit, such that it is very easy to form new words. The language *Bahasa Malaysia* is about four hundred years

old and as such, it is very difficult to use such a language to express concepts from a religion which is six times as old. On many occasions it is necessary to invent new vocabulary. The present author has sometimes been warned by fellow Buddhists of being reprimanded by the authorities for such treatment of the language, but this is usually a pessimistic view based on fear and politics. There is no law saying that we cannot invent new words!

As an example of the facility of *Bahasa Malaysia*, until now there has been no word for 'mind'. There was a word for 'consciousness', but it is a very simple word meaning the opposite of 'unconscious'. There is no actual word for 'mind', but fortunately for us, a certain professor invented the word '*minda*' from the word 'mind'. Even this is not enough however, because in Buddhist terminology there are so many terms for 'mind'. Thus, for this sort of reason, one of our tasks was to invent a vocabulary to transmit Buddhism and discuss Buddhism. 'Consciousness' is still missing from the Buddhism of *Bahasa Malaysia* so it was necessary to think of a word which was sufficiently Malay to be recognisable and sufficiently Buddhist to convey the implicit meaning. It is often necessary to mix words in order to get the right effect. To make the word for 'consciousness' the Malay word *sedar* (= awake) was mixed with *deria* (from the Sanskrit *indriya*), to give the new word '*sedarderia*' or '*sedarindera*' in *Bahasa Malaysia*. Looking at the way this word has been formed, it is possible to get an idea of the problems of Malay phraseology. The task is interesting because it is like staring all over again with a Buddhist language.

At this point, the *pūjā* in *Bahasa Malaysia* is only at the stage of being read: no-one has yet reached the stage of chanting it. By contrast, chanting in English has been much more successful especially in such places as Australia, where the majority of the Buddhists are English-speaking. The problem in Malaysia, with the *pūjā* in *Bahasa Malaysia* is that most of those participating are Chinese speakers.

2. ***Mandarin Chinese***: At the moment, amongst Buddhist teachers, *Bahasa Malaysia* is mostly widely used by monks from the Siamese Theravāda tradition in the North and on the East Coast of the Peninsular. By contrast, Mandarin is used mainly by the Chinese Buddhist community and by some Vajrayāna Buddhists. Most of the Chinese population is Mahāyāna, and they have close connections with monks from Taiwan and the United States (especially Golden Mountain Monastery). In Singapore, the Chinese population is also mostly Mahāyāna. Mandarin is Malaysia's third language, but it is the most important language for Singapore. In many ways it is much easier to work in Singapore because this is a universal language there.

3. ***English and Other Languages***: When English is used, it is most often used by the students in the university Buddhist societies, the middle class, the older generation, Buddhists who graduated before 1980, Theravāda and some Vajrayānists. In terms of tradition, there is an interesting division of adherance in relation to language because most of the Sinhalese Theravāda traditions are English-speaking. The Siamese Theravāda monks tend to speak their own language together with *Bahasa Malaysia* and Hok-kien. From a general impression, English may also involve a 'Class' division: the upper-middle classes tending to go to the Sinhalese temples and English language is associated with that level. Those teachers speaking Chinese, especially the dialects,

cover those of the lower classes, the lower echelons of society. The Mahāyāna use mainly Mandarin and Chinese dialects. Most of the members of the Vajrayāna come from the Chinese 'Business Class' (who are incidentally also increasingly interested in the Nichirenism of the Soka Gakkai).

Four-Faced Buddha

An interesting feature of Buddhism in Malaysia and Singapore is the introduction of Brahma-worship, or what is erroneously called 'the four-faced Buddha'. The present author has tried to correct this misunderstanding by writing a booklet called '*The Lesson of the Four-faced Buddha*'. This phenomenon is a symptom of the way in which Theravāda Buddhists have not been able to reach the masses, to solve the problems of daily life in the way that Nichiren can manage. Thus, the masses are attracted to such things as this deity, which has been borrowed from Hindu mythology, and people worship at such shrines as they would pay respect to a Buddha image. Such shrines are now to be seen in the homes of the 'Business' class, one of the newest developments. This may be a sign of pluralism rather than Buddhism, although it is a tradition promoted by some local Siamese Buddhists.

Buddhist Studies

On the Singapore scene, something very promising that has begun in the past decade is the introduction of Buddhist Studies in Secondary Schools as part of the 'O' level (Cambridge) Course. The present author was one of those who helped with the syllabus. The course turned out to be the most popular of the Religious Studies subjects. The politicians had hoped that Confucianism would be the most popular, even officially promoting it on television. However, regarding this course, the children (or at least their parents) found Buddhism more interesting because great trouble had been taken to make the textbooks as simple as possible. The aim of those who designed the course was to make the students 'pass' and to make them 'know Buddhism'. Singapore is probably the only country in the world with this sort of course where you can earn a credit and gain entry into 'A' levels. During the first year, 15,000 students signed up for the course. Unfortunately, to end on a sad note, since it is government policy to phase out Religious Studies in 1992, the future of Buddhist Studies is hard to know.

OVERCOMING PROBLEMS

Some Problems of Unity

The portrait of Buddhism in Malaysia and Singapore already presented will give the reader some idea of the situation in these countries. It is now necessary to examine the problems in a more systematic way in order to understand the philosophy behind the work of 'The Community of Dharmafarers'. The main philosophy used is to find ways to use 'the new' to bring back 'the old' and to use 'the old' to bring in 'the new'. In Japan, there are many new religions. In a way it seems that many of these religions want to bring back old values. On the other hand, in some of the traditional countries they are using old ways to bring in the new and adapting to find out more about Buddhism and its highest aspects. More will be explained about these two aspects in what is to follow.

How can 'the new' be used to bring in 'the old'? The key which we have found is 'self-development'. Any Malaysian or Singaporean who feels that they would like to develop should find a suitable place such as Siam (Thailand), where they can receive proper monastic training for a minimum of five years, learning Pāli and Siamese (Thai) before coming back to work in their own country. The trouble with many Buddhist organisations of the world is that they are disuniting the Buddhist community of Malaysia more than they are uniting them. We have Buddhists who are loyal to teachers who are in Siam, teachers in Taiwan, and even teachers in America. The country is totally fragmented and this situation is worsened by the local monks who have a tendency to emigrate to Australia, Canada, or even Thailand and Sri Lanka (bringing coals to Newcastle as it were!) The number of monks like the present author, who speak English and teach in Malaysia, can be counted on the fingers of one hand. In Singapore, there are many more, but most interestingly, the most active workers are foreigners. The Singaporeans are very hard-working and supportive of such efforts. Indeed, this paper has only come about through the invitation of one of the Dhammakāya Foundation's Singapore members!

It is important that I point out that if any international organisation is to work in Malaysia or Singapore, whatever they do, they should guide their work towards creating unity and some sort of feeling of fraternity amongst the local Buddhists. The local Buddhists are already weak because there is much inter-religious friction as well. Development is therefore needed not only of the spiritual aspect, but also of the social aspect. It is the duty of every monk, every nun and every foreign Buddhist worker to train local people to take on Buddhist work, too, because the local people understand local problems the best.

Self-Development

1. ***Moral Conduct***: On a higher level, a spiritual level, 'self-development' means 'moral conduct' in particular. Traditionally, moral conduct is synonymous with the Five Precepts, but, if we look deeply at the Five Precepts these are the essence of Buddhist Culture: a culture which has been largely uprooted in Singapore and Malaysia because of the history of Colonialism. Unlike the Muslims, who have an identifiable way of dressing, an identifiable way of behaviour, Buddhists have nowhere to start. The majority of Chinese Buddhists, however, tend to be more *Chinese* than Buddhist. This 'leaves out' quite a significant number of other Buddhists. Thus, we must have some sort of 'common denominator'. This is the point discussed by the present author in a book called '*Buddhist Culture*'. We need to have *Buddhist* culture because peoples' activities are a part of culture. If the culture is not a Buddhist one, then it detracts from the extent to which we can be Buddhist. Lack of such culture leads to superficial Buddhism. The possibility of being 100% Buddhist should be explored.

2. ***Meditation***: The Community of Dharmafarers exists for one main reason: because of meditation. It is the objective of the Community to show that meditation is not something that is difficult to do. In Siam, people may wonder why we make such

a big deal out of this point. Siam has more than one thousand years of history, so there are many meditation traditions. In Malaysia by contrast, the majority of people still do not know how to meditate. Most Malaysians are worried by meditation and think that it is only for monks: not something to do by yourself or outside the temple. Slowly, this anxiety is changing as the understanding of the variety of different sorts of meditation is becoming more widely understood. Kuala Lumpur is said to have about twenty meditation groups following schools and masters from overseas, but the groups do not seem to have much co-operation. On the bright side, they do seem to feel that meditation is useful and on a happy note that university students have been encouraged to meditate to the extent that The Community of Dharmafarers has been able to organise 'campus meditation retreats' for the last ten years.

3. *Sutra Study*: The Tipiṭaka is held in high esteem as an authority, a reference and a guide. Vinaya is mainly for monks, and the Abhidhamma is a bit too difficult for us at this point, so we have to concentrate on the *sūtras*. At this point, The Community of Dharmafarers are trying to reveal to the average Buddhist that the *sūtras* are not difficult to study. Since about 1988, there has been a new move to study *sūtras*, starting from the Pāli text.

One major milestone for this movement, was the translation of the Sutta Nipāta as a 'study edition'. The Sutta Nipāta is a key to the *sūtra* tradition of Buddhist guidelines: some of the oldest Teachings given by the Buddha. The Pāli text and the English translation are presented on facing pages. Footnotes present the variant readings from the Siam Tipiṭaka, the Burmese Tipiṭaka, the Cambodian Tipiṭaka, the Pāli Text Society Canon and all other sources available to the compilers. Also included, most importantly, is a very general section of study notes from sources including the Commentaries (Paramatthajotikā II.), traditional sources and any other books containing interesting explanation of the various points of doctrine.

It is through the *sūtras* that we can build up a knowledge of Buddhist Culture for application in our daily practice, to help ourselves and to help others. Such a text as the Sutta Nipāta help readers to understand what is meant by 'earliest Buddhism', and for Buddhists of Malaysia and Singapore in particular, having such understanding makes it much easier for the various diverse groups to work together.

In conclusion, it is obvious that the interests of good teachers must be much wider than their own school of practice. Even at the author's own ordination, although in Theravāda tradition, it was necessary to answer such questions as "Who is Guanyin?", "Why are some Buddhists vegetarian?" and "Who was Nichiren?". A non-sectarian approach is very important in Singapore and Malaysia, however this does not mean a watering down of doctrines. What is needed is an attitude of accepting other traditions and religions, and having dialogue with them. In the words of the Kassapa-sihanāda Sutta, "On those things which we agree, let us discuss: and those things on which we do not agree, let us put aside". This is what we mean by 'self-development' in relation to the *sūtras*.

Others' Development

Self-development serves as the foundation for the development of others: the missionary aspect of the work. The Community of Dharmafarers started with encouraging the doctrine of spiritual friendship, or fellowship spirit. It is necessary to 'secularize' the situation to make the most of the Dharma resources because there is such a shortage of teaching monks in Malaysia. It is not that Buddhists have become less religious, but that the lay people have become more religious. We need the laypeople to take on some of the tasks normally the domain of monks, such as teaching, spiritual counselling and even conducting marriages! The Community of Dharmafarers is trying to train lay people who can become full-time Buddhist workers, overcoming the problem experienced elsewhere that monks are seen as the only full-time workers. There are now five such laypeople working for the Community. By getting more lay people to become committed, many problems have been solved and the workload considerably lightened.

'Spiritual friendship' means to be able to relate to one another like monks, and to be able to work together, seeing something higher in life than the 'daily grind'. In order to do this, the Community runs courses, proceeding from very simple levels with activities like 'open camps', gradually building up to retreats: and from there, they find people who are ready to commit themselves. Such full-time lay Buddhist workers must find independent means to support themselves. The workers manage to support themselves through 'Right Livelihood' activities such as running bookshops or organising schemes for young graduates (against the prospect of a forthcoming increase in the level of unemployment in Malaysia). Most of all however, the Community hopes that the young people of Singapore and Malaysia will be like the young people of Wat Phra Dhammakāya and commit themselves to what they consider to be beautiful and important in their lives. Only in this way can Buddhism prosper and be meaningful. This is the only way it is possible to talk about any contribution on a worldwide scale. However, from the point of view of The Community of Dhammafarers, when our home is not in order, we cannot yet think on a global scale...

NOTES

1. *Persatuan Sahabat Sedharma Malaysia, Kamus Buddhis Caturbahasa Sanskrit-Pāli-lnggeriss-*BM, 1990.

22
The Reiyukai Movement

Dr. Tsugunari Kubo

The Reiyukai is an organization that has been numbered amongst the so-called 'New Buddhist Movements' in Japan. Members attempt to put into practice teachings based on the Lotus Sūtra, the original expositor of which was Sākyamuni Buddha. Accordingly, the Reiyukai hopes to improve the overall condition of human life by encouraging individuals to enhance their lives through their own will and effort, while being aware of the fact that their lives are connected with those of everybody around them. Those in the organisation believe that a movement of people motivated in this manner, working together, will inevitably help to establish a better society. In this paper I will give an account of the present situation in which the organisation finds itself, paying attention to the quality of universality that it acquires from the teachings of Sākyamuni Buddha, and other characteristics which seem, in particular, to make it relevant for the twenty-first century.

In the autumn of 1919 Kakutarō Kubo[a] (1892-1944) began to study the Lotus Sūtra and to seriously apply himself to the practice of *senzo-kuyō* (remembering and honouring one's ancestors). The ideas he developed at that time formed the basis for the establishment of the Reiyūkai[b] in November of 1924.

Before the Meiji Restoration of 1868, approximately seventy percent of the populace were farmers. After Japan entered the world political and economic arena in 1853, following 220 years of isolation, her economy expanded, with industry and foreign trade becoming increasingly important factors. In the process, Japan was forced to acknowledge and deal with the vastly different cultures and modern technologies of other countries for the first time. The Russo-Japanese War of 1905 in turn hastened industralization, and the subsequent movement of labour to the cities, as well as the weakening of close family ties, created a widespread sense of social and psychological dislocation.

The First World War opened up new markets to Japan, but the quick expansion and change within industry and labour caused economic imbalances and extremely high

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inflation. In 1918, riots caused by the astronomical price of rice broke out, with unprecedented violence and intensity throughout Japan. These so-called 'rice riots'[c] eventually brought down the existing government, revealing the fragility of Japan's new economy and social structure.

After the war, the Japanese economy went into a severe recession, and was just barely recovering when the great Tokyo earthquake of 1923 struck, destroying millions of yen worth of industrial facilities. This was followed by a severe financial crisis in 1927 in which three-hundred banks closed in eighteen months. Then in 1929 the New York Stock Market crashed, causing the worst economic shock of all; Japan's economy, heavily dependent on foreign trade, went into a severe depression.

In that decade of economic crisis, many searched for new ideas and answers to the problems caused by Japan's rapidly industrializing society. Marxist, democratic parliamentarian, labour, feminist and individualistic self-development movements abounded. The Japanese people were forced to confront new socio-economic problems as well as the influx of Western culture and ideas. They were forced to grapple with a new vision of Japan's role in the world while trying to maintain the right balance of Japanese traditional ideas and modern Western ideas.

Kakutarō Kubo could not help but be aware of the new forces and new ideas which had come into play in society, and recognized that their origins lay in a much improved education system. However, he did not believe that movements for social reform based on western patterns could give the people the kind of relief they really needed. He thought that no matter how well the social system might be organized, conditions of discontent and dissatisfaction would continue to arise in the future and the mental and spiritual life of the citizens would remain essentially unchanged. In other words, he was convinced that the prosperity of any society is primarily related to the mental and spiritual condition of the people making up that society. To a degree therefore, he had returned to the spirit of Nichiren[d] (1222-1282) in wishing to carry to ordinary people what he considered to be the basic message of the Lotus Sūtra, or *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* in Sanskrit. He found from his studies that the teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha extolled in the Lotus Sūtra differed greatly from the Buddhism he saw practised in priestly rituals. He understood its guiding idea to be that human beings should open up their lives through their individual will and effort.

In one respect of course, the task had become much easier than it was for Nichiren. One of the advances made in the Meiji era (1868-1912) had been the implementation of the compulsory national education system, under which almost all Japanese people had become literate. Thus for the first time in history conditions were ripe for citizens to engage fully in a secular practice of the teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha.

Kakutarō Kubo believed that the answer to the social hardships which his fellow citizens were experiencing lay in the popularization of the teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha and the practices expounded in the Lotus Sūtra, and in the large-scale adoption of a personal, independent approach to bodhisattva practice (the earnest search for enlightenment both for oneself and others). He became more and more convinced that people should not rely on rituals conducted by priests alone, but should

actively seek to improve their own lives, putting the teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha into practice themselves. Thus he envisioned a society in which all tried to follow the "bodhisattva" path -- a society of spiritually aware people -- and believed that in such a society peace and spiritual harmony would result.

PHILOSOPHY:

Reiyūkai Activities Underpinned by Śākyamuni Buddha's Teaching

In my introductory remarks I mentioned the Reiyūkai's central concept of Inner Self Development. At this stage in my exposition, it may be useful to explain what I mean in more detail and show how it relates to certain aspects of the teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha. Primarily, this requires an understanding of the concept of Dependent Origination [Sanskrit: *pratītyasamutpāda*] and the new perspectives which it opens up.

The principle of Dependent Origination states that the phenomena of the universe form an interrelated and interdependent network, extending through time and space. No one thing, being, or idea can come into existence independently. Once a thing exists, it necessarily has various connections with other existing things, and with things that existed in the past, and will in some way leave its mark on the future. The world of things, beings and ideas -- the network of existence itself -- is a manifestation of Dependent Origination. This view of the interconnecting structure of all things shapes the understanding of our relation to past, present and future phenomena and to fellow human beings.

Although the concept of Dependent Origination requires us to accept that all things are interdependent, this does not imply that they are uniform. In fact, the Reiyūkai wishes to stress the idea that all human beings are unique and must decide for themselves how they should shape and organize their lives. You could imagine all existent things as forming a carpet of a vast and intricate weave. Although from a distance the individual threads are indistinguishable, it is of course made up of an uncountable number of such threads. Each of these threads is actually unique, not only in itself but also because of the unique position it occupies within the whole, and the precise way that it interconnects with that whole. This model works well up to a point but it is only static. We need to move away from a metaphor which uses an inanimate object and add the factors of time and individual awareness. Each individual within the weave of existence needs to think about his or her own situation and recognize that it is constantly changing through time. Consequently, over time, he or she has the opportunity to influence the future and resolve the problems of the present -- this is the dynamic model. Through relationships with family, friends and colleagues, one learns to explore and understand oneself, and comes to realize how people influence and affect each other; one begins to understand where one belongs on the axis of human existence, in time (from one's ancestors to oneself to one's children), and in space (among friends, acquaintances and with one's spouse).

This concept relates directly to the principle of act and consequence, which is the real meaning of the word '*karman*'. It is the process beginning with one action and leading to its result. In accordance with the principle of Dependent Origination, karmic effects

continue eternally throughout the network of existence. One's present mode of being is a manifestation of the karma of one's past actions and those of one's ancestors. Similarly, the shape one's life will take in the future is a result of what one does in the present, that is, what kind of karma one creates in the present.

We human beings are all affected by the karma transferred at birth from our parents and ancestors, and by the karma we receive and create in our daily lives. From birth till death our karma is constantly changing. The Reiyūkai thus advocates the practice of "Inner Self Development" to help one realize that the future depends on one's present actions and attitudes, and that one can work to change karma in a positive way, thereby creating a positive future for oneself and for those who are affected by one's karma.

Inner Self Development leads to a higher awareness of Dependent Origination, and helps one to become conscious of the existence of karma. This awareness of the reality of Dependent Origination and karma makes one realize in turn that karma is something that can be made better or worse through one's own actions. Through this awareness, one can learn to control and create positive karma. One can acquire a stronger sense of treasuring the lives of others, as well as one's own. One can also gain a serene insight into one's real nature. Furthermore, one can more clearly understand the reality of one's own situation by trying to see oneself from the point of view of others.

A New Approach to the Teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha: The Reiyūkai's Concept of Inner Self Development

Ever since it was founded, the Reiyūkai has consistently advanced towards its goal, the establishment of a better society through the improvement of each indivdual.

The principle methods the Reiyūkai employs to bring this about are *senzo-kuyō*[e] and *michibiki*[f]. The Japanese term '*senzo-kuyō*' is, in its Reiyūkai form, a practice designed to enrich one's appreciation for life through understanding more deeply the connection that one has with one's ancestors. The traditional offering of respects to one's ancestors in Japan had come to be reduced to something essentially rather formulaic. Only those ancestors on the father's side of the family were revered, and only the eldest son in each family bore the responsibilty of ancestor worship.

The Reiyūkai practice, on the contrary, is an attempt to get back to what we consider to be the real purpose and significance of celebrating one's relationship with one's ancestors. The Reiyūkai does not teach its members to worship their ancestors and there is no sense in which ancestors are considered divine beings or supernatural powers. It teaches its members to recognize that their ancestors are the source of life from whom, through Dependent Origination, they have inherited karma. Furthermore it is their responsibility to resolve the negative karma by their own efforts, and to create positive karma not only for their own well-being, but for the contentment of their ancestors as well as the future happiness of their descendants.

To this end, the Reiyūkai practice of *senzo-kuyō* differs from traditional Japanese ancestor rites in several respects. The Reiyūkai believes in honouring the matrilineal ancestors as well as the patrilineal ancestors and that this act of thanks and remembrance should not be considered solely the duty of first-born sons. The blood of one's

ancestors runs evenly through every member of the family, regardless of family rank or sex; therefore the Reiyūkai practice believes that a relationship with one's ancestors is personal in exactly the same way as a relationship with members of one's family who are now living. Naturally, because this is a matter which involves the full participation of each individual it is vital that it is carried out by that individual and not through another person, such as a priest.

Michibiki means to convince others of the merit of Inner Self Development, guide them, and practice with them.

In accordance with the concept of Dependent Origination, the members of the Reiyūkai pay attention to the fact that the lives which all people lead are closely interrelated with those of others. They become aware that everyone is affected to a greater or lesser degree by the speech and behaviour of others in each of those relationships, and that what one does oneself has a certain effect on other people. Every individual has his/her own individual character and circumstances. *Michibiki* enables a person to meet various types of people, and through doing so, to become aware of his/her own good points and shortcomings. In developing a positive relationship with various individuals and in the course of reflecting upon their way of thinking and living, people can bring about changes in their selves, and experience a corresponding improvement in their lives.

In other words, *michibiki* is not simply a question of increasing the number of Reiyūkai members. It is the act of introducing the value of Inner Self Development to others; reaching out positively to their inner selves of others; making friends with them; improving one another and creating relationships in which individuals can learn from each other. *Michibiki* further enables them to improve their relationships with others, improve the world around them, and thus live fulfilled lives.

The recognition that something is wrong or lacking, and the subsequent effort to improve is an essential part of Inner Self Development. In recent years the Reiyūkai has attempted to give form and impetus to its ideas by promoting a number of "movements."

In 1971, the Reiyūkai started promoting what was called the "Inner Trip Movement," the declared aim of which was to let people become aware of the necessity of knowing one's inner self. In 1981, through the "Inner Self Development Movement," we further asserted the importance of developing oneself amidst positive relationships with others. In 1990, the Reiyūkai refocused again by launching the message "Life - a Dynamic Exchange," whereby people are encouraged to understand that we are just one of the myriad life forms that exist on the earth and that we live and receive life amidst innumerable human relationships sustained by the blessing of nature. Furthermore, people are encouraged to develop themselves by making use of their innate abilities, while being aware of the dignity of life as a totality. The Reiyūkai encourages not only its members, but all human beings, regardless of nationality, race and creed to carry out the same self-development and rise to the same awareness. We believe that when more people develop their inner selves, humanity in general will be improved, and that this in itself will form the basis for an improvement in society.

Spiritual Movements in Japan: The Reiyūkai and Other Movements for Spiritual Change

The foregoing explanation will, I hope, enable you to understand the specific practices and principles of the Reiyūkai. Clearly, they relate both to Buddhism in general and to Buddhism as it has evolved in a Japanese context, although, as I will argue later, this does not make them invalid or inappropriate for other countries and people of other faiths.

Our history provides many examples that show us that however worthy and valuable any idea may be, there is always the possibility that it may give rise to intolerant or restrictive practices. I cannot deny, therefore, that certain Buddhist organizations which arose at around the same time as the Reiyūkai do not appear to have the same quality of openness which we believe to be so essential to the proper implementation of Buddhist philosophy. It is true, for example, that the Sōka-Gakkai[g] practices a form of proselytisation which involves a stringent attack on the subject's previously held convictions and that the value of any other spiritual, religious or indeed philosophical belief is strenuously rejected. It is also perhaps of some significance in this case that the Sōka-Gakkai has never disaffiliated itself from the Nichiren-Shōshū[h] sect, of which it was an offshoot, and so is technically still a part of the Buddhist religious establishment in Japan. Consequently, it shares the Nichiren-Shōshū's faith in an object of veneration which is said to embody the teaching both of the Lotus Sūtra and Nichiren's exposition of it. In this way the Sōka-Gakkai shares a characteristic with most of what we now regard as organised religions, in that it declares "there is no truth but our truth." In fact, in the terminology of religious studies, it is called a "*Kō*"[i] - a group which should be under the guidance of priests - and therefore does not technically constitute a lay Buddhist organization. The Reiyūkai, on the other hand, is a group consisting purely of lay people, and therefore should not be classified within the group of Nichiren Sects, as is the current practice followed by the Cultural Agency of the Japanese Government.

Kakutarō Kubo did not wish to establish a new doctrine but to find a way to actively and concretely improve the condition of people's lives by using the beneficial teaching of something which stood within the Japanese tradition. One of his primary insights in fact, was that the teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha could be, and had been, misappropriated. He wished to restore a true sense of it to the people, reminding them that its teaching was at its most effective when it actively entered each individual life. One need only look at the ease with which Buddhism lived alongside Shintoism in Japan throughout almost all its history to be convinced that any sense of exclusiveness is a complete anathema to the teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha. In this sense, it should not be considered a religion in quite the same sense as Christianity, for example. Christianity must present its believers with certain absolutes - the existence of one true God, and the declaration that he is omnipotent and omniscient and therefore absolutely outside the real understanding of those who are his creatures. The teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha does not offer such absolutes, instead it offers the possibility of achieving something of the greatest value, of literally transforming oneself through an

active and sincere endeavour, when thought and action are united in the act of striving towards this goal.

Of course, I am well aware that Christianity also urges its believers to actually apply the gospel to their daily lives, and that Christ enjoined his followers to strive to improve themselves. In Christianity however, the degree of improvement to which individuals can aspire is ultimately limited, whereas Śākyamuni Buddha's Teaching offers the possibility for each individual to achieve a higher wisdom and awareness in himself. On the other hand, perhaps, Christianity labours too much under the influence of dualistic aspects of Western thought, with which it is sometimes actually identified, thereby making philosophical debate too much a question of categorization and abstract analysis. The teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha, as we hope to show by our practices, has continued to concentrate upon the effects and actions rather than searching too deeply for rational causes. What the body and mind do together are more likely to produce an answer than what the mind does alone.

Thus, when the Reiyūkai takes its teachings into countries outside Japan, as it began to do on a systematic basis in 1972, it does not come to replace their spiritual beliefs, but to add to them and to create new ones. Of course, we have often been posed questions such as, "Is the Reiyūkai a religion or not?," "Should conversion be required or not?" The frequency with which these questions are asked is attributable to the methods which the Reiyūkai employs in activities, as well as its attitude towards dissemination. The questioners are perhaps puzzled because we do not insist on our truth so much, we merely offer another perspective.

At present the Reiyūkai has branch offices in sixteen different countries in the world and the total foreign membership amounts to approximately eighty thousand. Of these members there are many who believe in Christianity, Judaism or Hinduism. One could therefore say that a form of spiritual culture which evolved under the influence of Buddhism in Japan has made the positive development of a syncretic attitude possible amid these totally different cultures. We do not wish people to dismiss the teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha by saying "it's a religion" or "it's a philosophy;" but rather wish them to find in it a system which expands and overlaps into their own daily philosophy; one which takes connections and extends them.

Thus the teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha can be regarded as a universal spiritual teaching which is compatible with a religion where God is considered an absolute.

CONCLUSION

Since its foundation seventy years ago, the Reiyūkai has developed into an association with 3,200,000 members. Furthermore, if we include the membership of the Risshō-kōseikai,[j] the Busshogonenkai[k] and other groups which split from the Reiyūkai during the course of its history, this new movement, consisting of ordinary people and based directly on the teachings of Śākyamuni Buddha, has affected the mentality and spiritual conduct of over thirteen million people to this date.

The philosophy of this movement, when being introduced to different cultures, has generally been accepted and acknowledged as a spiritual movement which does not necessitate conversion. We believe that the teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha can be

compatible with a religion such as Christianity, and indeed that its teaching is applicable to all mankind. The non-religious character of the teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha can be seen in its humanistic stance, which encourages one to come to a higher level of awareness of oneself for the sake of mutual improvement; and also in its relativism, which does not require any sense of an absolute being such as God. In this respect, the teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha should really be considered as religious, but not a religion. By this I mean that it concentrates upon the needs and qualities of the human spirit and opens up new paths for that spirit to follow, without proscribing or prescribing an exact path.

What it certainly does do, is to encourage practitioners to develop a perception of their position in the flow of time. A sense of wholeness, of value and significance can be derived from the simple recognition that we are connected with those who preceded us and those who are to follow us . It is certain that the lives of our descendants and all those whose lives are linked with ours will be affected by our own spiritual awareness, just as that spiritual awareness will affect our own future. It is through such a new sense of value and wholeness that the Reiyūkai approach to life can be of great benefit to those who believe in God and to those who do not.

SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS

1. The total number of Reiyūkai members is 3,235,550 including 79,915 members in overseas countries (as of December, 1988: by the Reiyūkai General Affairs Dept.)(see Table 32.1).

2. The Reiyūkai's organizational system:
The Reiyūkai, since its foundation, has employed an organizational system grounded on the person-to-person basis instead of a regional basis. "*Michibiki*," one of the fundamental practices of

Table 32.1
Membership of Reiyūkai-derived Groups

Group	No. Members
Risshōkōseikai	6,248,419
Busshogenenkai	1,980,993
Myōchikai Kyōdans	903,028
Kōdō Kyōdan	401,452
Myōdōkai Kyōdan	19,380
Daiekai Kyōdan	178,762
Shishinkai	136,376
Hosshikai Kyōdan	123,003

The above list shows membership of Reiyūkai-derived groups which together total more than 10,000,000.




Table 32.2:
The 'Oya-Ko' System on which Reiyukai is based

the Reiyūkai, is the act of convincing others of the merit of Inner Self Development, guiding them, and practicing with them. In Japanese, "*Oya*" means "parent" and "*Ko*" means "child". In this respect, human relationships between "*Oya*" (the person who introduced others to the Reiyūkai) and "*Ko*" (the person who was introduced to the Reiyūkai) come to have great importance for each individual. It can be said that all the Reiyūkai activities, and the organizational system, are based upon these "*Oya-Ko*" relationships.

The "*Oya*"[l] and "*Ko*"[m] form a group. The member who heads this group, who has introduced the other new members and guided and helped them, is granted a title depending on the number of members within the group. For example a *Hōza-in*[n] (Gathering Member) heads a group of three to nine members, a *Jun-hōza-shu*[o] (Sub-Leader), ten to forty-nine, a *Hōza-shu*[p] (Gathering Leader), 50 to 199, a *Jun-shibu-chō*[q] (Sub-Branch Director), 200 to 499, and finally a *Shibu-chō*[r] (Branch Director), who heads a group of no less than 500. As of December 1988 there were 3,509 *Shibu-cho*. It is important to note however that this is not a hierarchical system, all members are equal. The accreditation format is simply an effective organizational system that preserves the close person-to-person ties of the "*Oya-Ko*" relationship on which the Reiyūkai is based. (see Table 32.2)

NOTES

a. 久保角太郎
b. 霊友会
c. 米騒動
d. 日蓮
e. 先祖供養
f. 導き
g. 創価学会
h. 日蓮正宗
i. 講
j. 立正佼成会
k. 佛所護念會
l. 親
m. 子
n. 法座員
o. 準法座主
p. 法座主
q. 準支部長
r. 支部長
s. 妙智会
t. 孝道教団
u. 妙道会教団
v. 大慧会
w. 思親会
x. 法師会教団

PROF. DR. HEINZ BECHERT

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Education: Universities of München and Hamburg. Ph.D. in Indian and Tibetan Studies, Universität München, 1956.

Lecturer, Universities of Saarbrücken and Mainz, 1956-64; Reader, Univ. Mainz 1964-65; Professor and Director, Seminar of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Univ. Göttingen, since 1965.

Member of various learned societies, esp. Academy of Sciences (Göttingen), Royal Academy of Belgium (Bruxelles), Royal Swedish Academy of Antiquities (Stockholm), etc.

Author and editor of books and papers on Buddhism and related subjects: "Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft in den Länden des Theravāda-Buddhismus" (3 vols., 1966-73); Buddhism in Ceylon (1978); Einführung in die Indologie (with G.v. Simson, 1979); The Language of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition (1980); Pali Nīti Texts of Burma (with H. Braun, 1981); The World of Buddhism (with R. Gombrich, 1984); The Dating of the Historical Buddha (vol. 1, 1991); Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden (with G.v. Simson, M. Schmidt, et al., vol. 1, 1992), etc.

MR. L.S. COUSINS

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1942 born Hichin, Herts, England.

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1965-1966 Danish government scholarship to Copenhagen University.

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1962 BS Chemical Eng, Lic. in Mathematics (UNL-Mexico)

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1970 PhD Statistics (UC-Berkeley, USA)

1986 Pos-Doc Statistics (Univ. Oxford UK)

1970-1978 Prof. CIENES-OAS, Chile

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H.E. DR. ANANDA W.P. GURUGE

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1967-1968-Visting Professor of Asian Studies at State University of New York at Buffalo.

1968-1985-UNESCO Staff member-Specialist in Educational Planning and Management in Paris, New Delhi and Bangkok and Chief of UNESCO-UNICEF and UNESCO-WFP Cooperative Programme in Paris.

1985-1989-Ambassador and Permanent Delegate of Sri Lanka to UNESCO.

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Education:

1967-70 Mandarin Chinese/Japanese Summer Schools, Middlebury College Vermont, USA.
1969 Oberlin College Summer Program in Chinese, Tunghai University, Taiwan.
1971 B.A. in East Asian Studies, Oakland University, Michigan, USA.
1976 M.A. in Oriental Languages, University of California, Berkeley, USA.
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1971-1974 Danforth Foundation Graduate Fellowship.
1971 Student of Distinction, Oakland University.
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Member, Board of Trustees, Dharma Realm Buddhist University.
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Publications and Translations:

Co-authorship with Bhikshu Heng Chau:
With One Heart, Bowing To The City of Ten ThousandBuddhas (nine Volumes), Buddhist Text Translation Society, 1977-1980.
Letters From True Cultivators, Buddhist Text Translation Society, 1981.
Co-translator:
Flower Adornment Sūtra, Chapter 40, "Entering the Inconceivable Liberated State of Universal Worthy's Practices and Vows", Buddhat Text Translation Society, 1980.
Translator:
Shramanera Vinaya and Rules of Deportment, Buddhist Text Translation Society, 1976.
"*Goddess of the Ganges*", Phi Theta Papers, Oriental Languages Department, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1976.

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RESEARCH:

1985-87 Associate Research, Dept. Oriental Languages, University of California at Berkeley, CA.
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PUBLICATIONS :

BOOKS :

Nāgārjuna's Philosophy of Śūnyatā and his Dialectic to be published from Motilal Banarsidass, 1991;

TRANSLATIONS :

The Pai-chang Zen Monastic Regulation revised under the Yüan Imperial Edict. Translated from the Ch'i-hsiu Pai-chang-ch'ing-kuei in the Chêng-t'ung Edition, [Taisho Tripitaka No. 2025, Vol. 48];
The Vinaya Book in Four Divisions [SsOAC(√,u)-fên-lü or The Dharmaguptaka Vinaya in Taisho. No. 1428] and the Mahasanghika Vinaya Book [Taisho No. 1425, Vol. 48], both translated into English from Chinese, to be published from the Numata Foundation for Buddhist Translation and Research;

EDITING:
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Many Articles.

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1972-1978 Research Psychologist at the Medical faculty of Leiden University (Department of Psychiatry)
1978-1986 Professor of Clinical Psychology and Personality Theory at the Free University of Amsterdam.
Presently retired.

Professional Titles

President of the Friends of Buddhism Foundation,
President of the Dutch Buddhist Study Centre,
President of the Milinda Foundation,
Member of the Arya Maitreya Mandala.

PRAKRU VINAITORN VIRASAK KITTIVARO

Luang Por Eed, formally known as Phra Kru Vinaitorn Virasak Kittivaro, is a well-educated son of a Thai diplomat who turned from a successful and varied business career to become a Buddhist monk. He says, "I try to teach people to live together by the Precepts of Buddhism and be happy, so that we can have peace in the world".

Born in Bangkok on 6 April 1936, he left Thailand when he was fifteen years old for a fourteen-year stay in England, where he received the classical preparatory school education and graduated with a batchelor's degree in Economics from Trent College, London University. He subsequently held positions in banking and air-travel, worked as an agricultural advisor to the U.S. Government and lastly was manager of Bangkok's prestigious Mandarin Hotel. He also worked to establish the Labour Party in Thailand. Throughout this period he was an avid tennis player and at one point reached the quarter finals at Wimbledon.

When he was forty, Luang Por Eed decided to follow the Thai tradition of becoming a monk for two weeks. He has remained a monk ever since. A walking pilgrimage of 1000 kilometres from Bangkok to Phuket in 127 days brought him past Khao Takiab, a beautiful hill overlooking the Gulf of Thailand near the city of Hua Hin. He found the location strikingly good for meditation. After he returned to Bangkok, some Hua Hin residents invited him to come back and establish a temple. In the past ten years, Abbot Luang Por Eed has transformed Wat Khao Takiab into a haven for visitors seeking meditation and peace.

Awards

19 April 1989 U Thant Peace Award at United Nations
25 June 1989 Honorary degree from Sri-Lanka as 'Sasana Sobhon Siri Pavachana Visarado'.
May 1990: Community Development Award from H.R.H. Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn

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Born

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1963 B.A. Degree in Letters (Tokyo University)
1966 M.A. Indian Philosophy (Tokyo University)
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Professional Posts

1979-1983 Professor at Shitennoji Women's College
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Works
A Study of Early Bua-yen Thought in China, Tokyo, 1977. pp.629.
A Historical Survey on Chinese Buddhism, Tokyo, 1979, pp.219.
The Avatamsaksa Sūtra, Tokyo, 1986, pp.403.
Honen, Shinran, and Nichiren (collaboration), Tokyo. 1872. pp.456.
Selected Bua-yen Readings (collaboration), Tokyo, 1989. pp.447.

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NATAYADA NA SONGKHLA

Natayada na Songkhla was born in Bangkok, Thailand. Raised in a diplomatic family, he has lived in Europe, Africa, and North America. In 1985 he graduated. from Vassar College with an A.B. in Victorian Studies. He received an M.Phil. in Social Anthropology from Cambridge University in 1986 and is presently reading for a Ph.D. in the same subject at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He is a practising Buddhist.

VEN. PĀSĀDIKA

Venerable Pāsādika is associated with the Commission for Buddhist Studies, Academy of Sciences in Goettingen, Germany. His specialist field of research encompasses comparative study of Pāli Nikāyas, early Mahāyāna Sutras and Chinese Āgamas.

PROF. ALEXIS SANDERSON

Born 28 June 1944, Educated at the Royal Masonic School, 1957-1966. Entered Oxford University in 1967 with a Classical Scholarship at Balliol College. After completing Honour Moderations in Classics (Ancient Greek and Latin Language and Literature) in 1969, I turned to Sanskrit and graduated in this subject (with Prakrit) in 1971. I then began Indological research. I held a Senior Scholarship at Merton College, Oxford, from 1971 to 1974 and the Platnauer Junior Research Fellowship at Brasenose College, Oxford, from 1974 to 1977. These appointments enabled me to spend most of my time in India, I worked mainly in Kashmir. There I studied the Śaiva literature of Kashmir, particularly the Tantraloka and other Tantric works of Avhinavagupta, under Swami Lakshman, the last learned representative of this tradition. The greater part of the literature which Abhinavagupta quotes as authoritative in his works of Tantric exegesis appeared to have been lost. However in the latter years of my research in India I turned from studying within the tradition to searching in Indian and Nepalese libraries for manuscripts of texts belonging to this earlier period. In 1977 I was appointed to my present position as Lecturer in Sanskrit at Oxford University and was able to continue this search. By 1983 I had identified a substantial part of the literature presumed lost, principally in the Kathmandu and in other collections containing Nepalese manuscripts. Though many other works known to the early Kashmirian writers remained unidentified, it become evident that I had before me not a random selection preserved by chance but most of the fundamental and most influenttial texts of the earliest Tantric traditions. Since I have been studying this new literature and preparing critical editions of some it. The Buddhist tradition has always been central to my work. When I began research in Kashmir I was bound to come to terms with the thought of the thought of the brilliantBuddhist thinker Dharmakirti, since the predominantly philosophical texts with which he was

concerned were composed in the shadow of his genius; and in the last five years his research has drawn him into the closely related field of the Buddhist Tantric tradition (the Vajrayāna), particularly those parts of it, the latest, which were dominating north Indian Buddhism at the time of the early Śaiva literature and which still survive in the Kathmandu Valley, Tibet and Mongolia.

PROF. DR. LAMBERT SCHMITHAUSEN

Director of the Institute of Indian and Tibetan Culture and History, Hamburg University. Buddhist and vegetarian, Prof. Dr. Schmithausen is a renowned specialist in Buddhist philosophy.

MAHATHERA KOSGODA SOBHITA

Born in Sri Lanka, received Higher Ordination in 1940. Winning a French Government Scholarship in 1962, proceeded to France to read for the degree of Ph.D. Obtaining the degree "Doctorat de l'Université" from the University of Paris in 1967, has been engaged in lecturing as "Chargé de Conférences" at the Practical School of Higher Studies in the IV Section of the Sorbonne, while continuing research attached to the "Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique" under the Ministry of Education. President of the Buddhist Studies Centre.

DR. AKIRA YUYAMA, PH.D.(A.N.U.)

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1953-1957 Indian and Buddhist studies at Osaka University of Foreign Studies (B.A. 1957)

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1965-1971 South Asian and Buddhist Studies The Australian National University, Canberra(Ph.D. 1971)

Professional Posts:

1965-1973 Australian National University, Canberra: Research Assistant in South Asian and Buddhist Studies(1965-6), Lecturer in Sanskrit (1967-71); Senior Lecturer (1971-1973)

1973-1974 University of Auckland: University Post-Doctoral Fellow in Asian Languages and Literatures,

1974-1976 University of Göttingen: Alexander von Humboldt-Fellow in Indian and Buddhist Studies

1976-1981 Director of The Reiyukai Library, Tokyo

1982-present: Director of The International Institute for Buddhist Studies [formerly: The Reiyukai Library], Tokyo

1979-present: Regional Secretary for Asia on the Board of Directors of The International Association of Buddhist Studies

Temporary Lectureships at The Universities of Tokyo (1977, 1982-83, 1988-90), of Kyoto (1978, 1988), of Hokkaido, Sapporo (1980, 1984, 1987, 1989), of Tohoku, Sendai (1988), of Hiroshima (1989).

Visiting Professorships at The Universities of Hamburg (1985), of Calgary (1988), and of California, Berkeley (1989).

1984-1985 Alexander von Humboldt-Fellow in Indian and Buddhist Studies at the University of Göttingen

Publications:

Indic Manuscripts and Chinese Blockprints (Non-Chinese Texts) of the Oriental Collection of The Australian National University Library (Canberra 1967);

A Bibliography of the Sanskrit Texts of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra (Canberra 1970);

A Grammar of the Prajñā-pāramitāratna-guṇa -saṃcaya-gāthā (*Recension A*) (Canberra 1973); *Prajñāpāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā* (*Receension A*), edited with an introduction, bibliographical notes and a Tibetan version from Tunhuang (Cambridge 1979);

Systematische Übersicht über die buddhistische Sanskrit-Literatur, I: Vinaya-Texte (Wiesbaden 1979);

Sanskrit Fragments of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, I: Koyasan Manuscript (Tokyo 1981);

Kacchapa-Jātaka: *Eine Erzählung von der Schildkröte und dem Kranzwinder* (Tokyo 1983).

And many other publications.

II

Glossary

Prof. Visudh Busyakul

This glossary is not a general reference work. Entries are limited to Buddhist terms and proper names appearing in the foregoing articles. Roman transliteration is used throughout. Spelling of Sanskrit and Pali terms follows the international convention, with the exception of those terms which have been included in major English dictionaries, in which case they are spelled out as such. Deviation from the international transliteration occurs is the use of the simple "n" in place of "ṅ" (the guttural nasal), and occasionally "sh" in place of "ṣ". The Chinese and Japanese terms are spelled out the way they appear in the articles. Departures from this, especially on the use of diacritics, should not cause serious problems.

It is hoped that no harm is done when the explanation of a term may at times cover more than is intended by the contributors of the articles. It is also possible that important terms are overlooked, or the explanation given does not agree with what is intended by the contributors, for this the compiler of the glossary is sorry and craves indulgence from the contributors and the readers. The compiler admits that there is inconsistency in the spelling of common Pali and Sanskrit entries. The Pali-Sanskrit "c" is sometimes retained, but sometimes spelled "ch", (the pronunciation of the Pali-Sanskrit "c" is similar to the English "ch" in *church*, but with less aspiration, or none at all. The "ṇ" and "ṃ" are spelled as such, but sometimes the simple "n" is used. A very common term which is spelled out sometimes in Sanskrit, sometimes in Pali, is *dharma* (Sk.) and *dhamma* (P.), both forms carry the same meaning. The same applies for Sanskrit *Nirvāṇa* and Pali *Nibbāna*. Gautama and Gotama, the name of the Buddha, are both used. The following terms should also be noted:

Theravādin = a Theravāda Buddhist
Sarvāstivādin = an adherent to Sarvāstivāda School
Śaivaite = an adherent to Śaivism
Śākta = an adherent to Śaktism
Upanishadic = pertaining to the Upanishads

Most articles are written new for the glossary, but short explanations are often adapted from the following authorities:

Brandon, S. G. F., *A Dictionary of Comparative Religion*, New York, 1970. esp. articles by T.O. Ling.
Chan, Wing-tsit, *Religious Trends in Modern China*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1953.
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Murti, T. R. V., *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, London, 1955.
Nyanatiloka, *Buddhist Dictionary*, Colombo, Ceylon, 1972.
Runes, Dagobert D., *Dictionary of Philosophy*, Students Outlines Series, Ames, 1958.
Takakusu, Junjiro, *Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, University of Hawaii, 1949.
Thomas, E. J., *The History of Buddhist Thought*, London, 1953.
Ward, C. H. S., *Buddhism*, volume 2, London, 1952.

NOTES ON PALI AND SANSKRIT SOUNDS.

a. The macron sign on top of a vowel is the *long* mark.

"a, i, u," are short vowels, like in *but, pin, put.*

"ā, ī, ū," are long vowels, like in *father, meat, cool.*

The vowel "e" is similar to *e* in *beg*, (but *long*).

The vowel "ai" is similar to *y* in *my*.

The vowel "au" is similar to *ow* in *cow*.

b. There is a Sanskrit vowel "ṛ" which is pronounced like *ri*.

"Bṛhaspati" is pronounced *bri-has-pa-ti.*

"Ṛgveda" is pronounced *rig-we-da.*

c. The "v" is usually pronounced like the English w. The pronunciation as an English v is also accepted.

d. The "g" is always pronounced like *g* in *gun*. Never in *ginger*.

e. The "h" after a consonant is an indication of aspiration.

"bh" is pronounced as *bh* in English *abhor.*

"dh" is pronounced as *dh* in English *madhouse.*

"gh" is pronounced as *gh* in English *doghouse.*

"kh" is pronounced as *kh* in English *backhand.*

"ph" is pronounced as *ph* in English *lamphouse.*

"th" is pronounced as *th* in English *boathook.*

Pali and Sanskrit have no sounds like *th* in English *thief, then*, or *ph* in *elephant.*

f. The dot under the consonants "ṭ ḍ ṭh ḍh ṇ" shows that the letter is a retroflex, pronounced with the tongue rolled backward and upward. The neglect is however well tolerated.

g. The sound "ñ" is not rare in Sanskrit, and more common in Pali, and is pronounced as "ñ" in Spanish *siñora*, or as *gn* in French *campagne*. The Pali transliteration of Nyānatiloka (the author of *Buddhist Dictionary*, see above) is Ñāṇatiloka.

h. There are three sibilants in Sanskrit, "s" is pronounced as a regular "s" in English. "ṣ and ś" are pronounced as sh in English.

i. When an "n ṃ ṅ" is the final of a syllable, and immediately before "*k kh g gh*", that final *n ṃ ṅ* is very often pronounced as a final *ng* in English.

sankhāra, saṃkhāra, saṇkhāra are pronounced sang-khā-ra.

sangha, saṃgha, saṇgha are pronounced sang-gha.

sangama, saṃgama, saṇgama are pronounced sang-ga-ma.

But before "p ph b bh m" they are pronounced as a final *m* in English - like an m, or

ng, or n if followed by y r l h. There are very often variations, e.g. the *saṃ* in: *saṃ*jñā, *saṃ*tāna, *Saṃ*skṛta (= Sanskrit) is read either as *sam* or *san*.

ABBREVIATIONS

Following are abbreviations used in this glossary:

adj.	=	adjective;	i.e.	=	that is;
A.D.	=	Anno domini;	Jap.	=	Japanese:
B.C.	=	Before Christ;	lit.	=	literally;
c.	=	about;	n.	=	noun;
ca.	=	about;	P.	=	Pali;
cf.	=	confer;	Sk.	=	Sanskrit;
Chin.	=	Chinese;	s.v.	=	which see;
e.g.	=	for example;	viz.	=	namely.

A

Abhidhamma (Sk. Abhidharma) n. Higher-dharma, metaphysics, a Pāli collection, called in full 'Abhidhamma Piṭaka', the third section of the Theravāda Scripture, it consists of classified or logical expositions of the *dharmas* taught in the Sutta Piṭaka, dealing in particular with mind-control and analysis of phenomenal existence in terms of psychological interpretation. The fundamental doctrines discussed have in general been propounded in the Sutta Piṭaka in form of parables, anecdotes, metaphors, etc., referring to persons and places, whereas the Abhidhamma is abstract, impersonal and precise, the study of which requires self control, powers of memory and perseverance. Many Buddhist centres in Southeast Asia, especially in Burma, encourage the study of Abhidharma. Tradition holds that the Pali Abhidhamma Piṭaka was compiled at the Third Council at Pāṭaliputra (the modern Patna), the capital of Magadha Empire, during Aśoka's reign.

The Abhidhamma Piṭaka is divided into seven titles:

1. Dhammasanganī. "Enumeration of the *dharmas* or factors of existence." It deals for the most part with the same topics as the Sutta Piṭaka, differing only in methods of treatment. These Dharmas are arranged in numerical groups, in twos, threes, and fours, and discussed from a psychological standpoint to bring out their ethical significance. It may be called a book of mental elements or processes.

2. Vibhanga. "Distinction or determination". It deals in a general way with the analysis of different categories and formulas given in the Dhammasanganī, although different methods of treatment are used.

3. Dhātukathā. "A discussion on elements." On the mental elements or characteristics found in earnest and spiritually advanced, and their relations to other categories. It seems to have been designed as a supplement to the Dhammasanganī.

4. Puggalapaññatti. "Description of individuals." Generally considered to be the earliest of the Abhidhamma Books. Its subject matter is the description of *puggala* (person or individual, Sk. *pudgala*) especially according to their stages of accomplishment along the Noble Path (*ariya-magga*). Human types are classified in numerical groups of twos, threes, and so on up to tens, in the manner of the Anguttaranikāya.

5. Kathāvatthu. "Subjects for Discussion." Discussion of points of controversy between eighteen early sects, followed by another collection of discussions (*kathā*) and refutations of 219 heretical views on theological and philosophical matters propounded by schismatic groups of monks. Some modern scholars consider that part of the book must have been added, as some of the heretical views confuted belonged to those schools which arose some centuries later than Asoka's time.

6. Yamaka. "Book of Pairs," called by Wilhelm Geiger an applied logic. It is a logical treatises on psychological subjects, with analysis arranged in pairs of questions. The title is divided into ten chapters (each being called 'Yamaka'): Mūla-, khandha-, Āyatana-, Dhātu-, Sacca-, Sankhārā-, Anusaya-, Citta-, Dhamma- and Indriya-Yamaka.

7. Paṭṭhāna. "Book of causes or relations." It deals with analysis of the twenty four *paccaya*s or modes of relations (causality, etc.) between things, mental and material.

The Abhidharma was also preserved by the Sarvāstivādins, although the contents were very likely distinct from the Theravāda Abhidhamma. It contains the same number of books and has been translated by the Chinese with two commentaries. The teaching was systematized in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa and its commentaries.

Kanishka (1st cent. A.D.), an upholder of Sarvāstivādin School, summoned a Council and a commentary on Abhidharma was composed and known as 'Vibhāṣā-śāstra'. This commentary was much studied in Kashmir and gave rise to the Vaibhāshika sect in that region. The Tibetan Canon contains no Abhidharma proper, but they made a special collection of their Sūtras and commentaries and call it Abhidharma. The most prominent of these texts are the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras among

the Tibetans, and the Vajrachedikā Sūtras among the Chinese.

Ābhidharmika adj. pertaining to the Abhidharma (s.v.)

abhiṣeka (P. *abhiseka*) n. 1. In general Sanskrit and Pali literature, consecration (of a king after ascension to the throne); the anointment, or the water sprinkling in sacred Buddhist and Hindu ceremonies.

2. In Mahāvastu and Gaṇḍavyūha, Abhiṣeka-bhūmi is the the name of the last stage (*bhūmi*) of religious attainment of a Bodhisattva before enlightenment. See **bhūmi**.

3. In the Shingon School (the True-Word School) of Japan, *abhiṣeka* is the ritual anointment required in the observance of the mystic ceremony.

Ādi-Buddha n. The First Buddha, the Buddha at the beginning of time, the Primordial Buddha. (*ādi* = the beginning). The *Ādi*-Buddha concept is limited to Mahāyāna Buddhism. It is the Primordial Being, the unoriginated source of the Universal First Principle, similar to the Upanishadic Brahman. It is self-existent, eternal, formless, beyond the grasp of intellect, in and by which all phenomenal existence manifests.The objective aspect of the self-creative power of the *Ādi*-Buddha is symbolized under form of five *Dhyāni*-Buddhas (or *Jinas*) who theoretically have existed from the beginning of time like the *Ādi*-Buddha. These *Dhyāni*-Buddhas have their attributes further represented by the hypostatic personifications as *Dhyāni*-Bodhisattvas. Then, the manifestations on earth of the *Dhyāni*-Bodhisattvas are in the form of human Buddhas, or *Mānuṣī*-Buddhas. See **Dhyāni Bodhisattva, Dhyāni Buddha, Lamaism.**

ahiṃsā n. Non-injury, not-hurting, an ethical principle applicable to all living beings. It is compassion in the widest sense, both to men and beasts. The first of the Five Precepts (*pañca-śīla*, P. *pañca-sīla)* enjoins negative compassion by not taking life or doing injuries to living beings, and *karuṇā* (the second of the *brahmavihāra* virtues), inculcates positive compassion or loving kindness for all life. The two religions which put strong emphasis on *ahiṃsā* are Buddhism and Jainism.

akuśala (P. *akusala*) adj. bad, unwholesome, demeritorious, immoral. An *akuśala*-karma (P. *akusala*-kamma) is the act or deed which is motivated by malevolent *cetanā* (volition or will). The malevolent *cetanā*, in turn, arises from mental defilement (*kleśa*, P. kilesa), which consists of lobha (or *rāga*, greed), *dveṣa* (P. *dosa*, hatred) and *moha* (delusion). See **kuśala**.

ālaya-vijñāna. n. store-consciousness, ideation. It is the central store of consciousness which contains the "suchness of things, (*tathatā*)" in Mahāyāna Buddhism. According to the Vijñā-na-vāda School of China (Fa-hsiang School), and then the Hossō School of Japan, the mind consists of eight consciousnesses (*vijñāna*): the five sense-consciousnesses; the sixth consciousness which forms conception; the seventh consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*) which wills and reasons on a self-centred basis; the eighth, the *ālaya-vijñāna*. It is this *ālaya-vijñāna* which "keeps in storage" the "*bīja*, seeds" or effects of good and evil deeds committed from time immemorial, thus being perpetually influenced by incoming perceptions and cognitions from external manifestation. In the same time it endows perceptions and cognitions with the energy of the "*bīja*" which in turn produce manifestations.

Amidism n. The Japanese Buddhist doctrine which teaches devotion to Amida (Amitābha) as the means towards salvation. The Pure Land School (Jōdo) founded by Hōnen (1133-1212) was the first. The Shin School (founded by Shinran, 1173-1262, Hōnen's disciple), and the Ji School (founded by Ippen, 1239-1282) followed. In all these school, Amida is the ultimate representation of Compassion. See **Amitābha**, **Hōnen**, **Shinran**, and **Ippen**.

Amitābha (Jap. Amida) n. The Buddha of Infinite Light. The fourth of the Jinas or Dhyāni-Buddhas in the original Dhyāni-Buddha system. Amitābha is the personification of *karuṇā* (compassion) in ultimate form. In the Pure Land Sects of China and Japan, Amitābha Buddha is intermediary between the Supreme Reality (Ādi-Buddha) and mankind. Faith (*śraddhā*) in Amitābha Buddha ensures rebirth in Sukhāvatī or his Abode of Bliss. Esoterically, Amitābha is the Higher Self, and rebirth in Sukhāvatī is the awakening of Bodhicitta. See **Ādi-Buddha**, **Bodhi Citta**, **Dhyāni Buddha**, and **Pure Land**

anagāriya adj. retired from home to the homeless life.

anāgārika n. a homeless one. In Buddhism, the word often means one who leads a homeless life without being formally ordained and so never has a formal admission into the Sangha (Order). See **anagāriya**.

ānāpānasati (P. *āna*, in-breathing; *apāna*, out-breathing; *sati*, mindfulness). Literally, the mindfulness directed towards the inspiration and expiration of breath. As a technical term, it is one of the *kammaṭṭhānas* (basis of the action or deed) which consists in fixing the attention on actual inspiration and expiration of breath while meditating successively on specific objects (*kasiṇa*). Buddhaghoṣa enumerates ten *kasiṇas* which may serve as the centre of attention. In practising this *ānāpānasati*, the mind is wholly absorbed in the idea on which it is latently fixed. In modern terminology, *ānāpānasati* is the uninterrupted awareness of the impermanence, the activities and the totality of the nature of the five aggregates (P. *pañcakkhandha*, Sk. *pañca-skandha*) of the individual, while the attention is directed to the actual in-and-out breathing, and the mind wholly centred in specific *kasiṇa*. The exercise must be continued until the mind attains a state of complete absorption and nimitta is produced. See **nimitta**.

anātman (P. *anattā*). n. non-ego. One of the Three Signs of Existence, the other two being impermanence (Sk. *anityatā*, P. *aniccatā*) and suffering (Sk. *duḥkha* P. *dukkha*). As applied to man, it states that there is no such permanent ego, self, or soul on top of the five *skandhas*, which make up the personality. This doctrine of non-ego is an antithesis of the Upanishadic teaching that all beings emanate from the Universal and All-Pervading Soul in essence, each incorporating a permanent and unchanging principle throughout its existence and rounds of rebirth. This separate principle returns to the Universal Soul and loses all identity after attaining Nirvana. See **ātman**, **Anātmavāda**, and **nairātmya**.

Anātmavāda (P. Anattāvāda) n. The doctrine of non-ego, the doctrine of impersonality. A sentient being is made up of five aggregates (*skandha*, P. *khandha*), namely, form, feeling, perception, volition and consciousness. There is no such entity as the permanent soul or ego. After death, the five aggregates are dissolved, and only *karma-vipāka* (P. *kamma-vipāka*) remains which gives rise to another sentient being with a substratum of *vijñāna* (P. *viññāṇa*), a subtle level of consciousness which links the new existence with the previous one. See **Nairātmya**, **karma-vipāka**.

anattā (P., Sk. *anātman*) See **anātman**, **Annihilationism**.

Anāttavāda (P., Sk. *Anātmavāda*). The doctrine that man has no real self, ego or soul. See **anattā**, **anātman**, **Anātmavāda**.

anicca (P., Sk. *anitya*). Transitory, not everlasting, transient. Transitoriness (P. *aniccatā*, Sk. *anit-yatā*) is one of three characteristics of a compounded being, including man.

Annihilationism. In Indian materialism, called *Chārvāka* or *Lokāyata* doctrine, a man after death goes to complete extinction. There is neither reward nor retribution after death in this extreme materialistic doctrine. Everything ends at the time of death. In Buddhism, however, a man goes a long way in the course of an endless cycle of births and deaths. It is taught in Buddhism that Nirvana means the end of rebirth, and the end of suffering. This end of rebirth and of suffering has been interpreted by some that Nirvana means complete annihilation. Others refuse to accept that idea. Following are the various views concerning annihilation in Buddhism. 1. Annihilation is the complete extinction of an individual as the means to escape from suffering. This school argues that the Buddha defines life or existence as suffering, that man has no ego or self, and that Nirvana, the goal of Buddhist endeavour, is the complete cessation of suffering; therefore, Nirvana is incompatible with existence in any form, and must mean cessation of existence after death, i.e complete extinction. Those who support this view sometimes refer to Nirvana as *śūnyatā* or *suññatā* (P. meaning nothingness, complete void), and try to force the Pali sense into the term. 2. Another interpretation is that annihilation is limited to the extinction of the five corporeal *skandhas*, and without any more seeding for rebirth. There is no elucidation however if there is existence of the individual or not after the dissolution of the five *skandhas*. 3. Some hold that annihilation means complete suppression of the three impure cravings (*tṛṣṇā*, *taṇhā*): the craving for sensual pleasure (*kāma-tṛṣṇā*), the clinging to life (*bhavatṛṣṇā*),

and the irrepressible desire not to be reborn after death (*vibhava-tṛṣṇā*). These three categories of cravings are the source (*samudaya*, the second of the *ariyasacca*, the Four Noble Truths) of all sufferings, and the binding of a compounded aggregate to *saṃsāra*. The annihilation of them is thus the Cessation of Suffering (*nirodha*, the third of the *ariyasacca*) and the prerequisite of release from *saṃsāra* or the attainment of Nirvana. To an average Buddhist in Thailand, 'annihilation' is not a term which often comes to mind. Their belief in the release from *saṃsāra* or the attainment of Nirvāṇa is positive and indicative of certain undefinable state of bliss - *nibbānaṃ paramaṃ sukhaṃ* "Nirvāṇa is the ultimate happiness," which is not extinction or annihilation, but a state of spiritual and incorporeal existence. According to Rhys Davids, the Buddha teaches that the five *skandhas* (or aggregates) form the evanescent part of man, and even when one is living, with the five *skandhas* complete and effective, suffering can be avoided and suppressed with proper control of the mind and the body. When the Arhat enters Nirvāṇa, he loses objective existence but retains subjective being). This is contradictory to the view that Nirvāṇa is annihilation.

āpatti n. Offence, guilt, crime. A Theravāda monk observes 227 rules or regulations, a violation of which is an offence or sin called an *āpatti*. There are seven classes of offences, of different degrees of heinousness, namely, *pārājika*, *sanghādisesa*, *thullaccaya*, *nissaggiya*, *pācittiya*, dukkatā and*dubbhāsita*. *Pārājika* is the most serious offence which results in permanent expulsion of the monk from the congregation. There are four: fornication, theft, taking life, and falsely laying claim to the attainment to arhatship or any of other supernatural gifts or powers (*iddhi*). *Sanghādisesa* is an offence which is not so grave as the *pārājika*. There are thirteen offences classed under this and require suspension and penance. A chapter of monks is required in the initial rehabilitation, for the supervision of the progress at the beginning and the middle part of penance. A chapter of monk is again required at the end before he is reinstated into the Sangha. Other sins are of less gravity, but still require confession and absolution.

arahat, arhant see **arhat**.

arhat (or *arahat*, Sk. *arhant*). n. Lit. the worthy one. One who has traversed the Eightfold Path to the Goal, eliminated the Ten Fetters (*saṃyojanas*), and theFour Defilements (*āsavas*), which bind to existence, and on the death of the physical body attains Nirvāṇa. See **The Four Paths**.

Aryan (Sk. *āryan*). lit. Noble, exalted, of high birth. In social sense, it means "in accord with the customs and ideals of the Aryan people, or approved or held in esteem by the Aryans." Being cognate with "Eran", and thus with "Iran", the word is possibly the name of a race, or a large group of the people migrating downward and eastward from Central Asia from the homeland of the Proto-Indo-European speaking peoples, before their separation into the Iranians and the Indians. In religious context, Aryan means noble or of high esteem. The Pali form of the word is "*ariya*." There are several words compounded with *ariya*, e.g., *ariya-sacca, ariya-puggala, ariya-magga* and *ariya -phala*.

asaṃskṛta (P. *asankhata*) adj. uncompounded; unconditioned; not being produced by co-operating causes, eternal, absolute. The Sarvāstivāda doctrine teaches that there are three unconditioned or non-created elements of existence (*asaṃskṛtadharma*), namely, *ākāśā*, *pratisamkhyānirodha*, and *apratisamkhyā nirodha*. *Ākāśa* is space, *pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha-dharmas* are those elements of existence which once existed but have become nullified by intellectual power of the individual, and *apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* are those elements of existence which are liable to come into existence, but due to absence of the appropriate cause, remain uncreated. The idea is found in Kusha (Abhidharmakośa) School of Japan. It is also found in Hossō (Dharma-laksaṇa) School of Japan, but the number of the non-created elements increases to five. Both Schools base their teaching on Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu. See **elements of existence**. In Pāli Buddhism, Nirvāṇa is called "*a-sankhata-dhātu*", the unconditioned element (or principle). The other one is *ākāsa*, space. These two are unconditioned, uncompounded, unchangeable and eternal. As might be expected, the Theravādins rejected the Sarvāstivādin view of two *nirodhas* (*pratisamkhyā-nirodha* and *a-pratisamkhyā-nirodha*, See above).

āsava (Sk. *āsrava*, often misspelled *āśrava*) n. defilement, mental intoxication. Sometimes synonymous with *kleśa* (P. *kilesa*). The three *āsavas* are: *kāmāsava*, *bhavāsava* and *avijjāsava*, and sometimes a fourth, *diṭṭhāsava*, is added. *Kāma-āsava* is that defilement arising through attachment to sensual enjoyments. *Bhava-āsava* is the attachment to existence in the *Rūpāvacara* and the *Arūpāvacara* worlds (See **Brahmā**). *Avijjā-āsava* is the defilement arising from avijjā (Sk. *avidyā*), ignorance of the Four Noble Truths (*ariya-sacca*, Sk. *ārya-satya*). The fourth, *diṭṭhi-āsava*, is the defilement due to adherence to false doctrine or heresy.

Aśoka Emperor of India (*c.* 270-230 B.C.), grandson of Chandragupta, founder of Maurya Dynasty. Great Buddhist patron and ruler. Moved by the cruelties of war after his conquest of the State of Kalinga (now Orissa), the great king, although born a Hindu, became converted to Theravāda Buddhism. Aśoka earnestly practised Dhamma within his empire and sent missionaries to Ceylon and other countries. Renowned for his Rock-Edicts, Pillar-Edicts and Minor-Rock Edicts, which he set up throughout his empire. It is from these edicts that we read of his feats and Buddhistic rule of his time. After his conquest of Kalinga, he abolished war in his international policy and restricted the slaughter of animals and hunting. Hospitals for man as well as for animals were established. Aśoka is called in his inscriptions Dharmāśoka (Dharma-Aśoka, Aśoka the Virtuous) and also Priyadarśin (P. Piyadassi, the Beloved of gods)

Aśokan inscriptions See **Aśoka, Brahmagiri**.

Aśvaghoṣa n. A Buddhist writer and poet of the first century A.D. Originally a Hindu, after his conversion to Buddhism, he wrote Buddha-carita, a famous life story of the Buddha in beautiful Sankrit poems. The famous Śāstra translated by Suzuki under the title of the "Awakening of Faith - Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda" was once attributed to Aśvaghoṣa, but now considered a fourth-century Chinese work.

ātman (P. *attā*) n. self, ego, individuality. It is one of the most controversial Buddhist terms. Reference to *ātman* is found in pre-Buddhist Upanishads, where it is held that *ātman* has definite existence but elusive to the uninitiated. This self or *ātman* is identical with Brahman, the soul of the universe, from which all beings emanate. Endowed with this *ātman*, it follows that every individual has this very same soul. Because of the deeds or actions (*karma*) committed by an individual during his lifetime, he is reborn and his life conditioned by them. Only after attainment of the supreme knowledge of the *ātman* that he be reabsorbed into the supreme world-soul and loses all identity. The Upanishads teach that *ātman* is without beginning or end, completely pure, so pure that it has no attribute and is undescribable. Hence it is inconceivable by the uninitiated. Siddhattha Gotama from the beginning rejected the idea of *ātman*. If *ātman* were timeless and indefinite, it had to be perfect, free from decay and unaffected by defilement. It was just impossible for a man in search for the supreme truth to disregard his actual experience and be convinced that he was above defilement, sufferings and decay. Instead, the Buddha puts the emphasis on the three characteristics of human existence, that life is attended by sufferings, impermanence, and non-ego. A man is made up of five aggregates, namely, form, feeling, perception, volition and consciousness, (see **skandha**). A man is no more than the sum of his parts, thus has no *ātman* or *attā* on top of his aggregates. See **anātman, Anātmavāda** and **Brahmanism**

Atmavāda (P. Attāvāda). The theory that living being has a soul or ego or self as the essence. See **ātman**.

Avalokiteśvara n. lit. the Lord (Īśvara) who has been looking down from on high (*ava-lokita*). Also called *Padmapāṇi* (having a lotus in his hand). The idea is found only in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Avalokiteśvara is the *Dhyāni*-Bodhisattva of the *Dhyāni*-Buddha Amitābha, and is the personification of the self-generative creative cosmic force. Esoterically, Avalokiteśvara is the Self as perceived by Buddhi, the faculty of intuition. He is most prominent in Tibetan Buddhism. See **Ādi-Buddha** and **Dhyāni-Buddha.**

avatāra lit. Reincarnation. The idea is exclusively Hindu, where it is held that the world, after being created by Brahmā the Creator, has to be guarded by Viṣṇu the Protector from dangers arising from the evil principle. Viṣṇu will come down from his heaven and assume earthly form

when it is necessary to perform this function. His appearance in the world is called *avatāra*. Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva make up the Hindu Triad of the Creator, the Preserver and the Destroyer. Avatāra is not a Buddhist concept. Hodgson's description of the "last seven Buddhas" as being *avatāras* seems to come from the answers given him by his native scholars to his leading question, "How many *avatāras* of Buddha have there been?"

Avestan The language of the Avesta (formerly called the Zend Avesta), the sacred book of Zoroastrianism. Zoroaster (or Zarathustra in Avestan), was a religious leader in Iran. His teaching is based on strict dualism, with Ahura Mazda as the Wise God. Mazda is in continual struggle with Angra Manyu, the evil spirit counterpart.

The language of the Avesta is related to that of the Rigveda, the oldest Indo-Aryan text of India (before 1000 B.C.). Historical consideration, however, limits the composition of the Avesta to about the eighth century B.C. at the earliest. See also **Pahlevi**.

avyākṛta (P. *avyākata*) adj. indeterminate, indistinct, neutral. A deed committed by a man may be *kuśala-karma* (P. *kusala-kamma*), i.e. a deed which will give good reward, or it may be *akuśala-karma* (P. *akusala-kamma*), i.e. a deed which will give bad reward, or *avyākṛta-karma* (P. *avyākata-kamma*), i.e. a deed which will bring neither good nor bad reward. See **akuśala**, **kuśala**.

āyatana n. sense and organ of sense. There are altogether twelve *āyatanas* arranged in six pairs, each pair consisting of the the sense organ and its respective object: *cakṣus* and *rūpa* (eye and form), *śrotra* and *śabda* (ear and sound), *ghrāṇa* and *gandha* (nose and smell), *jihvā* and *rasa* (tongue and taste), *kāya* and *spraṣṭavya* (body and touch), and *manas* and dharma (mind and dharma). The *āyatanas* are often regarded as being six in number, in which each pair of receptor and sense are counted as one. Again, reference is occasionally made to ten *āyatanas*, omitting *manas* and dharma. The organ of sense is called *adhyātmika-āyatana* (internal *āyatana*, = P. *ajjhattika-āyatana*) and the object of sense *bāhira-āyatana* (external *āyatana*). The six external *āyatanas* are also called *ārammaṇas*, which in modern terminology may be called stimuli, whereas the internal *āyatanas* may be compared with sense receptors. The commoner term for sense organs, or the "internal *āyatana*" is *indriya*. (See also **indriya** for its specialized meaning.)

B

Bhagavad-gītā n. The "Song of the Blessed One", the most popular Hindu religio-philosophical poem of some seven-hundred stanzas in Sanskrit. Often called "Gītā" for short.

The Gītā forms part of the epic Mahābhārata. It is a long discourse between Arjuna, the general of the Pāṇḍava army, and his charioteer Krishṇa. Arjuna is despondent and unwilling to fight against his kinsmen and friends of the other army in battle. Krishṇa is actually the incarnation of God Viṣṇu who imparts to Arjuna the esoteric knowledge of the relationship between morality and absolute ethical values.

The Gītā teaches the function of man, who has to perform his duties on condition that his actions be never be motivated by selfish ends (*karma-yoga*). The soul of a man is immortal, and its source is the Universal Soul. One's action should be guided by the true comprehension of the relationship between man and the Universal Soul (*jñāna-yoga*). The Gītā also teaches the supremacy of Personal God, called Paramātman or Īśvara, as distinct from the ātman or purusha within the individual. With comprehension, faith and devotion (*bhakti*) to the Paramātman, one should act with complete renunciation of the fruits of action, and in the same time should realize that what he is doing is for the sake of the Paramātman. It is this *bhaktiyoga* which will lead the devotee to final salvation.

bhikkhu (P., Sk. *bhikṣu*) n. monk. See **bhikṣu**.

bhikkhunī (P., Sk. *bhikṣuṇī*) n. A formally ordained nun. See **bhikṣu**.

bhikṣu (P. *bhikkhu*) n. The term *bhikṣu* is variously translated, as monk, friar, mendicant, almsman, priest. In this article, it is translated as "monk." A Buddhist community is composed of disciples and laymen: (1) *bhikṣu*, "monks," (2) *bhikṣuṇī* formally ordained "nuns," (3) *upāsaka*, layman followers, and (4) *upāsikā*, laywoman followers. A *bhikṣu* is one who has devoted himself to the task of following the Noble Path (P. *ariya-magga*) by renunciation of the distractions of worldly affairs and temptations. He relies for his sustenance upon the gifts of lay followers. His daily life is governed by 227 rules (*śīla*, P. *sīla*) which are given in the Vinaya Piṭaka. In Hīnayāna (or Theravāda) Buddhist countries, all monks in a monastery meet in the assembly hall twice a month. In that assembly every monk openly confesses if he has violated any of these 227 rules. After the confession, the Pāṭimokkha (a collection of the rules in condensed form, Sk. *prātimokṣa*) is recited. A typical monk spends part of his time with his spiritual preceptor studying the Canon (Tipiṭaka) appropriate to his understanding and progress. When assigned by his preceptor or by the abbot, he teaches the laity on the religious topics and their application to everyday life. He participates with other monks in keeping the monastery clean and tidy. He utilizes part of his private time to meditation under the guidance of his spiritual preceptor. Early in the morning, he goes out on his rounds, alone or with other monks, to collect food and alms from laymen of his community. The feminine equivalent of a *bhikṣu* is *bhikṣuṇī* (P. *bhikkhuṇī*). No more *bhikṣuṇīs* have been ordained into the Order since the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*. The disciplinary measure for a *bhikṣuṇī* contains 311 rules.

bhikṣuṇī (P. *bhikkhuṇī*). See **bhikṣu**.

bhūmi 1 n. 1. Regular meanings: the ground, land, or the world; fig., state or condition. *suvarṇabhūmi*, the land where gold is found in abundance; *manuṣyabhūmi*, the human world; *tiracchānabhūmi*, the world of animals, the state of being an animal; *svargabhūmi*, heaven; *narakabhūmi*, or *nirayabhūmi*, hell. A man may be born a god in *svarga-bhūmi*, or in purgatory as a denizen of hell (*naraka-bhūmi*), depending on his karma.

bhūmi 2 n. As a technical term in Mahāyāna Buddhism, *bhūmi* is a stage of progressive religious development towards the idealistic goal. Ten stages are mentioned in Mahāyāna texts, but the lists do not always agree. The stages often mentioned are *śrāvaka-bhūmi, yauvarājya-bhūmi, abhiṣeka-bhūmi, bodhisattvabhūmi* and Buddha-*bhūmi*. A *sāvaka* (P., Sk. *śrāvaka*) literally means a listener, and hence a disciple. In Theravāda Buddhism, any Buddhist monk is a *sāvaka*; but in Mahāyāna convention, a *śrāvaka* refers emphatically to the follower of Hīnayāna or Theravāda Buddhism, and śrāvaka-bhūmi denotes the stage of development which may be attained by a follower of Hīnayāna Doctrine. In Mahāvyutpatti, a Mahāyāna text, the seventh stage is called *śrāvakabhūmi*, that is, the stage which may be reached by any disciple, or any Buddhist, Hīnayāna as well as Mahāyāna. There is no description of the accomplishment of this *śrāvaka-bhūmi*. The eighth *bhūmi* is *pratyeka-buddha-bhūmi*, which may also be attained by a Theravāda Buddhist. A man who reaches this stage becomes a Pratyeka-Buddha, that is, one who has attained by his unaided powers, like a Buddha, the knowledge necessary for passing into Nirvāṇa. This attainment is however limited to himself, as he does not preach it to others. He is not omniscient, and is in all respects inferior to a Sammāsambuddha or Supreme Buddha. The ninth *bhūmi*, called *bodhisattva-bhūmi*, is exclusively Mahāyānist. It refers to the stage where one has attained enlightenment and is qualified for Nirvāṇa, but chooses to remain a Bodhisattva out of loving kindness or compassion (*karuṇā*) to lead mankind to final salvation. See **Bodhisattva**. The tenth *bhūmi* in the series is *Buddha-bhūmi*, the stage or *bhūmi* for the Supreme Buddha. The list of ten *bhūmis* varies in different Mahāyāna texts, but the term *bhūmi* invariably denotes stages of attainment toward Buddhahood. As the Mahāyānist doctrine puts emphasis on the Bodhisattva, the list may lead up to Bodhisattva hood only. In Mahāvastu (an old text of the Mahāsanghika sect), *yauvarājya-bhūmi* and *abhiṣeka-bhūmi* are the ninth and tenth stages. The name of these two stages, as well as the teaching

contained in the text, show that the Bodhisattva concept is not much different from that of the Theravāda School, according to which a Buddha will appoint a successor to be the next Buddha after him. See **Mahāsanghika**). The lists of ten *bhūmis* from Mahāvastu (in a chapter entitled the Daśabhūmika, pp. 63-193 of vol. I of Mahāvastu edited by Emile Sénart) and from Daśabhūmika-Sūtra (a work associated with Avataṃsaka Sūtra, but held by some scholars as an independent work) are compared in the table below:

Mahāvastu	*Daśabhūmikasūtra*
1. Durārohā	1. Pramuditā
2. Baddhamānā	2. Vimalā
3. Puṣpamaṇḍitā	3. Prabhākarī
4. Rucirā	4. Arciṣmatī
5. Citravistarā	5. Sudurjayā
6. Rūpavatī	6. Abhimukhī
7. Durjayā	7. Dūrangamā
8. Janmanideśa	8. Acalā
9. Yauvarājya	9. Sādhumatī
10. Abhiṣeka.	10. Dharmameghā

Blavatsky, Helena Petrovna, (1831-1891). Russian theosophist. Daughter of German Colonel Peter Hahn, and grand daughter of Princess Helena Dolgoruki. Married at the age of seventeen but left her husband after a few months. She travelled widely in India and America. In 1858 she revisited Russia, and created a sensation as a spiritualistic medium. She often spoke vaguely of her seven years' sojourn in her Himalayan retreat. About 1870 she acquired prominence among the spiritualists of the United States, and became a naturalized citizen. On November 17, 1875, with the help of Colonel Henry S. Olcott, founded the Theosophical Society, with the object of "... making known the ancient religions, philosophies and sciences, ...investigating the laws of nature and developing the divine powers latent in man". The Society in 1879 organized a branch in Bombay, India. In 1880 she declared herself Buddhist at Galle (Ceylon) and inspired the Buddhist revival there. Her doctrines were a curious amalgam of Egyptian, kabbalistic, occultist, Indian and modern spiritualistic ideas and formulas. Many of her so-called miracles were demonstrated in 1884 as fraudulent by the Society for Psychical Research, and soon after that Olcott broke away from her. An active writer, she was author of *Isis Unveiled, Key to Theosophy* and many others. She died in London in 1891.

bodhi (P. and Sk.) n. Supreme wisdom, perfect wisdom, enlightenment.

bodhicitta n. lit. the thought towards enlightenment. It is regarded in Mahāyāna Buddhism as the primordial essence of mind, which consists in the supreme *bodhi*. It is that mental attitude which aspires to Buddhahood or Bodhisattvahood for the welfare of all. The profane mind, however, may be enveloped in egoism (*ahaṃkāra*) due to ignorance (*avidyā*). See **Bodhidharma**.

Bodhidharma. *n.* An Indian Buddhist monk (*ca.* 470-543 A.D.) who founded the Meditation School (Ch'an, Sk. *dhyāna*, P. *jhāna*) in China is classed as the first of the six great Chinese Patriarches. He is called in Chinese Pu-ti-ta-mo or Ta-mo and in Japanese Daruma. The School is in general inclined to the mystical side of the Yogācāra School, and relies much on the Lankāvatāra Sūtra. Emphasis is given to the *bodhicitta*, the direct perception of "the Store of the All-seeing True Law and the profound mind of *Nirvāṇā*". The *bodhicitta* is conceived as the Void (*śūnyatā*), which is "neither cause nor effect, neither good nor evil, neither form nor characteristic." The world of multiplicity is the result of ignorance and attachment and as such is unreal. The School was introduced into Japan and is known as the "Zen." His message was summarized in the famous stanzas:

> A special transmission outside the Scriptures,
> No dependence upon words or letters,
> Direct pointing at the soul of man,
> Seeing into one's own nature and attainment of
> Buddhahood.

Bodhisattva (P. *bodhisatta*) n. One who has *bodhi* or perfect wisdom as his essence, an aspirant for Buddhahood. 1.In Theravāda Buddhism, a Bodhisattva is an aspirant for Buddhahood, a being seeking *bodhi*, someone destined to attain fullest enlightenment. In this definition, a human being, through observance of perfect ethical and discipline and complete control of mind, speech and action, has to make a resolution (*mūla-paṇidhāna*) before a present Buddha to become a future Buddha for the welfare of others. He has to fulfil eight conditions: he is a human being, a

male, a recluse at the time he makes the resolution, has attained a certain stage of religious advancement, and others. Only after formal prediction (*vyākaraṇa*) by that Buddha that his bodhisattva's career starts. A bodhisattva will still have to practice and fulfil the Ten Perfections (*pāramitā*) before he will attain *bodhi* and become a future Buddha. The accounts of former existence of Gautama Buddha as a bodhisattva, 547 in number, are related in the Pali Commentary to the Jātaka.

2. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, a bodhisattva is the ideal of the Path as contrasted with the Arhat of the Theravāda He aims at the acquisition of *bodhi* or *Buddhajñāna*, and having practised the Six *pāramitās* and attained enlightenment, he renounces Nirvāṇa which is the results of individual meritorious deeds, and continues practising *karuṇā* or compassion to the highest degree of perfection by remaining in the worlds of birth and death for the ultimate enlightenment of humanity. Though being a Bodhisattva, he is also called the Buddha of Compassion. A bodhisattva in the Mahāyāna doctrine is different from a *śrāvaka* or a Pratyeka-Buddha in that the last two are content with his individual attainment of Nirvāṇa through the destruction of defilements (*āsravas*). See **sāvaka, Paccekabuddha, āsava and pāramitā**.

bodhisattva bhūmi: The stage an individual has to go through in order to become a Buddha. See **bhūmi** 2

Brahmā 1 n. In Hinduism, one of the three supreme gods, the others being Visṇu and Śiva. Brahmā is the creator, who brings into existence the physical world and heavens. After the creation, Brahmā goes into a period of inactivity, and the protector god Viṣṇu takes charge of warding off the evil powers. Idealistic as the scheme seems, the goodness inherent in man begins and continues to suffer, until everything is almost in chaos. The time then comes for Śiva, the god of destruction, who proceeds to bring about the dissolution of the entire universe. Then comes a period of void, after which Brahmā initiates the next cycle of activity with another world creation. Categorically, the Hindu triad represents the three modes: activity, the continuity and the return to status quo. The belief in the three supreme gods is characteristic of Hinduism. This Hindu Brahmā is the development from the speculative and abstract Brahman, grammatically neuter, of the Upanishads. But instead of being the world soul, from which everything emanates, it was anthropomorphized into a masculine god of creation, which should understandably have more appeal to the masses of people of the time.

Brahmā 2 n. In Buddhism, *brahmā* is the name of the higher beings, or gods, in the two higher planes of existence. There are three planes of existence in Buddhism: the world of senses (*kāmāvacara*), the world with forms (*rūpāvacara*), and the world with non-forms or immaterial world (*arūpāvacara*). Brahmā is the name of two classes of beings in the two higher planes of existence. Nirvāṇa is above all the three planes, and can be reached by destruction of all thirsts (Sk. *tṛṣṇā*, P. *taṇhā*), all *kleśa* (s.v.) and all *āsava* (s.v.). The three planes of existence have their corresponding thirsts (P. *tanhā*). In the *kāmāvacara* existence, all thirsts are present, with *kāmataṇhā* (a thirst for sensual gratification) predominates. We are of course living in this sensual world. In the *rūpāvacara* world, no *kāmataṇhā* remains, the predominating thirst is *bhavatanhā* (a clinging to existence), the Brahmā gods residing in this world still has bodily form or appearance. Higher up in the non-form (*arūpāvacara*) world, the Brahmā beings residing in this plane of existence has no bodily form, and the only thirst remaining is *vibhavataṇhā* (an aspiration not to be reborn, a desire for complete freedom from phenomenal existence).

brahmacārin (Hinduism) n. A young brahman studying the Veda. It is the first stage of life of a strict Brahman who has to observe complete chastity and devote his life to study. The second stage is when he becomes a *gṛhastha* or householder. Then comes the third, when he retires to the forest as a *vānaprastha* or the forest dweller. This is the first step of withdrawal from the world. The fourth, and last, stage is when he becomes a *sannyāsī*, leaving aside all his interest in worldly life and is devoted to meditation as a means to find the ultimate truth, a prerequisite to his escape from the cycle of rebirths. The four stages of this Hindu ideal life is called the four *āśrama*. A number of Hindu recluses skip through the second, or householder stage, and go directly from the Brahmacārin stage to the *vānaprastha* or even to

the *sannyāsin* stage.

brahmacariyā n. (Sk. *brahmacaryā*). The stage or quality of being a *brahmacārin* (s.v.). In Theravāda Buddhism, *brahmacariyā* refers to complete chastity. Literally, *brahma-cariyā* means the strict observance of the way of life of a *brahmā* (the one living in the *rūpāvacara* or the world of forms, where only *brahmā*s are residing. These beings are free from sensual desires). See **Brahmā**.

Brahmagiri edicts. Two of the Minor Rock Edicts set up by Emperor Aśoka Maurya at Brahmagiri in Mysore in the southern part of India. (see **Aśoka**). The contents of the edicts are as follows: 1. *Brahmagiri Minor Edict I.* Under the instructions of the Prince (*āryaputra*) and Ministers (*mahāmātra*) from Suvarṇagiri, it should be known that the Emperor Aśoka, after becoming a Buddhist lay-disciple for two years and a half, joined the Buddhist Sangha for over a year. From that time on His Sacred Majesty has been introducing the people to the Buddhist way of life, so that they will become closer to gods. To be close to gods by sustained exertion is open to both great men and ordinary people. This message aims at leading people of all standings, near and far, to the good way of life. The Buddhist practice should be continually emphasized for a long time. The message has to be proclaimed 256 times in the name of His Sacred Majesty. 2. *Brahmagiri Minor Edict II.* His Sacred Majesty proclaimed that in a family, the parents should be cared for and properly served. All life must be respected. This principle should be extended to all. Truth must be spoken. Religious virtues must be promoted. Preceptors must be revered by pupils. Proper treatment should be shown towards all relations. This is the traditional rule of conduct, and this makes for long life and the way of behaviour of all.

Brahmajāla n. Name of a sūtra in the Dīgha-nikāya of the Theravāda Tripiṭaka. *Sīla* (moral precepts) is discussed and elaborated. Then it goes on analysing the various theories and speculations regarding the existence of the "soul" or "self" of a living being. The sūtra is also called in English "the Sūtra of the Net of Brahmā".

Brahman 1 See **Brahmanism**.

Brahman 2 n. A common English spelling, side by side with Brahmin, for Sk. *brāhmaṇa*, a member of the Brāhmana caste. See **caste**.

Brāhmana 1 A class of old Sanskrit literature, pre-Upanishadic and pre-Buddhist, dating about 800-600 B.C.

Brāhmaṇa 2 Name of the priestly caste of the old Hindu society, also a member of such caste. Often spelled Brahman or Brahmin. See **caste**.

Brahmanism 1 n. The generic term of the philosophical, theological and ethical speculation of Indian thinkers from the sixth century B.C. onward. The essence of Brahmanism is in the recognition of Brahman or *ātman*, as the world-soul, which is perfect in all aspect, but defies definition and description using terms familiar to lay people. Being perfect, this Brahman or *ātman* is everlasting, without decay, without beginning or end, and is itself beautitude. Everything in existence, being identical with this *ātman*, including gods and human, emanates from it. When a man dies, his body disintegrates, but his self or soul does not perish. It should then return, be reabsorbed and become one with Brahman, but because of the operation of the law of karma, a man, or his soul, has to wander around in the cycles of rebirth and death according to his karma. Only after a man's true knowledge of the real that he can work his way to be once more reabsorbed in the Universal Brahman. Our Prince Gautama before his Enlightenment received his first lessons in the doctrine, but rejected them on logical ground. If a man is identical with this perfect being, he should also be perfect, free from suffering, decay and death. From this then evolved the Buddhist theory of *ti-lakkhaṇa* (Sk. *tri-lakṣaṇa*), the three attributes of life consisting of *dukkha*, *anicca* and *anattā* (Sk *dukkha*, *anitya* and *anātman*). See also **ātman, Ātmavāda, anātman, Anātmavāda.**

Brahmanism 2 n. A loosely used term for Hinduism (s.v.).

brahmavihāra n. lit. The abode of Brahma. In Theravāda Buddhism, it consists in the perfect exercise of the qualities of *mettā*, (friendliness, loving kindness, wish for the good of others), *karuṇā* (sympathy, active compassion), *muditā* (sympathetic or altruistic joy), and *upekkhā* (Sk. *utprekṣā*, equanimity, serenity). Free from

limitations in the practice, it is also called the four Boundless States (*appamañña*). The state is reached by practising good will toward all beings. The state can be achieved when one identifies himself with all beings in the entire world with the mind completely free from hatred and ill-will.

Brahmin See **caste**.

Brahminism n. (1) Another English spelling for Brāhmaṇism, the doctrine which holds Brahman as the abstract universal principle. See **Brahmanism**. (2) A loosely used term for Hinduism.

Brihad-devatā. Common English spelling for Sk. Bṛhaddevatā

Bṛhaddevatā n. A Sanskrit text, ascribed to Śaunaka, and is dated about 400 A.D. It is a catalogue of the gods worshipped in the separate hymns of the RigVeda, with myths and legends referring to these deities.

Buddhaghosa n. The greatest of commentators on the Pali or Theravāda Tipiṭaka. Originally a Hindu Brahman scholar well versed in the Vedas. Being defeated in philosophical discussion with a Buddhist monk named Revata, he entered the Buddhist order to study the Buddha's teachings. He later went to Ceylon and studied the Sinhalese commentaries on the Buddhist Canon, and wrote his Visuddhimagga, which is even today held in high esteem as an encyclopaedia of the Buddha's teachings in Theravāda Buddhist countries.

The voluminous commentaries on the Tipiṭaka which came out after his Visuddhimagga are, according to one tradition, the Pali translation of the original Sinhalese commentaries; but according to another tradition they are his own composition. After that, he returned to India. He lived in the 5th century A.D.

Buddha-kāya n. See **Tri-kāya**.

Buddha Nature n. (*buddhatā, buddhatva, buddhasvabhāva*), the potential ability inherent in all beings to achieve enlightenment or to become Buddhas. The idea is strictly Mahāyānist. See **bodhicitta, Tri-kāya**.

Buddhayāna n. Another name for Mahāyāna, see **yāna**.

C

caitasika n. (P. *cetasika*) Mental things, mental factors. In Theravāda Buddhism, all phenomenal existence is characterized by five *khandhas* (groups): *rūpa* (corporeality), *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (perception), *sankhāra* (volition) and *viññāna* (consciousness). The Dhammasanganī (s.v.) classifies these five *khandhas* into three aspects: *citta* (mind), *cetasika* (mental concomitants and *rūpa* (name and form). In Kusha School of Japan, *Caitasikas* are concomitant mental functions belonging to sub-group of the created elements (*samskṛta-dharma*). The Hossō School regards the *caitasika* to belong to the group of created element also, but treats these elements as belonging to a different sub-class.

cakra 1 (Sk.) n. In literary Sanskrit: a wheel (of a chariot); a discus (a divine weapon having the shape of sharp-edged circular missile appropriate to Viṣṇu, the protector god of the Hindu Triad of Supreme Gods).

cakra 2 (Sk., P. *cakka*; sometimes spelled in English *chakra*). In Buddhism, any one of the four conditions of desirable existence in the cycle of birth and death in which one may find himself: these four conditions are: (1) Living in a suitable place (P. *paṭirūpadesavāso*) (2) Association with good men (P. *sappurisapassayo*) (3) Proper self-regulation (P. *attasammāpaṇidhi*) (4) Having done good works in a former existence (P. *pubbakatapuññatā*) See **Dependent Origination**.

cakra 3 (Sk.), n. In Tantric Buddhism: (1) A circle in which a mystic ceremony (*cakrapūjā* the circle worship), is being performed; the circle itself is called a *cakra* or a *maṇḍala*. (2) Any of the six centres of the several minute channels of occult force in a human body. These centres are situated one above the other along the midline of the torso. By proper *Śākta yoga*, the power latent in the *cakras* will be released for the advantage of the worshipper. See **Tantra**.

Cakravartin, (Sk.) n. Literally a discus-wielder, or a wheel-roller. In Sanskrit literature, the word means a universal emperor, the wheels (*cakra*) of whose chariot roll (*vart*) everywhere without obstruction. The word *cakra* is also the name of the circular missile with round and jagged sharp-cutting edge appropriate to the protector god Viṣṇu of later Indian mythology. The term *cakravartin* hence implies that such a universal emperor is almost as powerful as an *avatāra* (incarnation) of the god Viṣṇu himself. The Viṣṇu-Purāṇa says that a Cakravartin is born with the mark of Viṣṇu's discus (*cakra*) in the palm of his hand. The Lakkhaṇa Suttanta of Dīghanikāya (of Pali Buddhism) says that the mark of a wheel with a thousand spokes appears on the soles of the feet of a superman (*mahāpurisa*, Sk. *mahāpuruṣa*), whose career is either the universal emperor or the Supreme Buddha. The first sermon which the Buddha gave to the five disciples is titled Dhamma-cakka-pavattana Sutta (Sk. Dharma-cakra-pravartana Sūtra), which may be translated as the "Sūtra on the Rolling of the Wheel of Dharma," which corresponds directly to the start of the propagation (*pravartana*, rolling) of his doctrine (*dharmacakra*). The choice of words in making up the compound is such that it can be a play on words on the prophesy uttered by the court-soothsayers that the young Prince Siddhārtha Gautama would become either the Buddha or a universal emperor (*cakra-vartin*, i.e. a discus-wielder or a wheel-roller). Thus the name of the Sūtra can be at once the first sermon of the Buddha and an implication of a religious *cakra-vartin*.

caste n. (Sk. *varṇa*, P. *vaṇṇa*, lit. colour of the skin, complexion). The social classes of ancient India based on heredity, birth and strict disciplinary injunctions. There were four castes in ancient India, namely the Brāhmaṇa, the Kshatriya (Sk. *kṣatriya*), the Vaiśya , and the Śūdra. Brāhmaṇa is often spelled 'brahman' or 'brahmin' in English. In this Glossary, the spelling *brahmin* is adopted. The first three castes are usually called the twice-born: i.e. born by natural birth first, and then secondly by going through the initiation ceremony (*upanayana*), a ceremony which is reserved for male members of the three upper castes, when the initiated is invested with the sacred cord. Late Buddhist texts often limit the twice-born to members of the Brahman caste only. Śūdras were held to be low and unclean. They could not mingle with the three upper castes. At best, they could be no more than menial workers subservient to the three upper castes. There are many theories concerning the origin of the caste system. One of these is that the division of the members of the community into three classes originated with the Aryan during or before their long migratory journey from Central Asia southward and eastward along the route north of Iran, through Afghanistan and Bactria into the Indus Valley. It is possible that the division was based on the regular daily functions assumed by the members of the group. Brahmans performed the propitiatory ceremonies to their gods, Kshatriyas were charged with keeping law and order, and the rest of the group had to provide food, clothing and other necessities for all. With this kind of social setting, they moved into India. They defeated the darker-complexioned, flat-nosed (Sk. *anāsa*), culturally more advanced, urbanized aborigines, and settled down there. They had to live together with the aborigines. The Aryan conquerors continued to perform their original daily functions, but with the added convenience of having the defeated aborigines as slaves to take care of the menial labour. Strict rules were set up by the Aryan settlers to safeguard the purity of their race, using the conspicuous skin colour (Sk. *varṇa*) as the differentiating factor. Thus there came to be two *colours* in the new community, one is fair (the Aryan colour, with three sub-classes) and the other dark. By the time of Yajurveda and the Brāhmaṇas (*ca.* 800 B.C.), the pattern of this mixed community became fixed, with four "functional classes" and the Sk. term *varṇa*, "colour", was adopted to denote each class. The Portuguese who first visited India noticed that each class or *varṇa* was hereditary, with a tendency to be endogamous, having same occupation and family priests. They therefore gave the name of each class *casta* (meaning lineage), from which is derived the word "caste" in English. The caste system has very rigid regulations, the violation of some of these, such as inter-caste marriage between the groom from the aboriginal Śūdra caste and the bride from any of the three upper castes. Such a violation may result in the loss of caste and excommunication of the family from the Aryan community. The members of the violator's family will then become the "untouchables" who can have no kind of contact with the original community. Buddhism is against the caste system. It is often said that in a Buddhist community "people from all castes become one, just as the

water from all the great rivers of India will become one and inseparable once it reaches the sea." The regulations governing the caste system are no more rigid in modern India. Occupations are no more hereditary on the ground of caste system. Many successful politicians and social figures have been from the Śūdra caste.

citta-samprayukta dharma n. The elements of the mental properties (*caitasika*, or *citta-samprayukta dharma*). These properties belong to a sub-category of compounded elements of existence, (*saṃskṛta dharma*). The process itself is called saṃskāra, See **elements of existence**, **Kusha** , **Hossō**.

citta-viprayuktāḥ dharma n. The dharma belonging to the sub-category of *saṃskṛta dharmas* which are not related to mind. See **elements of existence**, **Kusha**, **Hossō**.

D

dasa-sila-upāsaka n. (P.) A Buddhist layman who takes a vow to observe ten moral precepts normally intended for a novice (P. *sāmaṇera*, Sk. *śrāmaṇera*). A *bhikṣu* (a properly ordained monk) takes a vow of 227 rules; a bhikṣuṇi 311 rules; a novice ten rules. An ordinary Buddhist layman (*upāsaka*) or laywoman (*upāsikā*) normally takes a vow of five or eight precepts. Those who are willing to exert more control of their conduct may choose to take a vow to observe ten precepts.

dependent origination n. (P. *paṭicca-samuppāda*, Sk. *pratītya-samutpāda*). The chain of phenomenal cause and effect by which death and rebirth occur. It is the wheel of becoming (P. *bhavacakka*) affecting those whose mind is hindered by ignorance (P. *avijjā*) and kept in chains by cravings (P. *taṇhā*). It is the well-known formula which sums up the twelve principal causes (*nidānas*) of existence. The formula runs as follows: From *avijjā* (Sk. *a vidyā*, ignorance) arises *karma*, From *karma* arises *viññāna* (consciousness), from consciousness arises *sankhāra* (Sk. *saṃskāra*, organized being), from *saṅkhāra* arise the six organs of sense, from the six organs of sense arises contact (P. *phassa*, Sk. *sparśa*).from contact arises *vedanā* (sensation), from sensation arises *taṇhā* (Sk. *tṛṣṇā*, desire), from desire arises *upādāna* (attachment), from attachment arises *bhava* (continuation of existence), From continuation of existence arises birth (*jāti*), from birth arise decay and death (*jarā-maraṇa*), together with attending sorrow, lamentation, pain, and despair. Thus the chain of causation is traced back to ignorance (*avidyā*) especially the ignorance of the Four-Noble-Truth, (P. *ariyasacca*) the ultimate cause of suffering.

dhammadūta n. The term is not found in Sanskrit or Pali literature, or in Aśokan inscriptions. The meaning of the term is however clear, a *dharmadūta* is a goodwill messenger, whose mission is to propagate the Buddha's teaching in foreign lands. Such missions are not new. Towards the end of Aśoka's reign, Buddhist Theras were sent to Kashmir, Gandhāra, Sri Lanka, Suvarṇabhūmi and Himalayan countries. I-tsing, a Chinese Buddhist who travelled to India and spent about twenty years there mentioned names of many Indian monks who went to China, such as Kāśyapa-Mātanga, Dharmarakṣa (both went to China in A.D. 61), and Kumārajīva (A.D. 401). Another famous Indian monk is Bodhidharma (s.v.), who founded the meditation school was one of the most successful *dharmadūtas*..In modern times, the Buddhist congregation of Thailand has been regularly sending *dharmadūtas* to several countries in Asia, Europe, America and Australia.

Dhammapāla 1 n. (P.) Name of several elders in Theravāda Buddhism.

Dhammapāla 2 n. (P.) Name of a celebrated author, who lived posterior to Buddhaghosa. Several commentaries of the Khuddaka Nikāya texts are attributed to him, although it has been suggested that those several commentaries were written by several *thera* writers of the same name.

See also **Dharmapāla**.

Dhammayuttikā n. Name of the Buddhist sect founded by King Rama IV of Thailand (commonly known in English as King Mongkut) when he was still a monk. Before his ascension to the throne, towards the end of the reign of his father King Rama II, he took the yellow robe and became a Buddhist monk. Disappointed to find within the Buddhist Order the laxity in the observance of Buddhist disciplines, he started a reformation with a strong emphasis on the monastic discipline and devotion to the study of genuine Buddhist scripture. He attracted a large number of Buddhist monks and succeeded in founding a new sect under the name of Dhammayuttikā or Dhammayuttika-nikāya, (the sect which follows strictly the Dharma or True Teaching), as contrasted with the original Order which became thence known as the Mahānikāya (the larger sect, the sect of the majority). The difference between the two sects is not doctrinal, but in the strictness of disciplinary observance, the emphasis on the study of the Buddhist Canon, the enunciation of Pali terms, and the manner of wearing the outer yellow robes. Nowadays, an outsider notices little difference between the two sects. In Thailand, the sect is called *thammayut* for short. See **Mongkut, King**.

Dhammayuttikanikāya See **Dhammayuttikā.**

Dharmakāya See **Trikāya**.

Dharmanairātmya n. The theory that extends the conception of the Void to cover all things in general. Existence consists of *dharmas*, which means here simply things or objects. Since these things and objects are impermanent and changing, and nothing can be said of them at one moment which is not false the next. Thus *dharmas* (all things, all phenomena, and all experience etc.) cannot be real, they are as unreal as the *ātman* itself. See **Nairātmya**

Dharmapāla 1 n. Author of Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Completion of Mere Ideation), a Commentary on Vasubandhu's Vijñaptimātratā, (Reformed Idealism). He was an active professor at the Nālanda University and it is likely that Hieun-tsang's understanding of Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa and Triṃśikā was based on Dharmapāla's teaching while studying there.

dharmapāla 2 n. In Tibetan Lamaism, *dharmapāla* is a class of beings who function as defenders of the Faith. A *dharmapāla* is not a god, but a kind of being of extremely frightful countenance, fierce and with irresistible power.

Dharmasāstra n. A lawbook or code of laws. The term includes the whole body of Hindu law, but more especially applicable to the laws of Manu, Yājñavalkya, and a few others. Important as the basis of law in the old Indian society, they are also dealing with cosmological and religious matters.

dhyāna 1 (P. *jhāna*) Absorption, trance, meditation. 1. *dhyāna* is a religious spiritual exercise which will lead after death to rebirth in the World of Form (*rūpāvacara*)or in the world of Non-form (*arūpāvacara*). This means that a man who successfully reaches *dhyāna* has to be completely free from sensual desires. There are four stages of *dhyāna* or stages of mystic meditation, whereby the mind is purged step by step from all earthly emotions, and detached as it were from the body, which remains plunged in a profound trance. At the fourth stage, the mind becomes exalted and purified, is indifferent to all earthly emotions, alike of pleasures and of pains. The monk who desires to practise *dhyāna* retires to a secluded spot, seats himself cross-legged, and shutting out the world, concentrates his mind on a single thought. Gradually his mind becomes filled with a supernatural ecstasy and serenity, while his mind still reasons upon and investigates the subject chosen for contemplation. That is the first *dhyāna*, in which his faculty of investigation and reasoning is active, while experiencing ecstasy and serenity.In the following stages, his mind will purge itself of activities, with less and less consciousness of his experience ecstasy and serenity. In the last stage, he is completely indifferent to earthly emotions and is in undefined stage of supreme bliss. The*dhyāna* is also held to form the principal means of entrance into the Four Paths (s.v., *cattāro maggo*), which will lead a man to realize the final goal. This is possible as the monk practising *dhyāna*, at the point of attainment of *appanāsamādhi*, will have his five-fold sense-activity and the five hindrances (*nivaraṇa*) suspended completely, though temporarily. *Dhyāna* is not a state of sleep, but a state of consciousness, still full of alertness and lucidity.

The high degree of concentration is generally developed by the practice of one of the forty subjects mentioned in *samatha-kammaṭṭhāna*. See also **Brahmā** 2, and Childers, *A Dictionary of the Pali Language,* s.v.

Dhyāna 2 Name of a Buddhist school in China and Japan. See **Bodhidharma.**

Dhyāni-buddha n. A series of Buddha in Tibetan Buddhism. The word *Dhyāni* is Sanskrit, meaning "performing meditation or concentration." The *Dhyāni* Buddhas are emanations of the Original Buddha or the *Ādi*-Buddha in deep meditation. They are the creative aspects, or the modes of manifestation of the *Ādi* -Buddha, and are five (or seven) in number. The five *Dhyāni* Buddhas are concerned with the worlds of form, the last two with the "formless, immaterial" world. The names of the five are: Vairocana (the Illuminator), Akṣobhya (the Unperturbable), Ratnasambhava (the Jewel-Born), Amitābha (the Infinite Light), and Amoghasiddhi (the Unfailing Success). The name of the sixth is Vajra-sattva. No name of the seventh is found. In Tibet, the term "*Jina*, the Conqueror" is used in place of *Dhyāni*-Buddha.The term *Dhyāni*-Buddha was first used by Brian Houghton Hodgson, who during his residence in Nepal (1833-1843) had been sending Buddhist manuscripts to the French scholar Eugene Burnouf. It is curious that the term *Dhyāni* Buddha, which is faulty Sanskrit grammatically, and has never been found in any Sanskrit manuscript, caught on and has been in regular use to the present days. Being emanations from *Ādi*-Buddha, these *Dhyāni*-Buddhas in theory have existed from the very beginning.The *Dhyāni*-Buddha (or *Jina* doctrine) was evolved from the Tantric doctrine around 750 A.D. It seems to be the desire to account for the source of these *Dhyāni*-Buddhas that led to the formation of the *Ādi*-Buddha doctrine around 800 A.D. See **Ādi-Buddha, Dhyāni-Bodhisattva, Lamaism.**

Dhyāni-bodhisatva n. The hypostatic personifications of the attributes of the *Dhyāni*-Buddhas, who are in turn the objective aspects of the self-creative forces of the *Ādi*-Buddha. Avalokiteśvara is the *Dhyāni*-Bodhisattva of the present age and Sākyamuni or Gautama, the historical Buddha, is his *Mānuṣī* Buddha or his earthly manifestation. In the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, Gautama is however described as the *Ādi*-Buddha himself. See **Ādi-Buddha, Dhyāni-Buddha, Lamaism.**

Dravya-sat See **Sarvāstivāda.**

dukkha (Sk. *duḥkha*), Pain, suffering, painful feeling, sorrow. 1. *Dukkha* as the first of the four Noble Truths (*Sacca, Ariya-sacca*), and the first of the three characteristics of existence (*ti-lakkhaṇa*, Sk. *tri-lakṣaṇa*), is not limited to simple painful experience, but refers to the unsatisfactory nature and the general insecurity of all conditioned phenomena, which on account of their impermanence, are all liable to suffering. Some scholars point out that *dukkha* does not deny the existence of pleasurable experience, and suggest that the term should be understood as "liability to suffering" instead.


E

Eisai n. The founder of the Rinzai sect in Japan. Two centuries after Bodhidharma had founded the Meditation School (Ch'an) in China, the School split into the Southern School of Abrupt Enlightenment (led by Hui-neng) and the Northern School of Gradual Enlightenment (led by Sheng-hsiu). The Southern School later developed into several sects. The various sects of the Meditation School was introduced into Japan several times from the seventh to the ninth century, but did not last long. Eisai later in 1191 successfully founded the Rinzai Sect in Japan, under the name Zen. (The Chinese term Ch'an and the Japanese term Zen are the same word derived from Sk. *dhyāna* or P. *jhāna*). The important Zen sects are Rinzai, Soto, Fuke and Obaku. All Zen schools in Japan belong to the School of Abrupt Enlightenment.


ekaggatā n. (P., Sk. *ekāgratā*). The stage at which one's attention is fixed upon one point or

object, the intentness in the fixing of one's mind on one object, a requirement for those who practices meditation or concentration (*samādhi, dhyāna*).

elements of existence n. In the Kusha School of Japan, which is based on Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu, a Sarvāstivādin author, there are seventy-five *dharmas* or Elements of Existence.



The Elements of Existence in the Hossō School are also from Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu, but with one-hundred *dharmas*.



Eternalism n. (P. *sassataditthi, sassatavāda*; Sk. *śāśvatadṛṣṭi*). The heretical doctrine which holds that spirit and matter (*attā* and *loka*) are eternal. Buddhism holds that the worlds are impermanent, being subject to decay and destruction. With respect to spiritual aspect (P. *attā*, Sk. *ātman*), see **anātman**.

F

Four Paths (P. *cattāro maggo*). The Four Paths or Stages on the Path to Liberation or Nirvāṇa in Theravāda Buddhism. 1. Sotāpanna (Sk. Srotāpanna), one who has entered the Stream. At this stage, he is free from the first three of the ten Fetters (*saṃyojana*), which bind beings to existence in the sensuous sphere. 2. Sakadāgāmī (Sk. Sakṛdāgāmin), one who will return once only to this sensuous world before attaining liberation. He is nearly free from two more Fetters (the fourth and the fifth). 3. Anāgāmī, one who will never return to this world. He is fully free from five Fetters. 4. Arhat, or Arhant, Arahat, Arahant, "the Worthy One", who attains Nirvāṇa at the death of his present body. Such has completely and fully cast off all the ten Fetters. See **saṃyojana.**

H

Heruka An extremely frightful Tantric being endowed with power, being the spouse of a demonic fiendess. See **Tantra, Lamaism.**

Hīnayāna The Narrow Vehicle, the personal or private path or vehicle, contrasted with Mahāyāna, the Great Vehicle. The term was first used by Mahāyāna adherents with the connotation that the Hīnayāna doctrine is narrow and admits only a few to final salvation. The term *hīna,* however, also means base, or low, a fact which has led many Hīnayāna Buddhists to avoid calling themselves or their doctrine "Hīnayāna" and adopt the more neutral name "Theravādin" or "Thera-vāda" instead. Literally, Thera-vāda means The Doctrine of the Elders. Some scholars still use the term Hīnayāna and translate it the Limited Career, the Personal Career, the Little Career, etc. Hīnayāna or Theravāda Buddhism still flourishes in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. See **yāna.**

Hinduism 1 n. General. Hindu originally was the name of the River Sindhu (now in Pakistan) as called by the Persian and the Greek. The name was later used to represent the people living in the Sindhu valley and beyond. Historically therefore, Hinduism includes anything Indian, and is often used as a generic term covering loosely the

orthodox Indian religions of all periods. Broadly speaking, the development of orthodox religious doctrines in India may be briefly outlined as follows: 1. The Vedic period, (?)1200 - 600 B.C., (See **Veda**), 2. The Upanishadic period, 6th century B.C., (See **brahman, Brahmanism, Upanishads**). 3. Hinduism proper, 5th or 4th century B.C., with two sects: Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism. (See **Brahmā, Śiva, Viṣṇu, Śaktism, Vaiṣṇavism, Śākta**). 4. Tantrism, 4th cent. A.D. (See **Tantra**). Buddhism and Jainism are regarded as unorthodox.

Hinduism 2 n. Hinduism proper. It is very likely that the abstract Brāhman or *ātman* of Brahmanism (See **Brahmanism** 1) was too difficult for the masses to comprehend. Instead of holding that the abstract Brahman was the soul of the entire universe, it was easier for them to view that Brahman was the Creator of the universe. Thus the abstract Brahman of the Upanishads became personified as an all-powerful Creator God, with Viṣṇu as the Protector God and Śiva the Destroyer God. These three gods are almost human, except for their power. Brahmā creates the world, man, animal, and everything on earth. Viṣṇu sees that no evil power will disturb the created world.

In any case, the world deteriorates as time passes. Goodness previously inherent in man dwindles, and vice of all kinds predominates. Finally, the Destroyer god Śiva will destroy the chaotic world. After a definite period of time, Brahmā will recreate the world and the cycle of creation, continuity, and the return to status quo, will repeat itself ad infinitum. In Hinduism proper, men believe in the law of karma, and the unending samsāra, and attainment of heaven through the Grace of God. See **Brahmā**.

himsā Injury. See **ahimsā**.

Hōnen (Jap.). Hōnen Shonin (or Genku) (1133-1211 A.D.), the founder of the Jōdo-Shu or "Pure Land Sect" in Japan. See **Jōdo**.

Hossō n. A Japanese Idealistic school of Buddhism. It claims to have followed the orthodox system of Vasubandhu. The system is found in Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā, a short text on the theory in thirty stanzas. This Triṃśikā is believed to have been studied by Hiuen-tsang at Nalanda under Dharmapāla and the result was summed up in thirty Chinese volumes. Vasubandhu's original view was that nothing outside consciousness is real, hence the name Vijñapti-mātra or Vijñāna-mātra, "consciousness only." The Hossō School, however, emphasizes the "characteristic of the *dharmas*" (*dharma-laksana*), and is highly analytical. It taught that ultimate reality is to be found in the mind, in the *ālaya-vijñāna* or "store-consciousness" of each individual. It is the "seeds, *bīja* within this store-consciousness that manifest themselves in innumerable varieties of existences. Phenomena (*dharmatā*) exist by virtue of these "seeds" and the entire universe is made up of various combinations of their qualities. See **Vijnaptimātravāda, Vasubandhu, Trimsikā**.

I

iddhi (Sk. *ṛddhi*) n. power, magical power, miraculous faculty. *Iddhi* is the peculiar attribute of the arhats, though it may be possessed by those who have practised *dhyāna* (P. *jhāna*). There are ten *iddhis,* such as the power of passing through the air, of taking any form, of creating or causing to appear (P. *nimmāna*) anything that is required. Iddhi is one of the six Supernormal Knowledges (*abhiññā*) attainable through the utmost perfection in mental concentration (*samādhi*), and one supermundane (*lokuttara*) power attainable through penetrating insight (*vipassanā*). It will come with the realization of Arhatship or Holiness. The six *abhiññā*s in Theravāda Buddhism are:

1. *iddhi-vidhī*, Magical power;
2. *dibba-sota,* Divine ear;
3. *ceto-pariya-ñāna*, Penetration of the mind of others;
4. *divya-cakkhu*, Divine eye;
5. *pubbenivāsānussati*, Remembrance of former existences;
6. *āsavakkhaya*, Extinction of all defilements.

indriya 1 n. In Sanskrit as well as in general Buddhist literature, the term *indriya* means the organ of senses. In Theravāda Buddhism, the primary meaning of *indriya* remains. In Pali, the

word *indriya* is often compounded with another Pali word of specific sense: *cakkhu-indriya* (the eye-organ), *sota-indriya* (the ear-organ), *ghāna-indriya* (the nose-organ), *jivhā-indriya* (the tongue-organ) and kāya-indriya (the body-organ, i.e. body as the organ of touch). Sometimes a sixth *indriya* is added, viz. the *mano-indriya* (the mind-organ, with *dharma* as its object). See. **āyatana.**

indriya 2 n. *Indriya* has sometimes in Pali Scripture the sense of moral qualities, five in number: *saddhā-indriya* (faith), *viriya-indriya* (effort or energy), *sati-indriya* (mindfulness), *samādhi-indriya* (contemplation or meditation), and *paññā-indriya* (wisdom).

indriya 3 n. *Indriya* is sometimes the faculty of sensations, also five in number: *sukha-indriya* (happiness), *dukkha-indriya* (suffering), *somanassa-indriya* (joy), *dommanassa-indriya* (grief), and *upekkhā-indriya* (equanimity, indifference arising from understanding of the nature of the immediate phenomenon).

Ippen The Pure Land School (Jōdo-shu) was introduced into Japan several times, and it was through the effort of Hōnen (1133-1212) that it became firmly established in Japan. The school was based on the long and the short *Sukhāvati-vyuha sūtras*. The original Jōdo-shu teaches rather conservative worship of Amida through faith, devotion and performing good work. Two important sects were derived from the original Jōdo-shu. The Shin School of Shinran (1173-1262) emphasizes faith in Amida and the devotional repetition of the name Amida as an action of gratitude. The Ji School founded by Ippen (1276 A.D.) sets rule of reciting the hymns of Zen-do six times every day (*ji* = time). There is also a kind of religious dancing devoted to Amida in the Ji School. See also **Jōdo**

J

Jaina n. A follower of Jainism. See **Jainism.**

Jainism n. A religion of India whose founder Mahāvira was contemporaneous with the Buddha. He is usually referred to as Nigaṇṭha or Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta in Buddhist texts. He is one of the six heretics who had considerable followers in the time of the Buddha. Jainism has two sects, one is Śvetāmbara, white-clad, and the other is Digāmbara, sky-clad. The Nigaṇṭha referred to in Buddhist texts is very likely that naked or Sky-Clad ascetic. It teaches the existence of the soul, which is called *jīva.* The *jīva* is by nature pure and seeks the ultimate truth (*kaivalya*) but the karma flux which envelops the soul will obscure the thought and sight of an ordinary man. The influx can be destroyed by the heat of austerity (*tapas*, lit. heat). There are several injunctions for a Jain lay-man, but the strongest one is non-injury (*ahimsā).* A *jīva* which is perfect is called *siddha,* or the *kevalī* or the Accomplished, whereas most men are *saṃsārin,* or those who have to wander still in *samsāra* or the round of rebirth.

jātaka n. Birth stories of the Buddha. As a Pali text, it is found in Sutta Pitaka, describing summarily 547 previous lives of the Buddha. Detailed accounts are given in Jātakaṭṭhakathā, the Commentary to the Jātaka, and the Jātakaṭ-ṭhavannanā, a sub-commentary to that commentary. Birth stories of the Buddha are scattered in many texts, such as Cariyāpitaka and the Avadāna. Stories found in the Jātaka are also found in the Vinayapiṭaka, the Suttanipāta, Apadāna and others.

Jātakamālā n. The Garland of Birth Stories, a text belonging to the Mahāyāna Buddhism. The text was first discovered in Nepal. It is an ornate and artistic Sanskrit work by Āryaśūra in the Kāvya style. The work contains thirty-four Jātakas or birth-stories. These stories are intended to illustrate the *pāramitās* or "Perfections" of a Bodhisattva. Of these stories, a number are not found in the Pali collection of the Jātakas. I-tsing praises the Jātakamālā among the works which were particularly popular and much read in India at his time.

jñeyāvaraṇa n. A hindrance to religious attainment arising from intellectual faults. See **kleśāvarana**.

Jōdo (Jap.) The Pure Land School (Jōdo-shu), was first founded as White Lotus Sect in China by Hui Yuan (*ca.* 400 A.D.). Based on the larger and the smaller Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtras, and the Amitāyurdhyāna Sūtra. It was introduced into Japan several times, but could have a firm stand only through the effort of Hōnen (1133-1211). The original Jōdo-shu was relatively conservative, and did not differ much in practice from the worship of Amida in China. It taught worship of Amida through faith, devotion and performance of good works.

The Pure Land or the Jōdo doctrine personifies the Buddha Nature (*Buddha-sva-bhāva*) as Amitābha (Amida), teaching that faith in Amida and devotional prayer to him will lead to the awakening of the Buddha-Nature and ensure rebirth in Sukhāvatī the Pure Land, where the attainment of Nirvāṇa from there is certain. Two important sects were derived from the Jōdo-shu. The Shin school of Shinran (1173-1262), who was Hōnen's disciple, puts emphasis on faith alone and teaches that by appealing to the mercy of Amida, and by devotional repetition of his name, as an act of gratitude, the mantra being "Namu Amida Butsu", The Ji-shu School was soon founded by Ippen (1276 A.D.) He set the rule of reciting the hymns of Zen-do six times everyday (*ji* = time). There is also a kind of religious dancing devoted to Amida in the Ji School.

K

kāli n. The black. Originally in the Vedic period, *kāli* simply means the dark-coloured one, especially referring to the god Agni (Fire), whose visible appearance is red, but who makes every object turn black after he has touched it. This is because one of his seven flickering tongues is black and fierce. In time, the word has developed into the Goddess *Kāli*, the fierce and bloody consort of Śiva. The Sk. term *Kāla* means time, and as time is invincible, inflexible, severe, just and impartial, it soon acquires the extended meaning as the God of Death. It is likely that the connection of time with death is implied in the name of the Goddess *Kālī*, who can inflicts death to, or postpone death from, her devotee. She is prominent in rituals in Hindu Tantrism.

Kanishka (Sk. Kaniṣka) n. Name of a powerful Kushāṇa king of India who established the Śaka era starting with the year 78 A.D. His capital was at Puruṣapura (now Peshāwār in Pakistan). His fame usually rests on the patronage he extended to Buddhism. Coins and inscriptions bear eloquent testimony to the king's zeal for Buddhism. Whereas Aśoka was the upholder of the Theravāda Buddhism, Kanishka was the supporter of the Sarvāstivāda. Hiuen Tsang leaves a record that Kanishka summoned a Council to arrange the teaching of the conflicting schools of Buddhism, whose views were sometimes contradictory. Three commentaries came out from that Council: the Upadeśa-śāstra to explain the Sūtra-Piṭaka, the Vinaya-vibhāṣa-śāstra for the Vinaya and the Abhidharma-vibhāsā-śāstra for the Abhidharma. These texts were accepted by the Sarvāstivāda school. Aśvaghoṣa, an eminent poet who wrote the well-known *Buddhacarita* (Life of the Buddha) most likely lived at his court. The Vibhāṣā commentary of the Abhidharma was especially studied in Kashmir, giving rise to the Vaibhāṣika sects of that region. Kanishka's reign is noteworthy also for the Gandhāra or Indo-Greek School of art. The sculpture of the first Buddha image was undertaken in his reign. (Before this time, the Buddha was represented by symbols: his Enlightenment by the Bodhi tree, his First Sermon by the Wheel of Law and the deer (the Deer Park), his Mahāparinirvāṇa by an empty throne). See **Kushāna**.

karma (P. *kamma*) n. Action, deed. Often used with derived meaning "the appropriate result of action". In abstract sense, it is the law of immutable cause and effect, unlimited by time or by space. As applied to the moral sphere it is the Law of Ethical Causation, through the operation of which a man "reaps what he sows", builds his character, makes his destiny, and works out his salvation. The doctrine

of rebirth is an essential corollary to that of karma, the individual coming into physical life with a character and environment resulting from his actions in the past. His character, family, circumstance and destiny are all, therefore, his karma, and according to his reaction to his present destiny he modifies and builds his future. Karma does not, in itself, bind to the wheel of rebirth; the binding element is personal desire (*tṛṣṇā*, P. *taṇhā*) for the fruit of his action.

karma-vipāka (P. *kamma-vipāka*) n. the ripening of the deeds or acts performed. It is what a man "reaps" of what he "sows" in the past. Often translated as the result of the previous deeds performed in the previous existence.

karuṇā Active compassion. In Theravāda Buddhism, *karuṇā* is one of the four *brahma-vihāras*. See **brahmavihāra**. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, *karuṇā* is one of the two pillars of its main tenet, the other one being *prajñā* (wisdom). See **prajñā, Mañjusri, Avalokitesvara**.

Kathāvatthu n. One of the texts incorporating the Abhidhamma-pitaka of Theravāda Buddhism. See **Abhidharma.**

kaṭhina n. A robe offered to a chapter of bhikkhus after the rainy season retreat. Buddhist monks are required to stay in one monastery in the rainy season, which, in Thailand, begins in the middle of the lunar month of *Āṣāḍha* (P. *Āsālha*, June-July) and ends in the middle of *Āśvina* (P. *Assayuja*, September-October). The presentation of a *kaṭhina* robe must be made to a chapter of properly ordained monks. Only monks who observes the rainy season retreat are entitled to receive the *kaṭhina* robe. The chapter of monks decide among themselves who should be the recipient of the robe thus offered. Sometimes the robe is especially made, in which the whole process of making the robe from the raw cotton to the finished robe is gone through a single day. Such a process requires organized work and cooperation of a great number of people. The work starts with having the raw cotton spun into a yarn, woven into a robe, cutting into proper number of pieces — in Thailand usually nine — sewing them together, dyeing, and then putting in the sun to dry.

khandha n. (Sk. *skandha*). The five causally conditioned elements of existence forming a being or entity. In the personal sense, the *khandhas* are the elements which condition the appearance of life in any form, which together make up the personality within the *saṃsāra* cycle. The five *khandhas* are inherent in every form of life, either in an active or a potential state. The exception is only among the inhabitants of *arūpāvacara* or formless or immaterial world, where no form or *rūpa* exists. These *khandhas* usually embrace all the essential properties of every sentient being. In man, all five elements are active:

1. *rūpa*: Form, body, shape, physical or material;
2. *vedanā*: Feeling, sensation and emotional reactions;
3. *saññā:* Perception, awareness of and assimilation of sensation;
4. *sankhāra*: Impressions resulting from *vedanā* and *saññā*. The elements of consciousness, volition;
5. *viññāna*: Consciousness, the relation between subject and object.

When a man dies, the five *khandhas* of which he is constituted dissolve, but by the force of his karma another being appears, who though possessing different *khandhas* and a different form, is in reality identical with the man who just passed away, because his karma is the same. Karma is then the link that preserves the identity of a being through all the countless changes which it undergoes in its progress through *samsāra* or the round of rebirth. Thus there is practically no break in the line of organized existence, for the formation of the new *khandhas* follows without appreciable interval, upon the dissolution of the old. Only by attainment of arhatship, having destroyed all cravings (Sk. *tṛṣṇā*, P. *tanhā*), that the bond operated by the law of karma is destroyed, with the result that the potentiality for rebirth ceases. Hence the physical death of an arhat is the final dissolution of his *khandhas*, his material existence and he passes instantly into Nirvāṇa.

kleśa (P. *kilesa*). n. Defilement. Moral depravity or inclination to vice, the elimination of which is essential to progress on the Path. The listings of these defilements in various texts do not always agree. In Theravāda Buddhism they are greed, delusion, enmity, conceit, false views, doubt, mental torpor, uncontrollable thinking, shamelessness and lack of moral dread.

kleśāvarana n. A hindrance to religious attainment by moral faults. There are two kinds of hindrances: hindrance arising from moral faults

(*kleśavaraṇa*), such as depravities, passion, etc. and hindrance arising from intellectual faults (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) which obstructs the way to attain full knowledge. Both kinds of hindrance arise from the false belief in the real existence of self and of things.

King Mongkut See **Mongkut, King**

koans (Jap.) lit. A public notice, an official document. A technical term for an exercise given by a Zen master to his disciple. It is usually in the form of a riddle to test the qualification for progress towards enlightenment (*satori*). On receiving a koan, the disciple sits cross-legged in complete silence in deep meditation in the Zen hall. When the student thinks that he is prepared on the problem, he pays a private visit to the teacher's retreat, explains what he understands and proposes to resolve the question. A koan is, however, often couched as problems insoluble by, and nonsensical to, the intellect. D. T. Suzuki writes on this: "The worst enemy of Zen experience at least in the beginning, is the intellect, which consists and insists in discriminating subject from object... For a koan is not a logical proposition but the expression of a certain mental state resulting from the Zen discipline... What could not be solved on the plane of empirical consciousness is not transferred to the deeper recesses of the mind."

Kṣitigarbha n. Name of a well known Bodhisattva.

Kūkai (774-835 A.D.) Founder of Shingon Sect of Buddhism in Japan. According to the school, the universe is considered to be Vairocana Buddha (one of the *Dhyāni*-Buddhas), whose Dharmakāya or real body is divided into the mental and the material complementary constituents. Kūkai classified various forms of the religious life into ten grades of development, culminating in the mystic pantheism of Shingon Sect, in which full blessedness of Buddhahood is realized After his death, he is known as Kōbō Daishi.

kuśala (P. *kusala*) adj. In ordinary sense: skilful, expert, clever; lucky, happy, prosperous. In religious sense: good, right, virtuous, meritorious, and wholesome as far as karma is concerned. When the term is used in strictly religious sense, the term never means 'skilful.' *kuśala-karma* is that commitment of an action which will cause favourable results and contain the seeds of a happy destiny or rebirth.

Kushāna n. A dynasty of kings of India after Aśoka of Maurya dynasty. After Aśoka, the empire became divided and weakened. An aggressive nomadic group from the north pushed in, and soon succeeded in establishing control over Gandhāra, a region in the extreme northwest, with the centre of power at Takshasilā or Taxilā (about fifteen kilometres from the modern Rawalpindi now in Pakistan), and Purushapura (modern Peshawār) as the capital. Kanishka (s.v.) was the well known king of this dynasty, who was the key figure in spreading Buddhism to China, Tibet and Japan. See **Kanishka**.

L

lama n. Lit. the superior one. In Lamaism, a lama is a monk of high standing, often the head of a monastery. The head of the congregation of Lamaistic monks is called the Dalai Lama, who is held by tradition to be the perpetual incarnation of Avalokiteśvara, the Bodhisattva who renounces Nirvāna and continues his human incarnation out of kindness. It supposes that at the moment of decease of a Dalai Lama, he is immediately reborn in the vicinity of the monastery in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. The child is to be discovered by oracular means and then duly installed on the throne. Thus the incarnation by Avalokiteśvara is uninterrupted. The Dalai Lama, as the head of the congregation, performs the most elaborate ceremonial ritual in festivals throughout the year. See **Lamaism**.

Lamaism, n. Tibetan Buddhism. Strictly speaking, Lamaism is not limited to Tibet, but is also the accepted faith of the people in Mongolia. It is found active in Nepāl, Bhūtān and even in

Sikkim and in parts of Kashmir today. According to the Tibetan tradition, Lamaism was founded by Padmasambhava, the master of a ritualistic and mystical Yogācāra school in northeast India, who, at the invitation of Khri-Srong the king of Tibet, in 747 A.D. went with a group of Tantric Buddhists from Nālanda Buddhist University to Lhasa. In course of time Padmasambhava came to be worshipped as an arhat. Buddhism which Padmasambhava introduced into Tibet was a form of Yogācāra, a late Mahāyāna sect strongly influenced by Tantrism, accepting the Productive Principle (Prakṛti) as manifested in the goddess Kālī or Durgā, the female energy (*śakti*) of the primordial male Principle (Śiva), who is a gross representation of the Supreme or Universal Soul. The various forces of nature — physical, physiological, moral and intellectual — were in this cult deified under separate personalities and grouped into Divine Mothers, Ḍākinī, Yoginī (supernatural beings with magical powers), etc. And all were made to be merely different manifestations of the great central goddess Kālī, Śiva's consort. Wives were therefore allotted to the several *Dhyāni*-Bodhisattvas, as well as to most of the other gods and demons; and most of them were given a variety of forms, mild and terrible, according to the supposed moods of each divinity at different times. (Waddell 128 f.). This amalgamated form of belief in the meantime absorbed the belief in nature spirits, spirits of the dead and other magic cults of the old Tibetan "Bon" belief. As a result, Lamaism is a form of faith the doctrine of which differs much from Buddhism described in popular Buddhist texts. It has developed a system of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, starting with the Primordial *Ādi*-Buddha, the self-existent and unoriginated source of Universal Soul or Mind, similar to the immaterial and abstract Brahman of the Upanishads. From the Supreme Concentration of that Ādi-Buddha arise five Buddhas of Contemplation, the *Dhyāni* -Buddhas, who became *Ādi*-Buddha's agents in creation. The active aspects of these *Dhyāni* Buddhas are personified as the *Dhyāni* Bodhisattva, who are represented in turn by *Mānuṣī* or human Buddhas. Avalokiteśvara is the *Dhyāni* Bodhisattva of the present eon who is incarnate in the Dalai Lama. Our historical Gotama Buddha is his earthly or Mānuṣī reflex. One very familiar name is Padmapāṇi (the Lotus-handed), an epithet of Avalokiteśvara. He is represented as kind and compassionate, with the power to help all mankind. Another Dhyāni-Bodhisattva not mentioned in the list below but now very prominent is Mañjuśrī (the sweet-voiced one), the personification of Wisdom. He is now one of the two pillars of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Akṣobhya is the *Dhyāni*-Buddha leading the line of Mañjuśrī.

Ādibuddha	Dhyānibuddha	Dhyānibodhisattva	Mānusībuddha
	Vairocana	Samantabhadra	Dīpankara
	Akṣobhya	Vajrapāṇi	Kanakamuni
ĀDIBUDDHA	Ratnasambhava	Ratnapāṇi	Kāśyapa
	Amitābha	Avalokiteśvara	Gautama
	Amoghasiddhi	Viśvapāṇi	Maitreya

The meanings of the names are as follows:

- Vairocana	The Illuminator
Akṣobhya	The Imperturbable
Ratnasambhava	The Jewel-born
Amitābha	The Infinite Light
Amoghasiddhi	The Unfailing Success
- Samantabhadra	Auspicious on all sides
Vajrapāṇi	The Thunderbolt-Handed
Ratnapāṇi	The Jewel-Handed
Avalokiteśvara	The Lord who looks down from on high.
Viśvapāṇi	Holding all things in his hand.
- Dīpankara	The Light-maker
Kanakamuni	The Golden Sage
Kāśyapa	(Family name)
Gautama	(Family Name)
Maitreya	Friendship, The Friendly one, (Family name).

Lotus Sūtra n. Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra, one of the most important Mahāyāna texts. Variously translated as *The Lotus of the Good Law*, *The Lotus of the Wonderful Law*, *Le Lotus de la Bonne Loi*, etc., from "sad (good, true, real) + dharma + puṇḍarīka (a kind of white lotus)." The author is unidentified, this famous Mahāyāna text was written around A.D. 200.

It gives data on Mahāyāna doctrine with respect to the Buddha and the Bodhisattva. The transcendental Buddha has existed from the beginning of time, and his appearance as the human Buddha was only a skilful means (*upāya*) adopted in order to preach the True Doctrine to mankind.

The Sūtra emphasizes the omniscience of the

Buddhas, and the doctrine that all beings may attain the Buddhahood through an intermediate state of being a Bodhisattva. Grace of the Bodhisattvas is much extolled, to the point that the state of being a Bodhisattva becomes chief objects of religious enthusiasm. It is probable that devotion (*bhakti*) was first introduced into Buddhism through the teaching of this Sūtra. The Sūtra mentions and takes for granted the doctrine of *śūnyatā* (the Void). More emphasis is put on the doctrine of the nature of a Buddha, and on explaining away the Pratyekabuddhayāna and the Śrāvakayāna as mere temporary expedients. It stresses Buddhayāna as being the most important and the only doctrine taught by the Buddha. The Tendai School of Japan, which was derived from the T'ien T'ai School of China, bases its teaching on this LotusSūtra. See **Buddhayāna, yāna**.

M

Mādhyamaka or **Mādhyamika**. Another name for the Buddhist school of Śūnyavāda which rejects all concepts of dualism and teaches the theory of the void *śūnyatā*. Mādhyamaka or Mādhyamika means "the middle (path)" and the doctrine is so called because of its assumption of the middle path between theories clinging to the knowableness of the noumenal and the sufficiency of the phenomenal by proclaiming the oneness, i.e. *śūnyatā*, of the two extremes. His ultimate teaching is that there is neither self or non-self, as these are subjective device. Reality as the Indeterminate (*śūnya*) is free from conceptual construction. See **Nāgārjuna, Paramārtha satya**. It should be noted that the concept of *śūnyatā* is not lacking in Theravāda Buddhism. Concentration may be attained by meditating on the state which is void of phenomenal relations, which is "*appamāṇa*, *suññatā* and *animitta* (boundless, void and non-phenomenal). The emphasis, however, is not on the philosophical interpretation concerning the relative reality of the phenomenal and the noumenal. In Japan, the Sanron School follows the Mādhyamaka teaching on *śūnyatā*.

Mahā-Maudgalyāyana Sk. form of P. Mahā-Moggalāna Thera (s.v.).

Mahā-Moggallāna Thera n. The second of the chief disciples of the Buddha, the first one being Sāriputta (Sk. Sāriputra) Thera, who was highly esteemed for his wisdom and called the Dhammasenāpati. Also called Moggallāna, he and Sāriputta had been friends from childhood, and decided to renounce the world on the same day. They first became disciples of Sañjaya the Sceptic, one of the six famous Hindu heretical teachers during the Buddha's time. Moggallāna and Sāriputta were not satisfied with his teaching, and left Sañjaya in search of a better teacher. Sāriputta met Assaji, one of the five original disciples (P. *pañcavaggīya*, Sk. *pañcavargīya*) of the Buddha. Assaji told him that the Buddha could explain not only the cause (*hetu*) of all things (*dharma*), but also their cessation (*nirodha*). Sariputta understood the purport of Assaji's words, and immediately took Moggallāna to the Buddha and both became the Buddha's disciples. Moggallāna is renowned for his supernormal powers (*iddhi*).

Mahānikāya See **Dhammayuttikā**

Mahāparinibbāna Sutta P. "The Sutta of the Mahāparinirvāṇa or the Passing Away (of the Buddha)." It is one of the most important discourses, as it gives an almost continuous record of the latter part of the Buddha's life, his last sayings, and his passing away.

Mahāsanghikā n Also called Mahāsangītikā. According to the Pali source, it is one of the Schools which separated out from the Theravādins at the Second Council which took place a hundred years after the passing away of the Buddha. The Council reprimanded the Vajjīputta monks who modified a number of precepts and thus became loose in conduct in the eyes of the Council. This caused a reaction of the reprimanded monks who formed themselves into another School and gathered a large number of followers. They held another Council of their own, and it was attended by a large number of monks, giving rise to the

name Mahāsanghika School (the Sect of the Majority) or Mahāsangītikā (Belonging to the Greater Council). The Mahāsanghika School rejected the six sections of the Abhidhammas of the Theravāda School, the Parivāra (part of the Vinaya) and a few other texts of the Theravāda. According to Northern sources, the schism occurred on the difference of opinions regarding the nature or the achievement of an Arhat. A complete transcript of the Vinaya of the Mahāsanghika was taken from India into China. The best known Sanskrit works of the School are Mahāvastu and Lalitavistara. The teaching contained in Mahāvastu shows that the School differs much from the Mahāyāna doctrine we know of today. There is no clear cut statement that all men may become Buddhas. There will naturally be future Buddhas, but each is chosen by an existing Buddha to be his successor. The ninth and tenth stages of the Bodhisattva-Bhūmi in Mahāvastu, (the Crown-Prince and Consecration), evidently confirms this view. In Theravāda texts, Gotama Buddha (Sk. Gautama Buddha) appointed the Bodhisattva Ajita as successor, who will be the next Buddha by the personal name of Ajita from Metteyya (Sk. Maitreya) family (*gotra*). See **bhūmi, Mahāvastu**.

Mahāvastu n. An old text of the Mahāsanghika School. The chief content of the text is the biography of the Buddha, but is full of miracles. Life of the Buddha is treated in three sections: the life of the Buddha in the time of Dīpankara Buddha, his resolutions when he was born in Tuṣita Heaven, the history of first conversions and the rise of the monastic community. The narrative in Mahāvastu is continually interrupted by Jātakas, Avadānas and exposition of various doctrines. Many of the tales are not found in the Pali Jātaka books. The language is not standard Sanskrit, and is called Buddhist Sanskrit, Mixed Sanskrit, or Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit. Many of the stories in the text are repeated. For example, the legend of the Buddha's birth is told no less than four times. Episodes are often repeated, first in prose and then in verse. The nucleus of the work may be as old as the first or second century B.C., but interpolations and additions may have continued to the third or fourth century A.D. The doctrines found in Mahāvastu are not entirely Mahāyānist, there is some inherent flavour which may be from later addition of Mahāyāna mythology and literary embellishments. Thus we find the beams of light which illuminate the entire Buddha regions (Buddhaksetra). The mentioning of a great number of Buddhas, and the saying that the Bodhisattvas are not begotten by father and mother, but originate immediately and independently through their qualities, is unmistakingly Mahāyānistic. The text on the ten Bodhisattva-bhūmi seems to be adaptation of Mahāyāna doctrine, especially when the name of the section "Daśabhūmika Sūtra" is identical with the name of a Mahāyāna text. The description of the conducts of a Bodhisattva is also Mahāyāna-like. The following essential conducts of the Bodhisattvas are especially treated: - Their natural conduct - *prakṛticaryā;* - Conduct in making a vow - *pranidhāna*; - Conduct in practising the ten stages or *bhūmis* - *anulomacaryā;* and - No falling back - *a-vaivarta-caryā.*

Mahāyāna See **yāna**

Maitreya (P. Metteyya) n. The name of the Buddha to come in this aeon. The age of the world is divided into aeons (Sk. *kalpa*, P. *kappa*). According to Theravāda Buddhism, a definite number of Buddhas will appear in an aeon. In the present aeon, (named *bhaddakappa*, Sk. *bhadrakalpa*) four Buddhas have already appeared. Of these Gotama Buddha (Sk. Gautama Buddha) is the fourth. The fifth who will appear before the end of this aeon is Maitreya or Metteyya in Pali. The doctrine to be taught by Maitreya is identical with that taught by the preceding four Buddhas.

Malalasekera, Professor G. P., (1900-1973), a Ceylonese scholar who devoted most of his time and effort, not only to the academic advancement of Oriental Studies in his own country, but to the international understanding of Buddhism. A man of versatility, he was an educationist and once an ambassador for Ceylon to Europe. His well known works include the *Pali Literature of Ceylon* (329 pp.), a *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names* (2 vols., 1163 + 1270 pp.). He was the Editor-in-Chief of the *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism* from 1955 to 1973. A distinguished Buddhist scholar and able administrator, he was awarded honorary degrees from several universities in Asia as well as in Europe.

mandala n. In Tantrism, a maṇḍala is a ritual or mystic circle, in which a ritual or ceremony is performed. See **cakra**. In Lamaism, a *mandala*

is a diagram used in invocations, meditation and temple services. Usually seen on a *Thang-ka* (also spelled Tang-ka or Tong-ka), a painting of divinities on cloth which are hung on the walls of the temples as subject of meditation. They are also carried as banners in procession.

Mañjuśrī n. The personification of Perfect Wisdom (*prajñā)* in Mahāyāna. He is one of the two most prominent bodhisattvas in Mahāyāna, (the other one being Avalokiteśvara, the personification of *karuṇā*, Compassion). In Saddharma Pundarīka he appears as the principal Bodhisattva from whom the Bodhisattva Maitreya is represented as seeking instruction from him. He is also prominent in Gaṇḍavyāha (also called Buddhāvataṃsaka). His chief function is the dispelling of ignorance. He is represented as sitting cross-legged, holding a sword of divine knowledge in his right hand to cut off all difficult or knotty points, and in his left carrying the book of Transcendental Wisdom (the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā) placed upon a lotus flower. He is also the patron of astrology. He has no female counterpart in Tibetan presentations. His name is not in the list of five Dhyāni Bodhisattvas. The name Mañjuśrī is very prominent also in Tantric literature. Many works contain the name Mañjuśrī in the title, such as Mañjuśrī-mūla, Mañjuśrī-nāma-sangīti. In the latter work, a long list of the names of Mañjuśrī forms a hymn of praise. See **Lamaism**.

mantra n. A magical formula of invocation. A verse or a saying which is considered sacred when properly recited. In the Rigveda, the Gāyatri is the best known example. In later Hinduism, the syllable *om*, or *aum*, is regarded as the most efficacious. There are practically innumerable list of mantras especially in Tantrism. Chapter XXI of Saddharmapuṇḍarīka deals with *dhāraṇī*s, which are spells, words, phrases or special prayers believed to be filled with magic power. These *dhāranī*s have prominent part in Tantric Buddhism.

Mantrayāna n. A late form of Mahāyāna Buddhism, characterized by the use of mantras (s.v.) or chants as a means (*yāna*) to attain enlightenment. Mantras are also employed in the Japanese Shingon and Tendai sects. See **Vajrayāna**.

Marāthi n. Name of an Aryan languages of India. It is spoken over a wide area of the Deccan. The purest form of the language is supposed to be the Deśī Marāṭhī around Poona, not far from Bombay. The name Marāthī or Mārāṭhī is the vernacular form of the term Māhārāṣṭrī, the Prakrit language of the Province of Mahārāṣṭra.

Middle Way. n. The *majjhimā paṭipadā*, the Middle Way (or the Middle Path) described by the Buddha in the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta in the Deer Park near Benares (now Sarnath). It is the avoidance of the two extremes of sensual indulgence and self mortification. The Noble Eightfold Path is the key to the Middle Path that leads to Enlightenment.

Mīmāṃsā. n. One of the six Orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. (See **nyāya**). There are two systems of Mīmāmsā. The first is called Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Karma-Mīmāmsā, or simply Mīmāmsā. The earliest text of this system now extant is by Jaimini dating from the beginning of Christian era. It professes belief in the reality of the phenomenal and a plurality of eternal souls. The school aims at rationalizing the Vedic ceremonies and upholding the authority of the Vedas, maintaining that a cause necessarily will bring a corresponding effect. There is also an elaborate epistemology supporting Vedic truths, an ethics which makes observance of Vedic ritual and practice a condition of a good and blissful life. Another Mīmamsa is called Uttara-Mīmāṃsā, better known as Vedānta (s.v.).

Moggallāna See **Mahā-maudgalyāyana**

Moggalliputta Tissa n. President of the third Council held at Aśokārāma in Pāṭaliputta (now Patna) in the reign of King Aśoka. The Theravāda tradition holds that there were a thousand monks attending, and the Council took nine months before its conclusion. After this Council, monks were sent to neighbouring countries for the propagation of the religion. Kathāvatthu, an text belonging to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, is traditionally ascribed to him. See **Abhidhamma**.

moksha n. (Sk. *mokṣa*, P. *mokkha*). Liberation from the effect of karma and the resulting *saṃsāra* or cycles of rebirth. In Hinduism, *moksha* is the freedom from rebirth by being reabsorbed in and re-identified with Brahman or the Universal Soul, which can be achieved by the firm conviction or true knowledge (*jñāna*) that one is identical and

essentially one with the ultimate reality, which is eternal, changeless, blissful, beyond good and evil, beyond pleasure and pain. The phenomenal world is declared to be only faulty perception of Māyā. In Buddhism, *mokṣa* is the freedom from the cycle of rebirths (*saṃsāra*). This can be realized by following the Eightfold Path and avoiding the two extremes. (See **Middle Way**). *Moksha* is then defined as a condition in which all pain, suffering, mental anguish, and *samsāra* have all ceased.

Mongkut, King. An active, enlightened and progressive King of Thailand from 1851-1868 A.D., who ascended to the throne after spending twenty-six years as a monk. While still a monk, he founded a stricter sect within the local Buddhist Order which aimed at reviving the practice of the Buddha (see **Dhammayuttikā**). A liberal-minded king, officially known as King Rama IV, he studied foreign creeds and took pleasure in conversing with missionaries. He was interested in the western civilization, and versatile enough to get interested in subjects of wide variety, from Latin to mathematics and astronomy. In spite of scanty astronomical data and meagre instruments available to him, his calculation on the occurrence of a total solar eclipse on August 18, 1868, the exact time of the beginning of the eclipse and the particular spot in Thailand where it could be observed, were accurate. Sir Harry Ord, Governor of Singapore, and many English and French astronomers were invited to join in the observation. Himself a good Pali scholar, he deprecated the affected use of Pali words in everyday speaking, preferring a simpler Thai basic vocabulary and style. An all-round monarch, it was he who deciphered the first Sukhothai Inscription, and started an interest in archaeological studies in Thailand. King Mongkut died at the age of sixty-four from malaria which he contracted during the trip to observe the eclipse in 1868.

Mula-Sarvāstivāda. After the Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha, his Sangha is said to have split into eighteen schools, three of which are significant: the Sthavira (P. Theravāda), the Sarvāstivāda, and the Mahāsanghika. It is within the Sarvāstivāda School that the Mūlasarvāstivāda School was formed. This school had a stronghold in the north-west of India for some centuries. The Avadāna literature of the Sarvāstivāda School seems to have based on the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivāda School, which is found in Tibetan translation.

N

Nāgārjuna n. Indian Buddhist philosopher of the second century A.D. Originally a Brahman born in South India, and there he studied the four Vedas. Tradition says that he could master the entire Tripiṭaka within three months after he took a vow of becoming a monk. He propagated Buddhism in South India with great success. Nāgārjuna was the founder of the Mādhyamika school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. His great work was the Mādhyamika-kārikā or Mādhyamika-Śāstra. The school of thought founded by him was characterized by its use of the term *śūnyatā* for a method of expounding the voidness of any concept. See **śūnyatā, Mādhyamaka, Paramārtha-satya.**

nāirātmya n. The doctrine that there is no "self", from *nir-ātma*, which is identical in meaning to *Anātman*. The doctrine may be divided into two categories: 1. *pudgala-nairātmya*. A man is made up of five *skandhas* (P. *khandha*): *rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra* and *vijñāna*. These are aggregates of a man, the compounding of which gives rise to what we conceive as an individual or a being. The Buddha holds that the whole is not more than the sum of its parts, therefore a man is devoid of that *ātman* or self which should make up the individual soul. Therefore, *nairātmya* is the doctrine of non-existence of the *ātman* or self on top of the substantiality of an individual. Everything is but the phenomenalism of the individual (*pudgala*, P. *puggala*). 2. *dharma-nairātmya*. The doctrine that there is no self or an entity in an individual beyond the elements that it is composed of. It is later extended to things in general. Existence consists of *dharmas*, things or objects. These objects are all impermanent and continually changing. Nothing can be said of them

at one moment that is not false the next. Hence, they are as unreal as the *ātman* itself. What we are experiencing therefore is nothing but the ever-changing phenomenalism of nature and everything around us.

Namu-amida-butsu n. "Homage to the Amitābha Buddha", a mantra used in the Pure Land sect (s.v.).

Namu-myo-ho-renge-kyo n."Homage to the Lotus (*renge*) of the True Law", a mantra or formula employed in the Nichiren Sect (s.v.).

Nara n. The Nara period of Japan (645-793 A.D.). Buddhism in Japan during this period was a philosophy of investigation and speculation, while the following Heian period (794-1185 A.D.) was externally eclecticism or syncretism of Shintoistic and Buddhistic ideas, and internally a unification of the theory of universal immanence.

Net of Brahma. See **Brahmajāla**.

Nichiren n. Japanese religious reformer, who founded the Nichiren Sect in 1253 A.D. The sect is an offshoot of the Tendai Sect, and is based on the teaching of Saddharmapuṇdarīka. The belief is inclined towards being mystical, the name of the scripture has mantric power, and by meditating on the formula *Namu-myo-ho-renge-kyo* and repeating it as an invocation with the realization that one is potentially a Buddha, the barriers of the false self are removed and enlightenment is attained. There are several million followers in Japan.

Nigaṇṭha-Nātaputta Name of the founder of Jainism. See **Jainism**.

nikāya n. a multitude, assemblage; a collection; a class, group or sect. 1. When a part of the Theravāda Canon is meant, the term Nikāya stands for any major part of the Sutta-Piṭaka. This Sutta-Pitaka consists of five nikāyas, namely, Dīgha-nikāya, Majjhima-nikāya, Aṅguttara-nikāya, Saṇyutta-nikāya and Khuddaka-nikāya. 2. In Thailand, the Buddhist ecclesiastical organization is divided into two Nikāyas or groups. The larger group is called the Mahānikāya, the majority group, whereas the smaller group, founded by King Mongkut, is called Dhammayuttikanikāya, lit. the group of strict adherence to Dharma. See **Dhammayuttikā**.

nimitta n. A sign, mark, token, omen; cause. As one of the technical terms of the Buddhist system of ecstatic meditation, *nimitta* is the first sign of mental illumination produced by the successful exercise of *kammaṭṭhāna*. In the *kasina-kammaṭṭhāna* it is said to be established when the coloured circle is seen equally well with the eyes open and shut, the phenomenon of the circle seen with the eyes closed being the *nimitta*, sign or indication that supernatural illumination is attained. In the *ānāpānasati-kammatthāna* the monk with his eyes closed sees a form as of a star or gem or cloud or garland, etc. (Childers).

Nirmānakāya see **Trikāya**.

Nirvāna (P. *nibbāna*) n. The ultimate goal of Buddhist endeavour, the release from the limitations of existence. The normal existence is fraught down with the three characteristics of life, namely, *dukkha, aniccatā* and *anattā* (i.e. suffering, impermanence and non-self, (see **ti-lakkhana**)). Liberation from the three characteristics of existence is then the goal, but it is difficult to achieve because of the active functioning of the law of karma and the unending *samsāra* or cycle of rebirths. This *samsāra* of an individual is normally unending because of the inexhaustible fuel, that is, thirst or *tanhā* (Sk. *tṛṣ-ṇā*) inherent in the uncontrolled human nature. If *taṇhā* is extinguished, *samsāra*, being devoid of fuel, stops, which means that Nirvāna is attained. Nirvāna is therefore attainable in this life by right aspiration, purity of life and elimination of all thirsts and egoism. One who has attained to this state is called an arhat, and at the death of his physical body attains complete or final Nirvāna in which all attributes relating to phenomenal existence cease. The Theravāda School tends to view Nirvāna as escape from life by overcoming its attractions; the Mahāyāna views it as fruition of life, the unfolding of the infinite possibilities other innate Buddha-nature and exalts the arhat who remains in touch with living mankind than those who relinquishes all connection with it.

No-self See **anattā, nairātmya**.

nyāya n. One of the six orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. The six systems are Mīmāṃ-sā, Vedānta, Sānkhya, Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśe-ṣika. Nyāya is held by tradition to be founded by Gautama, otherwise called Akshapāda. The date

of the founder is not certain. It is a science of reasoning and epistemology founded in an atmosphere of Indian speculation how to accomplish the practical aims of life. As a doctrine of logical realism, the four sources of valid knowledge or truth are direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), testimony (*śabda*), inference (*anumāna*) and comparison (*upamāna*), and the objective world is conceived independent of thought and mind.

O

Olcott, Col. Henry Steele, (1832-1907), American theosophist. Studied occult science under Madame Blavatsky in 1874. A year later, he was the co-founder, with her, of the Theosophical Society in New York and was the first president of the Society. An energetic gentleman, he travelled with her and made "converts" in India and Ceylon (1879-1884). After exposure of Madame Blavatsky's frauds in 1884, he devoted to developing the Theosophical Society alone on legitimate basis.

He lectured widely in India, Ceylon and Japan, and opened many schools in India for the "Untouchables".

P

pācittiya n. An offence in the conduct specified for monks. See **āpatti**.

Padma-sambhava n. The "Lotus-Born", a native of North India. See **Lamaism**.

Pahlevi (also spelled Pahlavi). An Iranian language spoken and written in Persia from about the third to the tenth century A.D. The name is often restricted to the literary language of the Zoroastrian books, written *ca.* 224-651 A.D. They are the commentaries on the Avestan texts which dated back to the eighth century B.C. See **Avesta.**

paññā (P.) n. Wisdom. See **prajñā**.

pārājika n. The most serious class of offences committed by a monk in Theravāda Buddhism. See **āpatti**.

paramārtha-satya (P. *paramattha-Sacca*). The real truth, truth in the highest sense of the word, viz. an absolute truth or reality, not one that merely passes for truth among mankind. In Mādhyamaka-kārikā, a celebrated Mahāyāna text by Nāgārjuna, two distinct kinds of truth are (1) apparent truth (*saṃvṛtisatya)*, and (2) real truth (*paramārthasatya*). The world appears to be real, but the appearance is an illusion, as empty as a dream; yet we must live in it and in practice take it as real. The actual truth that all things are empty, seems to us to be folly, but it is the final truth, the *paramārtha-satya* of the world; and only when we rise to the wisdom of the Buddhas, we shall see its truth. Thus we need not hope to find the truth by intellectual activity, but must strive to hear the silence which is neither affirmation nor denial. Nāgārjuna's system is called Mādhyamaka or Mādhyamika (lit. "middle"), because its leading idea, "All things are empty, *śūnya*", takes the middle course between existence and non-existence. See **Mādhyamaka, Nāgārjuna**.

pāramitā, pārami n. Perfection, highest state, completeness. In Theravāda Buddhism, the term *dasa-pāramī*, the Ten Perfections, is often mentioned. They are the perfect exercise of the ten principal virtues to be fulfilled by a Bodhisattva as a condition of his reaching Buddhahood. These virtues are : liberality, morality, abnegation of the world and self, wisdom, energy, patience, truth, resolution, kindness and equanimity (P. *dāna-*, *sīla-*, *nekkhamma-*, *paññā-*, *viriya-*, *khanti-*,*sacca-*, *adhiṭṭhāna-*, *mettā-* and *upekkhā*

-*pāramī*). In Mahāyāna Buddhism, six *pāramitās* are required of the aspirant for Nirvāna: *dāna*, *śīla*, *kṣānti*, *vīrya*, *dhyāna* and *prajñā* (liberality, morality, patience, energy, concentration and wisdom).

piṇḍapāta n. lit. Food received in the alms-bowl of a Buddhist monk. It is also used as a term for a Buddhist monk going on his rounds to collect food from the Buddhist community early in the morning, and eat it after coming back to the monastery. A Theravāda monk may eat once or twice a day, but only from sunrise to noon. In a country like Thailand, once a monk sits down to eat, he must not get up from his seat until he has finished his meal.

piṭaka n. Originally, the term means basket (where things can be stored or kept). The term has now acquired the sense of the Pali Canonical Scriptures of Buddhism. There are three large sections of the Piṭaka, namely the Vinaya Pitaka (Collection or Code of Disciplines), the Sutta Pitaka (Collection of Discourses), and the Abhidhamma Pitaka (Books on Higher *dhammas* or Metaphysics).

prajñā (Sk., P. *paññā*) n. Wisdom. In Theravāda Buddhism, *paññā* (wisdom) constitutes the third and highest level of the Buddhist life, the other two being *sīla* (morality) and *samādhi* (meditation). Wisdom referred to in this connection is specifically Buddhist. It consists of direct apprehension of transcendent truths concerning nature of world and human existence, which must at first be accepted in faith, but with intention of verifying these transcendent truths for oneself, experientially. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, *prajñā* is one of the two pillars of its teaching, the other one being *karuṇā* (compassion). A type of Sanskrit literature called *Prajñā-Pāramitā Sūtras* is devoted to the discussion of the theme of *śūnyatā* or the Void. It is the knowledge or the true comprehension of this *śūṇyatā* which is the true wisdom.

Prajñā-pāramitā n. one of the most important Mahāyāna texts. There are several versions of the text by this name, from the most lengthy one called Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, with 100,000 strophes), then an abridgment with 20,000 strophes, then the Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, with 8,000 strophes. Finally, there is again the Mahā-Prajñāpāramitā-Hṛdaya Sūtra with a few folios in length. Waddell (p.161) understands that the shortest one may be the original text.These are described as the latest discourse given by the Buddha at the Vultures' Peak (Sk. Gṛdhra-kūta, P. Gijjha-kūta) at Rājagṛha (Rājgir), and is full of extravagantly speculative doctrines. The book in the lotus which Mañjuśrī is holding is held to be the one with 8,000 strophes.

prajñapti-sat a. real only in manifestation, real only in thought, subjective, unreal. A description of unreality of matter or elements as separate ultimate existences. See **Vasubandhu, Vijñānavāda**.

prātimoksa n. The collection of the various precepts and rules contained in the *Vinaya*, beginning with the four *pārājika* (See **āpatti**) and ending with the seventy-five *sekhiyadhammas*. These precepts are recited twice a month in every monastery and individual members are invited to make confession if they have broken any of the precepts. It may be described as the code of conduct for monks.

prātimokṣa saṃvara n. Restraint according to the precepts. See **prātimokṣa**.

pratītya-samutpāda See **dependent origination**.

pratītya-samutpāda-nidāna See **dependent origination**.

Pratyeka-buddha, (P. Pacceka-Buddha). In Theravāda Buddhism, a Pacceka-Buddha is one who has attained, like a Buddha, by his unaided powers the knowledge necessary to Nirvāṇa. He is unlike an arhat, because he has attained enlightenment independently, that is, without the help of any Buddha. He is unlike a Sammāsaṃbuddha or Supreme Buddha, because he attains enlightenment without any formal prediction (*vyākaraṇa*) by any previous Buddha. He is not omniscient, and is not able to teach to others the way towards enlightenment. He is in all respects inferior to a Sammāsambuddha. The conception of a private Buddha winning the truth merely for himself is primarily in Theravāda Buddhism. Mahāyāna texts always regard a Pratyekabuddha as inferior to a Bodhisattva. In Mahāyāna texts, the Pratyekabuddhayāna, simply means Hīnayāna or Theravāda Buddhism. See **yāna**.

pravāranā n. A ceremony at the termination of the rainy season retreat. For practical reasons,

during the rainy season, a monk is not permitted to travel or to stay away overnight from his monastery unless necessary. It is called *vassāvāsa* or the rainy season retreat and lasts from the first day after the full-moon day of *Āsāḷha*-month (Sk. *Āṣāḍha*) to the first day after the full-moon day of *Assayuja*-month (Sk. *Āśvina*).

Pudgalavāda n. A Buddhist sect which appeared about two hundred years after the death of the Buddha. Vatsiputra, a Brahman who had been converted to Buddhism put forward the theory that while the *anattā* (*anātman*) doctrine denied existence of an enduring individual soul, nevertheless something endured, and this was the *pudgala*, or person, or individual. He claimed that the Buddha in his discourses had made use of notion of *pudgala* and had thus indicated real existence of the person. Vatsiputra claimed that without enduring entity which transmigrated from existence to existence, there could be no proper basis for retributive justice operating through karma; hence incentive to responsible moral action was lost. The majority of Buddhist monks disagreed, pointing out that the use of the term *pudgala* in the discourses was merely concession to everyday usage They argued that the admission of such a view meant the reappearance of the rejected *ātman*, under another name. The literature of the sect is virtually non-existent.

pudgala-nāirātmya See **nāirātmya**.

Pure Land School. The Buddhist School founded in China as White Lotus Sect by Hui-Yuan (*ca.* 400 A.D.), and introduced into Japan by Honen (1133-1211 A.D.). Hui-Yuan and his successors accepted the orthodox Buddhist teaching that life is suffering governed by karma and rebirth, they also believed in the multiplicity of the Mahāyānist Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. The sacred text of the school are the long and the short Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtras which teach that faith and devotion in Amitābha Buddha will ensure the devotees rebirth in the Pure Land, the Sukhāvatī Paradise, where the attainment of Nirvāṇa is certain. The School is called Jōdo-shu in Japan, and sometimes referred to as Sukhāvatī School. Sukhāvati is translated as the Land of Bliss, or Pure Land. The Shin-shu Sect, founded by Honen's disciple Shinran, carries the idea of Buddha's grace further. Faith became the sole requisite to salvation, which could be gained by merely repetition of the Mantra "Namu Amida Butsu - Adoration to the Buddha Amida."

R

Rāhula n. The only son of Gautama Buddha. He was born on the day on which his father left the household life. When the Buddha visited King Suddhodana's palace for the first time after his Enlightenment, Rāhula's mother sent Rāhula to the Buddha and and asked for his inheritance. The Buddha gave him no answer, but left the palace after his meal. Rāhula followed him and repeated his request, until at last the Buddha asked Sāriputta to ordain him Rāhula was very obedient and eager to receive instruction from the Buddha. He was taught not only the theory, but also the practice of meditation. He finally became an arahant. The Buddha declared him to be foremost among his disciples who were anxious of training. He passed away into Nirvāna before the Buddha's Parinirvāna.

Rāmāyaṇa The oldest of the the Sanskrit epic poems, probably composed about the fifth century B.C. Tradition holds that it was written by the sage Vālmīki, narrating the adventures of Rāma, who was deprived of his rightful throne in the city of Ayodhyā and banished into the wilderness for a period of fourteen years by his father, who had to fulfil a promise which he had previously given to one of his wives. Rāma went to live in the forest together with his beautiful and faithful wife Sītā, and his loyal half-brother Lakshman (Sk. Lakṣmana). His wife was carried away by Rāvaṇa, the demon king of Lankā. With hosts of monkeys as allies, Rāma proceeded to Lanka and a great war ensued, in which Rāvaṇa was killed, and Sītā recovered. At the end of the term of his banishment he returned to his capital Ayodhyā and was

welcomed by all. Hindu tradition holds that Rāma was actually an Avatāra of Viṣṇu, the Protector God of the universe.

Rigveda The oldest literature of India, probably existing in the present form from about 1500 to 1000 B.C. It is polytheistic, with Indra and Agni as the most prominent gods - primarily personification of natural phenomena. Thus Indra is the protector god who fights against the demon of drought, Agni is the god of fire, Sūrya is the sun, Ushas the goddess of Dawn, the Maruts the gods of the wind, etc. Its cosmogony that the world originates from water is the source of many later speculative Sanskrit texts. A hymn on Puruṣa (RV.10.90) is also the seed of the idea which develops into the impersonal Ātman or Brahman of the Upanishads.

Rinzai n. Name of a Meditation School (Zen, Ch'an) founded in Japan by Eisai in 1191.

S

Sad-dharma-puṇḍarika Sūtra n. "The Lotus of the True Law". One of the most important Mahāyāna texts, dating probably from 200 A.D. and is the sacred text of the Nichiren sect in Japan. The original work contains the heart of Mahāyāna teaching. Chapters 21 to 26 of the version we now have are very likely of later origin. Gautama the Buddha is represented in this text almost as an omnipotent God, who controls the universe and all the creatures. He himself dwells continually in infinite glory. See **Lotus Sūtra**.

samaṇa (Sk. *śramaṇa*) n. An ascetic. The term is applied equally to a Buddhist monk or a recluse of other faith. The Buddha was often called by these unbelievers "*samaṇa* Gotamo" or simply "*samaṇa*". In Pali, the term *samaṇa* is often compounded with *brāhmaṇa*, and the compound then covers both Buddhist monks and the Brahmans.

sāmaṇera (Sk. *śrāmaṇera*) n. A novice. In Theravāda Buddhism, a man or a boy of the age of eight or older can receive the *pabbajjā* (Sk. *pravrajyā*) ceremony and become a *sāmaṇera* or novice. He will be under the tutorship of a monk, and his moral conduct is governed by ten precepts. He will go on rounds in the morning to receive alms and food from the lay disciples of the community, and spend his time studying the Buddhist scripture. A man who would like to join the Order as a *bhikṣu* is required to receive the *pabbajjā* ceremony and become a novice first. If he is qualified to become a monk, his spiritual preceptor may proceed to give him the *upasampadā* whereby he becomes a *bhikṣu* immediately, or after a lapse of some time. A *sāmaṇerī* (Sk. *śrāmaṇerī*) is a female *sāmaṇera*, now not permitted in the Buddhist Sangha.

samatha n. See **vipassanā**.

Sambhoga-kāya See **Tri-kāya**.

saṃyojana n. In a religious sense, *saṃyojana* is the bond of human passion which binds man to continued existence, and the removal of which is obtained when one gains entrance into the Paths (P.*magga*). The ten bonds or fetters are: 1. *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* (Sk. *svakāya-dṛṣṭi*), the belief in personality or individuality, 2. *vicikicchā* (Sk. *vicikitsā*), skeptical doubt, 3. *sīlabbata-parāmāsa* (Sk. *śīla-vrata-parāmarśa*), the clinging to mere rules and ritual, 4. *kāmarāga*, sensuous craving, 5. *vyāpāda*, ill-will, 6. *rūparāga*, craving for fine-material existence, 7. *arūparāga*, craving for immaterial existence, 8. *māna*, conceit, 9. *uddhacca*, restlessness, lack of seriousness of mind, uncontrollable and unsteady thinking, (the Pali form apparently corresponds to Sk. *auddhatya*, arrogance, but the Sk. sense is not applicable here. 10. *avijjā* (Sk. *avidyā*), ignorance. He who is free from 1-3 is a Sotāpanna (One who has entered the Stream to Nirvāṇa, as it were). He who, besides these three fetters, has overcome 4 and 5 in their grosser form, is called a *sakadāgāmī* or *sakidāgāmī*, a Once-returner to this sensuous world. He who is fully freed from 1-5 is an *anāgāmī*, or non-returner (to the sensuous world). He who is freed from all the ten fetters or bonds is called an arahat, who will pass directly into Nirvāṇa at the time of his physical death.

saṅgha n. The congregation of Buddhist monks. The term *saṅgha* sometimes refers to the Buddhist Order in general, but sometimes to a chapter of monks assembled for certain purpose. For instance, a monk cannot receive a *Kaṭhina* robe alone, or an ordination is ineffective if it is not conducted by a chapter of proper number of monks. Such a chapter of monks is called a *saṅgha* .

Saṅgharāja n. (P.) The chief of the Buddhist Congregation in Thailand. See **Supreme Patriarch**.

sankhāra n. (P., Sk. *saṃskāra*). There are three distinct uses of the term. 1. As a man is the sum total of five aggregates, namely, *rūpa, vedanā, saññā, sankhāra* and *viññāna* (corporeality or matter, feeling, perception, volition and consciousness), *sankhāra* is that specific aggregate of a sentient being which may be explained as the will in reaction to a stimuli. It is the conscious or unconscious manifestation of his will, or the resolution of a man in a situation, or his volition. 2. The term *sankhāra* is also used to denote that process of compounding or aggregation of parts to make up a complete sentient being which is automatic in the course of his karma in the cycle of rebirth and death. 3. The term also means an individual product of such an aggregation of the five component parts, that is, a sentient being which is an impermanent result of aggregation liable to dissolution. In this sense it is similar in meaning to the term *sankhata* (s.v.). *Sankhāra* in Sense 1 is usually limited to the discussion of the psychological interpretation and analysis of a sentient being. The second and third meanings are often overlapping in use. At a funeral ceremony in Thailand, a chapter of monks recites the following reminder stanza to the audience: "*aniccā vata saṃkhārā, uppāda-vaya-dhammino, uppajjitvā nirujjhanti, tesam vo'pasamo sukhō.*" The line-by-line translation of the above is: "Transient indeed are the aggregated beings (Sense 3). Their nature is to rise, then fall; Having arisen, they perish. The coming to rest of these (aggregations) (Sense 2 or 3) is leading to happiness."

sankhata (Sk. *saṃskṛta*) lit. put together, compounded, aggregated, refined. The word sankhata, as a noun, "the compounded thing" is often another term of *sankhāra* (Sk. *samskāra*). There are three sequential modes of any compounded thing or aggregated being (*sankhata-lakkhaṇa*): the production or birth (*jāti* or *uppāda*), the continuity or existence *(ṭhiti*), and the opposite of existence, the dissolution (*aññathatta*). We are a product of the aggregation of the five *skandha* (P. *khandha*), the aggregation of elements (*dhātu*), and the aggregation of the *āyatanas*. The nature of a compounded being or aggregated being is not only governed by the three modes above, but is also subject to the three characteristics inherent in it: *dukkha*, impermanence, and soullessness. See also **asankhata**.

Sanskrit The ancient language of India. Sanskrit belongs to the Indo-European family of languages, and is closely allied to the ancient Greek and Latin. The earliest stage of the language is found in the Rig-Veda, or the Veda of Praise, which was composed before 1000 B.C. The use of the language was limited to the elite and the upper class of the society. Pānini (4th cent. B.C.) wrote a highly sophisticated grammar of this language, which became so influential that Sanskrit from his time onward became rigid and all poets and writers conformed to his grammatical rules. The language was used in practically all academic works, such as medicine, mathematics, astronomy, astrology. Indian literature in the earlier period is always in Sanskrit. During his early years, Prince Siddhārtha (P. Siddhattha), studied Sanskrit, as was the convention of any one born in his position. All branches of knowledge during those days were taught in Sanskrit (or at least supposed to be so). After his enlightenment, however, he taught his doctrine in the language of the populace. The Buddhist schism divided Buddhism into Hīnayāna (or Theravāda) and Mahāyāna. The principal doctrine remains the same, but varies much in philosophy and other details. Pali language is used in Theravāda Buddhism nowadays in Śrī Lankā, Thailand, Burma, Laos and Cambodia. Sanskrit is used in other countries as the language of the Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Sarvāstivāda, Sarvāstivādin. A Buddhist school, which separated from Theravāda school and is regarded as constituting a transitional stage between the older and conservative school of Buddhism and Mahāyāna. The formation of the Sarvāstivāda doctrine started early, but was not evident before the Third Council held at Pātaliputra (now Patna) in the time of Aśoka (3rd cent. B.C.). The Sarvāstivādins are adherents to the

Sarvāstivāda doctrine. The Sarvāstivādins were realists. The name of the school, "Sarvāsti vāda" means "All-exists Doctrine." They asserted the existence of everything, but in the state of continual flux and restless change. The very being, whether material or spiritual, did not cease -- it went on becoming, in contrast with the Theravāda theory that there is no underlying reality in either matter or mind, as all dhammas are separate, instantaneous and non-continuous. There was however another interpretation, which asserted that what came under "the twelve *āyatana*s - bases of cognition" could be real, thus the existence of past, present and future were real things (*dravyatā, dravya-sat*). It is this second interpretation that the Theravādins vehemently rejected in the Council.

sati-paṭṭhāna n. (P.) lit. the bases of mindfulness. The name of a discourse in Sutta Piṭaka of Theravāda scriptures. A monk who is mindful (*sati* = mindfulness) sees the rise and fall of things (*dharma*) and understands the impermanence of the phenomenal world. Another discourse, also in Sutta Piṭaka, but in another section, called Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta, expounds further the four ways of directing the mind to the impurities and the impermanence of body or aggregated beings. They are: 1. *kāya*, physical structure, form, and activities; 2. *vedanā*, the emotional nature, first as bare feeling, then as having ethical implications; 3. *citta* conscious life or intelligence, considered under ethical aspects; 4. *dhamma*, considered under the five hindrances; the five aggregates (*khandha*), the six spheres of sense (*āyatana*), the seven *bhojjhanga*s, and the Four Noble Truths.

Sautrāntika A Buddhist school, originally belonging to the Theravāda. The split came when the adherents of this school refused to accept the Abhidhamma Piṭaka as being the authentic teaching of the Buddha. For them, only the Sūtras (the Sutta Piṭaka) were authoritative, and were the "end" or "final authority" of the genuine teaching. They appeared in the early part of the second century B.C., about the same time as the Sarvāstivāda school. While they admitted that there was no *ātman* or self of a being, an individual did exist. They rejected the notion found in the Theravāda Abhidhamma Piṭaka of separate, instantaneous and non-continuous elements or *dhamma*s of a sentient being, and asserted that the continuity of the individuality of a being could be possible only due to the continuous existence of the very subtle consciousness (P. *viññāna*, see **skandha**) as the basis of his life. See **Pudgalavādin**.

Shinran Shonin (Jap.) 1173-1262. Founder of the Jōdo-Shin Sect of Japan. A disciple of Hōnen (Jōdo Sect) he carried the doctrine of salvation by faith in Amida to the extreme of mere repetition of the name of Amida. He advocated the marriage of monks, and was himself married He popularized congregational worship and wrote about four-hundred hymns (*wa-san* or *gāthā*) for use at the temple services. He also wrote Kyogyo-shinshu Monrui, which deals exhaustively with the cardinal doctrines of Jōdo-Shin Buddhism. (Ch. Humphrey).

Sigālovāda Sutta n. A discourse in Dīghanikāya of the Sutta Piṭaka in which the whole domestic and social duty of a layman, according to the Buddhist point of view, is outlined. Sigāla was a young man who was in the habit of rising early and worshipping the several quarters of the earth and sky. The Buddha once met him and explained to him that there was also worship of the six quarters in Buddhism. The Buddha then taught him the six vices in conduct, the four motives of such evil action, the six channels for dissipating wealth and so on. He went on teaching him the six quarters to be honoured by performing the duties owing to them -- parents are the east, teachers the south, wife and children the west, friends and companions the north, servants and workpeople below, religious teachers and brahmans above. Sigāla finally became converted to Buddhism.

skandha n. See **khandha**.

Soṇadaṇḍa n. Name of a rich, learned and old Brahman, who lived in a royal domain given to him as royal fief by King Bimbisāra. He visited the Buddha once, and at the end of the discourse, Soṇadaṇḍa expressed his appreciation of the Buddha and his doctrine and invited him and his monks to a meal. At the end of the meal Soṇadaṇḍa asked the Buddha to forgive him if he, in the presence of other Brahmans, did not appropriately make humble obeisance to the Buddha, but merely saluted him.

sthavira. Sanskrit for *thera*.

Sthaviravāda lit. The Teaching of the Elders,

equal to the Pali term Theravāda. Sthaviravādins and Theravādins are terms referring to the adherents to the Theravāda or Sthaviravāda doctrine.

Suddhodana. The name of a king of Kapilavatthu, the father of Gautama Buddha.

Supreme Patriarch n. The head of the Buddhist congregation in Thailand, called in Pali '*sangharāja*'. The position is equivalent to Mahāsāṃi in other Theravāda countries. Although the ecclesiastical history in Thailand has been peaceful, the need for the Supreme Patriarch was felt from time-to-time, especially when the congregation of monks has become large enough and administration more complex. The Thai Sangharāja exercises his authority over the two Mahāyāna groups of monks in Thailand as well. The two recognized Mahāyāna groups in Thailand in the present are the Ānamma Nikāya, and the Cīna Nikāya, from Annam (now Vietnam) and China respectively.

Suttapiṭaka The second main division of the Theravāda, or Pali, Canon. Whereas the Vinayapiṭaka is the division dealing with the regulations of the Buddhist Sangha and the life of monks, the Suttapiṭaka is the collection dealing with Dhamma (Sk. Dharma) or the teaching of the Buddha in the form of dialogues, sayings and narratives, in prose as well as in verse. It consists of five major collections (P. *nikāya*), which are briefly given below. 1. Dīghanikāya (the Collection of long discourses or sermons). It consists of thirty-four independent suttas (Sk. *sūtras*) of considerable length, each of which dealing with one or more points of doctrine. It is in these suttas that ethical doctrines of the Buddha are set up controversially as against the teachings of Brahmans and other schools. 2. Majjhimanikāya (the Collection of medium *suttas* or sermons). It consists of 152 speeches and dialogues, each being somewhat shorter than those of the first collection. Almost all the points of the religion of the Buddha are discussed in this Collection, such as the Four Noble Truths, kamma (Sk. karma, or *karman*), the vanity of desires, the faulty view of the existence of individuality or of a soul, Nirvāṇa, meditation and concentration and others. Myths and legends are found related especially in the introduction of specific doctrines. Several of the sermons are tedious, but some are full of similes. 3. Saṃyuttanikāya (the Collection of grouped discourses). It consists of fifty-six groups (*saṃyutta* or *saṇyutta*) of Suttas, each of which deals with various points of the doctrine. The name of each group, however, does not refer directly to the doctrine, but serves more or less as the thread to bind the Suttas together. For example, Bhikkhunī-Saṃyutta contains ten legends of *bhikkhuṇīs* (nuns) whom Māra vainly tries to lure to apostasy. Sāriputta-saṃyutta contains a series of ten Suttas only because they are the teachings given by Sāriputta. Some of these saṃyuttas, however, may be grouped around one particular topic, such as the fifty-five suttas of the Samādhi-Saṃyutta deal with the various modes of contemplation or meditations. The virtues and vices of women (*mātugāma*) and the destinies awaiting them in the next life are dealt with in the thirty-five*suttas* of Mātugāma-saṃyutta. 4. Anguttaranikāya (the collection of sermons arranged in groups of ascending numerical order). The Suttas in this collection are numerous, and are arranged in eleven sections (*nipāta*) in such a manner that Section I treats of things of which only one exists, Section II of things of which there are two, Section III of things of which there are three, and so on. For example, in the Section of III, we find the three messengers of gods (old age, disease, and death), the three kinds of monks (one with desires, with some desires, and with no desire) and the three parts of an action or karma (physical, verbal, and mental). 5. Khuddakanikāya (the collection of smaller pieces). They are actually a group of narratives, poems and sayings on miscellaneous topics. There are altogether fourteen pieces or sub-titles. Some of the better known are the Dhammapada, the Suttanipāta, the Jātakas, Psalms of the Elders, and the Psalms of the Sisters. The teachings of the Buddha are found in these works, which are supposed to have been committed to memory verbatim from the time of the Buddha.

Śaiva n. An adherent of Śaivism.

Śāivism n. The worship of Śiva; one of the two most popular Hindu Sects in India, the other one being Vaishnavism. In Śaivism, Śiva is the Supreme Being. In theory, however, the three supreme gods of Hinduism are still worshipped, but the emphasis is on Śiva. Śiva is the Destroyer

God, who will destroy the world at the end of a world aeon. It is generally held that Śiva is not an Aryan god, but is an development from the aboriginal belief as evidenced on some of the seals of the Indus Valley Civilization.

Śākta See **Tantrism**

Śākya (P. Sākiya, Sakya, Sakka). Name of the princely family to which Gautama Buddha belonged.

Śākya-muni (P. Sākiyamuni, Sakyamuni). The Śākya sage, usually given as the epithet of Gautama Buddha.

sisya Sk. term for student.

Śiva Name of one of the three supreme gods (Brahmā, Vishnu and Śiva). See **Hinduism, Śaivism**.

śramana See **samana**.

śrāvakayāna See **yāna**.

śrāmanera See **sāmanera**.

śrāmaneri See **sāmanera**.

śūnyatā n. Nothingness, the Void. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, *śūnyatā* is one of the most important terms. In general literature, it means "nothingness, voidness, zero-ness", but in Buddhism, it is an amplification of the term "*anātman, anattā*". Brian H. Hodgson, one of the pioneering students of Mahāyāna Buddhism, refers to *śūnyatā* and *mahāśūnyatā* as follows: "You are a little Nothing; but I am a big Nothing. There are eighteen degrees of *śūnyatā*. You are annihilated, but I am eighteen times as much annihilated as you." And the lāmas of Tibet extended the degrees of this "nothingness" to seventy. Whereas Nirvāṇa is the idealistic goal of a Theravāda Buddhist, *śūnyatā* is the idealistic means of a Mahāyānist to attain the final goal. Nirvāna cannot be absolute void, in Pali "*nibbānaṃ paraṃam sukhaṃ*" Nirvāna is supreme happiness. See **Śūnyavāda**

Śūnya-vāda A theory holding that the world is void (*śūnya*) or unreal. It is the chief doctrine of the Mādhyamika School as founded by Nāgārjuna of about second century A.D. The phenomenal world has no reality, yet the world underlying it defies description, because of our inability to grasp the real nature (*svabhāva*) of it. We know the world no more than its dependence on some other cause or causes. Nothing definite can be said about the real, it is like the apparent, as nothing, in other words, *śūnya* or void. See. **Yogācāra**,

T

taṇhā. See **trishnā**.

Tantra A late development of religious interpretation of the power of nature and of gods. In this development, Śiva's consort is called variously as Umā, Pārvatī, Gaurī, Kālī, etc. Her productive power is called *śakti*. The sect is called Śāktism, and the followers are called Śāktas. The Śāktas are worshippers of the goddess who is regarded as the energy of the god himself. Śiva is almost entirely neglected. These Śāktas are divided into right-hand Śāktas and left-hand Śāktas. The right-hand Śāktas are accepted in Hindu society, and are scarcely distinguished from other Hindus, except that they worship the goddess rather than the god. The left-hand Śāktas, on the other hand, practise their religion in secret. The left-hand Śāktas gather in the worship of this power, which is called *cakra-pūjā* (circle worship). An equal number of men and women devotees meet in secret, usually at night, and sit in a circle. The goddess to be worshipped is represented by an image or a drawing of the female organ of generation, or by a naked woman who is the wife of the leader, but the object of veneration is the female organ. The mantras or sacred formulas are recited and the worship culminates into the partaking of the five elements, namely, wine, meat, fish, cereal, and sexual intercourse. Buddhism was influenced by this left-hand Śāktism in Bengal, and it was believed that every god had a consort. The Buddha was not an exception, hence every Buddha had a consort who was endowed with mystical power. The belief was introduced into Tibet, with the result that not only a human Buddha

should have a consort, but the *Jinas* (or *Dhyāni* Buddhas), or even the *Ādi*-Buddha should have corresponding Śakti. The frightful aspect of Kālī (God Śiva's spouse) was adopted, and in the extreme form, the host of frightful beings were added to the previously decent and respectable Buddhas, such as Dharmapāla (the Defender of the Faith), the Dakinīs, who had spouses as terrible as themselves. The spouses of these fiendish Ḍakinīs are many, under the names of Kāla-Cakra, Heruka, Acala, Vajra-Vairabha etc. They are credited with powers not inferior to those of the *Dhyāni*-Buddhas themselves, ferocious and bloodthirsty, who can be conciliated by constant worship of themselves and their female energies, with offerings and sacrifices, magic circles, etc. Tāranātha, the Tibetan historian, says that Buddhist Tantras were written in the 6th century A.D. It is with the influence of the Hindu Tantrism that led to the so-called Mantra-yāna and Vajra-yāna in Buddhism. There is no hard and fast line of demarcation between the two Tantric *yānas*. Mantrayāna is the "vehicle" or yāna, in which the Mantras, words and syllables of mysterious power, are the chief means of attaining salvation. Vajrayāna is another *yāna* which leads men to salvation not only by using Mantras, but by means of all things which are denoted by the word vajra. See **Mantra, Mantrayāna, Vajra, Vajrayāna.**

Tathatā (Sk.) Suchness. A common term in Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine for the ultimate and unconditioned nature of life. In one sense it is *Śūnya* (s.v.) which is the Void, but here expressed in the positive. It is that which is expressed in all separate things, which is not different from them and which is not divided by them. It cannot be called the One as distinct from the Many, for it is not distinct from anything. Nothing can be confirmed or denied concerning it, for these are modes of expression which exclude and thereby create opposition. It can only be understood by realizing that one can neither find it by searching nor lose it by trying to separate oneself from it. Yet it has to be found. (Ch. Humphrey)

trayas-triṃśa n. (Sk.) "Thirty-three". In Buddhism, Trayas-triṃśa, or Tāvatiṃsa in Pali, is the name of a heaven reigned over by Indra. This heaven is the second of the six strata in the heaven of Sensual Sphere. The Pali names of these heavens from low to high are: as follows: Cātumahārājikā, Tāvatiṃsa, Yāmā, Tusitā, Nimmānarati and Parinimmitavasavati.

Tri-kāya n. The Mahāyāna doctrine which holds that the Absolute Buddha exists in three *kāya* (bodies) each with a distinct aspect but essentially related to each other. The doctrine is also called the Buddha-*kāya*, the Body of the Buddha. They are: (1) Dharma-*kāya* (Dharma-Body), representing the Absolute Body of the Buddha, the Buddha-*svabhāva-kāya*, the "Essential Body of the Buddha," or the Buddha-nature. It is held to be reality itself, being the immutable and functional Dharma of the limitless space and time. Being transcendental, it is above all limitations and can not be grasped by senses or by intellect. The Mādhyamaka School holds Dharmakāya to be *śūnyatā* or the Void. (2) Sambhoga-kāya, the Body of Bliss. It represents the supramundane manifestation of the Buddha-nature (Buddha-svabhāva) to the initiated elect. It is the summation of all the spiritual discipline which the Buddha chooses to make manifest to the Bodhisattvas and other religiously perfect beings. (3) Nirmāṇa-kāya, the Transformation Body. It is by this body that the Buddha chooses to remain in contact with the phenomenal existence for the benefit of man, by helping humanity on its way of pilgrimage. Thus, this Nirmāṇa-kāya is the historical manifestation of the Buddha-*svabhāva* as Gotama Buddha.

Triṃśaka-kārikā See **Triṃsikā**.

trishnā (Sk. *tṛṣṇā*, P. *taṇhā*) n. thirst, craving, longing. There are three kinds of *tṛṣṇās* which make up an important link in the Chain of Causation (Sk. *pratītya-samutpāda*, P. *paṭicca-samuppāda*): *kāma-trsnā* (P. *kāma-tanhā*), a longing for sensual fulfilment; senses include sight, taste, smell, sound and touch. The desire for fame, position or wealth, which, by its nature of being the substrate of desire, is regarded as *kāma-trsnā* or sensual desire. *bhava-trsnā* (P. *bhava-tanhā*), a clinging to existence. It is the love of life in the present existence, and also the desire to be reborn in the future. *Vibhava-tṛṣṇā* (P. *vibhava-taṇhā*), a desire not to be reborn, holding the view that birth, or existence, is attended by sufferings. Even in Pre-Buddhistic time, it was recognized that life was attended by sufferings. It was also universally held that death was a mere precursor of inevitable rebirth. Ascetics could hold in check their sensual

desires, they were not afraid of death, because they knew that life was full of all kinds of pain. They did not want rebirth, a storehouse of sufferings. They could suppress *kāmatṛṣṇā*, and *bhavatṛṣnā* as well. But it was the fear of becoming reborn again that troubles them. It is this desire not to be reborn again that is called *vibhava-tṛṣṇā* (P. *vibhava-taṇhā*), the desire for complete annihilation after death, a wrong view in strict Theravāda Buddhism, because it is this desire that binds an individual to *saṃsāra* or cycle of rebirths.

Trimśikā n. Name of a short but important text written by Vasubandhu. Its full name is Triṃśakakārikā (an explanation in thirty strophes), and is commonly called Triṃśikā (Thirty). Vasubandhu and his brother Asanga lived in the extreme northwestern town of Peshawar in Gandhāra in the second half of the fifth century A.D. Both wrote a number of works which are now the foundation of Vijñānavādin, the Doctrine of consciousness only. It has a strong mystical side. The Triṃśikā is an important text, as is evidenced by the fact that it was commented upon by ten commentators. It is the exposition of Sarvāstivāda doctrine See **Vasubandhu**.

Tri-yāna See **yāna**.

U

Upaniṣad See **Vedic**.

upasampadā n. A ceremony by which one is ordained a Buddhist monk. In the time of the Buddha, the *upasampadā* might consist of mere acceptation of the man into the Order by the Buddha, by merely saying "*ehi bhikkhu*", literally meaning "Come! O Monk!" This is a special case, however, as it could be done by no other person than the Buddha himself, and such acceptation into the Order has special name "*ehi-bhikkhu-upasampadā*." In the present, one can become a monk by going through several stages. He must be over twenty years old, free from debt, free from required service to the state, etc. He must be ready to be under the 227 rules required of a monk. In the process, he will receive the *pabbajjā* ceremony and become a *sāmanera* first. His spiritual preceptor will give him the *upasampadā* ceremony only after that.

upāsaka n. In the time of the Buddha, the Buddhist community comprised four classes of members: *bhikṣu*, *bhikṣuṇī*, *upāsaka* and *upāsikā* -- monks, nuns, lay disciples and lay female disciples. The lay disciples and lay female disciples were those who embraced Buddhism and supported the monks and nuns so that they could have time to preach the right view to the people. In the present time, there are no more nuns, and the community comprises only three classes of members. An *upāsaka* or an *upāsikā* are required to observe five or eight moral precepts (*pañcasīla* or *uposathasīla*). In Buddhist countries in South East Asia, like Thailand, many *upāsakas* and *upāsikās* voluntarily take a formal vow to observe ten precepts, *dasasīla*. These laymen and laywomen actually observe many more rules in advance of their formal ordination. Many lay women who observe ten precepts wear white robes and stay in a female residential quarters outside the proper monks' precinct.

V

Vāibhāṣika Aśoka is the patron of Theravāda Buddhism. Later it was Kanishka of the extreme northwestern India who became the patron of Sarvāstivāda school. It is from this school that the commentaries of the Tri-piṭaka were composed in Sanskrit. The commentary for the Sūtra-piṭaka was called Upadeśa, and those for the Vinaya and the Abhidharma were called Vibhāṣā. The Vibhāṣā for the Abhidharma was much studied in Kashmir in the time of Kanishka, and the philosophy based on the Vibhāṣā commentary becomes known as the Vāibhāṣika. We do not know much about the

Vaibhāṣika system. The Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu, together with its commentary, gives us some idea of the controversy between the Vaibhāsika and the Sautrāntika.

Vāirocana A *Dhyāni*-Buddha. See **Lamaism**

Vāiṣṇava The cult of Viṣṇu. It is believed that the cult or sect arose as an amalgamation of Krishna cult, Vasudeva cult, etc. The cult is centred around *bhakti* (Devotion), and the reincarnation (*avatāra*) of Viṣṇu.

vajra n. In Sanskrit, *vajra* has two important meanings. In the Veda, *vajra* is the thunderbolt, the weapon of Indra with which he defeats Vṛtra or the demon of draught. In general Sanskrit literature, *vajra* means "diamond", especially its property of being hard, impermeable and indestructible (at least it is believed that the real diamond is indestructible, only if one can be found). In Buddhism, *vajra* is used sometimes to denote *śūnyatā* or the *śūnya*, the absolute, the only reality or the void which is indescribable in the Mādhyamika school. The Yogācārins who hold that Vijñāna or consciousness is the only reality, also occasionally call it *vajra*. In Vajrayāna, that is, in the extreme Tantric Buddhism, and also among the Hindu Sāktas, *vajra* means the male organ, just as the *padma* or the lotus serves as a term to describe the female organ.

Vajrasattva n. In Vajrayāna, the extreme Tantric Buddhist sect of East India, *vajrasattva* is the supreme reality like the Paramātman or Brahman of the Upanishads. This *vajrasattva* is immanent in all beings, just like Brahman in Brāhmanism, because all men are Buddhas. See **Vajrayāna, Vajra**.

Vajrayāna n. It is the last phase of development of Buddhism. In the 4th century Yogācāra school of Buddhism arose. It emphasized practical import of meditational methods and discipline. The practice developed further with the use of sacred mantras, or formulas, which are held to be the most direct method of achieving more advanced spiritual states. In this form of Buddhism, which is called Mantrayāna, a *yāna* or vehicle which will lead to final salvation through the recitation of potent mantras or magic spells, the adherents believed in the Hindu gods and demons, in the supernatural power to be gained by Yoga and related practice. They conceived of the numerous Buddhas and Bodhisattvas like other Hindu divinities in heavens of glory and pleasure. Hindu Tantrism was actually setting the example for the degradation of Buddhism. Every Buddha and Bodhisattva has his *śakti*, or wife. The new sect became known as Vajrayāna, with the introduction of the new meaning of Vajra (See **Vajra**). The practice characteristic of the left-hand Tantra was then adopted by the new Buddhist sect, *cakra-pūjā* was imitated, and the use of magic spells, postures and diagrams were the most prominent features. The Mahāyāna Tri-kāya doctrine was modified by addition of the fourth body, the *sukha-kāya* or "the body of happiness." The *mahāsukha* (highest bliss) is attained in the ritual connected with the enjoyment of meat, intoxicating drinks, fish, postures, and sexual intercourse. Moritz Winternitz says "The Vajrayāna is a queer mixture of monistic philosophy, magic and erotics, with a small admixture of Buddhist ideas."

Vasubandhu A Buddhist writer. Born in Peshāwar, the capital city of King Kanishka of India of fourth century A.D., he entered Buddhist monkhood and wrote Abhidharmakosha which came to be considered the most authoritative treatise of Sarvastivādin School. Unfortunately the text has not come down to us in the Sanskrit original. We only know the Abhidharmakośa-Vyākhyā, a commentary by Yaśomitra on the work, and other versions in Chinese and Tibetan. A special chapter of his work is devoted to the denial of the existence of a permanent soul, and is directed against the Pudgalavādins who believe in a permanent soul. He was converted to Mahāyāna later in his life by his elder brother Asanga. He then started writing commentaries on the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra, the Mahāpari-nirvāṇa Sūtra, the Vajracchedikā-Prajñā-Pāramitā. It was also at this time that he wrote the two classical treatises on idealism, the Viṃśatikā and Triṃśikā, in which he refutes the belief in the reality of the objective world, but defends the doctrine of the reality of pure consciousness Vi-jñānamātra.

vassā-vāsa n. (P.) The rainy-season-retreat, the requirement of the Order that a monk shall stay in one monastery during the rainy season (*vassā*). During the period, a monk is forbidden to travel for practical reasons. A monk traveling during the rainy season might crush the tender springing plants and destroy crawling insects. The Buddha

hence instituted the *vassāvāsa*. During their enforced retreat the monks devote themselves to the spiritual welfare and instruction of the people. A monk after residing in a monastery for the entire season is entitled to receive a robe from the lay disciples.

Vātsīputrīya See **Pudgalavāda**.

Veda The most sacred religious literature of the Hindus, from which are developed religious beliefs of later times. There are four collections in this class of literature, namely, Rig Veda, Yajur Veda, Sāma Veda and Atharva Veda. Rig-Veda is the oldest, part of which dates back to before 1200 B.C. It is entirely in verse, where gods are praised. The gods are primarily anthropomorphized from natural phenomena, but some of the gods in the late part of the text are abstract. There are several hymns showing advanced stage of cosmological speculations, and some are philosophical. The hymns in the Sāma Veda are mostly selected from the Rig Veda to be chanted when animal sacrifices are performed. There is no allusion to human sacrifice.The Yajur Veda is a liturgical text with definite sacrificial formulas and injunctions. Explanation is also given for details of the sacrifice by resorting to myths and speculations. The book is in prose. Sacrifice is to be performed to propitiate the gods, who can grant the wish of the sacrificer if the sacred formula is meticulously performed. The Atharva Veda contains formulas which are supposed to bring in desired results if properly executed, e.g., a cure from disease, a charm to secure a lover, etc. Some orthodox Hindus do not recognize this last Veda. The first three Vedas are generally called Tri-Veda and make up a well accepted class of literature before the Atharva Veda appears. Many of the gods are corresponding to the Greek and Roman counterparts. The Greek *Zeus pater*, the Roman *Ju(p)piter*, and the Rig Vedic *Dyaus Pitar* are linguistically related. The Rig Vedic god of fire "Agni" is cognate with Latin *ignis*. It is generally accepted that the belief in the gods from natural phenomena of these three Vedas are basically Indo-European. The Atharva Veda is the youngest, probably 1000-800 B.C. Whereas the earlier three Vedas emphasize on the gods from natural phenomena, the Atharva Veda brings in the popular indigenous belief on Fertility Goddess, the charms and spells and the unseen power of nature around us.

Vedic lit. Pertaining to the Veda. As a class of religious literature, the Vedic literature comprises the four Vedas and their subsidiary texts, namely, the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads. It is the collection called the Upanisads (often spelled Upanishads) that is the foundation of the Hindu systems of religious philosophy. When Vedic is used alone, it may mean the literature, or its period of composition, or the belief which can either mean the old belief found in the Vedas ofr the later and highly philosophical belief of the Upanishads. The Buddha received his education from several Hindu teachers who taught him the Upanishads. The old Upanishads teach that the world has a soul, called Brahma, or Ātman (or Paramātman, or Adhyātman). This soul is non-material, and is beyond ordinary understanding by the uninitiated. It is from this soul of the world, or of this universe, that everything emanates. We, human beings, as well as everything besides, are a part of this Ātman. Thus, we have a soul, a definite existence in this world. After dissolution, or death, our souls should return to the supreme Ātman, but due to the operation of our own free will, the souls are bound to our own acts, or karma, which becomes a bond binding us to the worldly existence. Because of this that transmigration of souls arises in Hinduism. The Buddha rejects the idea of the existence of the soul, and formulates his theory of *pratītya-samutpāda* (P. *paṭicca-samuppāda*).

Vesak See **Visākhā**

Vibhajjavāda n. Name of a Theravāda Sect in the time of King Aśoka. It is the Canon of this school which was compiled during the nine-month session of the Council of Pāṭaliputra (modern Patna) in the time of King Aśoka. The Elder Tissa, (commonly called Tissa Moggalliputta), was the president of the Council. He also composed the Kathāvatthu for refutation of heretical sects. See next.

Vibhajyavāda n. An early school of Buddhism. It is mentioned in the Chinese Canon. Literally, it means one who distinguishes or discriminates, referring specially to a method of philosophical discussion. The term is Sanskrit, and it corresponds exactly to the Pali term Vibhajjavāda, and may refer to the one and same school of Buddhism at that time.

vijñāna n. Consciousness, one of the five aggregates (P. *khandha*, Sk. *skandha*).

Vijñaptimātravāda n. The doctrine that nothing but consciousness (*vijñāna* or *vijñapti*) is real. See **Vasubandhu**.

Vijñāna-vāda See **Yogācāra**.

vinaya In Buddhism, Vinaya means code of conduct, discipline and regulations on the behaviour of individuals. As a collection, it is the name of a principal portion of the Buddhist Canon, Vinaya-piṭaka, which deals with the proper behaviour of the members of the Buddhist community: *bhiksus*, *bhiksunis*, *upāsakas* and *upāsikās* (monks, nuns, laymen, and laywomen). The Vinaya or the code of behaviour contains 227 rules for monks, 311 rules for nuns, and eight for laymen and laywomen. The minimum number of rules required by a Buddhist layman is five, called *pañcasīla*, or Five Precepts. There are however Buddhist laymen who voluntarily observe Eight Precepts (*uposathasīla*). Above these, there are devout laymen who voluntarily observe the Ten Precepts which are usually required for a novice (P. *sāmanera*). They are called *dasasīla-upāsakas*. The minimum Five Precepts are:

1. I undertake not to take away any life;
2. I undertake not to take what is not given me;
3. I undertake not to commit adultery;
4. I undertake not to tell lies;
5. I undertake not to take any intoxicating drinks.

vinayadhara n. One who is versed in the Vinaya-Piṭaka. In Thailand, the term is a position or rank the holder of which has the authority to give decision and pass final judgment if a monk has violated an established rule. See **bhikṣu**.

vipassanā n. Intuitive vision. Vipassanā is produced by the successful exercise of concentration meditation (*samādhi*), and is an indication that one is on the right path to arhatship. The term is also used for a Buddhist system of meditation practised in many Theravāda monasteries, especially the *satipaṭṭhāna*, the system of developing "right mindfulness -- *sammāsati*. Another term *samatha* (tranquility, cessation), is often mentioned together with the term *vipassanā* as attributes of the Arhat of Theravāda School. There are two orders of arhats, the *sukkhavipassaka* and the *samathayānika*. The *sukkhavipassaka* is so called because he attains enlightenment by contemplating the dry facts of physical and moral phenomena until his passions dry up. The *samathayānika*, on the other hand, by complete control of his mind with true knowledge, is superior.

Viṣṇu One of the three Hindu supreme gods. Hinduism holds that there are three supreme gods, viz. Brahmā the creator, Viṣṇu the protector, and Śiva the destroyer. Brahmā creates the universe, which is not permanent, but deteriorates as time passes. Viṣṇu guards the universe against Satanic powers. After a great aeon (*kalpa*, a 'world's age) of continuous deterioration, morality sinks to the bottom and Śiva will appear to destroy the entire universe. The cycle, i.e. creation, protection and destruction, will then repeat itself. See **Brahmā** and **Śiva**.

Visākhā The chief among the female lay disciples (*upāsikā*) of the Buddha, who declared her to be foremost among those who ministered to the Order. She became a Sotāpanna after visiting the Buddha. Being from a wealthy family and married to a wealthy husband, she had a large residential quarter built in Pubbārāma Park outside the eastern gate of Sāvatthī and donated it to the Buddha.

Visākha n. Name of a Lunar month, corresponding roughly to May-June. It is on the full moon day of the Viśākha month that Siddhattha Gotama was born, attained enlightenment and passed away into Parinirvāna.

W

War against Kalinga: Kalinga is identified as the modern Orissa in the southeast of India. It is recorded in Aśoka's Rock Edict XIII atShahbazga rhi (in the North) that "One hundred and fifty thousand persons were taken away captive, one hundred thousand were there slain, and many times that number perished The number may be an exaggeration, but it should be indicative of the

extremely heavy loss by the Kalinga King. It was his own sense of remorse that led Aśoka to become a Buddhist convert and strict adherent to the principle of *ahiṃsā* or Non-injury.

Wesak n. (P. Vesākha, Sk. Vaiśākha). A lunar month corresponding to April-May. It was on the full moon day of this month that Prince Siddhārtha was born, then on the same day thirty-five years later gained enlightenment and became the Buddha and on the same day forty-five years after his enlightenment that he passed into Parinirvāṇa. The full-moon day of this Vaiśākha month is celebrated in all Buddhist countries.

Y

yāna n. Literally, vehicle, carrier, way. By extension, the term *yāna* in Buddhism means the two or three vehicles or doctrines which will lead the followers to salvation. The two most often used *yānas* are Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. Hīnayāna literally means narrow or small vehicle, whereas Mahāyāna means great vehicle. The names are coined by the Mahāyāna followers, implying that Hīnayāna Buddhism can lead a very small number of followers to Nirvāṇa, while Mahāyāna Buddhism aims at leading total humanity to Nirvāṇa, hence the terms *hīna* and *mahā*, (small and large). As the term *hīna* also means low, based, inferior, the followers of the Hīnayāna Buddhism often decline to accept the term Hīnayāna, but show strong preference to use the term Theravāda, the Doctrine of the Elders, (Sk. Sthavira-vāda) instead. Hīnayāna Buddhism is that which is current in Thailand, Sri Lanka, Burma, Laos and Cambodia, and employs Pali as the official language of its Ṭipiṭaka (or Tepiṭaka, or Tripitaka), or Canon. Mahāyāna Buddhism employs Sanskrit and/or the vernacular speech as the official language, and is prevalent in other Buddhist countries such as Tibet, Nepal, Japan, China, and Mongolia. Both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna agree that existence in the world such as the present one is fraught with sufferings, and the means to be released permanently from these sufferings is to follow the teaching of the Buddha. Hīnayāna Buddhists usually look up to the Buddha as lofty and remote, and as a rule are contented with the attainment of of Bodhi and then Nirvāna for themselves through the guidance offered by the Buddha. To follow the teaching of the Buddha is to become his disciple, his *sāvaka* (Sk. *śrāvaka*). This gives rise of the term *śrāvaka-yāna*, as called by the Mahāyānists. Hīnayāna Buddhism also speaks of the Pacceka Buddha, a Buddha who attains enlightenment through his own effort, with no assistance from any other Buddha. He has one limitation, that is, he cannot teach others to attain the same goal. This is called the Pratyeka Buddha-yāna by the Mahāyānists. Thus the Hīnayāna doctrine is sometimes spoken of as *Dvi-yāna*, the doctrine which offers two alternatives, either the Śrāvaka-yāna or Pratyeka-yāna. Mahāyāna Buddhism, on the other hand, holds the theory that each individual has the Bodhicitta, that mental attitude which aspires to Buddhahood. After the attainment of Bodhi, however, A Mahāyāna Bodhisattva chooses to renounce Nirvāṇa and remain a Bodhisattva to lead mankind to salvation. The term Buddha-yāna therefore represents here the ideal of being a Buddha and a Bodhisattva. The goal is but one (*eka*), and can be called either Buddha-yāna, Tathāgata-yāna, Bodhisattva-yāna or Eka-yāna.Speaking of both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism, the *yāna* are three: Śrāvaka-yāna, Pratyeka-yāna, and Buddha-yāna. Thus we have the term Tri-yāna. Another *yāna* was developed in India during the period 500-1000 A.D., influenced to the extreme by Tantric Hinduism. It employs sacred chants, mantra, ritualism, mysticism, and symbolism, and is known as Vajrayāna or Mantrayāna. This is outside the usual reference to Tri-yāna or any of the other *yānas* explained above. Farquhar says of this movement "...a disastrous revolution ... it was repudiated by the best school of the parent faith."

Yoga n. One of the six orthodox philosophical systems of India. There have been suggestions that Yoga practice existed in the Indus Valley civilization, as proven by the figure of a man in a posture similar to that employed in Yoga practice of India later on. It is characterized by emphasis on self control and meditation. There are two systems of Yoga proper, the Haṭha Yoga and Rāja Yoga, although the practice of the two systems are overlapping. The Haṭha Yoga concentrates on the posture and control of the physical body whereas the Rāja Yoga on meditation and contemplation with the view to develop the inner powers. Asceticism is pronounced in Yoga practice. A man who practice Yoga is called a *yogī,* and a woman is called a *yoginī.*

Yogācāra An idealistic school of Mahāyāna, also known as Vijñānavāda. The *vijñāna* or consciousness alone is real, whereas objects of consciousness are not. It is therefore subjective idealism. We never know the world apart from the form it has in our consciousness, which is alone essential to it. The phenomenal universe is the expression of the essence of mind in eternal evolution. According to the School, occurrence of "illusion" demonstrates that con. ciousness can have "content, with no corresponding object outside", a proof of the "self-contained nature of consciousness." The School was founded by Asanga, the elder brother of Vasubandhu. In practice, it puts emphasis on Yoga as well as *ācāra* or ethical conduct.

yogī See **Yoga**.

yoginī See **Yoga**.

Z

Zen (Jap., Ch. Ch'an, Sk. *dhyāna*) A Chinese and Japanese school of Buddhism which has been described as the revolt of the Chinese mind against the Buddhism of India. It evolved from the teaching of Bodhidharma, the 28th patriarch of Buddhism, who came to China in A.D. 520.

The name Zen is derived from Sanskrit *dhyāna*, usually translated as "meditation". This, however, gives an erroneous conception of the meaning of Zen, which cannot be confined to any particular practice. Although sitting meditation (*za-zen*) is practised in Zen monasteries as a part of Zen training, it is not meditation in the Indian sense of the word. Posture used is similar to that used for Yoga, but the breathing control is different, and the mind is concentrated on a koan, a problem in non-sensical language which cannot be solved by the intellect.

III

Index

SUBJECT INDEX

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

INDEX OF PALI AND SANSKRIT TERMS

IV

Background to the Conference Organizers: The Dhammakaya Foundation

Inner peace is the primary factor in the development of lasting peace amongst the peoples of the world. Inner peace can be attained through a lifestyle of purity, generosity, social responsibility and teamwork together with devotion to the practice of meditation — a lifestyle traditionally known as 'Dhamma' practice.

Creating inner peace is the primary objective of the Dhammakāya Foundation, a non-profit religious organization founded in 1970 and based at the Buddhist temple of Wat Phra Dhammakāya, Patumthani in Thailand. The Dhammakāya Foundation was established with the objectives to perpetuate and propagate the tradition of Dhammakāya meditation in Thailand and abroad.

The word 'Dhammakāya' means the body of enlightenment or Buddha nature. The Dhammakāya in the form of a crystal-clear living Buddha is situated in the purest recess of the mind of every living being at a point at the centre of the body. Dhammakāya meditation is any method of meditation by which Dhammakāya can be attained. The method used by the Dhammakāya Foundation has refined the technique so that simply allowing the mind to come to a standstill, naturally, without force or the use of conceptual thought can be applied universally all the way from beginning to the attainment of *arahant*-hood. The experience of Dhammakāya is thus very central to the teaching of the Lord Buddha.

The Dhammakāya meditation technique is believed to have existed during the time of the Lord Buddha (explaining how He could have attained Buddhahood) but the essence of the technique was lost approximately five-hundred years after the Buddha's Parinirvāṇa. Fragments of the teaching were passed down and remain partially preserved in some ancient manuals of Thai meditation. Apart from this, the word 'Dhammakāya' exists in name in the Buddhist scriptures of the Theravāda and Mahāyāna schools. It was only through the unyielding determination of a Thai monk Phramonkolthepmuni (Sodh Candasaro), who dissatisfied with the results of other meditation techniques available at the time, staked his life in meditation in 1916 to find some part of the Truth known to the Lord Buddha. He attained the Dhammakāya inside, thereby re-assembling the fragments of a teaching passed down for generations but never understood. This was the rediscovery of the Dhammakāya tradition and Phramonkolthepmuni devoted the rest of his life to teaching and researching within this tradition from his temple, Wat Paknam Bhasicharoen in Bangkok.

After his passing Phramonkolthepmuṇi's leading disciple, the nun Kuhn Yay Upāsika Jan Kohn·nok·yung began to teach meditation to a group of dedicated students. The meditation group expanded to exceed the capacity of the land available at Wat Paknam thus in 1970, the group established a meditation centre on eighty acres of donated land in Patumthani province. The centre eventually became a temple under the auspices of the Dhammakāya Foundation and Phrasudharmayanathera (Chaibul Dhammajayo), the leading disciple of Kuhn Yay Acharn as abbot and president of the Dhammakāya Foundation. His colleague Phrabhavanaviriyakuhn (Phadet Dattajīvo) undertook the duties of vice-abbot and vice-president.

The Dhammakāya tradition encompasses the Buddhist ideals of both Theravāda and Mahāyāna schools. The Dhammakāya tradition if practised at low-level (individually) can lead ultimately to individual salvation (*arahant*-hood) as found in the other Buddhist traditions of the Theravāda school. If advanced Dhammakāya meditators meditate together as a team, doing high-level research into the nature of the being, the Dhammakāya tradition can lead ultimately to the salvation of all living beings, as found in the Bodhisatva vows of the Mahāyāna School. The blend of these two levels of practice, the former of which contains religious ceremonies and the latter of which is almost devoid of ceremony can explain why Dhammakāya culture is as a chameleon, adapting to the cultural context in which it finds itself, without difficulty and without losing its essence. The Dhammakāya tradition is practised by many temples in Thailand and is not considered heterodox by most Thai Buddhists.

The heart of the Dhammakāya tradition is the quiet contemplative lifestyle. To keep such a lifestyle accessible and relevant to the needs and expectations of those living in modern society, however, the Dhammakāya Foundation sees no contradiction in developing the use of media, modern educational techniques and administration to serve the increasingly large sector of society seeking for inner refuge. Besides meditation teaching, the Dhammakāya Foundation offers youth activities, pastoral care, scriptural research and study. Through these activities and the inspiring self-sacrifice of the founding pioneers of the tradition, nearly a thousand young people have been moved to devote their lives to monastic ordination or voluntary work within the Dhammakāya community. Part-time volunteers in the temple number many thousand and the congregation attending religious ceremonies at the temple has been known to reach 100,000.

The work of the Dhammakāya Foundation, bringing peace to the world through inner peace, is no small task. It may take the work of many lifetimes. The popularity of the tradition, is both an asset and a burden, making necessary many cautious changes of methodology and administration style. None of these changes, however, have deviated the devotees' from the aim set out two generations before by Phramonkolthepmuni, to bring all living beings to the salvation of Nirvāṇa.

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